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NFW LIBRARY EDITION 



THE 

NAVAL WAR OF 1812 



OR THE 

History of the United States Navy during the last 

WAR WITH Great Britain, to which is appended 

AN account of the Battle of New Orleans 



BY 



THEODORE ROOSEVELT 



two volumes in one 
part I 



G. p. PUTNAM'S SONS 

new YORK AND LONDON 

^be ftntckerbocker predd 



wv 



^ " 3 6 o 

-It ^6 



Copyright, 1882 

by 

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 



Copyright, 1910 

BY 

THEODORE ROOSEVELT 
(In renewal of copyright originally registered in 1882.) 



Made in the United States of America 



/ 



L7 



PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION 

1 ORIGINALLY intended to write a companion 
volume to this, which should deal with the 
operations on land. But a short examination 
showed that these operations were hardly worth 
serious study. They teach nothing new; it is 
the old, old lesson, that a miserly economy in 
preparation may in the end involve a lavish outlay 
of men and money, which, after all, comes too 
late to more than partially offset the evils pro- 
duced by the original short-sighted parsimony. 
This might be a lesson worth dwelling on did it 
have any practical bearing on the issues of the 
present day; but it has none, as far as the army 
is concerned. It was criminal folly for Jefiferson, 
and his follower Madison, to neglect to give us a 
force either of regulars or of well-trained volun- 
teers during the twelve years they had in which 
to prepare for the struggle that any one might 
see was inevitable ; but there is now far less need 
of an army than there was then. Circumstances 
have altered widely since 1812. Instead of the 
decaying might of Spain on our southern frontier, 

we have the still weaker power of Mexico. In- 

iii 



''JT 



iv Preface to Third Edition 

stead of the great Indian nations of the interior, 
able to keep civiHzation at bay, to hold in check 
strong armies, to ravage large stretches of terri- 
tory, and needing formidable military expeditions 
to overcome them, there are now left only broken 
and scattered bands which are sources of annoy- 
ance merely. To the north we are still hemmed 
in by the Canadian possessions of Great Britain; 
but since 1812 our strength has increased so pro- 
digiously, both absolutely and relatively, while 
England's military power has remained almost 
stationary, that we need now be under no appre- 
hensions from her land-forces ; for, even if checked 
in the beginning, we could not help conquering in 
the end by sheer weight of numbers, if by nothing 
else. So that there is now no cause for our keep- 
ing up a large army ; while, on the contrary, the 
necessity for an efficient navy is so evident that 
only our almost incredible short-sightedness pre- 
vents our at once preparing one. 

Not only do the events of the war on land teach 
very Httle to the statesman who studies history 
in order to avoid in the present the mistakes of 
the past, but besides this, the battles and cam- 
paigns are of very little interest to the student of 
military matters. The British regulars, trained 
in many wars, thrashed the raw troops opposed 
to them whenever they had anything like a fair 
chance; but this is not to be wondered at, for 



Preface to Third Edition v 

the same thing has always happened the world 
over under similar conditions. Our defeats were 
exactly such as any man might have foreseen, 
and there is nothing to be learned from the follies 
committed by incompetent commanders and un- 
trained troops when in the presence of skilled 
officers having under them disciplined soldiers. 
The humiliating surrenders, abortive attacks, and 
panic routs of our armies can be all paralleled 
in the campaigns waged by Napoleon's marshals 
against the Spaniards and Portuguese in the years 
immediately preceding the outbreak of our own 
war. The Peninsular troops were as little able 
to withstand the French veterans as were our 
militia to hold their own against the British regu- 
lars. But it must always be remembered, to our 
credit, that while seven years of fighting failed to 
make the Spaniards able to face the French,' two 
years of warfare gave us soldiers who could stand 
against the best men of Britain. On the northern 
frontier we never developed a great general, — 
Brown's claim to the title rests only on his not 
having committed the phenomenal follies of his 

' At the closing battle of Toulouse, fought between the 
allies and the French, the flight of the Spaniards was so 
rapid and universal as to draw from the Duke of Wellington 
the bitter observation, that "though he had seen a good 
many remarkable things in the course of his life, yet this was 
the first time he had ever seen ten thousand men running a 
race." 



vi Preface to Third Edition 

predecessors, — but by 1814 our soldiers had be- 
come seasoned, and we had acquired some good 
brigade commanders, notably Scott, so that in 
that year we played on even terms with the 
British. But the battles, though marked by as 
bloody and obstinate fighting as ever took place, 
were waged between small bodies of men, and 
were not distinguished by any feats of general- 
ship, so that they are not of any special interest 
to the historian. In fact, the only really note- 
worthy feat of arms of the war took place at New 
Orleans, and the only military genius that the 
struggle developed was Andrew Jackson. His 
deeds are worthy of all praise, and the battle he 
won was in many ways so peculiar as to make it 
well worth a much closer study than it has yet 
received. It was by far the most prominent 
event of the war ; it was a victory which reflected 
high honor on the general and soldiers who won 
it, and it was in its way as remarkable as any 
of the great battles that took place about the 
same time in Europe. Such being the case, I 
have devoted a chapter to its consideration at 
the conclusion of the chapters devoted to the naval 
operations. 

As before said, the other campaigns on land do 
not deserve very minute attention; but, for the 
sake of rendering the account of the battle of New 



Preface to Third Edition vii 

Orleans more intelligible, I will give a hasty 
sketch of the principal engagements that took 
place elsewhere. 

The war opened in mid-summer of 1812, by 
the campaign of General Hull on the Michigan 
frontier. With two or three thousand raw troops 
he invaded Canada. About the same time Fort 
Mackinaw was surrendered by its garrison of 60 
Americans to a British and Indian force of 600, 
Hull's campaign was unfortunate from the be- 
ginning. Near Brownstown the American Colonel 
Van Home, with some 200 men, was ambushed 
and routed by Tecumseh and his Indians. In 
revenge, Colonel Miller, with 600 Americans, at 
Maguaga attacked 150 British and Canadians 
under Captain Muir, and 250 Indians under Te- 
cumseh, and whipped them, — Tecumseh's Indians 
standing their ground longest. The Americans 
lost 75, their foes 180 men. At Chicago the 
small force of 66 Americans was surprised and 
massacred by the Indians. Meanwhile, General 
Brock, the British commander, advanced against 
Hull with a rapidity and decision that seemed to 
paralyze his senile and irresolute opponent. The 
latter retreated to Detroit, where, without strik- 
ing a blow, he surrendered 1400 men to Brock's 
nearly equal force, which consisted nearly one 
half of Indians under Tecumseh. On the Niagara 
frontier, an estimable and honest old gentleman 



viii Preface to Third Edition 

and worthy citizen, who knew nothing of military- 
matters, General Van Rensselaer, tried to cross 
over and attack the British at Oueenstown; 
iioo Americans got across and were almost all 
killed or captured by. an equal number of Brit- 
ish, Canadians, and Indians, while on the oppo- 
site side a larger number of their countrymen 
looked on, and with abject cowardice refused to 
cross to their assistance. The command of the 
army was then handed over to a ridiculous per- 
sonage named Smythe, who issued proclama- 
tions so bombastic that they really must have 
come from an unsound mind, and then made 
a ludicrously abortive effort at invasion, which 
failed almost of its own accord. A British and 
Canadian force of less than 400 men was foiled in 
an assault on Ogdensburg, after a slight skirm- 
ish, by about 1000 Americans under Brown; and 
with this trifling success the military operations 
of the year came to an end. 

Early in 181 3, Ogdensburg was again attacked, 
this time by between 500 and 600 British, who 
took it after a brisk resistance from some 300 
militia; the British lost 60 and the Americans 20 
in killed and wounded. General Harrison, mean- 
while, had begun the campaign in the Northwest. 
At Frenchtown, on the river Raisin, Winchester's 
command of about 900 Western troops was sur- 
prised by a force of iioo men, half of them 



Preface to Third Edition ix 

Indians, under the British Colonel Proctor. The 
right division, taken by surprise, gave up at once; 
the left division, mainly Kentucky riflemen, and 
strongly posted in houses and stockaded enclo- 
sures made a stout resistance, and only surren- 
dered after a bloody fight, in which i8o British 
and about half as many Indians were killed or 
wounded. Over 300 Americans were slain, some 
in the battle, but most in the bloody massacre 
that followed. After this, General Harrison went 
into camp at Fort Meigs, where, with about 11 00 
men, he was besieged by 1000 British and Cana- 
dians under Proctor and 1200 Indians under 
Tecumseh. A force of 1200 Kentucky militia 
advanced to his relief and tried to cut its way 
into the fort while the garrison made a sortie. 
The sortie w'as fairly successful, but the Ken- 
tuckians were scattered like chafT by the British 
regulars in the open, and when broken were cut 
to pieces by the Indians in the woods. Nearly 
two thirds of the relieving troops were killed or 
captured; about 400 got into the fort. Soon 
aftenvard. Proctor abandoned the siege. Fort 
Stephenson, garrisoned by Major Croghan and 
160 men, was attacked by a force of 391 British 
regulars, who tried to carry it by assault, and 
were repulsed with the loss of a fourth of their 
number. Some four thousand Indians joined 
Proctor, but most of them left him after Perry's 



X Preface to Third Edition 

victory on Lake Erie. Then Harrison, having 
received large reinforcements, invaded Canada. 
At the river Thames his army of 3500 men en- 
countered and routed between 600 and 700 British 
under Proctor, and about 1000 Indians under 
Tecumseh. The battle was decided at once by 
a charge of the Kentucky mounted riflemen, who 
broke through the regulars, took them in rear, 
and captured them, and then, dismounting, at- 
tacked the flank of the Indians, who were also 
assailed by the infantry. Proctor escaped by 
the skin of his teeth and Tecumseh died fighting, 
like the hero that he was. This battle ended the 
campaign in the Northwest. In this quarter 
it must be remembered that the war was, on the 
part of the Americans, mainly one against In- 
dians ; the latter always forming over half of the 
British forces. ]\Iany of the remainder were 
French Canadians, and the others were regulars. 
The American armies, on the contrary, were com- 
posed of the armed settlers of Kentucky and 
Ohio, native Americans, of English speech and 
blood, who were battling for lands that were to 
form the heritage of their children. In the West 
the war was only the closing act of the struggle 
that for many years had been waged by the hardy 
and restless pioneers of our race, as, with rifle and 
axe, they carved out the mighty empire that we 
their children inherit; it was but the final effort 



Preface to Third Edition xi 

with which they wrested from the Indian lords 
of the soil the wide and fair domain that now 
forms the heart of our great Republic. It was 
the breaking down of the last barrier that stayed 
the flood of our civiHzation ; it settled, once and 
forever, that henceforth the law, the tongue, and 
the blood of the land should be neither Indian, 
nor yet French, but EngHsh. The few French of 
the West were fighting against a race that was to 
leave as little trace of them as of the doomed 
Indian peoples with whom they made common 
cause. The presence of the British mercenaries 
did not alter the character of the contest; it 
merely served to show the bitter and narrow 
hatred with which the Mother-Island regarded 
her greater daughter, predestined as the latter 
was to be queen of the lands that lay beyond the 
Atlantic. 

Meanwhile, on Lake Ontario, the Americans 
made successful descents on York and Fort 
George, scattering or capturing their compara- 
tively small garrisons ; while a counter descent by 
the British on Sackett's Harbor failed, the at- 
tacking force being too small. After the capture 
of Fort George, the Americans invaded Canada; 
but their advance guard, 1400 strong, under 
Generals Chandler and Winder, was surprised in 
the night by 800 British, who, advancing with 
the bayonet, broke up the camp, capturing both 



xii Preface to Third Edition 

the generals and half the artillery. Though the 
assailants, who lost 220 of their small number, 
suffered much more than the Americans, yet the 
latter were completely demoralized, and at once 
retreated to Fort George. Soon afterward. Colonel 
Boerstler, with about 600 men, surrendered with 
shamefully brief resistance to a somewhat smaller 
force of British and Indians. Then about 300 
British crossed the Niagara to attack Black Rock, 
which they took, but were afterward driven off 
by a large body of militia with the loss of 40 men. 
Later in the season the American General McClure 
wantonly burned the village of Newark, and then 
retreated in panic flight across the Niagara. In 
retaliation the British in turn crossed the river; 
600 regulars surprised and captured in the night 
Fort Niagara, with its garrison of 400 men; two 
thousand troopers attacked Black Rock, and, 
after losing over a hundred men in a smart en- 
gagement with somewhat over 1500 militia whom 
they easily dispersed, captured and burned both 
it and Buffalo. Before these last events took 
place another invasion of Canada had been at- 
tempted, this time under General Wilkinson, "an 
unprincipled imbecile," as Scott very properly 
styled him. It was mismanaged in every possible 
way, and was a total failure; it was attended 
with but one battle, that of Chrystler's Farm, in 
Which 1000 British, with the loss of less than 200 



I 



Preface to Third Edition xiil 

men, beat back double their number of Americans, 
who lost nearly 500 men and also one piece of 
artillery. The American army near Lake Cham- 
plain had done nothing, — its commander, General 
Wade Hampton, being, if possible, even more in- 
competent than Wilkinson. He remained sta- 
tionary while a small force of British plundered 
Plattsburg and Burlington; then, with 5000 men 
he crossed into Canada, but returned almost im- 
mediately, after a small skirmish at Chateaugay 
between his advance guard and some 500 Cana- 
dians, in which the former lost 41 and the latter 
22 men. This affair, in which hardly a tenth of 
the American force was engaged, has been, ab- 
surdly enough, designated a "battle" by most 
British and Canadian historians. In reality, it 
was the incompetency of their general and not 
the valor of their foes that caused the retreat of 
the Americans. The same comment, by the way, 
applies to the so-called "Battle" of Plattsburg, 
in the following year, which may have been lost 
by Sir George Prevost, but was certainly not won 
by the Americans. And, again, a similar criticism 
should be passed on General Wilkinson's attack 
on La Colle Mill, near the head of the same lake. 
Neither one of the three affairs was a stand-up 
fight; in each a greatly superior force, led by an 
utterly incapable general, retreated after a slight 
skirmish with an enemy whose rout would have 



xlv Preface to Third Edition 

been a matter of certainty had the engagement 
been permitted to grow serious. 

In the early spring of 1814, a small force of 160 
American regulars, under Captain Holmes, fight- 
ing from behind felled logs, routed 200 British 
with a loss of 65 men, they themselves losing but 
8. On Lake Ontario, the British made a descent 
on Oswego and took it by fair assault ; and after- 
ward lost 180 men who tried to cut out some 
American transports, and were killed or captured 
to a man. All through the spring and early sum- 
mer the army on the Niagara frontier was care- 
fully drilled by Brown, and more especially by 
Scott, and the results of this drilling were seen 
in the immensely improved effectiveness of the 
soldiers in the campaign that opened in July. 
Fort Erie was captured with little resistance, and 
on the 4th of July, at the river Chippeway, Brown, 
with two brigades of regulars, each about 1200 
strong, under Scott and Ripley, and a brigade of 
800 militia and Indians under Porter, making a 
total of about 3200 men, won a stand-up fight 
against the British General Riall, who had nearly 
2500 men, 1800 of them regulars. Porter's brig- 
ade opened by driving in the Canadian militia 
and the Indians; but was itself checked by the 
British light-troops. Ripley's brigade took very 
little part in the battle, three of the regiments not 
being engaged at all, and the fourth so slightly 



Preface to Third Edition xv 

as to lose but five men. The entire brunt of the 
action was borne by Scott's brigade, which was 
fiercely attacked by the bulk of the British regu- 
lars under Riall. The latter advanced with great 
bravery, but were terribly cut up by the fire of 
Scott's regulars; and when they had come nearly 
up to him, Scott charged with the bayonet and 
drove them clean off the field. The American 
loss was 322, including 23 Indians; the British 
loss was 515, excluding that of the Indians. The 
number of Americans actually engaged did not 
exceed that of the British; and Scott's brigade, 
in fair fight, closed by a bayonet charge, defeated 
an equal force of British regulars. 

On July 25th occurred the battle of Niagara, 
or Lundy's Lane, fought between General Brown 
with 3100' Americans and General Drummond 
with 3500 - British. It was brought on by acci- 
dent in the evening, and was waged with obstinate 
courage and savage slaughter till midnight. On 
both sides the forces straggled into action by de- 
tachments. The Americans formed the attack- 
ing party. As before, Scott's brigade bore the 

' As near as can be found out; most American authorities 
make it much less; Lossing, for example, says, only 2400. 

^ General Druinmond in his official letter makes it but 
2800; James, who gives the details, makes it 3000 rank and 
file; adding 13 per cent, for the officers, sergeants, and 
drummers, brings it up to 3400; and we still have to count 
in the artillery drivers, etc. 



xvi Preface to Third Edition 

brunt of the fight, and over half of his men were 
killed, or wounded; he himself was disabled and 
borne from the field. The struggle was of the 
most desperate character, the combatants show- 
ing a stubborn courage that could not be sur- 
passed.' Charge after charge was made with the 
bayonet, and the artillery was taken and retaken 
once and again. The loss was nearly equal: on 
the side of the Americans, 854 men (including 
Generals Brown and Scott, wounded) and two 
guns; on that of the British, 878 men (including 
General Riall, captured) and one gun. Each side 
claimed it as a victory over superior numbers. 
The truth is beyond question that the British had 
the advantage in numbers, and a still greater 
advantage in position ; while it is equally beyond 
question that it was a defeat and not a victory 
for the Americans. They left the field and retired 
in perfect order to Fort Erie, while the British 
held the field and the next day pursued their foes. 
Having received some reinforcements, General 
Drummond, now with about 3600 men, pushed 

^ General Drummond writes: "In so determined a manner 
were their attacks directed against our guns that our artillery- 
men were bayoneted while in the act of loading, and the 
muzzle, of the enemy's guns were advanced within a few 
yards of ours." Even James says: "Upon the whole, how- 
ever, the American troops fought bravely; and the conduct 
of many of the officers, of the artillery corps especially, 
would have done honor to any service." 



Preface to Third Edition xvii 

forward to besiege Fort Erie, in which was the 
American army, some 2400 strong, under General 
Gaines. Colonel Tucker, with 500 British regulars, 
was sent across the Niagara to destroy the bat- 
teries at Black Rock, but was defeated by 300 
American regulars under Major Morgan, fighting 
from behind a strong breastwork of felled trees, 
with a creek in front. On the night of the 15th 
of August, the British in three columns advanced 
to storm the American works, but after making a 
most determined assault were beaten off. The as- 
sailants lost 900 men, the assailed about 80. After 
this nothing was done till September 17th, when 
General Brown, who had resumed command of the 
American forces, determined upon and executed 
a sortie. Each side had received reinforcements; 
the Americans numbered over 3000, the British 
nearly 4000. The fighting was severe, the Ameri- 
cans losing 500 men; but their opponents lost 600 
men ; and most of their batteries were destroyed. 
Each side, as usual, claimed the victory; but, 
exactly as Lundy's Lane must be accounted an 
American defeat, as our forces retreated from the 
ground, so this must be considered an American 
victory, for after it the British broke up camp 
and drew off to Chippeway. Nothing more was 
done, and on November 5th the American army 
recrossed the Niagara. Though marked by some 
brilliant feats of arms this four months' invasion of 



xviii Preface to Third Edition 

Canada, like those that had preceded it, thus came 
to nothing. But at the same time a British in- 
vasion of the United States was repulsed far more 
disgracefully. Sir George Prevost, with an army 
of 13,000 veteran troops, marched south along 
the shores of Lake Champlain to Plattsburg, which 
was held by General Macomb with 2000 regulars, 
and perhaps double that number of nearly worth- 
less militia ; — a force that the British could have 
scattered to the winds, though, as they were 
strongly posted, not without severe loss. But the 
British fleet was captured by Commodore Mac- 
Donough in the fight on the lake; and then Sir 
George, after some heavy skirmishing between 
the outposts of the armies, in which the Americans 
had the advantage, fled precipitately back to 
Canada. 

All through the war the sea-coasts of the United 
States had been harried by small predatory ex- 
cursions; a part of what is now the State of 
Maine was conquered with little resistance, and 
kept until the close of hostilities; and some of 
the towns on the shores of Chesapeake Bay had 
been plundered or burnt. In August, 18 14, a 
more serious invasion was planned, and some 
5000 troops — regulars, sailors, and marines — were 
landed, under the command of General Ross. So 
utterly helpless was the Democratic Administra- 
tion at Washington, that during the two years 



Preface to Third Edition xix 

of warfare hardly any steps had been taken to 
protect the Capitol, or the country round about; 
what little was done was done entirely too late, 
and bungled badly in addition. History has not 
yet done justice to the ludicrous and painful folly 
and stupidity of which the government founded 
by Jefferson and carried on by Aladison, was 
guilty, both in its preparations for, and in its way 
of carrying on, this war; nor is it yet realized 
that the men just mentioned, and their associates, 
are primarily responsible for the loss we suffered 
in it, and the bitter humiliation some of its inci- 
dents caused us. The small British army marched 
at will through Virginia and Maryland, burned 
Washington, and finally retreated from before 
Baltimore and re-embarked to take part in the 
expedition against New Orleans. Twice, at Bla- 
densburg and North Point, it came in contact with 
superior numbers of militia in fairly good position. 
In each case the result was the same. After 
some preliminary skirmishing, manoeuvring, and 
volley firing, the British charged with the bayonet. 
The rawest regiments among the American mi- 
litia then broke at once; the others kept pretty 
steady, pouring in quite a destructive fire, until 
the regulars had come up close to them, when 
they also fled. The British regulars were too 
heavily loaded to pursue, and, owing to their 
mode of attack, and the rapidity with which their 



f 



XX Preface to Third Edition 

opponents ran away, the loss of the latter was in 
each case very slight. At North Point, however, 
the militia, being more experienced, behaved 
better than at Bladensburg. In neither case 
were the British put to any trouble to win their 
victory. 

The above is a brief sketch of the campaigns 
of the war. It is not cheerful reading for an 
American, nor yet of interest to a military student ; 
and its lessons have been taught so often by 
similar occurrences in other lands under like cir- 
cumstances, and, moreover, teach such self-evident 
truths, that they scarcely need to be brought to 
the notice of an historian. But the crowning 
event of the war was the battle of New Orleans; 
remarkable in its military aspect, and a source 
of pride to every American. It is well worth a 
more careful study, and to it I have devoted the 
last chapter of this work. 

New York City, 18S3. 



PREFACE 

THE history of the naval events of the War of 
1812 has been repeatedly presented both 
to the American and the English reader. 
Historical writers have treated it either in con- 
nection with a general account of the contest on 
land and sea, or as forming a part of the complete 
record of the navies of the two nations. A few 
monographs, which confine themselves strictly to 
the naval occurrences, have also appeared. But 
none of these works can be regarded as giving 
a satisfactorily full or impartial account of the 
war, some of them being of the "popular " and 
loosely constructed order, while others treat it 
from a purely partisan standpoint. No single 
book can be quoted which would be accepted by 
the modern reader as doing justice to both sides, 
or, indeed, as telling the whole story. Any one 
specially interested in the subject must read all; 
and then it will seem almost a hopeless task to 
reconcile the many and widely contradictory 
statements he will meet with. 

There appear to be three works which, taken 
in combination, give the best satisfaction on the 

xxi 



XX 11 



Preface 



subject. First, in James's Naval History of Great 
Britain (which supplies both the material and 
the opinions of almost every subsequent English 
or Canadian historian) can be found the British 
view of the case. It is an invaluable work, written 
with fulness and care ; on the other hand, it is also 
a piece of special pleading by a bitter and not 
over-scrupulous partisan. This, in the second 
place, can be partially supplemented by Fenimore 
Cooper's Naval History of the United States. The 
latter gives the American view of the cruises and 
battles; but it is much less of an authority than 
James's, both because it is written without great 
regard for exactness, and because all figures for 
the iVmerican side need to be supplied from Lieu- 
tenant (now Admiral) George E. Emmons's Statis- 
tical History of the United States Navy, which is 
the third of the works in question. 

But even after comparing these three authors, 
many contradictions remain unexplained, and the 
truth can only be reached in such cases by a care- 
ful examination of the navy Records, the London 
Naval Chronicle, Niles's Register, and other similar 
documentary publications. Almost the only good 
criticisms on the actions are those incidentally 
given in standard works on other subjects, such 
as Lord Howard Douglass's Naval Gunnery, and 
Admiral Jurien de la Graviere's Guerres Maritimes. 
Much of the material in our Navy Department 



Preface 



XXlll 



has never been touched at alL In short, no full, 
accurate, and unprejudiced history of the war has 
ever been written. 

The subject merits a closer scrutiny than it has 
received. At present people are beginning to 
realize that it is folly for the great English-speak- 
ing Republic to rely for defence upon a navy com- 
posed partly of antiquated hulks, and partly of 
new vessels rather more worthless than the old. 
It is worth while to study with some care that 
period of our history during which our navy stood 
at the highest pitch of its fame ; and, to learn any- 
thing from the past, it is necessary to know, as 
near as may be, the exact truth. Accordingly, 
the work should be written impartially, if only 
from the narrowest motives. Without abating a 
jot from one's devotion to his country and flag, 
I think a history can be made just enough to 
\\3 Tant its being received as an authority equally 
among Americans and Englishmen. I have 
endeavored to supply such a work. It is im- 
possible that errors, both of fact and opinion, 
should not have crept into it; and although I 
have sought to make it in character as non-parti- 
san as possible, these errors will probably be in 
favor of the American side. 

As my only object is to give an accurate narra- 
tive of events. I shall esteem it a particular favor 
if any pne will furnjsh me with the means of 



xxlv Preface 

rectifying such mistakes; and if I have done in- 
justice to any commander, or officer of any grade, 
whether American or British, I shall consider 
myself under great obligations to those who will 
set me right. 

I have been unable to get access to the original 
reports of the British commanders, the logs of 
the British ships, or their muster-rolls, and so 
have been obliged to take them at second hand 
from the Gazette, or Naval Chronicle, or some 
standard history. The American official letters, 
log-books, original contracts, muster-rolls, etc., 
however, being preserved in the Archives at 
Washington, I have been able, thanks to the 
courtesy of the Hon. Wm. H. Hunt, Secretary 
of the Navy, to look them over. The set of letters 
from the officers is very complete, in three series, 
— Captains' Letters, Masters-Commandant Letters, 
and Officers' Letters, — there being several volumes 
for each year. The books of contracts contain 
valuable information as to the size and build of 
some of the vessels. The log-books are rather 
exasperating, often being very incomplete. Thus, 
when I turned from Decatur's extremely vague 
official letter describing the capture of the Mace- 
donian to the log-book of the Frigate United 
States, not a fact about the fight could be gleaned. 
The last entry in the log on the day of the fight is 
** strange sail discovered to be a frigate under Eng- 



Preface xxv 

lish colors," and the next entry (on the following 
day) relates to the removal of the prisoners. The 
log of the Enterprise is very full indeed, for most 
of the time, but is a perfect blank for the period 
during which she was commanded by Lieutenant 
Burrows, and in which she fought the Boxer. I 
have not been able to find the Peacock's log at all, 
though there is a very full set of letters from her 
commander. Probably the fire of 1837 destroyed 
a trrcat deal of valuable material. Whenever it 
was possible I have referred to printed matter in 
preference to manuscript, and my authorities can 
thus, in most cases, be easily consulted. 

In conclusion, I desire to express my sincerest 
thanks to Captain James D. Bulloch, formerly of 
the United States Navy, and Commander Adolf 
Mensing, formerly of the German Navy, without 
whose advice and sympathy this work would 
probably never have been written or even begun. 



New York City, 1882. 



PRINCIPAL AUTHORITIES 
REFERRED TO 

(see also in alphabetical place in index) 

American State Papers. 

Brenton, E. P. Naval History of Great Britain, lySj to 
t6'j6. 2 vols., octavo. London, 1S37. 

Broke, Adm., Memoir of, by Rev. J. G. Brighton. Octavo. 
London, 1866. 

Captains' Letters, in Archives at Washington. 

Codrington, Adtn. Sir E. Me))ioirs. Edited by his daugh- 
ter. 2 vols., octavo. London, 1873. 

Coggeshall, George. History of American Privateers. New 
York, 1876 

Cooper, J. F. Naval History of the United States. New 
York, i85(f 

Douglass, Lord Howard. Naval Gunnery. Octavo. Lon- 
don, i860. 

Dundonald, Earl. Autobiograpliy of a Seaman. London, 
i860. 

Emmons, Lieut. G. E. Statistical History of United States 
Navy. 1853. 

Farragut, Adm. D. G., Life of, by his son, Loyall Farragut. 
Octavo. New York, 1878. 

Graviere, Adm.. J. de la. Gnerres Maritimes. 2 vols., 
octavo. Paris, 1881. 

James, William. Naval History of Great Britain. 6 vols., 
octavo. London, 1837. 

James, William. Naval Occurrences with the Americans. 
Octavo. London, 181 7. 

London Naval Chronicle. 

xxvii 



Principal Authorities Referred To 

Lossing, Benson J . Field-book of the War of 1812. Octavo. 
New York, 1869. 

Low, C. R. History of the Indian Navy, 161 j to i86j. 2 
vols., octavo. London, 1877. 

Marshall. Royal Naval Biography. 12 vols., octavo. 
London, 1825. 

M asters-Commandant Letters, in Archives at Washington. 

Morris, Com. Charles. Autobiography. Annapolis, 1880. 

Naval Archives, at Washington. 

Niles. Weekly Register. 

Pielat, B. La Vie et les Actions Mcmorables dii St. Michel 
de Riiytcr. Amsterdam, 1677. 

Riviere, Lieut. H. La Marine Franfaise sous le Regime de 
Louis XV. Paris, 1S59. 

Tatnall, Com., Life, by C. C. Jones, Jr. Savannah, 1878. 

Toussard, L. de. American Artillerists' Companion. 
Phila. 181 1. 

Troude, O. Batailles Navalcs de la France. Paris, 1868 

Ward, Com. J. H. Manual of Naval Tactics. 1859. 

Yonge, Charles Duke. History of the British Navy. ?, 
vols., octavo. London, 1866. 



'» * .//■,, JX. XXVlll 



CONTENTS 



CHAPTER I 

INTRODUCTORY 

Causes of the War of 1812 — Conflicting views of America 
and Britain as regards neutral rights — Those of the former 
power right — Impossibihty of avoiding hostiUties — Declara- 
tion of war June 18, 1812— Slight preparations made — 
General features of the contest — -The treaty o^ peace nomin- 
ally leaves the situation^gplpap^ged — But practically settles 
the dispute in our favcffm respect to maritime rights — The 
British navy and its reputation prior to 18 12 — Comparison 
with other European navies — British and American author- 
ities consulted in the present work 1-26 

CHAPTER II 

Overwhelming naval supremacy of England when America 
declared war against her — Race identity of the combatants 
— American navy at the beginning of the war — Officers well 
trained — Causes tending to make our seamen especially 
efficient — Close similarity between British and American 
sailors — Our ships manned chiefly by native Americans, 
many of whom had formerly been impressed into the British 
navy — Quotas of seamen contributed by the difl'erent States 
— Navy yards — Lists of officers and men — Lists of vessels — 
Tonnage — Different ways of estimating it in Britain and 
America — Ratings — American ships properly rated — Ar- 
maments of the frigates and corvettes — Three styles of guns 
used — Difference between long guns and carronades — Short 

xxix 



^^xx Contents 

weight of American shot — Comparison of British frigates 
rating ;^S and American fi'igates rating 44 guns — Compared 
with a 74 27-88 



CHAPTER III 

1812 

ox THE OCEAN 

Commodore Rodgers's cruise and unsviccessful chase of the 
Belvidera — Engagement between Belvidcra and President — 
Hornet captures a privateer — Cruise of the Essex — Captain 
Hull's cruise and escape from the squadron of Commodore 
Broke— Constitution captures Guerriere — Marked superiority 
shown by the Americans — Wasp captures Frolic — Dispro- 
portionate loss on the British side — Both afterward captured 
by Poictiers — Second unsuccessful cruise of Commodore 
Rodgers — United States captures Macedonian — Constitution 
captures Java — Cruise of Essex — Summary 89- 169 



CHAPTER IV 

l8l2 
ON THE LAKES 

Preliminary. — The combatants starting nearly on an 
equality — Difficulties of creating a naval force — Difficulty of 
comparing the force of the rival squadrons — Meagreness of 
the published accounts — Unreliability of authorities, espe- 
cially James. — Ontario— Extraordinary nature of the Ameri- 
can squadron — Canadian squadron a kind of water militia — 
Sackett's Harbor feebly attacked by Commodore Earle — 
Commodore Chauncy attacks the Royal George — And bom- 
bards York.— Erie — Lieutenant Elliot captures the Detroit 
and Caledonia — Lieutenant Angus's unsviccessful attack on 
Red House barracks 1 70-194 



Contents xxxi 

CHAPTER V 

1S13 

ON THE OCEAN 

Blockade of the American coast — Commodore Porter's 
campaign with the Essex in the South Pacific — Iloriict block- 
ades Bonne Citoyenne — Hornet captures Resolution — Ilonicl 
captures Peacock — Generous treatment shown to the con- 
quered — Viper captured by Narcissus — American privateers 
cut out by British boats — Third cruise of Commodore Rodgers 
— United States, Macedonian, and Wasp blockaded in New 
London — Broke's challenge to Lawrence — The Chesapeake 
captured by the Sliannon — Comments and criticisms by 
various authorities — Surveyor captured by boats of Narcissus 
— Futile gunboat actions — British attack on Craney Island 
repulsed — Cutting-out expeditions — The Argus captured by 
the Pelican — -The Enterprise captures the Boxer — Ocean war- 
fare of 1813 in favor of British — Summary 195-267 

CHAPTER VI 

1813 

ON THE LAKES 

Ontario — Comparison of the rival squadrons — Chauncy's 
superiority in strength — Chauncy takes York and Fort George 
— Yeo is repulsed at Sackett's Harbor, but keeps command 
of the lake — The Lady of the Lake captures Lady Murray — 
Hamilton and Scourge founder in a squall — Yeo's partial 
victory off Niagara^Indecisive action off the Genesee — 
Chauncy's partial victory off Burlington, which gives him 
the command of the lake — Yeo and Chauncy compared — 
Reasons for American success. — ^Erie — Perry's success in 
creating a fleet — His victory — "Glory " of it overestimated — 
Cause of his success. — Champlain — The Growler and Eagle 
captured by gunboats — Summary of year's campaign, 

268-344 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812 



CHAPTER I 



INTRODUCTORY 



Causes of the War of 1812 — Conflicting views of America 
and Britain as regards neutral rights — Those of the former 
power right — ImpossibiUty of avoiding hostiUties — Declara- 
tion of war — General features of the contest — The treaty of 
peace nominally leaves the situation unchanged — But practi- 
cally settles the dispute in our favor in respect to maritime 
rights — The British navy and its reputation prior to 18 12 — 
Comparison with other European navies — British and Ameri- 
can authorities consulted in the present work. 

THE view professed by Great Britain in 181 2 
respecting the rights of belKgerents and 
neutrals was diametrically opposite to that 
held by the United States. "Between England 
and the United States of America," writes a 
British author, "a spirit of animosity, caused 
chiefly by the impressment of British seamen, or 
of seamen asserted to be such, from on board of 
American merchant vessels, had unhappily sub- 
sisted for a long time" prior to the war. " It is, 
we believe," he continues, "an acknowledged 

VOL. I.— 1. 



2 Naval War of 1812 

maxim of public law, as well that no nation but 
the one he belongs to can release a subject from 
his natural allegiance, as that, provided the juris- 
diction of another independent state be not in- 
fringed, every nation has a right to enforce the 
services of her subjects wherever they may be 
found. Nor has any neutral nation such a juris- 
diction over her merchant vessels upon the high 
seas as to exclude a belligerent nation from the 
right of searching them for contraband of war or 
for the property or persons of her enemies. And 
if, in the exercise of that right, the belligerent 
should discover on board of the neutral vessel a 
subject who has withdrawn himself from his law- 
ful allegiance, the neutral can have no fair ground 
for refusing to deliver him up ; more especially if 
that subject is proved to be a deserter from the 
sea or land service of the former." ' 

Great Britain's doctrine was, "once a subject 
always a subject." On the other hand, the United 
States maintained that any foreigner, after five 
years' residence within her territory, and after 
having complied with certain forms, became one 
of her citizens as completely as if he was native 
bom. Great Britain contended that her war ships 
possessed the right of searching all neutral vessels 

* The Naval History of Great Britain, by William James, 
vol. iv., p. 324. ' (New edition by Captain Chamier, R. N., 
London, 1S37.) 



Naval War of 1 812 3 

for the property and persons of her foes. The 
United States resisted this claim, asserting that 
"free bottoms made free goods," and that conse- 
quently her ships when on the high seas should 
not be molested on any pretext whatever. Finally, 
Great Britain's system of impressment,' by which 
men could be forcibly seized and made to serve 
in her navy, no matter at what cost to themselves, 
was repugnant to every American idea. 

Such wide differences in the views of the two 
nations produced endless difficulties. To escape 
the press-gang, or for other reasons, many British 
seamen took service under the American flag; 
and if they were demanded back, it is not likely 
that they or their American shipmates had much 
hesitation in swearing either that they were not 
British at all, or else that they had been natural- 
ized as Americans. Equally probable is it that 
the American blockade-runners were guilty of a 
great deal of fraud and more or less thinly veiled 
perjury. But the wrongs done by the Americans 
were insignificant compared with those they re- 
ceived. Any innocent merchant vessel was liable 
to seizure at any moment ; and when overhauled 
by a British cruiser short of men was sure to be 
stripped of most of her crew. The British officers 
were themselves the judges as to whether a 

* The best idea of which can be gained by reading Marry at 's 
Novels. 



4 Naval War of 1812 

seaman should be pronounced a native of Amer- 
ica or of Britain, and there was no appeal from 
their judgment. If a captain lacked his full com- 
plement there was little doubt as to the view he 
would take of any man's nationality. The 
wrongs inflicted on our seafaring countrymen by 
their impressment into foreign ships formed the 
main cause of the war. 

There were still other grievances which are thus 
presented by the British Admiral Cochrane." " Our 
treatment of its (America's) citizens was scarcely 
in accordance with the national privileges to 
which the young Republic had become entitled. 
There were, no doubt, many individuals among 
the American people who, caring little for the Fede- 
ral Government, considered it more profitable to 
break than to keep the laws of nations by aiding 
and supporting our enemy (France), and it was 
against such that the efforts of the squadron had 
chiefly been directed ; but the way the object was 
carried out was scarcely less an infraction of those 
national laws which we were professedly enfor- 
cing. The practice of taking English (and Ameri- 
can) seamen out of American ships, without regard 
to the safety of navigating them when thus de- 
prived of their hands, has been already mentioned. 

" Autobiography of a Seaman, by Thomas, tenth Earl of 
Dundonald, Admiral of the Red; Rear- Admiral of the Fleet. 
London, i860, vol. i., p. 24. 



Naval War of 1 8 1 2 5 

To this may be added the detention of vessels 
against which nothing contrary to international 
neutrality could be established, whereby their 
cargoes became damaged; the compelling them, 
on suspicion only, to proceed to ports other than 
those to which they were destined ; and generally 
treating them as though they were engaged in 
contraband trade. . . . American ships were 
not permitted to quit English ports without giving 
security for the discharge of their cargoes in some 
other British or neutral port." On the same sub- 
ject, James' writes: "When, by the maritime su- 
premacy of England, France could no longer trade 
for herself, America proffered her services, as a 
neutral, to trade for her ; and American merchants 
and their agents, in the gains that flowed in, soon 
found a compensation for all the perjury and 
fraud necessary to cheat the former out of her 
belligerent rights. The high commercial im- 
portance of the United States thus obtained, 
coupled with a similarity of language and, to a 
superficial observer, a resemblance in person be- 
tween the natives of America and Great Britain, 
has caused the former to be the chief, if not the 
only sufferers by the exercise of the right of 
search. Chiefly indebted for their growth and 
prosperity to emigration from Europe, the United 
States hold out every allurement to foreigners, 

'L. c, iv., 325. 



6 Naval War of 1812 

particularly to British seamen, whom, by a pro- 
cess peculiarly their own, they can naturalize as 
quickly as a dollar can exchange masters and a 
blank form, ready signed and sworn to, can be 
filled up.' It is the knowledge of this fact that 
makes British naval ojEficers, when searching for 
deserters from their service, so harsh in their 
scrutiny, and so sceptical of American oaths and 
asseverations." 

The last sentence of the foregoing from James 
is an euphemistic way of saying that whenever a 
British commander short of men came across an 
American vessel he impressed all of her crew that 
he wanted, whether they were citizens of the 
United States or not. It must be remembered 
however, that the only reason why Great Britain 
did us more injury than any other power was be- 
cause she was better able to do so. None of her 
acts were more offensive than Napoleon's Milan 
decree, by which it was declared that any neutral 
vessel which permitted itself to be searched by a 
British cruiser should be considered as British, 
and as the lawful prize of any French vessel. 
French frigates and privateers were very apt to 
snap up any American vessel they came across, 
and were only withheld at all by the memory of 
the sharp dressing they had received in the West 
Indies during the quasi-war of 1 799-1 800. What 

^ This is an exaggeration. 



Naval War of 1812 7 

we undoubtedly ought to have done was to have 
adopted the measure actually proposed in Con- 
gress, and declared war on both France and Eng- 
land. As it was, we chose as a foe the one that 
had done, and could still do, us the greatest 
injury. 

The principles for which the United States con- 
tended in 181 2 are now universally accepted, and 
those so tenaciously maintained by Great Britain 
find no advocates in the civilized world. That 
England herself was afterwards completely recon- 
ciled to our views, was amply shown by her intense 
indignation when Commodore Wilkes, in the ex- 
ercise of the right of search for the persons of the 
foes of his country, stopped the neutral British 
ship Trent; while the applause with which the 
act was greeted in America proves pretty clearly 
another fact — that we had warred for the right, 
not because it was the right, but because it agreed 
with our self-interest to do so. We were con- 
tending for "Free Trade and Sailors' Rights": 
meaning by the former expression, freedom to 
trade wherever we chose without hindrance save 
from the power with whom we were trading; 
and by the latter, that a man who happened to 
be on the sea should have the same protection ac- 
corded to a man who remained on land. Nom- 
inally, neither of these questions was settled by, or 
even alluded to, in the treaty of peace : but the 



8 Naval War of 1 8i 2 

immense increase in reputation that the navy ac- 
quired during the war practically decided both 
points in our favor. Our sailors had gained too 
great a name for any one to molest them with 
impunity again. 

Holding views on these maritime subjects so 
radically different from each other, the two nations 
could not but be continually dealing with 'causes 
of quarrel. Not only did British cruisers molest 
our merchantmen, but at length one of them, 
the 50-gun ship Leopard attacked an American 
frigate, the Chesapeake, when the latter was so 
lumbered up that she could not return a shot, 
killed or disabled some twenty of her men, and 
took away four others, one Briton and three 
Americans, who were claimed as deserters. For 
this act an apology was offered, but it failed to 
restore harmony between the two nations. Soon 
afterward another action was fought. The Ameri- 
can frigate President, Commodore Rodgers, at- 
tacked the British sloop Little Belt, Captain 
Bingham, and exchanged one or two broadsides 
with her, the frigate escaping scot-free while the 
sloop was nearly knocked to pieces. Mutual re- 
criminations followed, each side insisting that the 
other was the assailant. 

When Great Britain issued her Orders in Council 
forbidding our trading with France, we retaliated 
by passing an embargo act, which prevented us 



Naval War of 1 812 9 

from trading at all. There could be but one re- 
sult to such a succession of incidents, and that 
was war. Accordingly, in June, 181 2, war was 
declared; and as a contest for the rights of sea- 
men, it was largely waged on the ocean. We also 
had not a little fighting to do on land, in which, 
as a rule, we came out second-best. Few or no 
preparations for the war had been made, and the 
result was such as might have been anticipated. 
After dragging on through three dreary and un- 
eventful years it came to an end in 181 5, by a 
peace which left matters in almost precisely the 
state in which the war had found them. On land 
and water the contest took the form of a succes- 
sion of petty actions, in which the glory acquired 
by the victor seldom eclipsed the disgrace incurred 
by the vanquished. Neither side succeeded in 
doing what it intended. Americans declared 
that Canada must and should be conquered, 
but the conquering came quite as near being 
the other way. British writers insisted that the 
American navy should be swept from the seas ; 
and, during the sweeping process, it increased 
fourfold. ~ 

When the United States declared war, Great 
Britain was straining every nerve and muscle in a 
death struggle with the most formidable military 
despotism of modern times, and was obliged to 
entrust the defence of her Canadian colonies to a 



lo Naval War of 1812 

mere handful of regulars, aided by the local fenci- 
bles. But Congress had provided even fewer 
trained soldiers, and relied on the militia. The 
latter chiefly exercised their fighting abilities upon 
one another in duelling, and, as a rule, were 
afflicted with conscientious scruples whenever it 
was necessary to cross the frontier and attack the 
enemy. Accordingly, the campaign opened with 
the bloodless surrender of an American general to 
a much inferior British force, and the war con- 
tinued much as it had begun; we suffered dis- 
grace after disgrace, while the losses we inflicted, 
in turn, on Great Britain were so slight as hardly 
to attract her attention. At last, having crushed 
her greater foe, she turned to crush the lesser and, 
in her turn, suffered ignominious defeat. By this 
time events had gradually developed a small num- 
ber of soldiers on our Northern frontier, who, com- 
manded by Scott and Brown, w^ere able to 
contend on equal terms with the veteran troops 
to whom they were opposed, though these formed 
part of what was then undoubtedly the most for- 
midable fighting infantry any European nation 
possessed. The battles at this period of the 
struggle were remarkable for the skill and stub- 
bom courage with which they were waged, as well 
as for the heavy loss involved; but the number 
of combatants was so small that in Europe they 
would have been regarded as mere outpost skir- 



Naval War of 1 8 1 2 1 1 

mishes, and they wholly failed to attract any at- 
tention abroad in that period of colossal armies. 
When Great Britain seriously turned her at- 
tention to her transatlantic foe, and assembled in 
Canada an army of 14,000 men at the head of 
Lake Champlain, Congressional forethought en- 
abled it to be opposed by soldiers who, it is true, 
were as well disciplined, as hardy, and as well 
commanded as any in the world, but who were 
only a few hundred strong, backed by more or less 
incompetent militia. Only McDonough's skill 
and Sir George Prevost's incapacity saved us from 
a serious disaster; the sea-fight reflected high 
honor on our seamen, but the retreat of the 
British land-forces was due to their commander 
and not to their antagonists. Meanwhile, a large 
British fleet in the Chesapeake had not achieved 
much glory by the destruction of local oyster- 
boats and the burning of a few farmers' houses, 
so an army was landed to strike a decisive blow. 
At Bladensburg ' the five thousand British regu- 
lars, utterly worn out by heat and fatigue, by 
their mere appearance frightened into a panic 
double their number of American militia, well 
posted. But the only success attained was burn- 
ing the public buildings of Washington, and 
that result was of dubious value. Baltimore was 

' See the Capture of Washington, by Edward D. Ingraham 
(Philadelphia, 1849). 



12 Naval War of 1812 

attacked next, and the attack repulsed, after the 
forts and ships had shelled one another with the 
slight results that usually attend that spectacular 
and harmless species of warfare. 

The close of the contest was marked by the 
extraordinary battle of New Orleans. It was a 
perfectly useless shedding of blood, since peace 
had already been declared. There is hardly an- 
other contest of modern times where the defeated 
side suffered such frightful carnage, while the 
victors came off almost scathless. It is quite in 
accordance with the rest of the war that the 
militia, hitherto worse than useless, should on 
this occasion win against great odds in point of 
numbers ; and, moreover, that their splendid vic- 
tory should have been of little consequence in its 
effects upon the result. On the whole, the con- 
test by land, where we certainly ought to have 
been successful, reflected greater credit on our 
antagonists than upon us, in spite of the services 
of Scott, Brown, and Jackson. Our small force 
of regulars and volunteers did excellently; as for 
the militia, New Orleans proved that they could 
fight superbly; and the other battles, that they 
generally would not fight at all. 

At sea, as will appear, the circumstances were 
widely different. Here we possessed a small but 
highly effective force, the ships well built, manned 
by thoroughly trained men, and commanded by 



Naval War of 1 812 13 

able and experienced officers. The deeds of our 
navy form a part of history over which any Ameri- 
can can be pardoned for hngering. 

Such was the origin, issue, and general character 
of the war. It may now be well to proceed to a 
comparison of the authorities on the subject. 
Allusion has already been made to them in the 
preface, but a fuller reference seems to be neces- 
sary in this connection. 

At the close of the contest, the large majority 
of historians who wrote of it were so bitterly ran- 
corous that their statements must be received 
with caution. For the main facts, I have relied, 
wherever it was practicable, upon the official 
letters of the commanding officers, taking each as 
authority for his own loss.' For all the British 
victories we have British official letters, which 
tally almost exactly, as regards matters of fact 
and not of opinion, with the corresponding Ameri- 
can accounts. For the first year, the British also 
published official accounts of their defeats, which, 
in the cases of the Guerriere, Macedonian, and 

•■As, where Broke states his own force at 330, his antagonist's 
at 440, and the American court of inquiry makes the num- 
bers 396 and 379, I have taken them as being 330 and 379, 
respectively. This is the only just method; I take it for 
granted that each commander meant to tell the truth, and, 
of course, knew his own force, while he might very naturally 
and in perfect good faith exaggerate his antagonist's. 



14 Naval War of 1812 

Frolic, I have followed as closely as the accounts 
of the American victors. The last British official 
letter published, announcing a defeat, was that in 
the case of the Java, and it is the only letter that 
I have not strictly accepted. The fact that no 
more were published thereafter is of itself un- 
fortunate; and from the various contradictions 
it contains it would appear to have been tam- 
pered with. The surgeon's report accompanying 
it is certainly false. Subsequent to 181 2, no let- 
ter of a defeated British commander was pub- 
lished,' and I have to depend upon the various 
British historians, especially James — of whom 
more anon. 

The i\merican and British historians from whom 
we are thus at times forced to draw our material 
regard the war from very different standpoints, 
and their accounts generally differ. Each writer, 
naturally, so colored the affair as to have it ap- 
pear favorable to his own side. Sometimes this 
was done intentionally and sometimes not. Not 
infrequently errors are made against the his- 
torian's own side; as when the British author, 
Brenton, says that the British brig Peacock 
mounted 32's instead of 24's, while Lossing, in 
his Field Book of the War of 1812, makes the same 

' Except about the battles on the Lakes, where I have ac- 
cordingly given the same credit to the accounts both of the 
British and of the Americans. 



Naval War of 1812 15 

mistake about the armament of the American 
brig Argus. Errors of this description are, of 
course, as carefully to be guarded against as any 
others. Mere hearsay reports, such as "it has 
been said," "a prisoner on board the opposing 
fleet has observed," "an American (or British) 
newspaper of such and such a date has remarked," 
are of course to be rejected. There is a curious 
parallelism in the errors on both sides. For ex- 
ample, the American Mr. Low, writing in 1813, 
tells how the Constitution, 44, captured the Guer- 
riere of 49 guns, while the British Lieutenant Low, 
writing in 1880, tells how the Pelican, 18, captured 
the Argus of 20 guns. Each records the truth, 
but not the whole truth, for although rating 44 
and 18 the victors carried respectively 54 and 21 
guns, of heavier metal than those of their an- 
tagonists. Such errors are generally intentional. 
Similarly, most American writers mention the 
actions in which the privateers were victorious, 
but do not mention those in which they were de- 
feated; while the British, in turn, record every 
successful " cutting-out " expedition, but ignore en- 
tirely those which terminated unfavorably. Other 
errors arise from honest ignorance. Thus, James, 
in speaking of the repulse of the Endymion's 
boats by the Neufchatel, gives the latter a crew 
of 120 men; she had more than this number 
originally, but only forty were in her at the time 



i6 Naval War of 1 812 

of the attack. So also when the captain of the 
Pelican writes that the officers of the Argus report 
her loss at 40, when they really reported it at 24, 
or when Captain Dacres thought the Constitution 
had lost about 20 men instead of 14. The 
American gun-boat captains, in recounting their 
engagements with the British frigates invariably 
greatly overestimated the loss of the latter. So 
that on both sides there were some intentional 
misstatements or garblings, and a much more 
numerous class of simple blunders, arising largely 
from an incapacity for seeing more than one side 
of the question. 

Among the early British writers upon this war, 
the ablest was James. He devoted one work, his 
Naval Occurrences, entirely to it ; and it occupies 
the largest part of the sixth volume of his more 
extensive History of the British Navy.'' Two other 
British writers. Lieutenant Marshall ' and Captain 
Brenton,3 wrote histories of the same events, about 
the same time ; but neither of these naval officers 
produced half as valuable a work as did the 
civilian James. Marshall wrote a dozen volumes, 
each filled with several scores of dreary panegyrics 
or memoirs of as many different officers. There 

' A new edition. London, 1826. 

2 Royal Naval Biography, by John Marshall. London, 1823- 

1835- 

3 Naval History of Great Britain, by Edward Pelham Bren- 
ton. New edition, London, 1837. 



Naval War of 1 812 17 

is no attempt at order, hardly anything about the 
ships, guns, or composition of the crews ; and not 
even the pretence of giving both sides, the object 
being to make every EngHshman appear in his 
best Hght. The work is analogous to the numer- 
ous lives of Decatur, Bainbridge, Porter, etc., that 
appeared in the United States about the same 
time, and is quite as untrustworthy. Brenton 
made a far better and very interesting book, 
written on a good and well-connected plan, and 
apparently with a sincere desire to tell the truth. 
He accepts the British official accounts as needing 
nothing whatever to supplement them, precisely 
as Cooper accepts the American officials'. A 
more serious fault is his inability to be accurate. 
That this inaccuracy is not intentional, is proved 
by the fact that it tells as often against his own 
side as against his opponents. He says, for ex- 
ample, that the guns of Perry's and Barclay's 
squadrons "were about equal in number and 
weight," that the Peacock (British) was armed 
with 32's instead of 24's, and underestimates the 
force of the second Wasp. But the blunders are 
quite as bad when distributed as when confined 
to one side; in addition, Brenton's disregard of 
all details makes him of but little use. 

James, as already said, is by far the most valu- 
able authority on the war, as regards purely British 
affairs. He enters minutely into details, and has 



VOL. I.— 2 



i8 Naval War of 1 812 

evidently laboriously hunted up his authorities. 
He has examined the ships' logs, the Admiralty 
reports, various treaties, all the Gazette reports, 
gives very well-chosen extracts, has arranged his 
work in chronological order, discriminates be- 
tween the officers that deserve praise and those 
that deserve blame, and in fact writes a book 
which ought to be consulted by every student of 
naval affairs. But he is unfortunately afflicted 
with a hatred toward the Americans that amounts 
to a monomania. He wishes to make out as 
strong a case as possible against them. The 
animus of his work may be gathered from the not 
over-complimentary account of the education of 
the youthful seafaring American, which can be 
found in vol. vi., p. 113, of his History. On page 
153 he asserts that he is an " impartial historian" ; 
and about three hnes before mentions that "it 
may suit the Americans to invent any falsehood, 
no matter how barefaced, to foist a valiant char- 
acter on themselves." On page 419 he says that 
Captain Porter is to be believed, "so far as is 
borne out by proof (the only safe way where 
an American is concerned)," — which somewhat 
sweeping denunciation of the veracity of all of 
Captain Porter's compatriots would seem to indi- 
cate that James was not, perhaps, in that dis- 
passionate frame of mind best suited for writing 
history. That he should be biassed against in- 



Naval War of 1 812 19 

dividual captains can be understood, but when 
he makes rabid onslaughts upon the American 
people as a whole, he renders it difficult for an 
American, at any rate, to put implicit credence 
in him. His statements are all the harder to 
confute when they are erroneous, because they are 
intentionally so. It is not, as with Brenton and 
Marshall, because he really thinks a British cap- 
tain cannot be beaten, except by some kind of 
distorted special providence, for no man says 
worse things than he does about certain officers 
and crews. A writer of James's undoubted ability 
must have known perfectly well that his state- 
ments were untrue in many instances, as where 
he garbles Hilyar's account of Porter's loss, or 
misstates the comparative force of the fleets on 
Lake Champlain. 

When he says (p. 194) that Captain Bainbridge 
wished to run away from the Java, and would 
have done so if he had not been withheld by the 
advice of his first lieutenant, who was a renegade 
Englishman,' it is not of much consequence 
whether his making the statement was due to 
excessive credulity or petty meanness, for, in 
either case, whether the defect was in his mind or 
his morals, it is enough to greatly impair the 
value of his other "facts." Again, when James 

' Who, by the way, was Mr. Parker, born in Virginia, and 
never in England in his life. 



20 Naval War of 1 812 

(p. 165) states that Decatur ran away from the 
Macedonian until, by some marvellous optical de- 
lusion, he mistook her for a 32, he merely detracts 
a good deal from the worth of his own account. 
When the Americans adopt boarding helmets, he 
considers it as proving conclusively that they are 
suffering from an acute attack of cowardice. On 
p. 122 he says that "had the President, when she 
fell in • with the Belvidera, been cruising alone 
. . . Commodore Rodgers would have magni- 
fied the British frigate into a line-of-battle ship, 
and have done his utmost to avoid her," which 
gives an excellent idea of the weight to be attached 
to the various other anecdotes he relates of the 
much-abused Commodore Rodgers. 

But it must always be remembered that un- 
trustworthy as James is in anything referring 
purely to the Americans, he is no worse than his 
compeers of both nationalities. The misstate- 
ments of Niles in his Weekly Register about the 
British are quite as flagrant, and his information 
about his own side even more valuable.' Every 

' In Niles, by the way, can be found excellent examples of 
the traditional American "spread-eagle" style. In one place 
I remember his describing " The Immortal Rodgers," balked 
of his natural prey, the British, as "soaring about like the 
bold bald eagle of his native land," seeking whom he might 
devour. The accounts he gives of British line-of-battle 
ships fleeing from American 44's quite match James's anec- 
dotes of the latter's avoidance of British 38's and 36's for 



Naval War of 1 812 21 

little American author crowed over Perry's " Nel- 
sonic victory over a greatly superior force." The 
Constitution was declared to have been at a dis- 
advantage when she fought the Gnerriere, and so 
on, ad infinitum. But these writers have all faded 
into oblivion, and their writings are not even re- 
ferred to, much less believed. James, on the con- 
trary, has passed through edition after edition, is 
considered as unquestionable authority in his own 
country, and largely throughout Europe, and has 
furnished the basis for every subsequent account 
by British authors. From Alison to Lieutenant 
Low, almost every English work, whether of a 
popular character or not, is, in so far as it touches 
on the war, simply a "rehash" of the works writ- 
ten by James. The consequence is that the 
British and American accounts have astonishingly 
little resemblance. One ascribes the capture of 
the British frigates simply to the fact that their 
opponents were "cut down line-of-battle ships"; 
the other gives all the glory to the "undaunted 
heroism," etc., of the Yankee sailors. 

One not very creditable trait of the early Ameri- 
can naval historians gave their rivals a great 
advantage. The object of the former was to 

fear they might mount twenty-four -pounders. The two 
works taken together give a very good idea of the war; 
separately, either is utterly unreliable, especially in matters 
of opinion. 



22 Naval War of 1 812 

make out that the Constitution, for example, won 
her victories against an equal foe, and an exact 
statement of the forces showed the contrary; so 
they always avoided figures, and thus left the 
ground clear for James's careful misstatements. 
Even when they criticised him they never went 
into details, confining themselves to some remark 
about "hurhng" his figures in his face with 
" loathing." Even Cooper, interesting though his 
work is, has gone far less into figures than he 
should, and seems to have paid little, if any, at- 
tention to the British official statements, which 
of course should be received as of equal weight with 
the American. His comments on the actions are 
generally very fair, the book never being dis- 
figured by bitterness toward the British ; but he 
is certainly wrong, for example, in ascribing the 
loss of the Chesapeake solely to accident, that of 
the Argus solely to her inferiority in force, and so 
on. His disposition to praise all the American 
commanders may be generous, but is nevertheless 
unjust. If Decatur's surrender of the President 
is at least impliedly praised, then Porter's defence 
of the Essex can hardly receive its just award. 
There is no weight in the commendation bestowed 
upon Hull, if commendation, the same in kind 
though less in degree, is bestowed upon Rodgers. 
It is a great pity that Cooper did not write a 
criticism on James, for no one could have done it 



Naval War of 1812 23 

more thoroughly. But he never mentions him, 
except once in speaking of Barclay's fleet. In 
all probability this silence arose from sheer con- 
tempt, and the certainty that most of James's re- 
marks were false; but the effect was that very 
many foreigners believe him to have shirked the 
subject. He rarely gives any data by which the 
statements of James can be disproved, and it is 
for this reason that I have been obliged to criticise 
the latter' s work very fully. Many of James's re- 
marks, however, defy criticism from their random 
nature, as when he states that American midship- 
men were chiefly masters and mates of merchant- 
men, and does not give a single proof to support 
the assertion. It would be nearly as true to assert 
that the British midshipmen were for the most 
part ex-members of the prize-ring, and as much 
labor would be needed to disprove it. In other 
instances it is quite enough to let his words speak 
for themselves, as where he says (p. 155) that of 
the American sailors one third in number and 
one half in point of effectiveness were in reality 
British. That is, of the 450 men the Constitution 
had when she fought the Java, 150 were British, 
and the remaining 300 could have been as effec- 
tively replaced by 150 more British. So a very 
little logic works out a result that James certainly 
did not intend to arrive at: namely, that 300 
British led by American officers could beat, with 



24 Naval War of 1812 

ease and comparative impunity, 400 British led" 
by their own officers. He also forgets that the 
whole consists of the sum of the parts. He ac- 
counts for the victories of the Americans by 
stating (p. 280) that they were lucky enough to 
meet with frigates and brigs that had unskilful 
gunners or worthless crews; he also carefully 
shows that the Macedonian was incompetently 
handled, the Peacock commanded by a mere 
martinet, the Avon's crew unpractised at the guns, 
the Epervier's mutinous and cowardly, the Pen- 
guin s weak and unskilful, the Java's exceedingly 
poor, and more to the same effect. Now, the 
Americans took in single fight three frigates and 
seven sloops, and when as many as ten vessels 
are met it is exceedingly probable that they rep- 
resent the fair average; so that James's strictures, 
so far as true, simply show that the average 
British ship was very apt to possess, comparatively 
speaking, an incompetent captain or unskilful 
crew. These disadvantages were not felt when 
opposed to navies in which they existed to an 
even greater extent, but became very apparent 
when brought into contact with a power whose 
few officers knew how to play their own parts 
very nearly to perfection, and, something equally 
important, knew how to make first-rate crews out 
of what was already good raw material. Finally, 
a large proportion of James's abuse of the Ameri- 



Naval War of 1 812 25 

cans sufficiently refutes itself, and perhaps Coop- 
er's method of contemptuously disregarding him 
was the best; but no harm can follow from de- 
voting a little space to commenting upon him. 

Much the best American work is Lieutenant 
George E. Emmons's Statistical History of the 
United States Navy. Unfortunately, it is merely 
a mass of excellently arranged and classified sta- 
tistics, and while of invaluable importance to the 
student, it is not interesting to the average reader. 
Almost all the statements I have made of the 
force, tonnage, and armament of the American ves- 
sels, though I have, whenever practicable, taken 
them from the Naval Records, etc., yet could be 
just as well quoted from Emmons. Copies of most 
of the American official letters which I have quoted 
can be found in Niles's Weekly Register, volumes 
i. to X. and all of the British ones in the London 
Naval Chronicle for the same years. It is to 
these two authorities that I am most indebted, 
and nearly as much so to the American State 
Papers, vol. xiv. Next in order come Emmons, 
Cooper, and the invaluable, albeit somewhat scur- 
rilous, James; and a great many others whose 
names I have quoted in their proper places. In 
commenting upon the actions I have, whenever 
possible, drawn from some standard work, such 
as Jurien de la Graviere's Giierres Maritimes, Lord 
Howard Douglass's Naval Gunnery, or, better still, 



26 Naval War of 1812 

from the lives and memoirs of Admirals Farragut, 
Codrington, Broke, or Durham. The titles of the 
various works will be found given in full as they 
are referred to.' In a few cases, where extreme 
accuracy was necessary, or where, as in the case 
of the President's capture, it was desirable that 
there should be no room for dispute as to the 
facts, I have given the authority for each sen- 
tence; but in general this would be too cumber- 
some, and so I have confined myself to referring, 
at or near the beginning of the account of each 
action, to the authorities from whom I have taken 
it. For the less important facts, on which every 
one is agreed, I have often given no references. 

' To get an idea of the American seaman of that time 
Cooper's novels, Allies Wallingford, Home as Found, and The 
Pilot, are far better than any history; in the Two Admirals 
the description of the fleet manoeuvring is unrivalled. His 
view of Jack's life is rather rose-colored, however. Tom 
Cringle's Log ought to be read for the information it gives. 
Marryat's novels will show some of the darker aspects of 
sailor life. 



CHAPTER II 

Overwhelming naval supremacy of England when America 
declared war against her — Race identity of the combatants 
— The American navy at the beginning of the war — Officers 
well trained — Causes tending to make our seamen especially 
efficient — Close similarity between the British and American 
sailors — Our ships manned chiefly by native Americans, 
many of whom had formerly been impressed into the British 
navy — Quotas of seamen contributed by the different States 
— Navy yards — Lists of officers and men — List of vessels — 
Tonnage — Different ways of estimating it in Britain and 
America — Ratings — American ships properly rated — Arma- 
ments of the frigates and corvettes — Three styles of guns used 
— Difference between long guns and carronades — Short 
weight of American shot — Comparison of British frigates 
rating 38, and American frigates rating 44 guns — Compared 
with a 74. 

DURING the early years of this century, 
England's naval power stood at a height 
never reached before or since by that of 
any other nation. On every sea her navies rode, 
not only triumphant, but with none to dispute 
their sway. The island folk had long claimed the 
mastery of the ocean, and they had certainly suc- 
ceeded in making their claim completely good 
during the time of bloody warfare that followed 
the breaking out of the French Revolution. Since 
the year 1792, each European nation, in turn, 
had learned to feel bitter dread of the weight of 

27 



28 Naval War of 1812 

England's hand. In the Baltic, Sir Samuel Hood 
had taught the Russians that they must needs 
keep in port when the English cruisers were in the 
offing. The descendants of the Vikings had seen 
their whole navy destroyed at Copenhagen. No 
Dutch fleet ever put out after the day when, off 
Camperdown, Lord Duncan took possession of 
De Winter's shattered ships. But a few years 
before 181 2, the greatest sea-fighter of all time 
had died in Trafalgar Bay, and in dying had 
crumbled to pieces the navies of France and of 
Spain. 

From that day England's task was but to keep 
in port such of her foe's vessels as she had not 
destroyed. France alone still possessed fleets that 
could be rendered formidable, and so, from the 
Scheldt to Toulon, her harbors were watched and 
her coasts harried by the blockading squadrons 
of the English. Elsewhere, the latter had no fear 
of their power being seriously assailed ; but their 
vast commerce and numerous colonies needed 
ceaseless protection. Accordingly, in every sea 
their cruisers could be found, of all sizes, from the 
stately ship-of-the-line, with her tiers of heavy 
cannon and her many hundreds of men, down to 
the little cutter carrying but a score of souls and a 
couple of light guns. All these cruisers, but es- 
pecially those of the lesser rates, were continually 
brought into contact with such of the hostile ves- 



Naval War of 1 812 29 

sels as had run through the blockade, or were too 
small to be affected by it. French and Italian 
frigates were often caught and captured when 
they were skirting their own coasts, or had started 
off on a plundering cruise through the Atlantic, 
or to the Indian Ocean ; and though the Danes 
had lost their larger ships, they kept up a spirited 
warfare with brigs and gunboats. So the English 
marine was in constant exercise, attended with 
almost invariable success. 

Such was Great Britain's naval power when the 
Congress of the United States declared war upon 
her. While she could number her thousand sail, 
the American navy included but half-a-dozen 
frigates, and six or eight sloops and brigs ; and it 
is small matter for surprise that the British officers 
should have regarded their new foe with con- 
temptuous indifference. Hitherto, the xAjnerican 
seamen had never been heard of except in con- 
nection with two or three engagements with 
French frigates, and some obscure skirmishes 
against the Moors of Tripoli ; none of which could 
possibly attract attention in the years that saw 
Aboukir, Copenhagen, and Trafalgar. And yet 
these same petty wars were the school which 
raised our marines to the highest standard of 
excellence. A continuous course of victory, won 
mainly by seamanship, had made the English 
sailor overweeningly self-confident, and caused 



30 Naval War of 1812 

him to pay but little regard to manoeuvring or 
even to gunnery. Meanwhile, the American 
learned, by receiving hard knocks, how to give 
them, and belonged to a service too young to 
feel an over-confidence in itself. One side had let 
its training relax, while the other had carried it 
to the highest possible point. Hence our ships 
proved, on the whole, victorious in the apparently 
unequal struggle, and the men who had con- 
quered the best seamen of Europe were now in 
turn obliged to succumb. Compared with the 
great naval battles of the preceding few years, 
our bloodiest conflicts were mere skirmishes, but 
they were skirmishes between the hitherto ac- 
knowledged kings of the ocean, and new men who 
yet proved to be more than their equals. For 
over a hundred years, or since the time when they 
had contended on equal terms with the great 
Dutch admirals, the British had shown a decided 
superiority to their various foes, and during the 
latter quarter of the time this superiority, as 
already said, was very marked indeed; in con- 
sequence, the victories of the new enemy attracted 
an amount of attention altogether dispropor- 
tionate to their material effects. And it is a 
curious fact that our little navy, — in which the 
art of handling and fighting the old broadside 
sailing frigate in single conflict was brought to 
the highest point of perfection ever reached, — that 



Naval War of 1 8i 2 31 

this same navy should have contained the first 
representative of the modern war steamer, and 
also the torpedo — the two terrible engines which 
were to drive from the ocean the very white- 
winged craft that had first won honor for the 
starry flag. The tactical skill of Hull or Decatur 
is now of merely archaic interest, and has but 
little more bearing on the manoeuvering of a 
modern fleet than have the tactics of the Athenian 
gallies. But the war still conveys some most 
practical lessons as to the value of efficient ships 
and, above all, of efficient men in them. Had 
we only possessed the miserable gun-boats, our 
men could have done nothing; had we not pos- 
sessed good men, the heavy frigates would have 
availed us little. Poor ships and impotent artil- 
lery had lost the Dutch almost their entire navy; 
fine ships and heavy cannon had not saved the 
French and Spanish from the like fate. We owed 
our success to putting sailors even better than the 
Dutch on ships even finer than those built by the 
two Latin seaboard powers. 

The first point to be remembered in order to 
write a fair account of this war is that the differ- 
ence in fighting skill, which certainly existed be- 
tween the two parties, was due mainly to training, 
and not to the nature of the men. It seems cer- 
tain that the American had in the beginning some- 
what the advantage, because his surroundings, 



32 Naval War of 1 812 

partly physical and partly social and political, 
had forced him into habits of greater self-reliance. 
Therefore, on the average, he offered rather the 
best material to start with; but the difference 
was very slight, and totally disappeared under 
good training. The combatants were men of the 
same race, differing but little from one another. 
On the New England coast the English blood was 
as pure as in any part of Britain; in New York 
and New Jersey, it was mixed with that of the 
Dutch settlers — and the Dutch are by race nearer 
to the true old English of Alfred and Harold than 
are, for example, the thoroughly anglicized Welsh 
of Cornwall. Otherwise, the infusion of new 
blood into the English race on this side of the 
Atlantic has been chiefly from three sources — 
German, Irish, and Norse; and these three 
sources represent the elemental parts of the com- 
posite English stock in about the same proportions 
in which they were originally combined, — mainly 
Teutonic, largely Celtic, and with a Scandinavian 
admixture. The descendant of the German be- 
comes as much an Anglo-American as the de- 
scendant of the Strathclyde Celt has already 
become an Anglo-Briton. Looking through 
names of the combatants it would be difficult to 
find any of one navy that could not be matched 
in the other — Hull or Lawrence, Allen, Perry, or 
Stewart. And among all the English names on 



Naval War of 1 812 33 

both sides will be found many Scotch, Irish, or 
Welsh — McDonough, O'Brien, or Jones. Still 
stranger ones appear: the Huguenot Tattnall is 
one among the American defenders of the Con- 
stellation, and another Huguenot Tattnall is 
among the British assailants at Lake Borgne. 
It must always be kept in mind that the Ameri- 
cans and the British are two substantially similar 
branches of the great English race, which, both 
before and after their separation, have assimilated, 
and made Englishmen of, many other peoples/ 
The lessons taught by the war can hardly be 
learned unless this identity is kept in mind.^ 

To understand aright the efficiency of our navy, 
it is necessary to take a brief look at the character 

^ The inhabitants of Great Britain are best designated as 
"British" — English being either too narrow or too broad a 
term, in one case meaning the inhabitants of but a part of 
Britain, and in the other the whole Anglo-Saxon people. 

^ It was practically a civil war and was waged with much 
harshness and bitterness on both sides. I have already 
spoken of the numerous grievances of the Americans; the 
British, in turn, looked upon our blockade-runners which 
entered the French ports exactly as we regarded, at a later 
date, the British steamers that ran into Wilmington and 
Charleston. It is curious to see how illogical writers are. 
The careers of the Argiis and Alabama, for example, were 
strikingly similar in many ways, yet the same writer who 
speaks of one as an "heroic little brig," will call the other a 
"black pirate." Of course there can be no possible com- 
parison as to the causes for which the two vessels were 
fighting; but the cruises themselves were very much alike, 
both in character and history. 

VOL. I.— 3 



34 Naval War of 1812 

and antecedents of the ofBcers and men who served 
in it. 

When war broke out the United States Navy 
was but a few years old, yet it already had a far 
from dishonorable history. The captains and 
lieutenants of 18 12 had been taught their duties 
in a very practical school, and the flag under 
which they fought was endeared to them already 
by not a few glorious traditions — though these, 
perhaps, like others of their kind, had lost none 
of their glory in the telling. A few of the older 
men had served in the war of the Revolution, and 
all still kept fresh in mind the doughty deeds of 
the old-time privateering war-craft. Men still 
talked of Biddle's daring cruises and Barney's 
stubborn fights, or told of Scotch Paul and the 
grim work they had who followed his fortunes. 
Besides these memories of an older generation, 
most of the officers had themselves taken part, 
when younger in years and rank, in deeds not a 
whit less glorious. Almost every man had had a 
share in some gallant feat, to which he, in part at 
least, owed his present position. The captain had 
perhaps been a midshipman under Truxton when 
he took the Vengeance, and had been sent aboard 
the captured French frigate with the prize-master ; 
the lieutenant had borne a part in the various 
attacks on Tripoli, and had led his men in the 
desperate hand-to-hand fights in which the Yan- 



Naval War of 1 812 35 

kee cutlass proved an overmatch for the Turkish 
and Moorish scimitars. Nearly every senior offi- 
cer had extricated himself by his own prowess or 
skill from the dangers of battle or storm; he 
owed his rank to the fact that he had proved 
worthy of it. Thrown upon his own resources, 
he had learned self-reliance; he was a first-rate 
practical seaman, and prided himself on the way 
his vessel was handled. Having reached his rank 
by hard work, and knowing what real fighting 
meant, he was careful to see that his men were 
trained in the essentials of discipline, and that 
they knew how to handle the guns in battle as 
well as polish them in peace. Beyond almost any 
of his countrymen, he worshipped the "Gridiron 
Flag," and, having been brought up in the navy, 
regarded its honor as his own. It was, perhaps, 
the navy alone that thought itself a match, ship 
against ship, for Great Britain. The remainder 
of the nation pinned its faith to the army, or 
rather to that weakest of weak reeds, the militia. 
The officers of the navy, with their strong esprit 
de corps, their jealousy of their own name and 
record, and the knowledge, by actual experience, 
that the British ships sailed no faster and were no 
better handled than their own, had no desire to 
shirk a conflict with any foe, and, having tried 
their bravery in actual service, they made it 
doubly formidable by cool, wary skill. Even the 



36 Naval War of 1812 

younger men, who had never been in action, had 
been so well trained by the tried veterans over 
them that the lack of experience was not sensibly 
felt. 

The sailors comprising the crews of our ships 
were well worthy of their leaders. There was no 
better seaman in the world than American Jack; 
he had been bred to his work from infancy, and 
had been off in a fishing-dory almost as soon as 
he could walk. When he grew older, he shipped 
on a merchantman or whaler, and in those war- 
like times, when our large merchant-marine was 
compelled to rely pretty much on itself for pro- 
tection, each craft had to be well handled; all 
that were not, were soon weeded out by a process 
of natural selection, of which the agents were 
French picaroons, Spanish buccaneers, and Malay 
pirates. It was a rough school, but it taught 
Jack to be both skilful and self-reliant; and he 
was all the better fitted to become a man-of-war's 
man because he knew more about fire-arms than 
most of his kind in foreign lands. At home he 
had used his ponderous ducking-gun with good 
effect on the flocks of canvasbacks in the reedy 
flats of the Chesapeake, or among the sea-coots 
in the rough water off the New England cliffs; 
and when he went on a sailing voyage the 
chances were even that there would be some use 
for the long guns before he returned, for the 



Naval War of 1 8 1 2 37 

American merchant - sailor could trust to no 
armed escort. 

The wonderful effectiveness of our seamen at 
the date of which I am writing, as well as long 
subsequently to it, was largely due to the curious 
condition of things in Europe. For thirty years 
all the European nations had been in a state of 
continuous and very complicated warfare, during 
the course of which each nation in turn fought 
almost every other, England being usually at 
loggerheads with all. One effect of this was to 
force an enormous proportion of the carrying trade 
of the world into American bottoms. The old 
Massachusetts town of Salem was then one of the 
main depots of the East India trade; the Balti- 
more clippers carried goods into the French and 
German ports with small regard to the blockade; 
New Bedford and Sag Harbor fitted out whalers 
for the Arctic seas, as well as for the South Pacific ; 
the rich merchants of Philadelphia and New York 
sent their ships to all parts of the world; and 
every small port had some craft in the coasting 
trade. On the New England seaboard but few 
of the boys would reach manhood without having 
made at least one voyage to the Newfoundland 
Banks after codfish ; and in the whaling towns of 
Long Island it used to be an old saying that no 
man could marry till he struck his whale. The 
wealthy merchants of the large cities would often 



38 Naval War of 1812 

send their sons on a voyage or two before they let 
them enter their counting-houses. Thus it came 
about that a large portion of our population was 
engaged in seafaring pursuits of a nature strongly 
tending to develop a resolute and hardy character 
in the men that followed them. The British 
merchantmen sailed in huge convoys, guarded 
by men-of-war, while, as said before, our vessels 
went alone, and relied for protection on them- 
selves. If a fishing smack went to the Banks it 
knew that it ran a chance of falling in with some 
not over-scrupulous Nova Scotian privateer. The 
barques that sailed from Salem to the Spice 
Islands kept their men well trained both at great 
guns and musketry, so as to be able to beat off 
either Malay proas or Chinese junks. The New 
York ships, loaded for the West Indies, were pre- 
pared to do battle with the picaroons that 
swarmed in the Spanish main; while the fast 
craft from Baltimore could fight as well as they 
could run. Wherever an American seaman went, 
he not only had to contend with all the legitimate 
perils of the sea, but he had also to regard almost 
every stranger as a foe. Whether this foe called 
himself pirate or privateer mattered but little. 
French, Spaniards, Algerines, Malays, — from all 
alike our commerce suffered, and against all our 
merchants were forced to defend themselves. The 
effect of such a state of things, which made com- 



Naval War of 1 812 39 

merce so remunerative that the bolder spirits 
could hardly keep out of it, and so hazardous 
that only the most skilful and daring could suc- 
ceed in it, was to raise up as fine a set of seamen 
as ever manned a navy. The stern school in 
which the American was brought up, forced him 
into habits of independent thought and action 
which it was impossible that the more protected 
Briton could possess. He worked more intelli- 
gently and less from routine, and while perfectly 
obedient and amenable to discipline, was yet able 
to judge for himself in an emergency. He was 
more easily managed than most of his kind — be- 
ing shrewd, quiet, and, in fact, comparatively 
speaking, rather moral than otherwise; if he was 
a New Englander, when he retired from a sea life 
he was not unapt to end his days as a deacon. 
Altogether, there could not have been better 
material for a fighting crew than cool, gritty 
American Jack. Moreover, there was a good 
nucleus of veterans to begin with, who were well 
fitted to fill the more responsible positions, such 
as captains of guns, etc. These were men who 
had cruised in the little Enterprise after French 
privateers, who had been in the Constellation in 
her two victorious fights, or who, perhaps, had 
followed Decatur when with only eighty men he 
cut out the Philadelphia, manned by fivefold his 
force and surrounded by hostile batteries and war 



40 Naval War of 1812 

vessels, — one of the boldest expeditions of the 
kind on record. 

It is to be noted, furthermore, in this connec- 
tion, that by a singular turn of fortune, Great 
Britain, whose system of impressing American 
sailors had been one of the chief causes of the war, 
herself became, in consequence of that very sys- 
tem, in some sort a nursery for the seamen of the 
young Republican navy. The American sailor 
feared nothing more than being impressed on a 
British ship — dreading beyond measure the hard 
life and cruel discipline aboard of her; but once 
there, he usually did well enough, and in course of 
time often rose to be of some little consequence. 
For years before 181 2, the number of these im- 
pressed sailors was in reality greater than the 
entire number serving in the American navy, 
from which it will be readily seen that they formed 
a good stock to draw upon. Very much to their 
credit, they never lost their devotion to the home 
of their birth, more than two thousand of them 
being imprisoned at the beginning of the war be- 
cause they refused to serve against their country. 
When Commodore Decatur captured the Mace- 
donian, that officer, as we learn from Marshall's 
Naval Biography (ii., p. 10 19), stated that most of 
the seamen of his own frigate, the United States, 
had served in British war vessels, and that some 
had been with Lord Nelson in the Victory, and 



Naval War of 1 812 41 

had even been bargemen to the great Admiral, — 
a pretty sure proof that the American sailors did 
not show to a disadvantage when compared with 
others.' 

Good seaman as the impressed American proved 
to be, yet he seldom missed an opportunity to 
escape from the British service, by desertion or 
otherwise. In the first place, the life was very 
hard, and, in the second, the American seaman 
was very patriotic. He had an honest and deep 
affection for his own flag, while, on the contrary, 
he felt a curiously strong hatred for England, as 
distinguished from Englishmen. This hatred was 
partly an abstract feeling, cherished through a 
vague traditional respect for Bunker Hill, and 

' With perfect gravity, James and his followers assume De- 
catur's statement to be equivalent to saying that he had 
chiefly British seamen on board; whereas, even as quoted by 
Marshall, Decatur merely said that "his seamen had served 
on board a British man-of-war," and that some "had served 
under Lord Nelson." Like the Constitution, the United 
States had rid herself of most of the British subjects on 
board, before sailing. Decatur's remark simply referred to 
the number of his American seamen who had been impressed 
on board British ships. Whenever James says that an 
American ship had a large proportion of British sailors 
aboard, the explanation is that a large number of the crew 
were Americans who had been impressed on British ships. 
It would be no more absurd to claim Trafalgar as an American 
victory because there was a certain number of Americans in 
Nelson's fleet, than it is to assert that the Americans were 
victorious in 1812 because there were a few renegade British 
on board their ships. 



42 Naval War of 1 8 1 2 

partly something very real and vivid, owing to 
the injuries he, and others like him, had received. 
Whether he lived in Maryland or Massachusetts, 
he certainly knew men whose ships had been 
seized by British cruisers, their goods confiscated, 
and the vessels condemned. Some of his friends 
had fallen victims to the odious right of search, 
and had never been heard of afterward. He had 
suffered many an injury to friend, fortune, or 
person, and some day he hoped to repay them all; 
and when the war did come, he fought all the 
better because he knew it was in his own quarrel. 
But, as I have said, this hatred was against Eng- 
land, not against Englishmen. Then, as now, 
sailors were scattered about over the world with- 
out any great regard for nationality; and the 
resulting intermingling of natives and foreigners 
in every mercantile marine was especially great 
in those of Britain and America, whose people 
spoke the same tongue and wore the same aspect. 
When chance drifted the American into Liver- 
pool or London, he was ready enough to ship in an 
Indiaman or whaler, caring little for the fact that 
he served under the British flag; and the Briton, 
in turn, who found himself in New York or Phila- 
delphia, willingly sailed in one of the clipper- 
built barques, whether it floated the Stars and 
Stripes or not. When Captain Porter wrought 
such havoc among the British whalers in the South 



Naval War of 1812 43 

Seas, he found that no inconsiderable portion of 
their crews consisted of Americans, some of whom 
enlisted on board his own vessel; and among 
the crews of the American whalers were many 
British. In fact, though the skipper of each ship 
might brag loudly of his nationality, yet in prac- 
tical life he knew well enough that there was very 
little to choose between a Yankee and a Briton.^ 
Both were bold and hardy, cool and intelligent, 
quick with their hands, and showing at their best 
in an emergency. They looked alike and spoke 

' What choice there was, was in favor of the American. In 
point of courage, there was no difference whatever. The 
Essex and the Lawrence, as well as the Frolic and the Reindeer, 
were defended with the same stubborn, desperate, cool brav- 
ery that marks the English race on both sides of the Atlantic. 
But the American was a free citizen, any one's equal, a voter 
with a personal interest in his country's welfare, and, above 
all, without having perpetually before his eyes the degrading 
fear of the press-gang. In consequence, he was more trac- 
table than the Englishman, more self-reliant, and possessed 
greater judgment. In the fight between the Wasp and the 
Frolic, the latter's crew had apparently been well trained at 
the guns, for they aimed well; but they fired at the wrong 
time, and never corrected the error, while their antagonists, 
delivering their broadsides far more slowly, by intelligently 
waiting until the proper moment, worked frightful havoc. 
But though there was a certain slight difference between the 
seamen of the two nations, it must never be forgotten that 
it was very much less than that between the various indi- 
viduals of the same nation; and when the British had been 
trained for a few j^ears by such commanders as Broke and 
Manners, it was impossible to surpass them, and it needed 
our best men to equal them. 



44 Naval War of 1 812 

alike ; when they took the trouble to think, they 
thought alike ; and when they got drunk, which was 
not an infrequent occurrence, they quarrelled alike. 

Mingled with them were a few seamen of other 
nationalities. The Irishman, if he came from the 
old Dano-Irish towns of Waterford, Dublin, and 
Wexford, or from the Ulster coast, was very much 
like the two chief combatants ; the Celto-Turanian 
kern of the West did not often appear on ship- 
board. The French, Danes, and Dutch were 
hemmed in at home; they had enough to do on 
their own seaboard, and could not send men into 
foreign fleets. A few Norse, however, did come 
in, and excellent sailors and fighters they made. 
With the Portuguese and Italians, of whom some 
were to be found serving under the Union -Jack, 
and others under the Stars and Stripes, it was 
different; although there were many excellent 
exceptions they did not, as a rule, make the best 
kind of seamen. They were treacherous, fond of 
the knife, less ready with their hands, and likely 
to lose either their wits or their courage when in 
a tight place. 

In the American navy, unlike the British, there 
was no impressment; the sailor was a volunteer, 
and he shipped in whatever craft his fancy 
selected. Throughout the war there were no 
"picked crews" on the American side,' excepting 

* James's statements to the contrary being in every case 



Naval War of 1 812 45 

on the last two cruises of the Constitution. In 
fact (as seen by the letter of Captain Stewart 
and Bainbridge to Secretary Hamilton) , there was 
often much difficulty in getting enough men.' 
Many sailors preferred to serve in the innumerable 
privateers, and the two above-mentioned officers, 
in urging the necessity of building line-of -battle 
ships, state that it was hard work to recruit men 

utterly without foundation. He is also wrong in his asser- 
tion that the American ships had no boys; they had nearly 
as many in proportion as the British. The Constitution had 
31, the Adams 15, etc. So, when he states that our mid- 
shipmen were generally masters and mates of merchantmen; 
they were generally from eleven to seventeen years old at the 
beginning of the war, and, besides, had rarely or never been 
in the merchant-marine. 

' Reading about this war through the volumes of official let- 
ters, which are preserved in the office of the Secretary of the 
Navy, one of the most noticeable things is the continual com- 
plaints about the difficulty of getting men. The Adams at 
one time had a crew of but nineteen men — "fourteen of 
whom are marines," adds the aggrieved commander. A 
log-book of one of the gun-boats records the fact that, after 
much difficulty, two men were enlisted — from the jail, with a 
oarenthctical memorandum to the effect that they were both 
very drunk. British ships were much more easily manned, 
as they could always have recourse to impressment. 

The Constitution, on starting out on her last cruises, had an 
extraordinary number of able seamen aboard, viz., 218, with 
but 92 ordinary seamen, 12 boys, and 44 marines, — making, 
with the officers, a total of 440 men. (See letter of Captain 
Bainbridge, October 16, 1814; it is letter No. 51, in the 
fortieth volume of Captains' Letters, in the clerk's office of 
the Secretary of the Navy.) 



46 Naval War of 1812 

for vessels of an inferior grade, so long as the 
emeny had ships-of-the-line. 

One of the standard statements made by the 
British historians about this war is that our ships 
were mainly or largely manned by British sailors. 
This, if true, would not interfere with the lessons 
which it teaches; and, besides that, it is 7iot true. 

In this, as in everything else, all the modern 
writers have merely followed James or Brenton, 
and I shall accordingly confine myself to examin- 
ing their assertions. The former begins (vol. iv., 
p. 470) by diffidently stating that there is a " simi- 
larity" of language between the inhabitants of 
the two countries — an interesting philological dis- 
covery that but few will attempt to controvert. 
In vol. vi., p. 154, he mentions that a number of 
blanks occur in the American Navy List in the 
column "Where Born"; and in proof of the fact 
that these blanks are there because the men were 
not Americans, he says that their names "are all 
English and Irish." ' They certainly are; and 

* For example, James writes: " Out of the 32 captains, one 
only, Thomas Tingey, has England marked as his birthplace. 
. . . Three blanks occur, and we consider it rather credit- 
able to Captains John Shaw, Daniel S. Patterson, and John 
Ord Creighton, that they were ashamed to tell where they 
were bom." I have not been able to find out the latter's 
birthplace, but Captain Shaw was bom in New York, and I 
have seen Captain Patterson incidentally alluded to as "bom 
and bred in America." Generally, whenever I have been 
able to fill up the vacancies in the column "Where Bom," 



Naval War of 1 812 .47 

so are all the other names in the list. It could 
not well be otherwise, as the United States Navy- 
was not officered by Indians. In looking over 
this same Navy List (of 18 16) it will be seen that 
but a little over five per cent, of the officers were 
bom abroad — a smaller proportion by far than 
would exist in the population of the country at 
large — and most of these had come to America 
when under ten years of age. On p. 155, James 
adds that the British sailors composed " one third 
in number and one half in point of effectiveness" 
of the American crews. Brenton, in his Naval 
History, "^ writes : " It was said, and I have no reason 
to doubt the fact, that there were two hundred 
British seamen aboard the Constitution. These 
statements are mere assertions, unsupported by 
proof and of such a loose character as to be diffi- 
cult to refute. As our navy was small, it may 
be best to take each ship in turn. The only ones 
of which the British could write authoritatively 
were, of course, those which they captured. The 
first one taken was the Wasp. James says many 
British were discovered among her crew, instan- 
cing especially one sailor named Jack Lang ; now, 
Jack Lang was born in the town of Brunswick, 

I have found that it was in America. From these facts it 
would appear that James was somewhat hasty in concluding 
that the omission of the birthplace proved the owner of the 
name to be a native of Great Britain. 

'New edition. London, 1837, vol. ii., p. 456. 



4^ • " Naval War of 1 8 1 2 

New Jersey, but had been impressed and forced to 
serve in the British navy. The same was doubtless 
true of the rest of the "many British" seamen of 
her crew; at any rate, as the only instance James 
mentions (Jack Lang) was an American, he can 
hardly be trusted for those whom he does not 
name. 

Of the ninety-five men composing the crew of 
the Nautilus when she was captured, "six were 
detained and sent to England to await examina- 
tion as being suspected of being British subjects." ' 
Of the other small brigs, the Viper, Vixen, Rattle- 
snake, and Syren, James does not mention the 
composition of the crew, and I do not know that 
any were claimed as British. Of the crew of the 
Argus, "about ten or twelve were believed to 
be British subjects; the American officers swore 
the crew contained none" (James, Naval Occur- 
rences, p. 278). From o to 10 per cent, can be 
allowed. When the Frolic was captured "her 

' Quoted from letter of Commodore Rodgers of September 
12, 18 1 2 (in Naval Archives, Captains' Letters, vol. xxv., 
No. 43), enclosing a "List of American prisoners of war 
discharged out of custody of Lieutenant William Miller, 
agent at the port of Halifax," in exchange for some of the 
British captured by Porter. This list, by the way, shows the 
crew of the Nautilus (counting the six men detained as 
British) to have been 95 in number, instead of 106, as stated 
by James. Commodore Rodgers adds that he has detained 
twelve men of the Guerricre's crew as an offset to the six men 
belonging to the Nautilus. 



Naval War of 1 8 1 2 49 

crew consisted of native Americans" {do. p. 340). 
James speaks (History, p. 418) of "a portion of 
the British subjects on board the Essex," but 
without giving a word of proof or stating his 
grounds of belief. One man was claimed as a 
deserter by the British, but he turned out to be 
a New Yorker. There were certainly a certain 
number of British aboard, but the number prob- 
ably did not exceed thirty. Of the President's 
crew, he says (Naval Occurrences, p. 448): "In 
the opinion of several British officers there were 
among them many British seamen " ; but Com.mo- 
dore Decatur, Lieutenant Gallagher, and the other 
ofiicers swore that there were none. Of the crew 
of the Chesapeake, he says, "about thirty-two" 
were British subjects, or about ten per cent. One 
or two of these were afterward shot, and some 
twenty-five, together with a Portuguese boat- 
swain's mate, entered into the British service. 
So that, of the vessels captured by the British, 
the Chesapeake had the largest number of British 
(about ten per cent, of her crew) on board, the 
others ranging from that number down to none 
at all, as in the case of the Wasp. 

As these eleven ships would probably represent 
a fair average, this proportion, of from o to 10 
per cent., should be taken as the proper one. 
James, however, is of the opinion that those ships 
manned by Americans were more apt to be 

VOL. I.— 4 



50 Naval War of 1 812 

captured than those manned by the braver British; 
which calls for an examination of the crews of the 
remaining vessels. Of the American sloop Pea- 
cock, James says (Naval Occurrences, p. 348) that 
"several of her men were recognized as British 
seamen"; even if this were true, "several" could 
not probably mean more than sixteen, or ten per 
cent. Of the second Wasp, he says: "Captain 
Blakely was a native of Dublin, and, along with 
some English and Scotch, did not, it may be cer- 
tain, neglect to have in his crew a great many 
Irish." Now, Captain Blakely left Ireland when 
he was but sixteen months old, and the rest of 
James's statement is avowedly mere conjecture. 
It was asserted positively in the American 
newspapers that the Wasp, which sailed from 
Portsmouth, was manned exclusively by New 
Englanders, except a small draft of men from 
a Baltimore privateer, and that there was not a 
foreigner in her crew. Of the Hornet, James states 
that " some of her men were natives of the United 
Kingdom"; but he gives no authority, and the 
men he refers to were in all probability those 
spoken of in the journal of one of the Hornet's 
officers, which says that "many of our men 
(Americans) had been impressed in the British 
service. ' ' As regards the gun-boats, James asserts 
that they were commanded by "Commodore 
Joshua Barney, a native of Ireland." This officer, 



Naval War of 1812 51 

however, was bom at Baltimore on July 6, 1759. 
As to the Constitution, Brenton, as already men- 
tioned, supposes the number of British sailors in 
her crew to have been two hundred ; James makes 
it less, or about one hundred and fifty. Respect- 
ing this, the only definite statements I can find in 
British works are the following: In the Naval 
Chronicle, vol. xxix., p. 452, an officer of the Java 
states that most of the Constitution's men were 
British, many being from the Guerriere; which 
should be read in connection with James's state- 
ment (vol. i., p. 156) that but eight of the Guer- 
riere's crew deserted, and but two shipped on 
board the Constitution. Moreover, as a matter of 
fact, these eight men were all impressed Ameri- 
cans. In the Naval Chronicle it is also said that 
the Chesapeake's surgeon was an Irishman, for- 
merly of the British navy; he was born in Balti- 
more, and was never in the British navy in his 
life. The third lieutenant "was supposed to be 
an Irishman" (Brenton, ii., 456). The first lieu- 
tenant "was a native of Great Britain, we have 
been informed" (James, vi., 194); he was Mr. 
George Parker, born and bred in Virginia. The 
remaining three citations, if true, prove nothing. 
"One man had served under Mr. Kent" of the 
Guerriere (James, vi., p. 153). "One had been in 
the Achille" and "one in the Eurydice" (Brenton, 
ii., 456). These three men were most probably 



52 Naval War of 1812 

American seamen who had been impressed on 
British ships. From Cooper (in Putnam's Maga- 
zine, vol. i., p. 593) as well as from several places 
in the Constitution's log/ we learn that those of 
the crew who were British deserters were dis- 
charged from the Constitution before she left port, 
as they were afraid to serve in a war against Great 
Britain. That this fear was justifiable may be 
seen by reading James, vol. iv., p. 483. Qf the 
four men taken by the Leopard from the Chesa- 
peake, as deserters, one was hung and three 
scourged. In reality, the crew of the Constitution 
probably did not contain a dozen British sailors; 
in her last cruises she was manned almost ex- 
clusively by New Englanders. The only remain- 
ing vessel is the United States, respecting whose 
crew some remarkable statements have been made. 
Marshall (vol. ii., p. 1019) writes that Commodore 
Decatur "declared there was not a seaman in his 
ship who had not served from five to twelve years 
in a British man-of-war," from which he concludes 
that 'they were British themselves. It may be 

' See her log-book (vol. ii., Feb. i, 1812, to Dec. 13, 1813) ; 
especially on July 12th, when twelve men were discharged. 
In some of Hull's letters he alludes to the desire of the British 
part of the crew to serve on the gun-boats or in the ports; 
and then writes that, "in accordance with the instructions 
sent him by the Secretary of the Navy, " he had allowed the 
British-bom portion to leave the ship. The log-books are 
in the Bureau of Navigation. 



Naval War of 1 812 53 

questioned whether Decatur ever made such an 
assertion ; or, if he did, it is safe to assume again 
that his men were long-impressed Americans.' 

Of the Carolina's crew of seventy men, five 
were British. This fact was not found out till 
three deserted, when an investigation was made 
and the two other British discharged. Captain 

' At the beginning of the war there were on record in the 
American State Department 6257 cases of impressed Ameri- 
can seamen. These could represent but a small part of the 
whole, which must have amounted to 20,000 men, or more 
than sufficient to man our entire navy five times over. 
According to the British Admiralty Report to the House of 
Commons. February i, 1815, 2548 impressed American sea- 
men, who refused to serve against their country, were im- 
prisoned in 181 2. According to Lord Castlereagh's speech in 
the House, February 18, 1813, 3300 men claiming to be 
American subjects were serving in the British navy in 
January, 181 1, and he certainly did not give anything like 
the whole number. In the American service, the term of 
enlistment extended for two years, and the frigate United 
States, referred to, had not had her crew for any great length 
of time as yet. If such a crew were selected at random from 
American sailors, among them there would be, owing to the 
small number serving in our own navy and the enormous 
number impressed into the British navy, probably but one of 
the former to two of the latter. As already mentioned, the 
American always left a British man-of-war as soon as he 
could, by desertion or discharge; but he had no unwilling- 
ness to serve in the home navy, where the pay was larger, 
and the discipHne far more humane, not to speak of motives 
of patriotism. Even if the ex-British man-of-war's man 
kept out of service for some time, he would be very apt to 
enlist when a war broke out which his country undertook 
largely to avenge his own wrongs. 



54 Naval War of 1812 

Henly, in reporting these facts, made no conceal- 
ment of his surprise that there should be any 
British at all in his crew.' 

From these facts and citations we may accord- 
ingly conclude that the proportion of British sea- 
men serving on American ships, after the war broke 
out, varied between none, as on the Wasp and 
Constitution, to ten per cent., as on the Chesa- 
peake and Essex. On the average, nine tenths of 
each of our crews were American seamen, and 
about one twentieth British, the remainder being 
a mixture of various nationalities. 

On the other hand, it is to be said that the British 
frigate Guerriere had ten Americans among her 
crew, who were permitted to go below during 
action, and the Macedonian eight, who were not 
allowed that privilege, three of them being killed. 
Three of the British sloop Peacock's men were 
Americans, who were forced to fight against the 
Hornet; one of them was killed. Two of the 
Epervier's men were Americans, who were also 
forced to fight. When the crew of the Nautilus 
was exchanged, a number of other American pris- 
oners were sent with them; among these were a 
number of American seamen who had been serving 
in the Shannon, Acasta, Africa, and various other 
vessels So there was also a certain proportion 

' See his letter in Letters of Masters-Commandant, 1814, i., 
No. 1 16. 



Naval War of 1812 



55 



of Americans among the British crews, although 
forming a smaller percentage of them than the 
British did on board the American ships. In 
neither case was the number sujfficient to at all 
affect the result. 

The crews of our ships being thus mainly native 
Americans, it may be interesting to try to find 
out the proportions that were furnished by the 
different sections of the country. There is not 
much difficulty about the officers. The captains, 
masters-commandant, lieutenants, marine offi- 
cers, whose birthplaces are given in the Navy 
List of 1 81 6, — 240 in all, — came from the various 
States as follows : 



f 



N. H., 
New England s ^ , ' 
l^ Conn . , 



Middle States 



District of Columbia ■{ D. C, 

r Md., 
Va.. 
N. C, 
S. C, 




43 



78 



Southern States •< 



Ga., 
La., 

I Ky., 



Total of given birthplaces. 



340 



56 Naval War of 1 812 

Thus, Maryland furnished, both absolutely and 
proportionately, the greatest number of officers- 
Virginia, then the most populous of all the States, 
coming next; four-fifths of the remainder came 
from the Northern States. 

It is more difficult to get at the birthplaces of the 
sailors. Something can be inferred from the num- 
ber of privateers and letters of marque fitted out. 
Here Baltimore again headed the list; following 
closely came New York, Philadelphia, and the 
New England coast towns, with, alone among 
the Southern ports, Charleston, S. C. A more 
accurate idea of the quotas of sailors furnished 
by the different sections can be arrived at by 
comparing the total amount of tonnage the 
country possessed at the outbreak of the war. 
Speaking roughly, 44 per cent, of it belonged to 
New England, 32 per cent, to the Middle States, 
and II per cent, to Maryland. This makes it 
probable (but of course not certain) that three- 
fourths of the common sailors hailed from the 
Northern States, half the remainder from Mary- 
land, and the rest chiefly from Virginia and South 
Carolina. 

Having thus discussed somewhat at length the 
character of our officers and crews, it will now be 
necessary to present some statistical tables to 
give a more accurate idea of the composition of 



Original cost 


Mi 


inimum number of 
men employed 


$ 5,500 




10 


39.214 




20 


40,000 




102 


37,000 




13 


4,000 




36 


12,000 




16 



Naval War of 181 2 57 

the navy — the tonnage, complements, and arma- 
ments of the ships, etc. 

At the beginning of the war the Government 
possessed six navy yards (all but the last estab- 
lished in 1 80 1 ) , as follows ' : 

Place 

1 Portsmouth, N. H. 

2 Charlestown, Mass. 

3 New York 

4 Philadelphia 

5 Washington 

6 Gosport 

In 181 2, the following was the number of officers 
in the navy "^ : 

12 captains 

10 masters-commandant 
73 lieutenants 
53 masters 
310 midshipmen 
42 marine officers 

500 

At the opening of the year, the number of sea- 
men, ordinary seamen, and boys in service was 
4010, and enough more were recruited to increase 
it to 5230, of whom only 2346 were destined for 
the cruising war vessels, the remainder being de- 
tailed for forts, gunboats, navy yards, the lakes, 

' Report of Naval Secretary Jones, November 30, 18 14. 
'List of Vessels, etc., by Geo. H. Preble, U.S.N. (1874). 



58 Naval War of 1 812 

etc The marine corps was already ample, con- 
sisting of 1523 men.^ 

No regular navy lists were published till 18 16, 
and I have been able to get very little informa- 
tion respecting the increase in officers and men 
during 181 3 and 1814; but we have full returns 
for 1 8 1 5 , which may be summarized as follows ^ : 

30 captains 

25 masters-commandant 
141 lieutenants 

24 commanders 
510 midshipmen 
230 sailing-masters 
50 surgeons 
12 chaplains 
50 pursers 
10 coast pilots 
45 captain's clerks 
80 surgeon's mates 

530 boatswains, gunners, carpenters, and sail-makers 
268 boatswain's mates, gunner's mates, etc. 
1,106 quarter gunners, etc. 
5,000 able seamen 
6,849 ordinary seamen and boys. 

Making a total of 14,960, with 2,715 marines.4 

Comparing this list with the figures given be- 
fore, it can be seen that during the course of the 
war our navy grew enormously, increasing to be- 
tween three and four times its original size. 

I Report of Secretary Paul Hamilton, February 21, 1812. 
^ Ibid. 

3Seybert's Statistical Annals, p. 676 (Philadelphia, 1818). 
4 Report of Secretary B. W. Crowninshield, April 18, 1816. 



Naval War of 1812 59 

At the beginning of the year 181 2, the navy of 
the United States on the ocean consisted of the 
following vessels, which either were, or could have 
been, made available during the war ' : 

Cost 

$299,336 

302,718 
220,910 

314,212 
197,246 

220,677 

139.362 

76,622 

52,603 

40,000 

37.428 
32.521 
18,763 

20,872 
16,240 



There also appeared on the lists the New York, 
36, Boston, 28, and John Adams, 28. The two 
former were condemned hulks; the latter was 
entirely rebuilt after the war. The Hornet was 
originally a brig of 440 tons, and 18 guns; having 

' Letter of Secretary Benjamin Stoddart to Fifth Congress, 
December 24, 1798; Letters of Secretarj- Paul Hamilton, Feb- 
ruary 21, 1812 ; American State Papers, vol. xix., p. 149. See 
also The History of the Navy of the United States, by Lieut. G. 
E. Emmons, U. S. N. (published in Washington, 1853, under 
the authority of the Navy Department) . 



(J^s) Name 


Where Built 


44 


United States 


Philadelphia 


44 


Constitution 


Boston 


44 


President 


New York 


38 


Constellation 


Baltimore 


38 


Congress 


Portsmouth 


38 


Chesapeake 


Norfolk 


32 


Essex 


Salem 


28 


Adams 


New York 


iS 


Hornet 


Baltimore 


18 


Wasp 


Washington 


16 


Argus 


Boston 


16 


Syren 


Philadelphia 


14 


Nautilus 


Baltimore 


14 


Vixen 


Baltimore 


12 


Enterprise 


Baltimore 


12 


Viper 


Purchased 



When 


Ton- 


Built 


nage 


1797 


1576 


1797 


1576 


1800 


1576 


1797 


1265 


1799 


1268 


1799 


1244 


1799 


860 


1799 


560 


1805 


480 


1806 


450 


1803 


298 


1803 


250 


1803 


185 


1803 


185 


1799 


165 


1810 


148 



6o Naval War of 1812 

been transformed into a ship, she was pierced for 
20 guns, and in size was of an intermediate grade 
between the Wasp and the heavy sloops, built 
somewhat later, of 509 tons. Her armament con- 
sisted of 3 2 -pound carronades, with the exception 
of the two bow-guns, which were long 12's. The 
whole broadside was, in nominal weight, just 300 
pounds ; in actual weight, about 277 pounds. Her 
complement of men was 140, but during the war 
she generally left port with 150.' The Wasp had 
been a ship from the beginning, mounted the 
number of guns she rated (of the same calibres 
as the Hornet's) and carried some ten men less. 
She was about the same length as the British 18- 
gun brig-sloop, but, being narrower, measured 
nearly 30 tons less. The Argus and Syren were 
similar and very fine brigs, the former being the 
longer. Each carried two more guns than she 
rated; and the Argus, in addition, had a couple 
thrust through the bridle-ports. The guns were 
24-pound carronades, with two long 12's for bow- 
chasers. The proper complement of men was 
100, but each sailed usually with about 125. The 
four smaller craft were originally schooners, armed 
with the same number of light long guns as they 

I In the Hornet's log of October 25, 1812, while in port, it is 
mentioned that she had 158 men; four men who were sick 
were left behind before she started. (See, in the Navy- 
Archives, the Log-book, Hornet, Wasp, and Argus, July 20, 
1809, to October, 1813.) 



Naval War of 1 812 61 

rated, and carrying some 70 men apiece; but 
they had been very effectually ruined by being 
changed into brigs, with crews increased to a 
hundred men. Each was armed with 18-pound 
carronades, carrying two more than she rated. 
The Enterprise, in fact, mounted 16 guns, having 
two long 9's thrust through the bridle-ports. 
These little brigs were slow, not very seaworthy, 
and overcrowded with men and guns; they all 
fell into the enemy's hands without doing any 
good whatever, with the single exception of the 
Enterprise, which escaped capture by sheer good 
luck, and in her only battle happened to be pitted 
against one of the corresponding and equally bad 
class of British gun-brigs. The Adams, after sev- 
eral changes of form, finally became a flush-decked 
corvette. The Essex had originally mounted 
twenty-six long 12's on her main-deck, and sixteen 
24-pound carronades on her spar-deck; but official 
wisdom changed this, giving her 46 guns, twenty- 
four 32-pound carronades, and two long 12's on 
the main-deck, and sixteen 3 2 -pound carronades 
with four long 12's on the spar-deck. When Cap- 
tain Porter had command of her he was deeply 
sensible of the disadvantages of an armament 
which put him at the mercy of any ordinary antag- 
onist who could choose his distance ; accordingly, 
he petitioned several times, but always without 
success, to have his long 12's returned to him. 



62 Naval War of 1812 

The American 38's were about the size of the 
British frigates of the same rate, and armed 
almost exactly in the same way, each having 
twenty-eight long i8's on the main-deck and 
twenty 3 2 -pound carronades on the spar-deck. 
The proper complement was 300 men, but each 
carried from 40 to 80 more.' ^ 

Our three 44-gun ships were the finest frigates 
then afloat (although the British possessed some 
as heavy, such as the Egyptienne, 44) . They were 
beautifully modelled, with very thick scantling, 
extremely stout masts, and heavy cannon. Each 
carried on her main-deck thirty long 24's, and 
on her spar-deck two long bow-chasers, and 
twenty or twenty-two carronades — 4 2 -pounders 

' The Chesapeake, by some curious mistake, was frequently 
rated as a 44, and this drew in its train a number of attendant 
errors. James says that when she was captured, in one of 
her lockers was found a letter, dated in February, 181 1, from 
Robert Smith, the Secretary of War, to Captain Evans, at 
Boston, directing him to open houses of rendezvous for man- 
ning the Chesapeake, and enumerating her crew at a total of 
443. Naturally, this gave British historians the idea that 
such was the ordinary complement of our 3S-gun frigates. 
But the ordering so large a crew was merely a mistake, as 
may be seen by a letter from Captain Bainbridge to the 
Secretary of the Navy, which is given in full in the Captains' 
Letters, vol. xxv.. No. 19 (Navy Archives) . In it he mentions 
the extraordinary number of men ordered for the Chesapeake, 
saying: "There is a mistake in the crew ordered for the 
Chesapeake , as it equals in number the crews of our 44-gun 
frigates, whereas the Chesapeake is of the class of the Congress 
and Constellation." 



Naval War of 1812 63 

on the President and United States, 32-pounders 
on the Constitution. Each sailed with a crew of 
about 450 men — 50 in excess of the regular 
complement.' 

It may be as well to mention here the only- 
other class of vessels that we employed during 
the war. This was composed of the ship-sloops 
built in 1 81 3, which got to sea in 181 4. They 
were very fine vessels, measuring 509 tons apiece,^ 
with very thick scantling and stout masts and 
spars. Each carried twenty 3 2 -pound carronades 
and two long 12's with a crew nominally of 160 
men, but with usually a few supernumeraries.^ 

' The President, when in action with the Endymion, had 450 
men aboard, as sworn by Decatur; the muster-roll of the 
Constitution, a few days before her action with the Guerriere, 
contains 464 names (including 51 marines); eight men were 
absent in a prize, so she had aboard, in the action, 456. Her 
muster-roll just before the action with the Cyane and Levant 
shows 461 names. 

^ The dimensions were 117 feet 11 inches upon the gun- 
deck, 97 feet 6 inches keel for tonnage, measuring from one 
foot before the forward perpendicular and along the base 
line to the front of the rabbet of the port, deducting three- 
ffths of the moulded breadth of the beam, which is 31 feet 
6 inches; making 509!^ tons. (See in Navy Archives, Cow- 
tracts, vol. ii., p. 137.) 

3 The Peacock had 166 men, as we learn from Com- 
mander Warrington's letter of June ist (Letter No. 144 in 
M asters-Commandant Letters, 1814, vol. i.). The Frolic took 
aboard "10 or 12 men beyond her regular complement" 
(see letter of Joseph Bainbridge, No. 51, in same vol.). 
Accordingly, when she was captured by the Orpheus, the 



64 Naval War of 1 8 1 2 

The British vessels encountered were similar, 
but generally inferior, to our own. The only 24- 
pounder frigate we encountered was the Endymion, 
of about a fifth less force than the President. 
Their 38-gun frigates were almost exactly like 
ours, but with fewer men in crew as a rule. They 
were three times matched against our 44-gun frig- 
ates, to which they were inferior about as three 
is to four. Their 3 6 -gun frigates were larger than 
the Essex, with a more numerous crew, but the 
same number of guns ; carrying on the lower deck, 
however, long i8's instead of 3 2 -pound carro- 
nades, — a much more effective armament. The 
32-gun frigates were smaller, with long 12's on 
the main-deck. The largest sloops were also 
frigate-built, carrying twenty-two 3 2 -pound car- 
ronades on the main-deck, and twelve lighter guns 
on the quarter-deck and forecastle, with a crew 
of 180. The large flush-decked ship-sloops carried 
21 or 23 guns, with a crew of 140 men. But our 
vessels most often came in contact with the 
British i8-gun brig-sloop. This was a tubby craft, 
heavier than any of our brigs, being about the 
size of the Hornet. The crew consisted of from 
no to 135 men; ordinarily, each was armed with 

commander of the latter, Captain Hugh Pigot, reported the 
number of men aboard to be 171. The Wasp left port with 
173 men, with which she fought her first action; she had a 
much smaller number aboard in her second. 



Naval War of 1 812 65 

sixteen 32-pound carronades, two long 6's, and a 
shifting 1 2 -pound carronade; often with a light 
long gun as a stem-chaser, making 20 in all. The 
Reindeer and Peacock had only 24-pound carro- 
nades; the Epervier had but eighteen guns, all 
carronades.' 

Among the stock accusations against our navy 
of 181 2 were, and are, statements that our vessels 
were rated at less than their real force, and in 
particular that our large frigates were "disguised 
line-of-battle ships." As regards the ratings, 
most vessels of that time carried more guns than 
they rated; the disparity was less in the French 
than in either the British or American navies. 
Our 38-gun frigates carried 48 guns, the exact 
number the British 38's possessed. The worst case 
of underrating in our navy was the Essex, which 
rated 32, and carried 46 guns, so that her real 
was 44 per cent, in excess of her nominal force; 
but this was not as bad as the British sloop Cyane, 
which was rated a 20 or 22, and carried 34 guns, 
so that she had either 55 or 70 per cent, greater 
real than nominal force. At the beginning of the 

' The Epervier was taken into our service under the same 
name and rate. Both Preble and Emmons described her as 
of 477 tons. Warrington, her captor, however, says: "The 
surveyor of the port has just measured the Epervier and 
reports her 467 tons." (In the Navy Archives, Masters' 
Commandant Letters, 1814, i., No. 125.) 

For a full discussion of tonnage, see Appendix, A. 

VOL. 1, — S 



66 Naval War of 1812 

war we owned two i8-gun ship-sloops, one mount- 
ing 18 and the other 20 guns; the i8-gun brig- 
sloops they captured mounted each 19 guns; so 
the average was the same. Later, we built sloops 
that rated 18 and mounted 22 guns, but when one 
was captured it was also put down in the British 
navy list as an i8-gun ship-sloop. During all 
the combats of the war there were but four 
vessels that carried as few guns as they rated. 
Two were British, the Epervier and Levant, and 
two American, the Wasp and Adams. One navy 
was certainly as deceptive as another, as far as 
underrating went. 

■ The force of the statement that our large frig- 
ates were disguised line-of-battle ships, of course, 
depends entirely upon what the words ' ' frigate ' ' 
and "line-of-battle ship" mean. When on the 
loth of August, 1653, De Ruyter saved a great 
convoy by beating off Sir George Ayscough's fleet 
of 38 sail, the largest of the Dutch admiral's '' t^t, 
sail of the line" carried but 30 guns and 150 men, 
and his own flag-ship but 28 guns and 134 men.' 
The Dutch book from which this statement is 
taken speaks indifferently of frigates of 18, 40, 

. ^ La Vie et les Actions Memorables du Sr. Michel de Ruyter 
a Amsierdatn, chez Henry et Theodore Boom, mdclxxvii. 
The work is by Bartheleniy Pielat, a surgeon in De Ruyter's 
fleet, and personally present during many of his battles. It 
is written in French, but is in tone more strongly anti- 
French than anti-English. 



Naval War of 1812 67 

and 58 guns. Toward the end of the eighteenth 
century the terms had crystalHzed. Frigate then 
meant a so-called single-decked ship ; it in reality 
possessed two decks, the main- or gun-deck, and 
the upper one, which had no name at all, until 
our sailors christened it spar-deck. The gun-deck 
possessed a complete battery, and the spar-deck 
an interrupted one, mounting guns on the fore- 
castle and quarter-deck. At that time all "two- 
decked" or "three-decked" (in reality three- and 
four-decked) ships were liners. But in 181 2 
this had changed somewhat; as the various 
nations built more and more powerful vessels, 
the lower rates of the different divisions were 
dropped. Thus, the British ship Cyane, captured 
by the Constitution, was in reality a small frigate, 
with a main-deck battery of 22 guns and 12 
guns on the spar-deck; a few years before, she 
would have been called a 24-gun frigate, but she 
then ranked merely as a 2 2 -gun sloop. Similarly 
the 50- and 64-gun ships that had fought in the 
line at the Doggerbank, Camperdown, and even 
at Aboukir, were now no longer deemed fit for that 
purpose, and the 74 was the lowest line-of -battle 
ship. 

The Constitution, President, and United States 
must then be compared with the existing European 
vessels that were classed as frigates. The French 
in 1812 had no 24-pounder frigates, for the very 



68 Naval War of 1 8 1 2 

good reason that they had all fallen victims to 
the English i8-pounders; but in July of that 
year a Danish frigate, the Nayaden, which carried 
long 24's, was destroyed by the English ship 
Dictator, 64. 

The British frigates were of several rates. The 
lowest rated 32, carrying in all 40 guns, twenty-six 
long 12's on the main-deck and fourteen 24-pound 
carronades on the spar-deck — a broadside of 324 
pounds. I The 36-gun frigates, like the Phcebe, car- 
ried 46 guns, twenty-six long iS's on the gun-deck 
and 3 2 -pound carronades above. The 38-gun 
frigates, like the Macedonian, carried 48 or 49 guns, 
long i8's below and 32-pound carronades above. 
The 3 2 -gun frigates, then, presented in broadside 
thirteen long 12's below and seven 24-pound car- 
ronades above; the 38-gun frigates, fourteen long 
1 8's below and ten 3 2 -pound carronades above; so 
that a 44-gun frigate would naturally present fifteen 
long 24's below and twelve 42-pound carronades 
above, as the United States did at first. The rate 
was perfectly proper, for French, British, and Danes 
already possessed 24-pounder frigates; and there 
was really less disparity between the force and rate 
of a 44 that carried 54 guns, than there was in a 
38 that carried 49, or, like the Shannon, 52. Nor 
was this all. Two of our three victories were won 

* In all these vessels there were generally two long 6's or 
g's substituted for the bow-chase carronades. 



Naval War of 1 812 69 

by the Constitution, which only carried 3 2 -pound 
carronades, and once 54 and once 52 guns; and 
as two thirds of the work was thus done by this 
vessel, I shall now compare her with the largest 
British frigates. Her broadside force consisted 
of fifteen long 24's on the main-deck, and on the 
spar-deck one long 24, and in one case ten, in the 
other eleven, 3 2 -pound carronades — a broadside 
of 704 or 736 pounds/ There was then in the 
British navy the A casta, 40, carrying in broad-side 
fifteen long i8's and eleven 3 2 -pound carronades; 
when the spar-deck batteries are equal, the addi- 
tion of 90 pounds to the main-deck broadside 
(which is all the superiority of the Constitution 
over the Acasta) is certainly not enough to make 
the distinction between a frigate and a disguised 
74. But not considering the Acasta, there were 
in the British navy three 24-pounder frigates, the 
Cornzvallis, Indefatigable, and Endymion. We only 
came in contact with the latter in 1 8 1 5 , when the 
Constitution had but 5 2 guns. The Endymion then 
had an armament of twenty-eight long 24's, two 
long iS's, and twenty 3 2 -pound carronades, mak- 
ing a broadside of 674 pounds,^ or, including a 
shifting 24-pound carronade, of 698 pounds- 
just six pounds, or one per cent., less than the 

' Nominally ; in reality about 7 per cent, less on account 
of the short weight in the metal. 

^According to James, 664 pounds: he omits the chase 
guns for no reason. 



70 Naval War of 1812 

force of that "disguised line-of -battle ship" the 
Constitution ! As the Endymion only rated as a 
40, and the Constitution as a 44, it was in reality 
the former and not the latter which was under- 
rated. I have taken the Constitution, because 
the British had more to do with her than they 
did with our other two 44's taken together. The 
latter were both of heavier metal than the Con- 
stitution, carrying 42-po\ind carronades. In 1812, 
the United States carried her full 54 guns, throw- 
ing a broadside of 846 pounds; when captured, 
the President carried 53, having substituted a 24- 
pound carronade for two of her 42 's, and her 
broadside amounted to 828 pounds, or 16 per 
cent, nominal and, on account of the short weight 
of her shot, nine per cent, real excess over the 
Endymion. If this difference made her a line-of- 
battle ship, then the Endymion was doubly a 
line-of -battle ship, compared to the Congress or 
the Constellation. Moreover, the American com- 
manders found their 4 2 -pound carronades too 
heavy; as I have said, the Constitution only 
mounted 32's, and the United States landed six of 
her guns. When, in 18 13, she attempted to break 
the blockade, she carried but 48 guns, throwing a 
broadside of 720 pounds — just three per cent, more 
than the Endymion.^ If our frigates were line-of- 

' It was on account of this difference of three per cent, that 
Captain Hardy refused to allow the Endymion to meet the 



Naval War of 1812 71 

battle ships, the disguise was certainly marvel- 
lously complete, and they had a number of com- 
panions equally disguised in the British ranks. 

The 44's were thus true frigates, with one com- 
plete battery of long guns and one interrupted 
one of carronades. That they were better than 
any other frigates was highly creditable to our 
ingenuity and national skill. We cannot, per- 
haps, lay claim to the invention and first use of 
the heavy frigate, for 24-pounder frigates were 
already in the service of at least three nations, 
and the French 36-pound carronade, in use on 
their spar-decks, threw a heavier ball than our 
42 -pounder. But we had enlarged and perfected 
the heavy frigate, and were the first nation that 
ever used it effectively. The French Forte and 
the Danish Nayaden shared the fate of ships 
carrying guns of lighter calibre; and the British 
24-pounders, like the Endymion, had never ac- 
complished anything. Hitherto, there had been 
a strong feeling, especially in England, that an 
18-pound gun was as effective as a 24- in arming 

United States (James, vi. , p. 470) . This was during the course 
of some challenges and counter-challenges which ended in 
nothing, Decatur in his turn being unwilling to have the Mace- 
donian meet the Statira, unless the latter should agree not to 
take on a picked crew. He was perfectly right in this; but 
he ought never to have sent the challenge at all, as two 
ships but an hour or two out of port would be at a frightful 
disadvantage in a fight. 



72 Naval War of 1 812 

a frigate; we made a complete revolution in this 
respect. England had been building only 18- 
pounder vessels when she ought to have been 
building 24-pounders. It was greatly to our 
credit that our average frigate was superior to 
the average British frigate; exactly as it was to 
our discredit that the Essex was so ineffectively 
armed. Captain Porter owed his defeat chiefly 
to his ineffective guns, but also to having lost his 
topmast, to the weather being unfavorable, and, 
still more, to the admirable skill with which 
Hilyar used his superior armament. The Java, 
Macedonian, and Guerriere owed their defeat 
partly to their lighter guns, but much more to 
the fact that their captains and seamen did not 
display either as good seamanship or as good 
gunnery as their foes. Inferiority in armament 
was a factor to be taken into account in all the 
four cases, but it was more marked in that of 
the Essex than in the other three ; it would have 
been fairer for Porter to say that he had been 
captured by a line-of-battle ship than for the 
captain of the Java to make that assertion. In 
this last case, the forces of the two ships compared 
almost exactly as their rates. A 44 was matched 
against a 38 ; it was not surprising that she should 
win, but it was surprising that she should win 
with ease and impunity. The long 24's on the 
Constitution's gun-deck no more made her a line- 



Naval War of 1 812 73 

of -battle ship than the 3 2 -pound carronades 
mounted on an English frigate's quarter-deck and 
forecastle made her a line-of-battle ship when 
opposed to a Frenchman with only 8's and 6's 
on his spar-deck. When, a few years before, the 
English Phoebe had captured the French Nereide, 
their broadsides were respectively 407 and 258 
pounds, a greater disparity than in any of our 
successful fights ; yet no author thought of claim- 
ing that the Phoebe was anything but a frigate. 
So with the Clyde, throwing 425 pounds, which 
took the Vestale, throwing but 246. The facts 
were that 18 -pounder frigates had captured 12- 
pounders, exactly as our 24-pounders in turn 
captured the i8-pounders. 

Shortly before Great Britain declared war on us, 
one of her i8-pounder frigates, the San Florenzo, 
throwing 476 pounds in a broadside, captured the 
i2-pounder French frigate Pysche, whose broad- 
side was only 246 pounds. The force of the 
former was thus almost double that of the latter, 
yet the battle was long and desperate, the English 
losing 48 and the French 124 men. This conflict, 
then, reflected as much credit on the skill and 
seamanship of the defeated as of the victorious 
side ; the difference in loss could be fairly ascribed 
to the difference in weight of metal. But where, 
as in the famous ship-dtiels of 1 8 1 2 , the difference 
in force is only a fifth, instead of a half, and 



74 Naval War of 1 812 

yet the slaughter, instead of being as five is to 
two, is as six to one, then the victory is certainly 
to be ascribed as much to superiority in skill as 
to superiority in force. But, on the other hand, 
it should always be remembered that there was a 
very decided superiority in force. It is a very 
discreditable feature of many of our naval his- 
tories that they utterly ignore this superiority, 
seeming ashamed to confess that it existed. In 
reality, it was something to be proud of. It was 
highly to the credit of the United States that her 
frigates were of better make and armament than 
any others; it always speaks well for a nation's 
energy and capacity that any of her implements 
of warfare are of a superior kind. This is a per- 
fectly legitimate reasoij for pride. 

It spoke well for the Prussians in 1866 that 
they opposed breech-loaders to the muzzle-loaders 
of the Austrians; but it would be folly to give 
all the credit of the victory to the breech-loaders 
and none to Moltke and his lieutenants. Thus, it 
must be remembered that two things contributed 
to our victories. One was the excellent make 
and armament of our ships; the other was the 
skilful seamanship, excellent discipHne, and superb 
gunnery of the men who were in them. British 
writers are apt only to speak of the first, and 
Americans only of the last, whereas both should 
be taken into consideration. 



Naval War of 1812 75 

To sum up: the American 44-gun frigate was 
a true frigate, in build and armament, properly- 
rated, stronger than a 38-gun frigate just about 
in the proportion of 44 to 38, and not exceeding 
in strength an 18 -pounder frigate as much as the 
latter exceeded one carrying 12 -pounders. They 
were, in no way whatever, line-of -battle ships ; but 
they were superior to any other frigates afloat, 
and, what is still more important, they were better 
manned and commanded than the average frigate 
of any other navy. Lord Codrington says {Me- 
moirs, {., p. 310): "But I well know the system 
of favoritism and borough corruption prevails so 
very much that many people are promoted and 
kept in command that should be dismissed the 
service, and while such is the case the few Ameri- 
cans chosen for their merit may be expected to 
follow up their successes except where they meet 
with our best officers on even terms." ' The 
small size of our navy was probably to a certain 

^ To show that I am not quoting an authority biassed in 
our favor I will give Sir Edward Codrington's opinion of our 
rural better class (i.,318). "It is curious to observe the animos- 
ity which prevails here among what is called the better order 
of people, which I think is more a misnomer here than in any 
other country where I have ever been. Their ii'lt-ig and tory 
are democrat and federalist, and it would seem for the sake 
of giving vent to that bitterness of hatred which marks the 
Yankee character, every gentleman (God save the term) who 
takes possession of a property adopts the opposite political 
creed to that of his nearest neighbor." 



76 Naval War of 1 812 

extent effective in keeping it up to a high stand- 
ard ; but this is not the only explanation, as can 
be seen by Portugal's small and poor navy. On 
the other hand, the champions or pick of a large 
navy ought to be better than the champions of a 
small one.' 

^ In speaking of tonnage, I wish I could have got better 
authority than James for the British side of the question. 
He is so bitter that it involuntarily gives one a distrust of 
his judgment. Thus in speaking of the Penguin's capture, 
he, in endeavoring to show that the Hornet's loss was greater 
than she acknowledged, says, "several of the dangerously 
wounded were thrown overboard because the surgeon was 
afraid to amputate, owing to his want of experience" {Naval 
Occurrences, 492). Now, what could persuade a writer to 
make such a foolish accusation ? No matter how utterly 
depraved and brutal Captain Biddle might be, he would 
certainly not throw his wounded over alive because he feared 
they might die. Again, in vol. vi., p. 546, he says: "Captain 
Stewart had caused the Cyane to be painted to resemble a 
36-gun frigate. The object of this was to aggrandize his 
exploit in the eyes of the gaping citizens of Boston." No 
matter how skilful an artist Captain Stewart was, and no 
matter how great the gaping capacities of the Bostonians, 
the Cya7ie (which by the way went to New York and not to 
Boston) could no more be painted to look like a 36-gun 
frigate than a schooner could be painted to look like a brig. 
Instances of rancor like these two occur constantly in his 
work, and make it very difficult to separate what is matter of 
fact from what is matter of opinion. I always rely on the 
British official accounts when they can be reached, except in 
the case of the Java, which seem garbled. That such was 
sometimes the case with British officials is testified to by 
both James (vol. iv., p. 17) and Brenton (vol. ii., p. 454, note). 
From the Memoir of Admiral Broke, we learn that his public 



Naval War of 1 812 ^^ 

Again, the armaments of the American as well 
as of the British ships were composed of three 
very different styles of guns. The first, or long 
gun, was enormously long and thick-barrelled in 
comparison to its bore, and in consequence very 
heavy; it possessed a very long range, and varied 
in calibre from two to forty-two pounds. The 
ordinary calibres in our navy were 6, 9, 12, 18, and 
24. The second style was the carronade — a short, 
light gun of large bore ; compared to a long gun of 
the same weight, it carried a much heavier ball for 
a much shorter distance. The chief calibres were 
9, 12, 18, 24, 32, 42, and 68 pounders, the first and 
the last being hardly in use in our navy. The 



letter was wrong in a number of particulars. See also any 
one of the numerous biographies of Lord Dundonald, the 
hero of the little Speedy' s fight. It is very unfortunate that 
the British stopped publishing ofhcial accounts of their de- 
feats; it could not well help giving rise to unpleasant sus- 
picions. 

It may be as well to mention here, again, that James's 
accusations do not really detract from the interest attaching 
to the war and its value for purposes of study. If, as he says, 
the American commanders were cowards, and their '""ews 
renegades, it is well worth while to learn the lesson that 
good training will make such men able to beat brave officers 
with loyal crews. And why did the British have such bad 
average crews as he makes out? He says, for instance, that 
the Java's was unusually bad; yet Brenton says (vol. ii., p. 
461) it was like "the generality of our crews." It is worth 
while explaining the reason why such a crew was generally 
better than a French and worse than an American one. 



78 Naval War of 1 812 

third style was the columbiad, of an intermediate 
grade between the first two. Thus it is seen that 
a gun of one style by no means corresponds to a 
gun of another style of the same calibre. As a 
rough example, a long 12, a columbiad 18, and 
a 3 2 -pound carronade would be about equivalent 
to one another. These guns were mounted on 
two different types of vessel. The first was flush- 
decked ; that is, it had a single straight open deck 
on which all the guns were mounted. This class 
included one heavy corvette (the Adams), the 
ship-sloops, and the brig-sloops. Through the 
bow-chase port, on each side, each of these 
mounted a long gun ; the rest of their guns were 
carronades, except in the case of the Adams, 
which had all long guns. Above these came the 
frigates, whose gun-deck was covered above by 
another deck ; on the fore and aft parts (forecastle 
and quarterdeck) of this upper, open deck were 
also mounted guns. The main-deck guns were all 
long, except on the Essex, which had carronades; 
on the quarter-deck were mounted carronades, 
and on the forecastle also carronades, with two 
long bow-chasers. 

Where two ships of similar armament fought 
one another, it is easy to get the comparative 
force by simply comparing the weight in broad- 
sides, each side presenting very nearly the same 
proportion of long guns to carronades. For such 



Naval War of 1 812 79 

a broadside we take half the guns mounted in the 
ordinary way, and all guns mounted on pivots, or 
shifting. Thus Perry's force in guns was 54 to 
Barclay's 63 ; yet each presented 34 in broadside. 
Again, each of the British brig-sloops mounted 19 
guns, presenting 10 in broadside. Besides these, 
some ships mounted bow-chasers run through the 
bridle-ports, or stern-chasers, neither of which 
could be used in broadsides. Nevertheless, I in- 
clude them, both because it works in about an 
equal number of cases against each navyfand be- 
cause they were sometimes terribly effective. 
James excludes the Guerriere's bow-chaser; in 
reality, he ought to have included both it and its 
fellow, as they worked more damage than all the 
broadside guns put together. Again, he excludes 
the Endymion's bow-chasers, though in her action 
they proved invaluable. Yet he includes those of 
the Enterprise and Argus, though the former's 
were probably not fired. So I shall take the half 
of the fixed, plus all the movable, guns aboard, in 
comparing broadside force. 

But the chief difficulty appears when guns of 
one style are matched against those of another. 
If a ship armed with long 12's meets one armed 
with 3 2 -pound carronades, which is superior in 
force? At long range the first, and at short range 
the second; and of course each captain is pretty 
sure to insist that "circumstances" forced him to 



8o Naval War of 1 8 1 2 

fight at a disadvantage. The result would depend 
largely on the skill or luck of each commander in 
choosing position. 

One thing is certain: long guns are more for- 
midable than carronades of the same calibre. 
There are exemplifications of this rule on both 
sides; of course, American writers, as a rule, only 
pay attention to one set of cases and British to 
the others. The Cyane and Levant threw a heav- 
ier broadside than the Constitution, but were 
certainly less formidably armed; and the Essex 
threw a heavier broadside than the Phoebe, yet was 
also less formidable. On Lake Ontario the Ameri- 
can ship, General Pike, threw less metal at a broad- 
side than either of her two chief antagonists, but 
neither could be called her equal ; while on Lake 
Champlain a parallel case is afforded by the Brit- 
ish ship Confiance. Supposing that two ships 
throw the same broadside weight of metal, one 
from long guns, the other from carronades, at 
short range they are equal ; at long, one has it all 
her own way. Her captain thus certainly has a 
great superiority of force, and if he does not take 
advantage of it it is owing to his adversary's skill 
or his own mismanagement. As a mere approxi- 
mation, it may be assumed, in comparing the 
broadsides of two vessels or squadrons, that long 
guns count for at least twice as much as car- 
ronades of the same calibre. Thus on Lake 



Naval War of 1812 81 

Champlain Captain Downie possessed an immense 
advantage in his long guns, which Commodore 
Macdonough's exceedingly good arrangements nul- 
lified. Sometimes part of the advantage may be 
willingly foregone so as to acquire some other. 
Had the Constitution kept at long bowls with the 
Cyane and Levant she could have probably cap- 
tured one without any loss to herself, while the 
other would have escaped; she preferred to run 
down close so as to insure the capture of both, 
knowing that even at close quarters long guns are 
somewhat better than short ones (not to mention 
her other advantages in thick scantling, speed, 
etc.). The British carronades often upset in ac- 
tion; this was either owing to their having been 
insufficiently secured, and to this remaining un- 
discovered because the men were not exercised at 
the guns, or else it was because the unpractised 
sailors would greatly overcharge them. Our bet- 
ter-trained sailors on the ocean rarely committed 
these blunders, but our less-skilled on the lakes 
did so as often as their antagonists. 

But while the Americans thus, as a rule, had 
heavier and better-fitted guns, they labored under 
one or two disadvantages. Our foundries were 
generally not as good as those of the British, and 
our guns, in consequence, more likely to burst ; it 
was an accident of this nature which saved the 
British Belvidera; and the General Pike, under 

VOL. I. — 6. 



82 Naval War of 1 812 

Commodore Chauncy, and the new American frig- 
ate Guerriere suffered in the same way ; while often 
the muzzles of the guns would crack. A more 
universal disadvantage was in the short weight of 
our shot. When Captain Blakely sunk the Avon 
he officially reported that her four shot which came 
aboard weighed just 32 pounds apiece, a pound and 
three-quarters more than his heaviest ; this would 
make his average shot about 2^ pounds less, or 
rather over 7 per cent. Exactly similar statements 
were made by the officers of the Constitution in her 
three engagements. Thus, when she fought the 
Java, she threw at a broadside, as already stated, 
704 pounds; the Java mounted twenty -eight long 
i8's, eighteen 32-pound carronades, two long 12's, 
and one shifting 24-pound carronade, — a broad- 
side of 576 pounds. Yet, by the actual weighing 
of all the different shot on both sides, it was found 
that the difference in broadside force was only 
about 77 pounds, or the Constitution's shot were 
about 7 per cent, short weight. The long 24's of 
the United States each threw a shot but 4I- pounds 
heavier than the long i8's of the Macedonian; 
here again the difference was about 7 per cent. 
The same difference existed in favor of the Pen- 
guin and Epervier compared with the Wasp and 
Hornet. Mr. Fenimore Cooper ' weighed a great 
number of shot some time after the war. The 
* See Naval Histoty, i., 380. 



Naval War of 1 812 83 

later castings, even, weighed nearly 5 per cent, less 
than the British shot, and some of the older ones 
about 9 per cent. The average is safe to take at 
7 per cent, less, and I shall throughout make this 
allowance for ocean cruisers. The deficit was 
sometimes owing to windage, but more often the 
shot was of full size, but defective in density. The 
effect of this can be gathered from the following 
quotation from the work of a British artillerist: 
"The greater the density of shot of like calibres, 
projected with equal velocity and elevation, the 
greater the range, accuracy, and penetration." ' 
This defectiveness in density might be a serious 
injury in a contest at a long distance, but would 
make but little difference at close quarters (al- 
though it may have been partly owing to their 
short weight that so many of the Chesapeake s shot 
failed to penetrate the Shannon's hull). Thus, in 
the actions with the Macedonian and Java, the 
American frigates showed excellent practice when 
the contest was carried on within fair distance, 
while their first broadsides at long range went very 
wild; but in the case of the Guerriere the Con- 
stitution reserved her fire for close quarters, and 

^ Heavy Ordnance, Capt. T. F. Simmons, R. A., London, 
1837. James supposes that the "Yankee captains" have in 
each case hunted round till they could get particularly small 
American shot to weigh; and also denies that short weight is 
a disadvantage. The last proposition, carried out logically, 
would lead to some rather astonishing results. 



84 Naval War of 1812 

was probably not at all affected by the short 
weight of her shot. 

As to the officers and crew of a 44-gun frigate, 
the following was the regular complement estab- 
lished by law ' : 



I captain 


I coxswam 


4 lieutenants 


I sailmaker 


2 lieutenants of marines 


1 cooper 


2 sailing-masters 


I steward 


2 master's mates 


I armorer 


7 midshipmen 


I master of anus 


I purser 


I cook 


1 surgeon 

2 surgeon's mates 


I chaplain 




I clerk 


50 


I carpenter 


120 able seamen 


2 carpenter's mates 


150 ordinary seamen 


I boatswain 


30 boys 


2 boatswain's mates 
I yeoman of gun-room 


50 marines 




I gunner 


400 in all. 


1 1 quarter gunners 





An i8-gun ship had 32 officers and petty officers, 
30 able seamen, 46 ordinary seamen, 12 boys, and 
20 marines— 140 in all. Sometimes ships put to 
sea without their full complements (as in the case 
of the first Wasp), but more often with super- 
numeraries aboard. The weapons for close quar- 
ters were pikes, cutlasses, and a few axes; while 
the marines and some of the topmen had muskets 
and occasionally rifles. 

^ See State Papers, vol. xvi., p. 159, Washington, 1834. 



Naval War of 1 8i 2 85 

In comparing the forces of the contestants, I 
have always given the number of men in crew; 
but this in most cases was unnecessary. When 
there were plenty of men to handle the guns, trim 
the sails, make repairs, act as marines, etc., any 
additional number simply served to increase the 
slaughter on board. The Guerriere undoubtedly 
suffered from being short-handed, but neither the 
Macedonian nor Java would have been benefited 
by the presence of a hundred additional men. 
Barclay possessed about as many men as Perry, 
but this did not give him an equality of force. 
The Penguin and Frolic would have been taken 
just as surely had the Hornet and Wasp had a 
dozen men less apiece than they did. The prin- 
cipal case where numbers would help would be in 
a hand-to-hand fight. Thus, the Chesapeake, hav- 
ing fifty more men than the Shannon, ought to 
have been successful ; but she was not, because the 
superiority of her crew in numbers was more than 
counterbalanced by the superiority of the Shan- 
non's crew in other respects. The result of the 
battle of Lake Champlain, which was fought at 
anchor, with the fleets too far apart for musketry 
to reach, was not in the slightest degree affected 
by the number of men on either side, as both com- 
batants had amply enough to manage the guns 
and perform every other service. 

In all these conflicts the courage of both parties 



86 Naval War of 1 812 

is taken for granted ; it was not so much a factor 
in gaining the victory as one which, if lacking, was 
fatal to all chances of success. In the engage- 
ments between regular cruisers, not a single one 
was gained by superiority in courage. The crews 
of both the Argus and Epervier certainly flinched ; 
but had they fought never so bravely they were 
too unskilful to win. The Chesapeake's crew 
could hardly be said to lack courage ; it was more 
that they were inferior to their opponents in dis- 
cipline as well as in skill. 

There was but one conflict during the war 
where the victory could be said to be owing to 
superiority in pluck. This was when the Neuf- 
clidtel privateer beat off the boats of the Endy- 
mion. The privateersmen suffered a heavier 
proportional loss than their assailants, and they 
gained the victory by sheer ability to stand pun- 
ishment. 

For convenience in comparing them, I give in 
tabulated form the force of the three British 38's 
taken by American 44's (allowing for short weight 
of metal of latter) : 

Constitution Gtierritre 

30 long 24's 30 long iS's 

2 long 24's 2 long 12's 
22 short 32's 16 short 32's 
• I short 1 8 



Broadside, nominal, 736 lbs. 



real, 684 lbs. Broadside, 556 lbs. 



Naval War of 1 8 1 2 87 

United States Macedonian 

30 long 24*s 28 long i8's 

2 long 24's 2 long i2's 

22 short 42 's 2 long 9's 



— 16 short 32's 

Broadside, nominal, 846 lbs. i short 18 

real, 786 lbs. 



Broadside, 547 lbs. 

Constitution Java 
30 long 24's 28 long i8's 
2 long 24's 2 long 12's 
20 short 32's 18 short 32's 
I short 24 



Broadside, nominal, 704 lbs. 



real, 654 lbs. Broadside, 576 lbs. 

■ The smallest line-of -battle ship, the 74, with 
only long i8's on the second deck, was armed as 
follows ; 

28 long 32's 

28 long i8's 

6 long 12's 
14 short 32's 

7 short i8's, 

or a broadside of 1032 lbs., 736 from long guns, 
296 from carronades; while the Constitution 
threw (in reality) 684 lbs., 356 from long guns, 
and 328 from her carronades, and the United 
States 102 lbs. more from her carronades. Re- 
membering the difference between long guns and 
carronades, and considering sixteen of the 74's 
long i8's as being replaced by 4 2 -pound carro- 



88 Naval War of 1 8i 2 

nades ' (so as to get the metal on the ships distrib- 
uted in similar proportions between the two styles 
of cannon), we get as the 74's broadside 592 lbs. 
from long guns and 632 from carronades. The 
United States threw nominally 360 and 486, and 
the Constitution nominally 360 and 352; so the 
74 was superior even to the former nominally 
about as three is to two; while the Constitution, 
if "a line-of-battle ship," was disguised to such a 
degree that she was in reality of but little more 
than one half the force of one of the smallest true 
liners England possessed! 

' That this change would leave the force about as it was, 
can be gathered from the fact that the Adams and John 
Adams, both of which had been armed with 42-pound carro- 
nades (which were sent to Sackett's Harbor), had them 
replaced by long and medium i8-pounders, these being con- 
sidered to be more formidable; so that the substitution of 
42-pound carronades would, if anything, reduce the force of 
the 74. 



CHAPTER III 
1812 

• ON THE OCEAN 

Commodore Rodgers's cruise and unsuccessful chase of the 
Belvidera — Cruise of the Essex — Captain Hull's cruise and 
escape from the squadron of Commodore Broke — Constitu- 
tion captures Guerriere — Wasp captures Frolic — Second un- 
successful cruise of Commodore Rodgers — United States 
captures Macedonian — Constitution captures Java — Essex 
starts on a cruise — Summary. 

AT the time of the declaration of war, June 18, 
181 2, the American navy was but partially- 
prepared for effective service. The Wasp, 
18, was still at sea, on her return voyage from 
France; the Constellation, 38, was lying in the 
Chesapeake River, unable to receive a crew for 
several months to come; the Chesapeake, 38, was 
lying in a similar condition in Boston harbor ; the 
Adams, 28, was at Washington, being cut down 
and lengthened from a frigate into a corvette. 
These three cruisers were none of them fit to go to 
sea till after the end of the year. The Essex, 32, 
was in New York harbor, but, having some repairs 
to make, was not yet ready to put out. The Con- 
stitution, 44, was at Annapolis, without all of her 

8g 



90 Naval War of 1 812 

stores, and engaged in shipping a new crew, the 
time of the old one being up. The Nautilus, 14, 
was cruising off New Jersey, and the other small 
brigs were also off the coast. The only vessels 
immediately available were those under the com- 
mand of Commodore Rodgers at New York, con- 
sisting of his own ship, the President, 44, and of 
the United States, 44, Commodore Decatur; 
Congress, 38, Captain Smith; Hornet, 18, Captain 
Lawrence; and y4 rgw5, 1 6 , Lieutenant Sinclair. It 
seems marvellous that any nation should have 
permitted its ships to be so scattered, and many 
of them in such an unfit condition, at the begin- 
ning of hostilities. The British vessels cruising off 
the coast were not at that time very numerous or 
formidable, consisting of the Africa, 64, Acasta, 
40, Shannon, 38, Guerriere, 38, Belvidera, 36, 
Molus, 32, Southampton, 32, and Minerva, 32, with 
a number of corvettes and sloops ; their force was, 
however, strong enough to render it impossible for 
Commodore Rodgers to make any attempt on the 
coast towns of Canada or the West Indies. But 
the homeward bound plate fleet had sailed from 
Jamaica on May 20th, and was only protected by 
the Thalia, 36, Captain Vashon, and Reindeer, 18, 
Captain Manners. Its capture or destruction 
would have been a serious blow, and one which 
there seemed a good chance of striking, as the fleet 
would have to pass along the American coast, run- 



Naval War of 1 812 91 

ning with the Gulf Stream. Commodore Rodgers 
had made every preparation in expectation of war 
being declared, and an hour after official intelli- 
gence of it, together with his instructions, had 
been received, his squadron put to sea on June 
2 1 St, and ran off toward the southeast ' to get at 
the Jamaica ships. Having learned from an 
American brig that she had passed the plate fleet 
four days before in lat. 36° N., long. 67° W., the 
Commodore made all sail in that direction. At 6 
A.M. on June 23d a sail was made out in the N. E., 
which proved to be the British frigate Belvidera, 36, 
Captain Richard Byron.' The latter had sighted 
some of Commodore Rodgers's squadron some 
time before and stood toward them, till at 6.30 
she made out the three largest ships to be frigates. 
Having been informed of the likelihood of war by 
a New York pilot boat, the Belvidera now stood 
away, going N. E. by E., the wind being fresh from 
the west. The Americans made all sail in chase, 
the President, a very fast ship off the wind, lead- 
ing, and the Congress coming next. At noon the 
President bore S.W., distant 2f miles from the 
Belvidera, Nantucket shoals bearing 100 miles N. 
and 48 miles E.^ The wind grew Hghter, shifting 

' Letter of Commodore John Rodgers to the Secretary of 
the Navy, September i, 1812. 
^ Brenton, v., 46. 
3 Log of Belvidera, June 23, 18 12. 



92 Naval War of 1812 

more toward the southwest, while the ships con- 
tinued steadily in their course, going N. E. by E. 
As the President kept gaining, Captain Byron 
cleared his ship for action, and shifted to the stern 
ports two long i8-pounders on the main-deck and 
two 3 2 -pound carronades on the quarter-deck. 

At 4.30 ' the President's starboard forecastle 
bow-gun was fired by Commodore Rodgers him- 
self; the corresponding main-deck gun was next 
discharged, and then Commodore Rodgers fired 
again. These three shots all struck the stern of 
the Belvidera, killing and wounding nine men, — ■ 
one of them went through the rudder coat into the 
after gun-room, the other two into the captain's 
cabin. A few more shots would have rendered 
the Belvidera's capture certain, but when the 
Presideyifs main-deck gun was discharged for the 
second time it burst, blowing up the forecastle 
deck and killing and wounding sixteen men, among 
them the Commodore himself, whose leg was 
broken. This saved the British frigate. Such an 
explosion always causes a half panic, every gun 
being at once suspected. In the midst of the con- 
fusion. Captain Byron's stern-chasers opened with 
spirit and effect, killing or wounding six men more. 
Had the President still pushed steadily on, only 

^ Cooper, ii., 151. According to James, vi., 117, the Presi- 
dent was then 600 yards distant from the Belvidera half a 
point on her weather or port quarter 



Naval War of 1 812 93 

using her bow-chasers until she closed abreast, 
which she could probably have done, the Belvidera 
could still have been taken; but, instead, the 
former now bore up and fired her port broadside, 
cutting her antagonist's rigging slightly, but doing 
no other damage, while the Belvidera kept up a 
brisk and galling fire, although the long bolts, 
breeching-hooks, and breechings of the guns now 
broke continually, wounding several of the men, 
including Captain Byron. The President had lost 
ground by yawing, but she soon regained it, and, 
coming up closer than before, again opened from 
her bow-chasers a well-directed fire, which se- 
verely wounded her opponent's main -topmast, 
crossjack yard, and one or two other spars ' ; but 
shortly afterward she repeated her former tactics 
and again lost ground by yawing to discharge 
another broadside, even more ineffectual than the 
first. Once more she came up closer than ever, 
and once more yawed; the single shots from her 
bow-chasers doing considerable damage, but her 
raking broadsides none.^ Meanwhile, the active 
crew of the Belvidera repaired everything as fast 
as it was damaged, while, under the superintend- 
ence of Lieutenants Sykes, Bruce, and Campbell, 

'James, vi., 119. He says the President was within 400 
yards. 

^ Lord Howard Douglass, Naval Gunnery, p. 419 (third 
edition) . 



94 Naval War of 1812 

no less than three hundred shot were fired from 
her stern guns.' Finding that if the Presi- 
dent ceased yawing she could easily run alongside, 
Captain Byron cut away one bower, one stream, 
and two sheet anchors, the barge, yawl, gig, and 
jolly-boat, and started fourteen tons of water. 
The effect of this was at once apparent, and she 
began to gain ; meanwhile, the damage the sails of 
the combatants had received had enabled the Con- 
gress to close, and when abreast of his consort Cap- 
tain Smith opened with his bow-chasers, but the 
shot fell short. The Belvidera soon altered her 
course to east by south, set her starboard stud- 
ding-sails, and by midnight was out of danger; 
three days afterward she reached Halifax harbor. 
Lord Howard Douglass's criticisms on this en- 
counter seem very just. He says that the Presi- 
dent opened very well with her bow-chasers (in 
fact, the Americans seemed to have aimed better 
and to have done more execution with these guns 
than the British with their stern-chasers), but 
that she lost so much ground by yawing and de- 
livering harmless broadsides as to enable her an- 
tagonist to escape. Certainly, if it had not been 
for the time thus lost, to no purpose, the Commo- 
dore would have run alongside his opponent and 
the fate of the little 36 would have been sealed. 
On the other hand, it must be remembered that it 

* James, vi., n8. 



Naval War of 1812 95 

was only the bursting of the gun on board the 
President, causing such direful confusion and loss, 
and especially harmful in disabling her com- 
mander, that gave the Belvidera any chance of 
escape at all. At any rate, whether the American 
frigate does, or does not, deserve blame, Captain 
Byron and his crew do most emphatically deserve 
praise for the skill with which their guns were 
served and repairs made, the coolness with which 
measures to escape were adopted, and the courage 
with which they resisted so superior a force. On 
this occasion Captain Byron showed himself as 
good a seaman and as brave a man as he sub- 
sequently proved a humane and generous enemy 
when engaged in the blockade of the Chesapeake. 
This was not a very auspicious opening of hos- 
tilities for America. The loss of the Belvidera was 
not the only thing to be regretted, for the dis- 
tance the chase took the pursuers out of their 
course probably saved the plate fleet. When the 
Belvidera was first made out. Commodore Rodgers 
was in latitude 39° 26' N., and longitude 71° 10' 
W., at noon the same day the Thalia and her 
convoy were in latitude 39° N., longitude 
62° W. Had they not chased the Belvidera, the 

' Even Niles, unscrupulously bitter as he is toward the 
British, does justice to the humanity of Captains Byron and 
Hardy, which certainly shone in comparison to some of the 
rather buccaneering exploits of Cockbum's followers in Chesa- 
peake Bay. 



9^ Naval War of 1812 

Americans would probably have run across the 
plate fleet. 

The American squadron reached the western 
edge of the Newfoundland Banks on June 29th,' 
and on July ist, a little to the east of the Banks, 
fell in with large quantities of cocoa-nut shells, 
orange peels, etc., which filled every one with 
great hopes of overtaking the quarry. On July 
9th, the Hornet captured a British privateer in lati- 
tude 45° 30' N., and longitude 23° W., and her 
master reported that he had seen the Jamaica- 
men the previous evening; but nothing further 
was heard or seen of them, and on July 13th, being 
within twenty hours' sail of the English Channel, 
Commodore Rodgers reluctantly turned south- 
ward, reaching Madeira July 21st. Thence he 
cruised toward the Azores and by the Grand Banks 
home, there being considerable sickness on the 
ships. On August 31st he reached Boston after a 
very unfortunate cruise, in which he had made but 
seven prizes, all merchantmen, and had recap- 
tured one American vessel. 

On July 3d, the Essex, 32, Captain David Porter, 
put out of New York. As has been already ex- 
plained, she was most inefficiently armed, almost 
entirely with carronades. This placed her at the 
mercy of any frigate with long guns which could 
keep at a distance of a few hundred yards; but, 

^ Letter of Commodore Rodgers, September i. 



Naval War of 1812 97 

in spite of Captain Porter's petitions and remon- 
strances, he was not allowed to change his arma- 
ment. On the I ith of July, at 2 a.m., latitude t,t,° 
N., longitude 66° W., the Essex fell in with the 
Minerva, 32, Captain Richard Hawkins, convoy- 
ing seven transports, each containing about 200 
troops, bound from Barbadoes to Quebec. The 
convoy was sailing in open order, and, there being 
a dull moon, the Essex ran in and cut out trans- 
port No. 299, with 197 soldiers aboard. Having 
taken out the soldiers, Captain Porter stood back 
to the convoy, expecting Captain Hawkins to 
come out and fight him ; but this the latter would 
not do, keeping the convoy in close order around 
him. The transports were all armed and still con- 
tained in the aggregate 1200 soldiers. As the 
Essex could only fight at close quarters these 
heavy odds rendered it hopeless for her to try to 
cut out the Minerva. Her carronades would have 
to be used at short range to be effective, and it 
would of course have been folly to run in right 
among the convoy and expose herself to the cer- 
tainty of being boarded by five times as many men 
as she possessed. The Minerva had three less 
guns a side, and on her spar-deck carried 24-pound 
carronades instead of 32's, and, moreover, had 
fifty men less than the Essex, which had about 270 
men this cruise ; on the other hand, her main-deck 
was armed with long 12's, so that it is hard to say 

VOL. >-.— 7 



98 Naval War of 1 812 

whether she did right or not in refusing to fight. 
She was of the same force as the Southampton, 
whose captain, Sir James Lucas Yeo, subsequently 
challenged Porter, but never appointed a meeting- 
place. In the event of a meeting, the advantage, 
in ships of such radically different armaments, 
would have been with that captain who succeeded 
in outmanoeuvring the other and in making the 
fight come off at the distance best suited to him- 
self. At long range either the Minerva or South- 
ampton would possess an immense superiority ; but 
if Porter could have contrived to run up within a 
couple of hundred yards, or still better, to board, 
his superiority in weight of metal and number of 
men would have enabled him to carry either of 
them. Porter's crew was better trained for board- 
ing than almost any other American commander's ; 
and probably none of the British frigates on 
the American station, except the Shannon and 
the Tenedos, would have stood a chance with the 
Essex in a hand-to-hand struggle. Among her 
youngest midshipmen was one, by name David 
Glasgow Farragut, then but thirteen years old, 
who afterward became the first and greatest ad- 
miral of the United States. His own words on 
this point will be read with interest.: "Every 
day," he says,' "the crew were exercised at the 

^ Life of Farragut (embodying his journal and letters) > p. 
31. By his son, Loyall Farragut, New York, 1879. 



Naval War of 1 812 99 

great guns, small arms, and single stick. And I 
may here mention the fact that I have never been 
on a ship where the crew of the old Essex was rep- 
resented but that I found them to be the best 
swordsmen on board. They had been so thor- 
oughly trained as boarders that every man was 
prepared for such an emergency, with his cutlass 
as sharp as a razor, a dirk made by the ship's 
armorer out of a file, and a pistol." ' 

On August 13th, a sail was made out to wind- 
ward, which proved to be the British ship-sloop 
Alert, 16, Capt. T. L. O. Laugharne, carrying 
twenty 18-pound carronades and 100 men.^ As 

'James says: "Had Captain Porter really endeavored to 
bring the Minerva to action, we do not see what could have 
prevented the Essex, with her superiority of sailing, from 
coming alongside of her. But no such thought, we are sure, 
entered into Captain Porter's head." What "prevented the 
Essex" was the Minerva s not venturing out of the convoy. 
Farragut, in his journal, writes; "The captured British offi- 
cers were very anxious for us to have a fight with the Minerva, 
as they considered her a good match for the Essex, and Cap- 
tain Porter replied that he should gratify them with pleasure 
if his majesty's commander was of their taste. So we stood 
toward the convoy and when within gunshot hove to, and 
awaited the Minerva, but she tacked and stood in among the 
convoy, to the utter amazement of our prisoners, who de- 
nounced the commander as a base coward, and expressed 
their determination to report him to the Admiralty." An 
incident of reported "flinching" like this is not worth men- 
tioning; I allude to it only to show the value of James's sneers. 

2 James {History, vi., p. 128) says "86 men." In the Naval 
Archives at Washington, in the Captains' Letters for 18 12 (vol. 



loo Naval War of 1812 

soon as the Essex discovered the Alert, she put out 
drags astern, and led the enemy to beheve she was 
trying to escape by sending a few men aloft to 
shake out the reefs and make sail. Concluding 
the frigate to be a merchantman, the Alert bore 
down on her ; while the Americans went to quar- 
ters and cleared for action, although the tompions 
were left in the guns and the ports kept closed.' 
The Alert fired a gun and the Essex hove to, when 
the former passed under her stern, and when on 
her lee quarter poured in a broadside of grape and 
canister; but the sloop was so far abaft the frig- 
ate's beam that her shot did not enter the ports 
and caused no damage. Thereupon Porter put up 
his helm and opened as soon as his guns would 
bear, tompions and all. The Alert now discov- 
ered her error and made off, but too late, for in 
eight minutes the Essex was alongside, and the 
Alert fired a musket and struck, three men being 
wounded and several feet of water in the hold. 
She was disarmed and sent as a cartel into St. 
John's. It has been the fashion among American 
writers to speak of her as if she were " unworthily " 
given up, but such an accusation is entirely 

ii., No. 182), can be found enclosed in Porter's letter the 
parole of the officers and crew of the Alert, signed by Captain 
Laugharne; it contains either loo or loi names of the crew 
of the Alert, besides those of a number of other prisoners sent 
back in the same cartel. 
^ Life of Farragut, p. i6 



Naval War of 1812 loi 

groundless. The Essex was four times her force, 
and all that could possibly be expected of her 
was to do as she did — exchange broadsides and 
strike, having suffered some loss and damage. 
The Essex returned to New York on September 
7th, having made 10 prizes, containing 423 men.' 
The Belvidera, as has been stated, carried the 
news of the war to Halifax. On July 5th, Vice- 
Admiral Sawyer despatched a squadron to cruise 
against the United States, commanded by Philip 
Vere Broke, of the Shannon, 38, having under him 
the Belvidera, 36, Captain Richard Byron; Africa, 
64, Captain John Bastard; and Molus, 32, Captain 
Lord James Townsend. On the 9th, while off 
Nantucket, they were joined by the Gnerriere, 38, 
Captain James Richard Dacres. On the i6th, the 
squadron fell in with and captured the United 
States brig Nautilus, 14, Lieutenant Crane, which, 
like all the little brigs, was overloaded with guns 
and men. She threw her lee guns overboard and 

' Before entering New York, the Essex fell in with a British 
force which, in both Porter's and Farragut's works, is said to 
have been composed of the Acasta and Shannon, each of fifty 
guns, and Ringdove, of twenty. James saj^s it was the Shan- 
non, accompanied by a merchant vessel. It is not a point of 
much importance, as nothing came of the meeting, and the 
Shannon alone, with her immensely superior armament, 
ought to have been a match twice over for the Essex; al- 
though, if James is right, as seems probable, it gives rather a 
comical turn to Porter's account of his "extraordinary 
escape." 



102 Naval War of 1 812 

made use of every expedient to escape, but to no 
purpose. At 3 p.m. of the following day, when 
the British ships were abreast of Barnegat, about 
four leagues off shore, a strange sail was seen 
and immediately chased, in the south-by-east, or 
windward quarter, standing to the northeast. 
This was the United States frigate Constitution, 44, 
Captain Isaac Hull.' When the war broke out he 
was in the Chesapeake River getting a new crew 
aboard. Having shipped over 450 men (counting 
officers), he put out of harbor on the 12th of July. 
His crew was entirely new, drafts of men coming 
on board up to the last moment.^ On the 17th, 
at 2 P.M., Hull discovered four sail, in the northern 
board, heading to the westward. At 3, the wind 
being very light, the Constitution made sail and 
tacked, in 18^ fathoms. At 4, in the N.E., a 
fifth sail appeared, which afterward proved to be 
the Guerrihre. The first four ships bore N. N. W., 
and were all on the starboard tack; while by 6 

' For the ensuing chase I have rehed mainly on Cooper; see 
also Memoir of Admiral Broke, p. 240; James, vi., 133; and 
Marshall's Naval Biography, ii., 625 (London, 1825). 

2 In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy {Captains' Letters, 
1812, ii., No. 85), Hull, after speaking of the way his men 
were arriving, says: "The crew are as yet unacquainted with 
a ship of war, as many have but lately joined and have never 
been on an armed ship before. . . . We are doing all 
that we can to make them acquainted with their duty, and 
in a few days we shall have nothing to fear from any single- 
decked ship." 



Naval War of 1 812 103 

o'clock the fifth bore E.N.E. At 6.15, the wind 
shifted and blew lightly from the south, bringing 
the American ship to windward. She then wore 
round with her head to the eastward, set her light 
studding-sails and stay-sails, and at 7.30 beat to 
action, intending to speak the nearest vessel, the 
Guerriere. The two frigates nearedone another 
gradually, and at 10 the Constitution began mak- 
ing signals, which she continued for over an hour. 
At 3.30 A.M. on the i8th, the Guerriere, going 
gradually toward the Constitution on the port tack, 
and but one half-mile distant, discovered on her 
lee beam the Belvidera and the other British ves- 
sels, and signalled to them. They did not answer 
the signals, thinking she must know who they 
were, — a circumstance which afterward gave rise 
to sharp recriminations among the captains, — and 
Dacres, concluding them to be Commodore Rod- 
gers's squadron, tacked, and then wore round and 
stood away from the Constitution for some time 
before discovering his mistake. 

At 5 A.M., Hull had just enough steerage way on 
to keep his head to the east, on the starboard 
tack; on his lee quarter, bearing N.E. by N., 
were the Belvidera and Guerribre, and astern the 
Shannon, Molus, and Africa. At 5.30, it fell en- 
tirely calm, and Hull put out his boats to tow the . 
ship, always going southward. At the same time 
he whipped up a 24 from the main-deck, and got 



I04 Naval War of 1812 

the forecastle-chaser aft, cutting away the taffrail 
to give the two guns more freedom to work in, and 
also running out, through the cabin windows, two 
of the long main-deck 24's. The British boats 
were towing also. At 6 a.m., a light breeze sprang 
up, and the Constitution set studding-sails and 
stay-sails; the Shannon opened at her with her 
bow-guns, but ceased when she found she could 
not reach her. At 6.30, the wind having died 
away, the Shannon began to gain, almost all the 
boats of the squadron towing her. Having 
sounded in 26 fathoms. Lieutenant Charles Morris 
suggested to Hull to try kedging. All the spare 
rope was bent on to the cables, payed out into the 
cutters, and a kedge run out half a mile ahead and 
let go ; then the crew clapped on and walked away 
with the ship, overrunning and tripping the kedge 
as she came up with the end of the line. Mean- 
while, fresh lines and another kedge were carried 
ahead, and the frigate glided away from her pur- 
suers. At 7.30 A.M., a little breeze sprang up, 
when the Constitution set her ensign and fired a 
shot at the Shannon. It soon fell calm again and 
the Shannon neared. At 9.10 a light air from the 
southward struck the ship, bringing her to wind- 
ward. As the breeze was seen coming, her sails 
were trimmed, and as soon as she obeyed her 
helm she was brought close up on the port tack. 
The boats dropped in alongside; those that be- 



Naval War of 1 812 105 

longed to the davits were run up, while the others 
were just lifted clear of the water, by purchases on 
the spare spars, stowed outboard, where they 
could be used again at a minute's notice. Mean- 
while, on her lee beam the Guernere opened fire; 
but her shot fell short, and the Americans paid 
not the slightest heed to it. Soon it again fell calm 
when Hull had 2000 gallons of water started, and 
again put out his boats to tow. The Shannon, 
with some of the other boats of the squadron help- 
ing her, gained on the Constitution, but by severe 
exertion was again left behind. Shortly after- 
ward, a slight wind springing up, the Belvidera 
gained on the other British ships, and when it fell 
calm she was nearer to the Constitution than any 
of her consorts, their boats being put on to her.' 
At 10.30, observing the benefit that the Constitu- 
tion had derived from warping. Captain Byron did 
the same, bending all his hawsers to one another, 
and working two kedge anchors at the same time 
by paying the warp out through one hawse-hole 
as it was run in through the other opposite. Hav- 
ing men from the other frigates aboard, and a 
lighter ship to work. Captain Byron, at 2 p.m. was 

* Cooper speaks as if this was the Shannon; but from Mar- 
shall's Naval Biography we learn that it was the Belvidera. 
At other times, he confuses the Belvidera with the Guerribre. 
Captain Hull, of course, could not accurately distinguish the 
names of his pursuers. My account is drawn from a careful 
comparison of Marshall, Cooper, and James. 



io6 Naval War of 1812 

near enough to exchange bow- and stern-chasers 
with the Constitution — out of range, however. Hull 
expected to be overtaken, and made every arrange- 
ment to try in such case to disable the first frigate 
before her consorts could close. But neither the 
Belvidera nor the Shannon dared to tow very near 
for fear of having their boats sunk by the Amer- 
ican's stern-chasers. 

The Constitution'' s crew showed the most ex- 
cellent spirit. Officers and men relieved each 
other regularly, the former snatching their rest 
anywhere on deck, the latter sleeping at the guns. 
Gradually, the Constitution drew ahead, but the 
situation continued most critical. All through 
the afternoon the British frigates kept towing and 
kedging, being barely out of gunshot. At 3 p.m., a 
light breeze sprung up, and blew fitfully at inter- 
vals; every puff was watched closely and taken 
advantage of to the utmost. At 7 in the evening 
the wind almost died out, and for four more weary 
hours the worn-out sailors towed and kedged. At 
10.45, a little breeze struck the frigate, when the 
boats dropped alongside and were hoisted up, ex- 
cepting the first cutter. Throughout the night 
the wind continued very light, the Belvidera forg- 
ing ahead till she was off the Constitution's lee 
beam; and at 4 a.m. on the morning of the 19th, 
she tacked to the eastward, the breeze being light 
from the south by east. At 4.20 the Constitution 



Naval War of 1 812 107 

tacked also; and at 5.15 the Molus, which had 
drawn ahead, passed on the contrary tack. Soon 
afterward the wind freshened so that Captain Hull 
took in his cutter. The Africa was now so far to 
leeward as to be almost out of the race, while the 
five frigates were all running on the starboard 
tack with every stitch of canvas set. At 9 a.m., an 
American merchantman hove in sight and bore 
down toward the squadron. The Belvtdera, by 
way of decoy, hoisted American colors, when the- 
Constitution hoisted the British flag, and the mer- 
chant vessel hauled off. The breeze continued 
light till noon, when Hull found he had dropped 
the British frigates well behind; the nearest was 
the Belvtdera, exactly in his wake, bearing W.N, 
W. 2h miles distant. The Shannon was on his lee, 
bearing N. by W. I W. distant 3I- miles. The 
other two frigates were five miles off on the lee 
quarter. Soon afterward the breeze freshened, 
and " Old Ironsides" drew slowly ahead from her 
foes, her sails being watched and tended with the 
most consummate skill. At 4 p.m., the breeze 
again lightened, but even the Belvtdera was now 
four miles astern and to leeward. At 6.45, there 
were indications of a heavy rain squall, which 
once more permitted Hull to show that in sea- 
manship he excelled even the able captains against 
whom he was pitted. The crew were stationed 
and everything kept fast till the last minute, when 



io8 Naval War of 1812 

all was clewed up just before the squall struck the 
ship. The light canvas was furled, a second reef 
taken in the mizzen-topsail, and the ship almost 
instantly brought under short sail. The British 
■ vessels, seeing this, began to let go and haul down 
without waiting for the wind, and were steering on 
different tacks when the first gust struck them. 
But Hull, as soon as he got the weight of the wind 
sheeted home, hoisted his fore- and main-top- 
gallantsails, and went off on an easy bowline at the 
rate . f 1 1 knots. At 7 .40, sight was again obtained 
of the enemy, the squall having passed to leeward ; 
the Belvidera, the nearest vessel, had altered her 
bearings two points to leeward, and was a long 
way astern. Next came the Shannon ; the Giier- 
riere and Molus were hull down, and the Africa 
barely visible. The wind now kept light, shifting 
occasionally in a very baffling manner, but the 
Constitution gained steadily, wetting her sails 
from the sky-sails to the courses. At 6 a.m. on 
the morning of the 20th, the pursuers were almost 
out of sight; and at 8.15 a.m. they abandoned the 
chase. Hull at once stopped to investigate the 
character of two strange vessels, but found them 
to be only Americans; then, at midday, he stood 
toward the east, and went into Boston on July 
26th. 

In this chase. Captain Isaac Hull was matched 
against five British captains, two of whom. Broke 



Naval War of 1 812 109 

and Byron, were fully equal to any in their navy; 
and while the latter showed great perseverance, 
good seamanship, and ready imitation, there can 
be no doubt that the palm in every way belongs 
to the cool old Yankee. Every daring expedient 
known to the most perfect seamanship was tried, 
and tried with success; and no victorious fight 
could reflect more credit on the conqueror than 
this three-days' chase did on Hull. Later, on 
two occasions, the Constitution proved herself 
far superior in gunnery to the average British 
frigate; this time, her officers and men showed 
that they could handle the sails as well as they 
could the guns. Hull out-manoeuvred Broke 
and Byron as cleverly as a month later he out- 
fought Dacres. His successful escape and victori- 
ous fight were both performed in a way that place 
him above any single ship-captain of the war. 

On August 2d, the Constitution made sail from 
Boston ' and stood to the eastward, in hopes of 
falling in with some of the British cruisers. She 
was unsuccessful, however, and met nothing. 
Then she ran down to the Bay of Fundy, steered 
along the coast of Nova Scotia, and thence toward 
Newfoundland, and finally took her station off 
Cape Race in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, where she 
took and burned two brigs of little value. On 
the 15th she recaptured an American brig from 

' Letter of Captain Isaac Hull, August 28, 1812. 



no Naval War of 1 8i 2 

the British ship-sloop Avenger, though the latter 
escaped ; Captain Hull manned his prize and sent 
her in. He then sailed southward, and on the 
night of the i8th spoke a Salem privateer which 
gave him news of a British frigate to the south; 
thither he stood, and at 2 p.m. on the 19th, in lat. 
41° 30 ' N. and 55° W., made out a large sail bear- 
ing E.S.E. and to leeward, ' which proved to be 
his old acquaintance, the frigate Guerriere, Captain 
Dacres. It was a cloudy day, and the wind was 
blowing fresh from the northwest. The Guer- 
riere was standing by the wind on the starboard 
tack, under easy canvas^ ; she hauled up her 
courses, took in her topgallantsails, and at 4.30 
backed her main-topsail. Hull then very delib- 
erately began to shorten sail, taking in topgallant- 
sails, stay-sails, and flying-jib, sending down the 
royal yards and putting another reef in the top- 
sails. Soon the Englishman hoisted three en- 
signs, when the American also set his colors, one 
at each mast-head, and one at the mizzen-peak. 

The Constitution now ran down with the wind 
nearly aft. The Guerriere was on the starboard 
tack, and at five o 'clock opened with her weather- 
guns,^ the shot falling short, then wore round and 
fired her port broadside, of which two shots struck 

^Do., August 30th. 

' Letter of Captain James R. Dacres, September 7, 181 2. 
■ 3 Log of Guerriere. 



Naval War of 1 8 1 2 1 1 1 

her opponent, the rest passing over and through 
her rigging.' As the British frigateagain wore, to 
open with her starboard battery, the Constitution 
yawed a Httle and fired two or three of her port 
bow-guns. Three or four times the Giierribre 
repeated this manoeuvre, wearing and firing alter- 
nate broadsides, but with Httle or no effect, while 
the Constitution yawed as often to avoid being 
raked, and occasionally fired one of her bow-guns. 
This continued nearly an hour, as the vessels were 
very far apart when the action began, hardly any 
loss or damage being inflicted by either party. At 
6.00 the Guerrihe bore up and ran off under her 
topsails and jib, with the wind almost astern, a 
little on her port quarter, when the Constitution 
set her main-topgallantsail and foresail, and at 
6.05 closed within half pistol-shot distance on her 
adversary's port beam.^ Immediately a furious 
cannonade opened, each ship firing as the guns 
bore. By the time the ships were fairly abreast, 

' See in the Naval Archives (Bureau of Navigation) the 
Constitution's Log-Book (vol. ii., from February i, 1812, to 
December 13, 1813). The point is of some little importance, 
because Hull in his letter speaks as if both the first broad- 
sides fell short, whereas the log distinctly says that the second 
went over the ship, except two shot, which came home. 
The hypothesis of the Guerriere having damaged powder was 
founded purely on this supposed falling short of the first two 
broadsides. 

'Autobiography of Commodore Morris, p. 164. Annapolis, 
18S0. 



1 1 2 Naval War of 1 8 1 2 

at 6.20, the Constitution shot away the Guerrihre's 
mizzen-mast, which fell over the starboard quarter, 
knocking a large hole in the counter, and bringing 
the ship round against her helm. Hitherto, she had 
suffered very greatly, and the Constitution hardly 
at all. The latter, finding that she was ranging 
ahead, put her helm aport and then luffed short 
round her enemy's bows,* delivering a heavy rak- 
ing fire with the starboard guns and shooting away 
the Guerriere's main-yard. Then she wore and 
again passed her adversary's bows, raking with 
her port guns. The mizzen-mast of the Guerriere, 
dragging in the water, had by this time pulled her 
bow round till the wind came on her starboard 
quarter; and so near were the two ships that the 
EngHshman's bowsprit passed diagonally over the 
Constitution s quarter-deck, and as the latter ship 
fell off it got foul of her mizzen-rigging, and the 
vessels then lay with the Guerriere's starboard 
bow against the Constitution's port, or lee quarter- 
gallery. ^ The Englishman's bow-guns played 
havoc with Captain Hull's cabin, setting fire to it; 
but the flames were soon extinguished by Lieuten- 
ant Hoffman. On both sides the boarders were 
called away; the British ran forward, but Captain 
Dacres relinquished the idea of attacking ^ when 

' Log of Constitution. 

2 Cooper, in Putnam's Magazine, i., 475. 

3 Address of Captain Dacres to the court-martial at Halifax. 



Naval War of 1812 113 

he saw the crowds of men on the American's decks. 
Meanwhile, on the Constitution, the boarders and 
marines gathered aft, but such a heavy sea was 
running that they could not get on the Guerriere. 
Both sides suffered heavily from the closeness of 
the musketry fire; indeed, almost the entire loss 
on the Constitution occurred at this juncture. As 
Lieutenant Bush, of the marines, sprang upon the 
taffrail to leap on the enemy's decks, a British 
marine shot him dead; Mr. Morris, the first 
lieutenant, and Mr. Alwyn, the master, had also 
both leaped on the taffrail, and both were at the 
same moment wounded by the musketry fire. On 
the Guerriere the loss was far heavier, almost all 
the men on the forecastle being picked off. Cap- 
tain Dacres himself was shot in the back and 
severely wounded by one of the American mizzen- 
topmen, while he was standing on the starboard 
forecastle hammocks, cheering on his crew ' ; two 
of the lieutenants and the master were also shot 
down. The ships gradually worked round till the 
wind was again on the port quarter, when they 
separated, and the Guerriere' s foremast and main- 
mast at once went by the board, and fell over on 
the starboard side, leaving her a defenceless hulk, 
rolling her main-deck guns into the water.'' At 
6.30, the Constitution hauled aboard her tacks, ran 
off a little distance to the eastward, and lay to. 

'James, vi., 144. * Brenton, v., 51. 

VOL. I.— 8 



114 Naval War of 1 8i 2 

Her braces and standing and running rigging were 
much cut up and some of the spars wounded, but 
a few minutes sufficed to repair damages, when 
Captain Hull stood under his adversary's lee, and 
the latter at once struck, at 7.00 p.m.,' just two 
hours after she had fired the first shot. On the 
part of the Constitution, however, the actual 
fighting, exclusive of six or eight guns fired during 
the first hour, while closing, occupied less than 
30 minutes. 

The tonnage and metal of the combatants have 
already been referred to. The Constitution had, 
as already said, about 456 men aboard, while of 
the Guerribre's crew, 267 prisoners were received 
aboard the Constitution; deducting 10 who were 
Americans and would not fight, and adding the 15 
killed outright, we get 272 ; 28 men were absent in 
prizes. 





Tons 


COMPARATIVE FORCE 

Broad- 
Guns side Men Loss 


Compara- 
tive Force 


Compara 

tive loss 
inflicted 


Constitution . 
Guerriere 


•1576 
•1338 


27 684 456 14 
25 556 272 79 


I.OO 

.70 


I.OO 
.18 



The loss of the Constitution included Lieutenant 
William S. Bush, of the marines, and six seamen 
killed, and her first lieutenant, Charles Morris, mas- 
ter, John C. Alwyn, four seamen, and one marine, 
wounded. Total, seven killed and seven wounded. 
Almost all this loss occurred when the ships came 

' Log of the Constitution. 



coMtriruTiofi 






\ 



This diagram is taken from Commo- 
dore Morris's autobiography and the log 
of the Guerriere: the official accounts 
apparently consider "larboard" and 
"starboard " as interchangeable terras. 



/ 



§.eo 



I 9b 



eUERRIEUE 



V 




9.0S 



^^^::# 



"5 



t.M 



1 1 6 Naval War of 1 8 1 2 

foul, and was due to the Guerrieres musketry and 
the two guns in her bridle-ports. 

The Guerriere lost 23 killed and mortally 
wounded, including her second lieutenant, Henry 
Ready, and 56 wounded severely and slightly, 
including Captain Dacres himself, the first lieu- 
tenant, Bartholomew Kent, master, Robert Scott, 
two master's mates, and one midshipman. 

The third lieutenant of the Constitution, Mr. 
George Campbell Read, was sent on board the 
prize, and the Constitution remained by her during 
the night; but at daylight it was found that she 
was in danger of sinking. Captain Hull at once 
began removing the prisoners, and at three o'clock 
in the afternoon set the Guerriere on fire, and in a 
quarter of an hour she blew up. He then set sail 
for Boston, where he arrived on August 30th. "Cap- 
tain Hull and his officers," writes Captain Dacres in 
his official letter, " have treated us like brave and 
generous enemies ; the greatest care has been 
taken that we should not lose the smallest trifle." 

The British laid very great stress on the rotten 
and decayed condition of the Guerriere; mention- 
ing in particular that the mainmast fell solely be- 
cause of the weight of the falling foremast. But 
it must be remembered that until the action 
occurred she was considered a very fine ship. 
Thus, in Brighton's Memoir of Admiral Broke, it is 
declared that Dacres freely expressed the opinion 



Naval War of 1 812 117 

that she could take a ship in half the time the 
Shannon could. The fall of the mainmast oc- 
curred when the fight was practically over ; it had 
no influence whatever on the conflict. It was 
also asserted that her powder was bad, but on no 
authority; her first broadside fell short, but so, 
under similar circumstances, did the first broadside 
of the United States. None of these causes ac- 
count for the fact that her shot did not hit. Her 
opponent was of such superior force — nearly in 
the proportion of 3 to 2 — that success would have 
been very difficult in any event, and no one can 
doubt the gallantry and pluck with which the 
British ship was fought; but the execution was 
very greatly disproportioned to the force. The 
gunnery of the Guerribre was very poor, and that 
of the Constitution excellent ; during the few min- 
utes the ships were yard-arm and yard-arm, the 
latter was not hulled once, while no less than 30 
shot took effect on the former's engaged side,' 
five sheets of copper beneath the bends. The 
Giierriere, moreover, was out-manoeuvred; "in 
wearing several times and exchanging broadsides 
in such rapid and continual changes of position, 
her fire was much more harmless than it would 
have been if she had kept more steady," ' The 

* Captain Dacres's address to the court-martial. 
^ Lord Howard Douglass's treatise on Naval Gunnery, p. 
454. London, 185 1. 



n8 Naval War of 1 812 

Constitution was handled faultlessly ; Captain Hull 
displayed the coolness and skill of a veteran in the 
way in which he managed, first, to avoid being 
raked, and then to improve the advantage 
which the precision and rapidity of his fire had 
gained. "After making every allowance claimed 
by the enemy, the character of this victory is not 
essentially altered. Its peculiarities were a fine 
display of seamanship in the approach, extraor- 
dinary efficiency in the attack, and great readi- 
ness in repairing damages; all of which denote 
cool and capable officers, with an expert and 
trained crew; in a word, a disciplined man-of- 
war." ^ The disparity of force, 10 to 7, is not 
enough to account for the disparity of execution, 
10 to 2. Of course, something must be allowed 
for the decayed state of the Englishman's masts, 
although I really do not think it had any influence 
on the battle, for he was beaten when the main- 
mast fell; and it must be remembered, on the 
other hand, that the American crew was absolutely 
new, while the Giierriere was manned by old hands. 
So that, while admitting and admiring the gal- 
lantry, and, on the whole, the seamanship, of Cap- 
tain Dacres and his crew, and acknowledging that 
he fought at a great disadvantage, especially in 
being short-handed, yet all must acknowledge 
that the combat showed a marked superiority, 

' Cooper, ii., 173. 



Naval War of 1 812 119 

particularly in gunnery, on the part of the Amer- 
icans. Had the ships not come foul, Captain 
Hull would probably not have lost more than 
three or four men; as it was, he suffered but 
slightly. That the Guerrtere was not so weak as 
she was represented to be, can be gathered from 
the fact that she mounted two more main-deck 
guns than the rest of her class; thus carrying on 
her main-deck thirty long 1 8-pounders in battery 
to oppose to the thirty long 24's or rather (allow- 
ing for the short weight of shot) long 22's of the 
Constitution. Characteristically enough, James, 
though he carefully reckons in the long bow- 
chasers in the bridle-ports of the Argus and Enter- 
prise, yet refuses to count the two long i8's 
mounted through the bridle-ports on the Guer- 
riere's main-deck. Now, as it turned out, these 
two bow-guns were used very effectively, when the 
ships got foul, and caused more damage and loss 
than all of the other main-deck guns put together. 
Captain Dacres, very much to his credit, allowed 
the ten Americans on board to go below, so as not 
to fight against their flag ; and, in his address to the 
court-martial, mentions, among the reasons for 
his defeat, "that he was very much weakened by 
permitting the Americans on board to quit their 
quarters." Coupling this with the assertion 
made by James and most other British writers 
that the Constitution was largely manned by Eng- 



I20 Naval War of 1812 

lishmen, we reach the somewhat remarkable con- 
clusion that the British ship was defeated because 
the Americans on board would not fight against 
their country, and that the American was vic- 
torious because the British on board would. How- 
ever, as I have shown, in reality there were 
probably not a score of British on board the 
Constitution. 

In this, as well as the two succeeding frigate 
actions, every one must admit that there was a 
great superiority in force on the side of the vic- 
tors, and British historians have insisted that this 
superiority was so great as to preclude any hopes 
of a successful resistance. That this was not 
true, and that the disparity between the com- 
batants was not as great as had been the case in a 
number of encounters in which English frigates 
had taken French ones, can be best shown by a 
few accounts taken from the French historian 
Troude, who would certainly not exaggerate the 
difference. Thus, on March i, 1799, the English 
38-gun i8-pounder frigate Sybil captured the 
French 44-gun 24-pounder frigate Forte, after an 
action of two hours and ten minutes.^ In actual 
weight the shot thrown by one of the main-deck 
guns of the defeated Forte was over six pounds 
heavier than the shot thrown by one of the main- 

^ Batailles Navales de la France. O. Troude, iv., 171. 
Paris, 1868. 



Naval War of 1812 121 

deck guns of the victorious ConstitiUion or United 
States.^ 

There are later examples than this. But a very- 
few years before the declaration of war by the 
United States, and in the same struggle that was 
then still raging, there had been at least two vic- 
tories gained by English frigates over French foes 
as superior to themselves as the American 44's 
were to the British ships they captured. On 
August 10, 1805, the PhcBni.v, 36, captured the 
Didon, 40, after 3^ hours' fighting, the compara- 
tive broadside force being ^ : 



P ha; nix 


Didon 


13 X 18 


14 X 18 


2X9 


2X8 


6 X 32 


7 X 36 


21 guns, 444 lbs. 


23 guns, 522 lbs. 




(nominal; about 




600, real). 



On March 8, 1808, the San Florenzo, 36, cap- 
tured the Piedmontaise, 40, the force being 
exactly what it was in the case of the Phoenix and 
Didon. ^ Comparing the real, not the nominal, 
weight of metal, we find that the Didon and Pied- 
montaise were proportionately of greater force, 
compared to the PhcBnix and San Florenzo, than 

* See Appendix B for actual weight of French shot. 
^ Batailles Navales de la France, iii., 425. 
3 Ibid., iii., 499. 



122 Naval War of 1812 

the Constitution was, compared to the Guerriere or 
Java. The French i8's threw each a shot weigh- 
ing but about two pounds less than that thrown 
by an American 24 of 181 2, while their 3 6 -pound 
carronades each threw a shot over 10 pounds 
heavier than that thrown by one of the Constitu- 
tion's spar-deck 32's. 

That a 24-pounder cannot always whip an 18- 
pounder frigate is shown by the action of the 
British frigate Eurotas with the French frigate 
Chlorinde, on February 25, 18 14.' The first, with 
a crew of 329 men threw 625 pounds of shot at a 
broadside, the latter carrying 344 men and throw- 
ing 463 pounds; yet the result was indecisive. 
The French lost 90, and the British 60 men. The 
action showed that heavy metal was not of much 
use unless used well. 

To appreciate rightly the exultation Hull's vic- 
tory caused in the United States, and the intense 
annoyance it created in England, it must be re- 
membered that during the past twenty years the 
Island Power had been at war with almost every 
state in Europe, at one time or another, and in the 
course of about two hundred single conflicts be- 
tween ships of approximately equal force (that 
is, where the difference was less than one half), 
waged against French, Spanish, Italian, Turkish, 
Algerine, Russian, Danish, and Dutch antagon- 

^James, vi., 391. 



■SuMi 



Naval War of 1 812 123 

ists, her ships had been beaten and captured in 
but five instances. Then war broke out with 
America, and in eight months five single-ship 
actions occurred, in every one of which the British 
vessel was captured. 

Even had the victories been due solely to supe- 
rior force, this would have been no mean triumph 
for the United States. 

On October 13, 181 2, the American i8-gun ship- 
sloop Wasp, Captain Jacob Jones, with 137 men 
aboard, sailed from the Delaware and ran off 
southeast to get into the track of the West India 
vessels; on the i6th, a heavy gale began to blow, 
causing the loss of the jib-boom and two men who 
were on it. The next day, the weather moderated 
somewhat, and at 11.30 p.m., in latitude 37° N., 
longitude 65° W., several sail were descried.' 
These were part of a convoy of 14 merchantmen 
which had quitted the bay of Honduras on Sep- 
tember 12th, bound for England,^ under the con- 
voy of the British i8-gun brig-sloop Frolic, of 19 
guns and no men. Captain Thomas Whinyates. 
They had been dispersed by the gale of the i6th, 
during which the Frolic's main-yard was carried 
away and both her topsails torn to pieces ^ ; next 
day she spent in repairing damages, and by dark 

'Captain Jones's official letter, November 24, 1812. 

^James's History, vi., 158. 

3 Captain Whinyates's official letter, October 18, 1812. 



124 Naval War of 1812 

six of the missing ships had joined her. The day 
broke almost cloudless on the i8th (Sunday), 
showing the convoy, ahead and to leeward of the 
American ship, still some distance off, as Captain 
Jones had not thought it prudent to close during 
the night, while he was ignorant of the force of his 
antagonists. The Wasp now sent down her top- 
gallant yards, close reefed her topsails, and 
bore down under short fighting canvas ; while the 
Frolic removed her main-yard from the casks, 
lashed it on deck, and then hauled to the wind 
under her boom mainsail and close-reefed fore- 
topsail, hoisting Spanish colors to decoy the 
stranger under her guns, and permit the convoy 
to escape. At 11.32 the action began^the two 
ships running parallel on the starboard tack, not 
sixty yards apart, the Wasp firing her port, and 
the Frolic her starboard guns. The latter fired 
very rapidly, delivering three broadsides to the 
Wasp's two,' both crews cheering loudly as the 
ships wallowed through the water. There was a 
very heavy sea running, which caused the vessels 
to pitch and roll heavily. The Americans fired as 
the engaged side of their ship was going down, 
aiming at their opponent's hull ^ ; while the British 
delivered their broadsides while on the crests of 
the seas, the shot going high. The water dashed 

^ Cooper, 182. 

2 Niles's Register, iii., p. 324. 



Naval War of 1 812 125 

in clouds of spray over both crews, and the vessels 
rolled so that the muzzles of the guns went under/ 
But in spite of the rough weather, the firing was 
not only spirited but well directed. At 1 1.36, the 
Wasp's main-topmast was shot away and fell, 
with its yard, across the port fore and fore-topsail 
braces, rendering the head yards unmanageable; 
at 1 1.46, the gaff and mizzen-topgallantmast came 
down, and by 11.52 every brace and most of the 
rigging was shot away.^ It would now have been 
very difficult to brace any of the yards. But 
meanwhile the Frolic suffered dreadfully in her 
hull and lower masts, and had her gaff and head 
braces shot away.-' The slaughter among her 
crew was very great, but the survivors kept at 
their work with the dogged courage of their race. 
At first the two vessels ran side by side, but the 
American gradually forged ahead, throwing in her 
fire from a position in which she herself received 
little injury; by degrees, the vessels got so close 
that the American struck the Frolic s side with 
her rammers in loading,'* and the British brig was 
raked with dreadful effect. The Frolic then fell 
aboard her antagonist, her jib-boom coming in 
between the main- and mizzen-rigging of the 
Wasp and passing over the heads of Captain Jones 
and Lieutenant Biddle, who were standing: near 



^to 



' Niles's Register, iii., p. 324. 3 Captain Whinyates's letter. 
* Captain Jenes's letter. ^ Captain Jones's letter. 



126 Naval War of 1812 

the capstan. This forced the Wasp up in the 
wind, and she again raked her antagonist, Captain 
Jones trying to restrain his men from boarding till 
he could put in another broadside. But they 
could no longer be held back, and Jack Lang, a 
New Jersey seaman, leaped on the Frolic s bow- 
sprit. Lieutenant Biddle then mounted on the 
hammock-cloth to board, but his feet got entangled 
in the rigging, and one of the midshipmen seizing 
his coat-tails to help himself up, the lieutenant 
tumbled back on the deck. At the next swell he 
succeeded in getting on the bowsprit, on which 
there were already two seamen whom he passed 
on the forecastle. But there was no one to oppose 
him; not twenty Englishmen were left unhurt. 
The man at the wheel was still at his post, grim 
and undaunted, and two or three more were on 
deck, including Captain Whinyates and Lieuten- 
ant Wintle, both so severely wounded that they 
could not stand without support.' There could 
be no more resistance, and Lieutenant Biddle 
lowered the flag at 12.15 — j^st 43 minutes after 
the beginning of the fight. 3 A minute or two 
afterward both the Frolic's masts went by the 
board — the foremast about fifteen feet above the 
deck, the other short off. Of her crew, as already 
said, not twenty men had escaped unhurt. Every 

' Captain Whinyates's letter. 

a James, vi., i6i. 3 Captain Jones's letter. 



Naval War of 1 812 127 

officer was wounded; two of them, the first Heu- 
tenant, Charles McKay, and master, John Ste- 
phens, soon died. Her total loss was thus over 
90 ' ; about 30 of whom were killed outright or 
died later. The Wasp suffered very severely in 
her rigging and aloft generally, but only two or 
three shots struck her hull ; five of her men were 
killed — two in her mizzen-top and one in her 
main-topmast rigging — and five wounded,^ chiefly 
while aloft. 

The two vessels were practically of equal force. 
The loss of the Frolic's main-yard had merely 
converted her into a brigantine, and, as the 
roughness of the sea made it necessary to fight 
under very short canvas, her inferiority in men 
was fully compensated for by her superiority in 
metal. She had been desperately defended; no 
men could have fought more bravely than Captain 
Whinyates and his crew. On the other hand, the 
Americans had done their work with a coolness 
and skill that could not be surpassed ; the contest 
had been mainly one of gunnery, and had been 
decided by the greatly superior judgment and 
accuracy with which they fired. Both officers 
and crew had behaved well; Captain Jones 

^ Captain Whinyates's official letter thus states it, and is, 
of course, to be taken as authority; the Bermuda account 
makes it 69, and James only 62. 

^ Captain Jones's letter. 



128 Naval War of 1812 

particularly mentions Lieutenant Claxton, who, 
though too ill to be of any service, persisted 
in remaining on deck throughout the engage- 
ment. 

The Wasp was armed with two long 12's and 
sixteen 32-pound carronades; the Frolic with two 
long 6's, sixteen 3 2 -pound carronades, and one 
shifting 1 2 -pound carronade. 

DIAGRAM.^ 



t 



WASP 



J 



u.az / 



„ ^ 



U.f£ 



I Hi \ 



\ 
\ 
I 

I 

fgOlIC 



' l2.tS 



^ It is difficult to reconcile the accounts of the manoeuvres 
in this action. James says "larboard" where Cooper says 
" starboard"; one says the Wasp wore, the other says that 
she could not do so, etc. 



Naval War of 1 812 129 

COMPARATIVE FORCE 

Tons No. Guns Weight Metal Crews Loss 

Wasp 450 9 250 13s 10 

Frolic 467 10 274 no 90 

Vice-Admiral Jurien de la Graviere comments 
on this action as follows ' : 

" The American fire showed itself to be as accu- 
rate as it was rapid. On occasions when the 
roughness of the sea would render all aim exces- 
sively uncertain, the effects of their artillery were 
not less murderous than under more advantageous 
conditions. The corvette Wasp fought the brig 
Frolic in an enormous sea, under very short canvas, 
and yet, forty minutes after the beginning of the 
action, when the two vessels came together, the 
Americans who leaped aboard the brig found on 
the deck, covered with dead and dying, but one 
brave man, who had not left the wheel, and three 
officers, all wounded, who threw down their 
swords at the feet of the victors." Admiral de la 
Graviere's criticisms are especially valuable, be- 
cause they are those of an expert, who only refers 
to the War of 18 12 in order to apply to the French 
navy the lessons which it teaches, and who is per- 
fectly unprejudiced. He cares for the lesson 
taught, not the teacher, and is quite as willing to 

^ Guerres Maritimes, ii., 287. Septieme Edition, Paris, 
1881. 

VOL. I. — 9 



130 Naval War of 1812 

learn from the defeat of the Chesapeake as from 
the victories of the Constitution — while most Amer 
ican critics only pay heed to the latter. 

The characteristics of the action are tne 
practical equality of the contestants in point of 
force and the enormous disparity in the damage 
each suffered; numerically, the Wasp was su- 
perior by 5 per cent., and inflicted a ninefold 
greater loss. 

Captain Jones was not destined to bring his 
prize into port, for a few hours afterward the 
Poictiers, a British 74, Captain John Poer Beres- 
ford, hove in sight. Now appeared the value of 
the Frolic's desperate defence; if she could not 
prevent herself from being captured, she had at 
least ensured her own recapture, and also the cap- 
ture of the foe. When the Wasp shook out her 
sails they were found to be cut into ribbons aloft, 
and she could not make off with sufficient speed. 
As the Poictiers passed the Frolic, rolling like a 
log in the water, she threw a shot over her, and 
soon overtook the Wasp. Both vessels were car- 
ried into Bermuda. Captain Whinyates was again 
put in command of the Frolic. Captain Jones 
and his men were soon exchanged; 25,000 dol- 
lars prize-money was voted them by Congress, 
and the Captain and Lieutenant Biddle were both 
promoted, the former receiving the captured ship 
Macedonian. Unluckily, the blockade was too 



Naval War of 1812 131 

close for him to succeed in getting out during the 
remainder of the war. 

On October 8th, Commodore Rodgers left Boston 
on his second cruise, with the President, United 
States, Congress, and Argus, "^ leaving the Hornet 
in port. Four days out, the United States and 
Argus separated, while the remaining two frigates 
continued their cruise together. The Argus,'' 
Captain Sinclair, cruised to the eastward, making 
prizes of six valuable merchantmen, and returned 
to port on January 3d. During the cruise she was 
chased for three days and three nights (the latter 
being moonlight) by a British squadron, and was 
obliged to cut away her boats and anchors and 
start some of her water. But she saved her guns, 
and was so cleverly handled that during the chase 
she actually succeeded in taking and manning a 
prize, though the enemy got near enough to open 
fire as the vessels separated. Before relating 
what befell the United States, we shall bring Com- 
modore Rodgers's cruise to an end. 

On October loth, the Commodore chased, but 
failed to overtake, the British frigate Nymphe, 38, 
Captain Epworth. On the i8th, off the great 
Bank of Newfoundland, he captured the Jamaica 
packet Swallow, homeward bound, with 200,000 
dollars in specie aboard. On the 31st, at 9 a.m., 

^ Letter of Commodore Rodgers, January i, 1813. 
,* Letter of Captain Arthur Sinclair, January 4, 1813. 



132 Naval War of 1812 

lat. T,^° N., long. 32° W., his two frigates fell in 
with the British frigate Galatea, 36, Captain 
Woodley Losack, convoying two South Sea ships, 
to windward. The Galatea ran down to recon- 
noitre, and at 10 a.m., recognizing her foes, hauled 
up on the starboard tack to escape. The Amer- 
ican frigates made all sail in chase, and continued 
beating to windward, tacking several times, for 
about three hours. Seeing that she was being 
overhauled, the Galatea now edged away to get on 
her best point of sailing ; at the same moment one 
of her convoy, the Argo, bore up to cross the hawse 
of her foes, but was intercepted by the Congress, 
who lay to to secure her. Meanwhile, the Presi- 
dent kept after the Galatea ; she set her topmast, 
topgallantmast and lower studding-sails, and 
when it was dusk had gained greatly upon her. 
But the night was very dark, the President lost 
sight of the chase, and, toward midnight, hauled 
to the wind to rejoin her consort. The two 
frigates cruised to the east as far as 22° W., and 
then ran down to 17° N.; but during the month 
of November they did not see a sail. They had 
but slightly better luck on their return toward 
home. Passing 120 miles north of Bermuda, 
and cruising a little while toward the Virginia 
capes, they re-entered Boston on December 31st, 
having made nine prizes, most of them of little 
value. 



Naval War of 1812 133 

When four days out, on October 12th, Com- 
modore Decatur had separated from the rest of 
Rodgers's squadron and cruised east ; on the 25th, 
in lat. 29° N., and long. 29° 30', W., while going 
close-hauled on the port tack, with the wind fresh 
from the S.S.E., a sail was descried on the 
weather beam, about twelve miles distant.' This 
was the British 38-gun frigate Macedoniayi, Cap- 
tain John Surnam Carden. She was not, like the 
Guerriere, an old ship captured from the French, ' 
but newly built of oak, and larger than any 
American i8-pounder frigate; she was reputed 
(very wrongfully) to be a " crack ship." According 
to Lieutenant David Hope, " the state of discipline 
on board was excellent; in no British ship was 
more attention paid to gunnery. Before this 
cruise, the ship had been engaged almost every day 
with the enemy; and in time of peace the crew 
were constantly exercised at the great guns." ^ 
How they could have practised so much and 
learned so little, is certainly marvellous. 

The Macedonian set her fore-topmast and top- 
gallant studding-sails and bore away in chase, ^ edg- 
ing down with the wind a little aft the starboard 
beam. Her first lieutenant wished to continue on 
this course and pass down ahead of the United 

'Official letter of Commodore Decatur, October 30, 1812. 

^Marshall's Naval Biography, iv., p. 1018. 

3 Captain Carden to Mr. Croker, October 28, 181 2. 



134 Naval War of 1812 

States,^ but Captain Garden's over-anxiety to keep 
the weather-gage lost him this opportunity of 
closing.^ Accordingly he hauled by the wind and 
passed way to windward of the American. As 
Commodore Decatur got within range, he eased 
off and fireci a broadside, most of which fell short ^ ; 
he then kept his luff, and, the next time he fired, 
his long 24's told heavily, while he received very 
little injury himself. ^ The fire from his main- 
deck (for he did not use his carronades at all for 
the first half -hour) s was so very rapid that it 
seemed as if the ship was on fire; his broadsides 
were delivered with almost twice the rapidity of 
those of the Englishman.'' The latter soon found 
he could not play at long bowls with any chance of 
success; and, having already erred either from 
timidity or bad judgment. Captain Carden de- 
cided to add rashness to the catalogue of his vir- 
tues. Accordingly, he bore up, and came down 
end on toward his adversary, with the wind on his 
port quarter. The States now (10.15) ^^^'^ ^^^^ 
main-topsail aback and made heavy play with 
her long guns, and, as her adversary came nearer, 
with her carronades also. The British ship would 



^ James, vi., i66. 

^ Sentence of court-martial held on the San Domingo, 74, 
at the Bermudas, May 27, 18 12. 

3 Marshall, iv., 1080. s Letter of Commodore Decatur. 

4 Cooper, ii., 178. ^ James, vi., 169. 



Naval War of 1 8i 2' 135 

reply with her starboard guns, hauHng up to do 
so; as she came down, the American would ease 
off, run a Httle way and again come to, keeping up 
a terrific fire. As the Macedonian bore down to 
close, the chocks of all her forecastle guns (which 
were mounted on the outside) were cut away ' ; 
her fire caused some damage to the American's 
rigging, but hardly touched her hull, while she 
herself suffered so heavily both alow and aloft that 
she gradually dropped to leeward, while the Amer- 
ican forereached on her. Finding herself ahead 
and to windward, the States tacked and ranged up 
under her adversary's lee, when the latter struck 
her colors at 11. 15, just an hour and a half after 
the beginning of the action.^ 

The United States had suffered surprisingly little ; 
what damage had been done was aloft. Her miz- 
zen-topgallantmast was cut away, some of the 
spars were wounded, and the rigging a good deal 
cut ; the hull was only struck two or three times. 
The ships were never close enough to be within 
fair range of grape and musketry,^ and the wounds 
were mostly inflicted by round shot and were thus 
apt to be fatal. Hence the loss of the Americans 
amounted to Lieutenant John Messer Funk (5th 
of the ship) and six seamen killed or mortally 

^ Letter of Captain Garden. 

" Letter of Commodore Decatur. 

3 Ibid. 



136 ■ Naval War of 181 2 

wounded, and only five severely and slightly 
wounded. 

The Macedonian, on the other hand, had re- 
ceived over a hundred shot in her hull, several be- 
tween wind and water; her mizzen-mast had 
gone by the board ; her fore- and main-topmasts 
had been shot away by the caps, and her main- 
yard in the slings ; almost all her rigging was cut 
away (only the foresail being left) ; on the engaged 
side all of her carronades but two, and two of her 
main-deck guns, were dismounted. Of her crew 
43 were killed and mortally wounded, and 61 (in- 
cluding her iirst and third lieutenants) severely 
and slightly wounded.' Among her crew were 
eight Americans (as shown by her muster-roll) ; 
these asked permission to go below before the 
battle, but it was refused by Captain Garden, and 
three were killed during the action. James says 
that they were allowed to go below, but this is un- 
true; for if they had the three would not have 
been slain. The others testified that they had 
been forced to fight, and they afterward entered 
the American service — the only ones of the Mace- 
donian's crew who did, or who were asked to. 

The Macedonian had her full complement of 
301 men; the States had, by her muster-roll of 
October 20th, 428 officers, petty officers, seamen, 
and boys, and 50 officers and privates of marines, 

' Letter of Captain Garden. 



S V 



^ V 



) 



/ 









/ 






/'"' 
/'\i 






ki 



\ 



Is 






s\ 



137 



138 Naval War of 1812 

a total of 478 (instead of 509 as Marshall in his 
Naval Biography makes it). 

COMPARATIVE FORCE 

Broadside Weight 
Size Guns Metal Men Loss 

United States 1576 27 786 478 12 

Macedonian 1325 25 547 301 104 

Comparative Comparative Loss 

Force Inflicted 

United States 100 100 

Macedonian 66 11 

That is, the relative force being about as three 
is to two,' the damage done was as nine to one! 

Of course, it would have been almost impossible 
for the Macedonian to conquer with one third less 
force; but the disparity was by no means suffi- 
cient to account for the ninefold greater loss suf- 
fered, and the ease and impunity with which the 

' I have considered the United States as mounting her full 
allowance of 54 guns; but it is possible that she had no more 
than 49. In Decatur's letter of challenge of January 17, 
18 14 (which challenge, by the way, was a most blustering 
affair, reflecting credit neither on Decatur nor his opponent, 
Captain Hope, nor on any one else, excepting Captain Stack- 
pole of H. M. S. Statira), she is said to have had that number; 
her broadside would then be 15 long 24's below, i long 24, one 
12-pound, and eight 42-pound carronades above. Her real 
broadside weight of metal would thus be about 680 lbs., and 
she would be superior to the Macedonian in the proportion of 
5 to 4. But it is possible that Decatur had landed some of 
his guns in 18 1 3, as James asserts; and though I am not at all 
sure of this, I have thought it best to be on the safe side in 
describing his force. 



Naval War of 1 812 139 

victory was won. The British sailors fought with 
their accustomed courage, but their gunnery was 
exceedingly poor; and it must be remembered 
that though the ship was bravely fought, still the 
defence was by no means so desperate as that 
made by the Essex or even the Chesapeake, as wit- 
nessed by their respective losses. The Mace- 
donian, moreover, was surrendered when she had 
suffered less damage than either the Giierriere or 
Java. The chief cause of her loss lay in the fact 
that Captain Garden was a poor commander. The 
gunnery of the Java, Guerriere, and Macedonian 
was equally bad; but while Captain Lambert 
proved himself to be as able as he was gallant, and 
Captain Dacres did nearly as well, Captain Carden, 
on the other hand, was first too timid, and then 
too rash, and showed bad judgment at all times. 
By continuing his original course he could have 
closed at once; but he lost his chance by over- 
anxiety to keep the weather-gage, and was cen- 
sured by the court-martial accordingly. Then he 
tried to remedy one error by another, and made a 
foolishly rash approach. A very able and fair- 
minded English writer says of this action: "As a 
display of courage the character of the service was 
nobly upheld, but we would be deceiving our- 
selves were we to admit that the comparative 
expertness of the crews in gunnery was equally sat- 
isfactory. Now, taking the difference of effect as 



T40 Naval War of 1812 

given by Captain Garden, we must draw this con- 
clusion — that the comparative loss in killed and 
wounded (104 to 12), together with the dreadful 
account he gives of the condition of his own ship, 
while he admits that the enemy's vessel was in 
comparatively good order, must have arisen from 
inferiority in gunnery as well as in force." ' 

On the other hand, the American crew, even 
according to James, were as fine a set of men as 
ever were seen on shipboard. Though not one 
fourth were British by birth, yet many of them 
had served on board British ships of war, in some 
cases voluntarily, but much more often because 
they had been impressed. They had been trained 
at the guns with the greatest care by Lieutenant 
Allen. And, finally, Commodore Decatur handled 
his ship with absolute faultlessness. To sum up: 
a brave and skilful crew, ably commanded, was 
matched against an equally brave but unskilful 
one, with an incompetent leader ; and this accounts 
for the disparity of loss being so much greater than 
the disparity in force. 

At the outset of this battle, the position of the 
parties was just the reverse of that in the case of 
the Constitution and Guerriere; the Englishman 
had the advantage of the wind, but he used it in a 
very different manner from that in which Captain 
Hull had done. The latter at once ran down to 

' Lord Howard Douglass, Naval Gunnery, p. 525. 



Naval War of 1 812 141 

close, but manoeuvred so cautiously that no dam- 
age could be done him till he was within pistol- 
shot. Captain Garden did not try to close till 
after fatal indecision, and then made the attempt 
so heedlessly that he was cut to pieces before he 
got to close quarters. Commodore Decatur, also, 
manoeuvred more skilfully than Captain Dacres, 
although the difference was less marked between 
these two. The combat was a plain cannonade; 
the States derived no advantage from the superior 
number of her men, for they were not needed. 
The marines in particular had nothing whatever 
to do, while they had been of the greatest service 
against the Guerriere. The advantage was simply 
in metal, as 10 is to 7. Lord Howard Douglass's 
criticisms on these actions seem to me only ap- 
plicable in part. He says (p. 524): "The Amer- 
icans would neither approach nor permit us to 
join in close battle until they had gained some ex- 
traordinary advantage from the superior faculties 
of their long guns in distant cannonade, and from 
the intrepid, uncircumspect, and often very ex- 
posed approach of assailants who had long been 
accustomed to contemn all manoeuvring. Our 
vessels were crippled in distant cannonade from 
encountering rashly the serious disadvantage of 
making direct attacks; the uncircumspect gal- 
lantry of our commanders led our ships unguarded- 
ly into the snares which wary caution had spread." 



142 Naval War of 1812 

These criticisms are very just as regards the 
Macedonian, and I fully agree with them (pos- 
sibly reserving the right to doubt Captain Car- 
den's gallantry, though readily admitting his 
uncircumspection). But the case of the Gnerriere 
differed widely. There the American ship made 
the attack, while the British at first avoided close 
combat; and, so far from trying to cripple her 
adversary by a distant cannonade, the Constitution 
hardly fired a dozen times until within pistol-shot. 
This last point is worth mentioning, because in a 
work on Heavy Ordnance, by Capt. T. F. Sim- 
mons, R.A. (London, 1837), it is stated that the 
Guerriere received her injuries before the closing, 
mentioning especially the "thirty shot below the 
water-line"; whereas, by the official accounts of 
both commanders, the reverse was the case. Cap- 
tain Hull, in his letter, and Lieutenant Morris, in 
his autobiography, say they only fired a few guns 
before closing ; and Captain Dacres, in his letter, 
and Captain Brenton, in his History, say that not 
much injury was received by the Guerriere until 
about the time the mizzen-mast fell, which was 
three or four minutes after close action began. 

Lieutenant Allen w£fs put aboard the Mace- 
donian as prize-master; he secured the fore- and 
main-masts and rigged a jury mizzen-mast, con- 
verting the vessel into a bark. Commodore De- 
catur discontinued his cruise to convoy his prize 



Naval War of 1 812 143 

back to America; they reached New London 
December 4th. Had it not been for the necessity 
of convoying the Macedonian, the States would 
have continued her cruise, for the damage she 
suffered was of the most trifling character. 

Captain Garden stated (in Marshall's Naval 
Biography) that the States measured 1670 tons, 
was manned by 509 men, suffered so from shot 
under water that she had to be pumped out every 
watch, and that two 18-pound shot passed in a 
horizontal line through her mainmasts; all of 
which statements were highly creditable to the 
vividness of his imagination. The States measured 
but 1576 tons (and by English measurement very 
much less), had 478 men aboard, had not been 
touched by a shot under water-line and her lower 
masts were un wounded. James states that most 
of her crew were British, which assertion I have 
already discussed; and that she had but one boy 
aboard, and that he was seventeen years old, — in 
which case 29 others, some of whom (as we learn 
from the Life of Decatur) were only twelve, must 
have grown with truly startling rapidity during 
the hour and a half that the combat lasted. 

During the twenty years preceding 181 2, there 
had been almost incessant warfare on the ocean, 
and although there had been innumerable single 
conflicts between French and English frigates, 
there had been but one case in which the French 



144 Naval War of 1812 

frigate, single-handed, was victorious. This was 
in the year 1805, when the Milan captured 
the Cleopatra. According to Troude, the former 
threw at a broadside 574 pounds (actual), the lat- 
ter but 334 ; and the former lost 35 men out of her 
crew of 350; the latter $8 out of 200. Or, the 
forces being as 100 to 58, the loss inflicted was as 
100 to 60 ; while the States' force, compared to the 
Macedonian s, being as loo to 66, the loss she in- 
flicted was as loo to ii. 

British ships, moreover, had often conquered 
against odds as great; as, for instance, when the 
Sea Horse captured the great Turkish frigate 
Badere-Zaffer; when the Astrea captured the 
French frigate Gloire, which threw at a broadside 
286 pounds of shot, while she threw but 174; and 
when, most glorious of all. Lord Dundonald, in the 
gallant little Speedy, actually captured the Spanish 
xebec Gamo, of over five times her own force! 
Similarly, the corvette Comus captured the Danish 
frigate Fredrickscoarn, the brig Onyx captured the 
Dutch sloop Manly, the little cutter Thorn cap- 
tured the French Courier-National, and the Pasley 
the Spanish Virgin; while there had been many 
instances of drawn battles between English 12- 
pound frigates and French or Spanish i8-pounders. 

Captain Hull having resigned the command of 
the Constitution, she was given to Captain Bain- 
bridge, of the Constellation, who was also entrusted 



Naval War of 1 812 145 

with the command of the Essex and Hornet. The 
latter ship was in the port of Boston with the Con- 
stttution; under the command of Captain Lawrence, 
The Essex was in the Delaware, and accordingly 
orders were sent to Captain Porter to rendezvous 
at the Island of San Jago; if that failed, several 
other places were appointed, and if, after a certain 
time, he did not fall in with his commodore, he was 
to act at his own discretion. 

On October 26th, the Constitution and Hornet 
sailed, touched at the different rendezvous, and, 
on December 1 3th, arrived off San Salvador, where 
Captain Lawrence found the Bonne Citoyenne, 18, 
Captain Pitt Barnaby Greene. The Bonne Cito- 
yenne was armed with eighteen 32-pound carron- 
ades and two long 9's, and her crew of 1 50 men was 
exactly equal in number to that of the Hornet ; the 
latter' s short weight in metal made her antagonist 
superior to her in about the same proportion that 
she herself was subsequently superior to the Pen- 
guin, or, in other words, the ships were practically 
equal. Captain Lawrence now challenged Captain 
Greene to single fight, giving the usual pledges that 
the Constitution should not interfere. The chal- 
lenge was not accepted for a variety of reasons: 
among others, the Bonne Citoyenne was carrying 
home half a million pounds in specie.' Leaving 

^ Brenton and James both deny that Captain Greene was 
blockaded by the Hornet, and claim that he feared the Con- 

VOL. I. — lO. 



1^6 Naval War of 1 812 

the Hornet to blockade her, Commodore Bainbridge 
ran off to the southward, keeping the land in view. 
At 9 A.M., December 29, 181 2, while the Con- 
stitution was running along the coast of Brazil, 
about thirty miles off shore in latitude 13° 6' S., 
and longitude 31° W., two strange sail were made,' 
inshore and to windward . These were H . B . M . frig- 
ate Java, Captain Lambert, forty-eight days out of 
Spithead, England, with the captured ship William 

stitution. James says (p. 275) that the occurrence was one 
which "the characteristic cunning of Americans turned 
greatly to their advantage"; and adds that Lawrence only 
sent the challenge because "it could not be accepted," and so 
he would "suffer no personal risk." He states that the 
reason it was sent, as well as the reason that it was refused, 
was because the Constitution was going to remain in the offing 
and capture the British ship if she proved conqueror. It is 
somewhat surprising that even Jaines should have had the 
temerity to advance such arguments. According to his own 
account (p. 277), the Constitution left for Boston on January 
6th, and the Hornet remained blockading the Bonne Citoycnne 
till the 24th, when the Montagu, 74, arrived. During these 
eighteen days there could have been no possible chance of the 
Constitution or any other ship interfering, and it is ridiculous 
to suppose that any such fear kept Captain Greene from sail- 
ing out to attack his foe. No doubt Captain Greene's course 
was perfectly justifiable, but it is curious that with all the 
assertions made by James as to the cowardice of the Ameri- 
cans, this is the only instance throughout the war in which a 
ship of either party declined a contest with an antagonist of 
equal force (the cases of Commodore Rodgers and Sir George 
Collier being evidently due simply to an overestimate of the 
opposing ships) . 

' Official letter of Commodore Bainbridge, January 3, 1813 



Naval War of 1 812 147 

in company. Directing the latter to make fpr 
San Salvador, the Java bore down in chase of the 
Constitution.^ The wind was blowing light from 
the N.N.E., and there was very little sea on. At 
10 the Java made the private signals, English, 
Spanish, and Portuguese in succession, none being 
answered ; meanwhile, the Constitution was stand- 
ing up toward the Java on the starboard tack; a 
little after 11 she hoisted her private signal, and 
then, being satisfied that the strange sail was an 
enemy, she wore and stood off toward the S.E., 
to draw her antagonist away from the land,^ 
which was plainly visible. The Java hauled up, 
and made sail in a parallel course, the Constitution 
bearing about three points on her lee bow. The 
Java gained rapidly, being much the swifter. 

At 1.30 the Constitution luffed up, shortened 
her canvas to topsails, topgallantsails, jib, and 
spanker, and ran easily off on the port tack, head- 
ing tow^ard the southeast; she carried her com- 
modore's pennant at the main, national ensigns at 
the mizzen-peak and main-topgallant mast-head, 
and a jack at the fore. The Java also had taken 
in the mainsail and royals, and came down in a 
lasking course on her adversary's weather-quarter,^ 

^Official letter of Lieutenant Chads, December 31, 1S12. 
^ Log of the Constitution. 

3 Lieutenant Chads s address to the court-martial, April 23, 
1813. 



148 Naval War of 181 2 

hoisting her ensign at the mizzen-peak, a union- 
jack at the mizzen- topgahant mast-head, and 
another lashed to the main-rigging. At 2 p.m., 
the Constitution fired a shot ahead of her, following 
it quickly by a broadside,^ and the two ships began 
at long bowls, the English firing the lee or star- 
board battery while the Americans replied with 
their port guns. The cannonade was very spirited 
on both sides, the ships suffering about equally. 
The first broadside of the Java was very destruc- 
tive, killing and wounding several of the Constitu- 
tion's crew. The Java kept edging down, and the 
action continued, with grape and musketry in 
addition; the swifter British ship soon fore- 
reached and kept away, intending to wear across 
her slower antagonist's bow and rake her ; but the 
latter wore in the smoke, and the two combatants 
ran off to the westward, the Englishman still 
a-weather and steering freer than the Constitution, 
which had luffed to close. ^ The action went on 
at pistol-shot distance. In a few minutes, how- 
ever, the Java again forged ahead, out of the 
weight of her adversary's fire, and then kept off, 
as before, to cross her bows; and, as before, the 
Constitution avoided this by wearing, both ships 
again coming round with their heads to the east, 
the American still to leeward. The Java kept the 
weather-gage tenaciously, forereaching a little, 
' Commodore Bainbridge's letter ' Log of the Constitution. 



Naval War of 1 812 149 

and whenever the Constitution luffed up to close,' 
the former tried to rake her. But her gunnery 
was now poor, little damage being done by it; 
most of the loss the Americans suffered was early 
in the action. By setting her foresail and main- 
sail, the Constitution got up close on the enemy's 
lee beam, her fire being very heavy and carrying 
away the end of the Javas bowsprit and her jib- 
boom.^ The Constitution forged ahead and re- 
peated her former manoeuvre, wearing in the 
smoke. The Java at once hove in stays, but 
owing to the loss of headsail fell off very slowly, 
and the American frigate poured a heavy raking 
broadside into her stem, at about two cables' 
length distance. The Java replied with her port 
guns as she fell off. 3 Both vessels then bore up 
and ran off free, with the wind on the port quarter; 
the Java being abreast and to windward of her an- 
tagonist, both with their heads a little east of 
south. The ships were less than a cable's length 
apart, and the Constitution inflicted great damage, 
while suffering very little herself. The British 
lost many men by the musketry of the American 
topmen, and suffered still more from the round 
and grape, especially on the forecastle,'* many 

^ Log of the Constitution. * Lieutenant Chads's letter. 

3 Ibid. 

-* Testimony of Christopher Speedy, in minutes of the 
court-martial on board H.M.S. Gladiator, at Portsmouth, 
April 23, 1813. 



I50 Naval War of 1 812 

marked instances of valor being shown on both 
sides. The Java's masts were wounded and her 
rigging cut to pieces, and Captain Lambert then 
ordered her to be laid aboard the enemy, who was 
on her lee beam. The helm was put a-weather, 
and the Java came down for the Constitution's 
main-chains. The boarders and marines gathered 
in the gangways and on the forecastle, the boat- 
swain having been ordered to cheer them up with 
his pipe that they might make a clean spring.' 
The Americans, however, raked the British with 
terrible effect, cutting off their main- topmast 
above the cap, and their foremast near the cat 
harpings.^ The stump of the Javas bowsprit 
got caught in the Constitutions mizzen-rigging, 
and before it got clear the British suffered still 
more. 

Finally, the ships separated, the Javas bowsprit 
passing over the taffrail of the Constitution; the 
latter at once kept away to avoid being raked. 
The ships again got nearly abreast, but the Con- 
stitution, in her turn, forereached; whereupon 
Commodore Bainbridge wore, passed his antag- 
onist, luffed up under his quarter, raked him with 
the starboard guns, then wore, and recommenced 

I Testimony of James Humble, in minutes of the court- 
martial on board H.M.S. Gladiator, at Portsmouth, April 23, 

1813. 

^ Log of Constitution 



Naval War of 1812 151 

the action with his port broadside at about 3.10. 
Again the vessels were abreast, and the action went 
on as furiously as ever. The wreck of the top ham- 
per on the Java lay over her starboard side, so 
that every discharge of her guns set her on fire,' and 
in a few minutes her able and gallant commander 
was mortally wounded by a ball fired by one of the 
American main-topmen.^ The command then de- 
volved on the first lieutenant, Chads, himself pain- 
fully wounded. The slaughter had been terrible, 
yet the British fought on with stubborn resolu- 
tion, cheering lustily. But success was now hope- 
less, for nothing could stand against the cool 
precision of the Yankee fire. The stump of the 
Java's foremast was carried away by a double- 
headed shot, the mizzen-mast fell, the gaff and 
spanker boom were shot away, also the main-yard, 
and finally the ensign was cut down by a shot, and 
all her guns absolutely silenced; when at 4.05 the 
Constitiition, thinking her adversary had struck,^ 
ceased firing, hauled aboard her tacks, and passed 
across her adversary's bows to windward, with her 
topsails, jib, and spanker set. A few minutes 
afterward the Javas mainmast fell, leaving her a 
sheer hulk. The Constitution assumed a weatherly 
position, and spent an hour in repairing damages 

^ Lieutenant Chads's address. 

2 Surgeon J. C. Jones's report. 

3 Log of the Constitiition (as given in Bainbridge's letter). 



152 Naval War of 1812 

and securing her masts ; then she wore and stood 
toward her enemy, whose flag was again flying, 
but only for bravado, for as soon as the Constitu- 
tion stood across her forefoot she struck. At 5.25 
she was taken possession of by Lieutenant Parker, 
ist of the Constitution, in one of the latter's only 
two remaining boats. 

The American ship had suffered comparatively 
little. But a few round shot had struck her hull, 
one of which carried away the wheel; one 18- 
pounder went through the mizzen-mast ; the fore- 
mast, main-topmast, and a few other spars were 
slightly wounded, and the running rigging and 
shrouds were a good deal cut; but in an hour 
she was again in good fighting trim. Her loss 
amounted to 8 seamen and i marine killed; the 
5th lieutenant, John C. Alwyn, and 2 seamen, 
mortally. Commodore Bainbridge and 12 seamen, 
severely, and 7 seamen and 2 marines, slightly 
wounded ; in all 1 2 killed and mortally wounded, 
and 22 wounded severely and slightly.' 

" The Java sustained unequalled injuries beyond 
the Constitution," says the British account.^ 
These have already been given in detail ; she was 
a riddled and entirely dismasted hulk. Her loss 
(for discussion of which see farther on) was 48 
killed (including Captain Henry Lambert, who 

' Report of Surgeon Amos A. Evans. 
^ Naval Chronicle, xxix.. 452. 




153 



1 54 Naval War of 1 8 1 2 

died soon after the close of the action, and five 
midshipmen), and 102 wounded, among them 
Lieutenant Henry Ducie Chads, Lieutenant of 
Marines David Davies, Commander John Mar- 
shall, Lieutenant James Saunders, the boatswain, 
James Humble, master. Batty Robinson, and four 
midshipmen. 

In this action both ships displayed equal gal- 
lantry and seama"nship. "The Java,'' says Com- 
modore Bainbridge, "was exceedingly well handled 
and bravely fought. Poor Captain Lambert was 
a distinguished and gallant officer, and a most 
worthy man, whose death I sincerely regret." 
The manoeuvring on both sides was excellent; 
Captain Lambert used the advantage which his 
ship possessed in her superior speed most skilfully, 
always endeavoring to run across his adversary's 
bows and rake him when he had forereached, and 
it was only owing to the equal skill which his an- 
tagonist displayed that he was foiled, the length 
of the combat being due to the number of evolu- 
tions. The great superiority of the Americans 
was in their gunnery. The fire of the Java was 
both less rapid and less well-directed than that of 
her antagonist ; the difference of force against her 
was not heavy, being about as ten is to nine, and 
was by no means enough to account for the almost 
fivefold greater loss she suffered. 

On page 153 is a diagram of the battle. It 



Naval War of 1 812 155 

differs from both of the official accounts, as these 
conflict greatly, both as to time and as regards 
some of the evolutions. I generally take the 
mean in cases of difference; for example. Com- 
modore Bainbridge's report makes the fight en- 
dure but I hour and 55 minutes. Lieutenant 
Chads 's 2 hours and 25 minutes; I have made it 
2 hours and 10 minutes, etc. 

The tonnage and weight of metal of the com- 
batants have already been stated ; I will give the 
complements shortly. The following is the 

COMPARATIVE FORCE AND LOSS 

Tons Weight Metal No. Men Loss 

Constitution 1576 654 475 34 

Java 1340 576 426 150 

Relative Force Relative Loss Inflicted 

Constitution 100 100 

Java 89 23 

In hardly another action of the war do the ac- 
counts of the respective forces differ so widely; 
the official British letter makes their total of men 
at the beginning of the action 377, of whom Com- 
modore Bainbridge officially reports that he 
paroled 378 ! The British state their loss in killed 
and mortally wounded at 24; Commodore Bain- 
bridge reports that the dead alone amounted to 
nearly 60! Usually I have taken each com- 
mander's account of his own force and loss, and I 
should do so now if it were not that the British 
accounts differ among themselves, and whenever 



156 Naval War of 181 2 

they relate to the Americans are flatly con- 
tradicted by the affidavits of the latter' s officers. 
The British first handicap themselves by the 
statement that the surgeon of the Constitution was 
an Irishman and lately an assistant surgeon in the 
British navy (Naval Chronicle, xxix., 452) ; which 
draws from Surgeon Amos A. Evans a solemn 
statement in the Boston Gazette that he was bom 
in Maryland and was never in the British navy in 
his life. Then Surgeon Jones of the Java, in his 
official report, after giving his own killed and 
mortally wounded at 24, says that the Americans 
lost in all about 60, and that 4 of their amputa- 
tions perished under his own eyes; whereupon 
Surgeon Evans makes the statement (Niles's Reg- 
ister, vi., p. 35), backed up by affidavits of his 
brother officers, that in all he had but five ampu- 
tations, of whom only one died, and that one, a 
month after Surgeon Jones had left the ship. To 
meet the assertions of Lieutenant Chads that he 
began action with but 377 men, the Constitution's 
officers produced the Java's muster-roll, dated 
November 17th, or five days after she had sailed, 
which showed 446 persons, of whom 20 had been 
put on board a prize. The presence of this large 
number of supernumeraries on board is explained 
by the fact that the Java was carrying out Lieu- 
tenant-General Hislop, the newly-appointed Gov- 
ernor of Bombay, and his suite, together with part 



Naval War of 1 812 157 

of the crews for the Cornwallis, 74, and gun-sloops 
Chameleon and Icarus; she also contained stores 
for those two ships. 

Besides conflicting with the American reports, 
the British statements contradict one another. 
The official published report gives but two mid- 
shipmen as killed ; while one of the volumes of the 
Naval Chronicle (vol. xxix., p. 452) contains a let- 
ter from one of the Java's lieutenants, in which 
he states that there were five. Finally, Commo- 
dore Bainbridge found on board the Constitution, 
after the prisoners had left, a letter from Lieu- 
tenant H. D. Comick, dated January i, 181 3, and 
addressed to Lieutenant Peter V. Wood, 2 2d 
Regiment, foot, in which he states that 65 of their 
men were killed. James (Naval Occurrences) gets 
around this by stating that it was probably a 
forgery ; but, aside from the improbability of Com- 
modore Bainbridge being a forger, this could not 
be so, for nothing would have been easier than for 
the British lieutenant to have denied having 
written it, which he never did. On the other hand, 
it would be very likely that in the heat of the ac- 
tion. Commodore Bainbridge and the Java's own 
officers should overestimate the latter' s loss.' 

^ For an account of the shameless corruption then existing 
in the Naval Administration of Great Britain, see Lord Dun- 
donald's Autobiography of a Seaman. The letters of the com- 
manders were often garbled, as is mentioned by Brenton. 



158 Naval War of 181 2 

Taking all these facts into consideration, we 
find 446 men on board the Java by her own muster- 
list; 378 of these were paroled by Commodore 
Bainbridge at San Salvador; 24 men were ac- 
knowledged by the enemy to be killed or mortally 
wounded; 20 were absent in a prize, leaving 24 
unaccounted for, who were undoubtedly slain. 

The British loss was thus 48 men killed and 
mortally wounded, and 102 wounded severely and 
slightly. The Java was better handled and more 
desperately defended than the Macedonian or even 
the Guerriere, and the odds against her were much 
smaller; so she caused her opponent greater loss, 
though her gunnery was no better than theirs. 

Lieutenant Parker, prize-master of the Java, 
removed all the prisoners and baggage to the Con- 
stitution, and reported the prize to be in a very 
disabled state ; owing partly to this, but more to 
the long distance from home and the great danger 
there was of recapture. Commodore Bainbridge 
destroyed her on the 31st, and then made sail for 
San Salvador. "Our gallant enemy," reports 
Lieutenant Chads, "has treated us most gener- 
ously"; and Lieutenant-General Hislop pre- 
sented the Commodore with a very handsome 

Among numerous cases that he gives may be mentioned the 
cutting out of the Chevretie, where he distinctly says, "our 
loss was much greater than was ever acknowledged " (vol. i., 
p. 505, edition of 1837). 



Naval War of 1 812 159 

sword as a token of gratitude for the kindness 
with which he had treated the prisoners. 

Partly in consequence of his frigate's injuries, 
but especially because of her decayed condition, 
Commodore Bainbridge sailed from San Salvador 
on January 6, 181 3, reaching Boston February 
27th, after his four months' cruise. At San Sal- 
vador he left the Hornet still blockading the 
Bonne Citoyenne. 

In order "to see ourselves as others see us," I 
shall again quote from Admiral Jurien de la Gra- 
viere, ^ as his opinions are certainly well worthy 
of attention, both as to these first three battles 
and as to the lessons they teach. " When the 
American Congress declared war on England in 
181 2," he says, "it seemed as if this unequal con- 
flict would crush her navy in the act of being bom ; 
instead, it but fertilized the germ. It is only since 
that epoch that the United States has taken rank 
among maritime powers. Some combats of frig- 
ates, corvettes, and brigs, insignificant without 
doubt as regards material results, sufficed to break 
the charm which protected the standard of St. 
George, and taught Europe what she could have 
already learned from some of our combats, if the 
louder noise of our defeats had not drowned the 
glory, that the only invincibles on the sea are good 
seamen and good artillerists. 

^ Guerre s Maritime s,\{., 284 (Paris, 1881). 



i6o 



Naval War of 1812 



"The English covered the ocean with their 
cruisers when this unknown navy, composed of 
six frigates and a few small craft hitherto hardly 
numbered, dared to establish its cruisers at the 
mouth of the Channel, in the very centre of the 
British power. But already the Constitution had 
captured the Guerriere and Java, the United States 
had made a prize of the Macedonian, the Wasp of 
the Frolic, and the Hornet of the Peacock. The 
honor of the new flag was established. England, 
humiliated, tried to attribute her multiplied re- 
verses to the unusual size of the vessels which 
Congress had had constructed in 1799, and which 
did the fighting in 1 8 1 2 . She wished to refuse them 
the name of frigates, and called them, not without 
some appearance of reason, disguised line-of- 
battle ships. Since then all maritime powers have 
copied these gigantic models, as the result of the 
War of 181 2 obliged England herself to change 
her naval material; but if they had employed, in- 
stead of frigates, cut-down 74's (vaisseaux rases), 
it would still be difficult to explain the prodigious 
success of the Americans. . . 

"In an engagement which terminated in less 
than half an hour, the English frigate Guerriere, 
completely dismasted, had fifteen men killed, 
sixty-three wounded, and more than thirty shot 
below the water-line. She sank twelve hours 
after the combat. The Constitution, on the con- 



Naval War of 1 812 161 

trary, had but seven men killed and seven 
wounded, and did not lose a mast. As soon as 
she had replaced a few cut ropes and changed a 
few sails, she was in condition, even by the testi- 
mony of the British historian, to take another 
Guerriere. The United States took an hour and a 
half to capture the Macedonian, and the same 
difference made itself felt in the damage suffered 
by the two ships. The Macedonian had her masts 
shattered, two of her main-deck and all her spar- 
deck guns disabled; more than a hundred shot 
had penetrated the hull, and over a third of the 
crew had suffered by the hostile fire. The Amer- 
ican frigate, on the contrary, had to regret but 
five men killed and seven wounded ; her guns had 
been fired each sixty-six times to the Macedonian s 
thirty-six. The combat of the Constitution and 
the Java lasted two hours, and. was the most 
bloody of these three engagements. The Java 
only struck when she had been razed like a sheer 
hulk; she had twenty-two men killed and one 
hundred and two wounded. 

• *•••• 

"This war should be studied with unceasing 
diligence ; the pride of two peoples to whom naval 
affairs are so generally familiar has cleared all the 
details and laid bare all the episodes, and through 
the sneers which the victors should have spared, 
merely out of care for their own glory, at everv 

V3L. I. — IT., 



1 62 Naval War of 1812 

step can be seen that great truth, that there is only 
success for those who know how to prepare for it. 

• ••••■ 

"It belongs to us to judge impartially these 
marine events, too much exalted perhaps by a na- 
tional vanity one is tempted to excuse. The 
Americans showed, in the War of 181 2, a great 
deal of skill and resolution. But if, as they have 
asserted, the chances had always been perfectly 
equal between them and their adversaries, if they 
had only owed their triumphs to the intrepidity of 
Hull, Decatur, and Bainbridge, there would be for 
us but little interest in recalling the struggles. We 
need not seek lessons in courage outside of our own 
history. On the contrary, what is to be well con- 
sidered is that the ships of the United States con- 
stantly fought with the chances in their favor, and 
it is on this that the American government should 
found its true title to glory. . . . The Ameri- 
cans in 181 2 had secured to themselves the advan- 
tage of a better organization [than the English]." 

The fight between the Constitution and the Java 
illustrates best the proposition, " that there is only 
success for those who know how to prepare for it.'' 
Here the odds in men and metal were only about 
as 10 to 9 in favor of the victors, and it is safe to 
say that they might have been reversed without 
vitally affecting the result. In the fight Lambert 
handled his ship as skilfully as Bainbridge did his ; 



Naval War of 1 812 163 

and the Javas men proved by their indomitable 
courage that they were excellent material. The 
Java's crew was new shipped for the voyage, and 
had been at sea but six weeks; in the Constitu- 
tion's first fight her crew had been aboard of her 
but five weeks. So the chances should have been 
nearly equal, and the difference in fighting capa- 
city that was shown by the enormous disparity in 
the loss, and still more in the damage inflicted, 
was due to the fact that the officers of one ship 
had, and the officers of the other had not, trained 
their raw crews. The Constitution's men were not 
"picked," but simply average American sailors, 
as the Java's were average British sailors. The 
essential difference was in the training. 

During the six weeks the Java was at sea, her 
men had fired but six broadsides, of blank cart- 
ridges; during the first five weeks the Constitution 
cruised, her crew were incessantly practised ' at 
firing with blank cartridge, and also at a target.' 
The Java's crew had only been exercised occasion- 
ally, even in pointing the guns, and when the 
captain of a gun was killed the effectiveness of 
the piece was temporarily ruined, and, moreover, 
the men did not work together. The Constitution s 

^ In looking through the logs of the Constitution, Hornet, 
etc., we continually find such entries as "beat to quarters, 
exercised the men at the great guns," "exercised with 
musketry," "exercised the boarders," "exercised the great 
guns, blank cartridges, and afterward firing at mark." 



1 64 Naval War of 1812 

crew were exercised till they worked like machines, 
and yet with enough individuality to render it im- 
possible to cripple a gun by killing one man. The 
unpractised British sailors fired at random; the 
trained Americans took aim. The British mar- 
ines had not been taught anything approxi- 
mating to skirmishing or sharpshooting ; the 
Americans had. The British sailors had not 
even been trained enough in the ordinary duties 
of seamen ; while the Americans in five weeks had 
been rendered almost perfect. The former were 
at a loss what to do in an emergency at all out of 
their own line of work; they were helpless when 
the wreck fell over their guns, when the Americans 
would have cut it away in a jiffy. As we learn 
from Commodore Morris's Autobiography, each 
Yankee sailor could, at need, do a little carpenter- 
ing or sail-mending, and so was more self-reliant. 
The crew had been trained to act as if guided by 
one mind, yet each man retained his own indi- 
viduality. The petty officers were better paid 
than in Great Britain, and so were of a better class 
of men, thoroughly self-respecting; the Americans 
soon got their subordinates in order, while the 
British did not. To sum up: one ship's crew had 
been trained practically and thoroughly, while 
the other crew was not much better off than the 
day it sailed ; and, as far as it goes, this is a good 
test of the efficiency of the two navies. 



I 



Naval War of 1812 165 

The U. S. brig Vixen, 12, Lieutenant George U. 
Read, had been cruising off the southern coast ; on 
November 2 2d she fell in with the Southampton, 
32, Captain Sir James Lucas Yeo, and was cap- 
tured after a short but severe trial of speed. Both 
vessels were wrecked soon afterward. 

The Essex, 32, Captain David Porter, left the 
Delaware on October 28th, two days after Com- 
modore Bainbridge had left Boston. She ex- 
pected to make a very long cruise and so carried 
with her an unusual quantity of stores and sixty 
more men than ordinarily, so that her muster-roll 
contained 319 names. Being deep in the water, 
she reached San lago after Bainbridge had left. 
Nothing was met with until after the Essex had 
crossed the equator in latitude 30° W. on Decem- 
ber nth. On the afternoon of the next day a 
sail was made out to windward, and chased. At 
nine in the evening it was overtaken, and struck 
after receiving a volley of musketry which killed 
one man. The prize proved to be the British 
packet Nocton, of 10 guns and 31 men, with $55,- 
000 in specie aboard. The latter was taken out, 
and the Nocton sent home with Lieutenant Finch 
and a prize crew of 1 7 men, but was recaptured by 
a British frigate. 

The next appointed rendezvous was the Island 
of Fernando de Noronha, where Captain Porter 
found a letter from Commodore Bainbridge, 



1 66 



Naval War of 1812 



informing him that the other vessels were off 
Cape Frio. Thither cruised Porter, but his com- 
patriots had left. On the 29th, he captured an 
English merchant vessel ; and he was still cruising 
when the year closed. 



The year 181 2, on the ocean, ended as gloriously 
as it had begun. In four victorious fights the dis- 
parity in loss had been so great as to sink the dis- 
parity of force into insignificance. Our successes 
had been unaccompanied by any important re- 
verse. Nor was it alone by the victories, but by 
the cruises, that the year was noteworthy. The 
Yankee men-of-war sailed almost in sight of the 
British coast and right in the track of the mer- 
chant fleets and their armed protectors. Our ves- 
sels had shown themselves immensely superior to 
those of their foee. 

The reason of these striking and unexpected 
successes was that our navy in 1 8 1 2 was the exact 
reverse of what our navy is now, in 1882. I am 
not alluding to the personnel, which still remains 
excellent; but, whereas we now have a large num- 
ber of worthless vessels, standing very low down 
in their respective classes, we then possessed a few 
vessels, each unsurpassed by any foreign ship of 
her class. To bring up our navy to the condition 
in which it stood in 181 2 it would not be neces- 
sary (although in reality both very wise and in the 



Naval War of 1 812 167 

end very economical) to spend any more money 
than at present ; only instead of using it to patch 
up a hundred antiquated hulks, it should be em- 
ployed in building half a dozen ships on the most 
effective model. If in 181 2 our ships had borne 
the same relation to the British ships that they do 
now, not all the courage and skill of our sailors 
would have won us a single success. As it was, we 
could only cope with the lower rates, and had no 
vessels to oppose to the great "liners"; but to- 
day there is hardly any foreign ship, no matter 
how low its rate, that is not superior to the corre- 
sponding American ones. It is too much to hope 
that our political shortsightedness will ever enable 
us to have a navy that is first-class in point of size ; 
but there certainly seems no reason why what 
ships we have should not be of the very best 
quality. The efTect of a victory is twofold, moral 
and material. Had we been as roughly handled 
on water as we were on land during the first year 
of the war, such a succession of disasters would 
have had a most demoralizing effect on the nation 
at large. As it was, our victorious sea-fights, 
while they did not inflict any material damage 
upon the colossal sea-might of England, had the 
most important results in the feelings they pro- 
duced at home and even abroad. Of course, they 
were magnified absurdly by most of our writers at 
the time; but they do not need to be magnified, 



1 68 



Naval War of 1812 



for, as they are, any American can look back upon 
them with the keenest national pride. For a hun- 
dred and thirty years England had had no equal on 
the sea; and now she suddenly found one in the 
untried navy of an almost unknown power. 



BRITISH VESSELS CAPTURED OR DESTROYED IN l8l2 

Name Guns Tonnage Remarks 

Guerriere 49 1 34° 

Macedonian 49 1325 

Java 49 i340 

Frolic 19 477 Recaptured. 

Alert 20 325 

186 4807 

19 477 Deducting Fro/tc. 

167 4330 



AMERICAN VESSELS CAPTURED OR DESTROYED 

Name Guns Tonnage 

Wasp 18 450 

Nautilus 14 185 

Vixen 14 185 

46 820 



VESSELS BUILT IN l8l2 

Name Rig Guns Tonnage Where Built Cost 

Nonsuch Schooner 14 148 Charleston $15,000 



Carolina. . . Schooner 14 230 
Louisiana.. Ship 16 341 



8,743 
New Orleans 15-500 



Naval War of 1812 169 

PRIZES MADE ^ 

Ship No. of Prizes 

President 7 

United States 2 

Constitution 9 

Congress 2 

Chesapeake i 

Essex II 

Wasp 2 

Hornet 1 

Argus 6 

Small craft 5 

46 

' These can only be approximately given; the records are 
often incomplete or contradictory, especially as regards the 
small craft. Most accounts do not give by any means the 
full number. 



CHAPTER IV 



1812 



ON THE LAKES 



Preliminary — The combatants starting nearly on an 
equality^Difficulties of creating a naval force — Difficulty of 
comparing the force of the rival squadrons — Meagreness of 
the published accounts — Unreliability of James. — Ontario — • 
Extraordinary nature of the American squadron — Canadian 
squadron forming only a kind of water militia — ^Sackett's 
Harbor feebly attacked by Commodore Earle — Commodore 
Chauncy bombards York. — Erie — Lieutenant Elliott captures 
the Detroit and Caledonia — Unsuccessful expedition of Lieu- 
tenant Angus. 

AT the time we are treating of, the State of 
Maine was so sparsely settled, and covered 
with such a dense growth of forest, that it 
was practically impossible for either of the con- 
tending parties to advance an army through its 
territory. A continuation of the same wooded 
and mountainous district protected the northern 
parts of Vermont and New Hampshire, while in 
New York the Adirondack region was an im- 
penetrable wilderness. It thus came about that 
the northern boundary was formed, for military 
purposes, by Lake Huron, Lake Erie, the Niagara, 
Lake Ontario, the St. Lawrence, and, after an in- 

170 



Naval War of 1 812 171 

terval, by Lake Champlain. The road into the 
States by the latter ran close along shore, and 
without a naval force the invader would be wholly 
unable to protect his flanks, and would probably 
have his communications cut. This lake, how- 
ever, was almost wholly within the United States, 
and did not become of importance till toward the 
end of the war. Upon it were two American gun- 
boats, regularly officered and manned, and for 
such smooth water sufficiently effective vessels. 

What was at that time the western part of the 
northern frontier became the main theatre of mili- 
tary operations, and as it presented largely a 
water front, a naval force was an indispensable 
adjunct, the command of the lakes being of the 
utmost importance. As these lakes were fitted 
for the manoeuvring of ships of the largest size, 
the operations upon them were of the same nature 
as those on the ocean, and properly belong to 
naval and not to military history. But while on 
the ocean America started with too few ships to 
enable her really to do any serious harm to her 
antagonist, on the inland waters the two sides 
began very nearly on an equality. The chief 
regular forces either belligerent possessed were on 
Lake Ontario. Here the United States had a 
man-of-war brig, the Oneida, of 240 tons, carrying 
sixteen 24-pound carronades, manned by experi- 
enced seamen, and commanded by Lieut. M. T. 



172 Naval War of I $12 

Woolsey. Great Britain possessed the Royal 
George, 22, Prince Regent, 16, Earl of Moira, 14, 
Gloucester, 10, Seneca, 8, and Simco, 8, all under 
the command of a Commodore Earle ; but though 
this force was so much the more powerful it was 
very inefficient, not being considered as belonging 
to the regular navy, the sailors being undis- 
ciplined, and the officers totally without experi- 
ence, never having been really trained in the 
British service. From these causes, it resulted 
that the struggle on the lakes was to be a work as 
much of creating as of using a navy. On the sea- 
board, success came to those who made best use of 
the ships that had already been built; on the 
lakes, the real contest lay in the building. And 
building an inland navy was no easy task. The 
country around the lakes, especially on the south 
side, was still very sparsely settled, and all the 
American naval supplies had to be brought from 
the seaboard cities through the valley of the 
Mohawk. There was no canal or other means of 
communication, except very poor roads inter- 
mittently relieved by transportation on the Mo- 
hawk and on Oneida Lake, when they were 
navigable. Supplies were thus brought up at an 
enormous cost, with tedious delays, and great 
difficulty; and bad weather put a stop to all 
travel. Very little, indeed, beyond timber, could 
be procured at the stations on the lakes. Still, a 



Naval War of 1812 



7i 



few scattered villages and small towns had grown 
up on the shores, whose inhabitants were largely 
engaged in the carrying trade. The vessels used 
for the purpose were generally small sloops or 
schooners, swift and fairly good sailors, but very 
shallow and not fitted for rough weather. The 
frontiersmen themselves, whether Canadian or 
American, were bold, hardy seamen, and when 
properly trained and led made excellent man-of- 
war's men; but on the American side they were 
too few in number, and too untrained to be made 
use of, and the seamen had to come from the 
coast. But the Canadian shores had been settled 
longer, the inhabitants were more numerous, and 
by means of the St. Lawrence the country was 
easy of access to Great Britain ; so that the seat of 
war, as regards getting naval supplies, and even 
men, was nearer to Great Britain than to us. Our 
enemies also possessed, in addition to the squadron 
on Lake Ontario, another on Lake Erie, consisting 
of the Queen Charlotte, 17, Lady Prevost, 13, Hun- 
ter, 10, Caledonia, 2, Little Belt, 2, and Chippeivay, 
2 . These two squadrons furnished training schools 
for some five hundred Canadian seamen, whom a 
short course of discipline under experienced officers 
sufficed to render as good men as their British 
friends or American foes. Very few British sea- 
men ever reached Lake Erie (according to James, 
not over fifty) ; but on Lake Ontario, and after- 



1 74 Naval War of 1 8 1 2 

ward on Lake Champlain, they formed the bulk of 
the crews, " picked seamen, sent out by govern- 
ment expressly for service on the Canada lakes." ' 
As the contrary has sometimes been asserted, it 
may be as well to mention that Admiral Codring- 
ton states that no want of seamen contributed to 
the British disasters on the lakes, as their sea- 
ships at Quebec had men drafted from them for 
that service till their crews were utterly depleted. ^ 
I am bound to state that, while I think that on the 
ocean our sailors showed themselves superior to 
their opponents, especially in gun practice, on the 
lakes the men of the rival fleets were as evenly 
matched, in skill and courage, as could well be. 
The difference, when there was any, appeared in 
the officers, and, above all, in the builders; which 
was the more creditable to us, as in the beginning 
we were handicapped by the fact that the British 
already had a considerable number of war vessels, 
while we had but one. 

The Falls of Niagara interrupt navigation 
between Erie and Ontario; so there were three 
independent centres of naval operations on the 
northern frontier. The first was on Lake Cham- 
plain, where only the Americans possessed any 
force, and, singularly enough, this was the only 

^ James, vi., 353. 

"^Memoirs, i., 322, referring especially to battle of Lake 
Champlain. 



Naval War of 1 8i 2 175 

place where the British showed more enterprise in 
ship-building than we did. Next came Lake On- 
tario, where both sides made their greatest efforts, 
but where the result was indecisive, though the 
balance of success was slightly inclined toward us. 
Our naval station was at Sackett's Harbor ; that of 
our foes at Kingston. The third field of operations 
was Lake Erie and the waters above it. Here 
both sides showed equal daring and skill in the 
fighting, and our advantage must be ascribed to 
the energy and success with which we built and 
equipped vessels. Originally, we had no force at 
all on these waters, while several vessels were 
opposed to us. It is a matter of wonder that the 
British and Canadian governments should have 
been so supine as to permit their existing force to 
go badly armed, and so unenterprising as to build 
but one additional ship, when they could easily 
have preserved their superiority. 

It is very difficult to give a full and fair account 
of the lake campaigns. The inland navies were 
created especially for the war, and, after it, were 
allowed to decay, so that the records of the ton- 
nage, armament, and crews are hard to get at. Of 
course, where everything had to be created, the 
services could not have the regular character of 
those on the ocean. The vessels employed were 
of widely different kinds, and this often renders it 
almost impossible to correctly estimate the relative 



176 Naval War of 181 2 

force of two opposing squadrons. While the 
Americans were building their lake navy, they, as 
make-shifts, made use of some ordinary merchant 
schooners, which were purchased and fitted up 
with one or two long, heavy guns each. These 
gun vessels had no quarters, and suffered under all 
the other disadvantages which make a merchant 
vessel inferior to a regularly constructed man-of- 
war. The chief trouble was that in a heavy sea 
they had a strong tendency to capsize, and were 
so unsteady that the guns could not be aimed 
when any wind was blowing. Now, if a few of 
these schooners, mounting "long 32's, encountered 
a couple of man-of-war brigs, armed with carro- 
nades, which side was strongest ? In smooth water 
the schooners had the advantage, and in rough 
weather they were completely at the mercy of the 
brigs ; so that it would be very hard to get at the 
true worth of such a contest, as each side would be 
tolerably sure to insist that the weather was such 
as to give a great advantage to the other. In all 
the battles and skirmishes on Champlain, Erie, 
and Huron, at least there was no room left for 
doubt as to who were the victors. But on Lake 
Ontario there was never any decisive struggle, 
and whenever an encounter occurred, each com- 
modore always claimed that his adversary had 
" declined the combat" though " much superior in 
strength." It is, of course, almost impossible to 



Naval War of 1 812 177 

find out which really did decline the combat, for 
the official letters flatly contradict each other; 
and it is often almost as difficult to discover where 
the superiority in force lay, when the fleets differed 
so widely in character as was the case in 18 13. 
Then Commodore Chauncy's squadron consisted 
largely of schooners ; their long, heavy guns made 
his total foot up in a very imposing manner, and 
similar gun vessels did very good work on Lake 
Erie; so Commodore Yeo, and more especially 
Commodore Yeo's admirers, exalted these schoon- 
ers to the skies, and conveyed the impression that 
they were most formidable craft, by means of 
which Chauncy ought to have won great victories. 
Yet when Yeo captured two of them he refused to 
let them even cruise with his fleet, and they were 
sent back to act as coast gunboats and transports, 
which certainly would not have been done had 
they been fitted to render any effectual assistance. 
Again, one night a squall came on and the two 
largest schooners went to the bottom, which did 
not tend to increase the confidence felt in the 
others. So there can be no doubt that in all but 
very smooth water the schooners could almost be 
counted out of the fight. Then the question 
arises in any given case, Was the water smooth? 
And the testimony is as conflicting as ever. 

It is not too easy to reconcile the official letters of 
the commanders, and it is still harder to get at the 

VOL. 1. — 12. 



1 78 Naval War of 1 8 1 2 

truth from either the American or British his- 
tories. Cooper is very inexact, and, moreover, 
paints everything couleur de rose, paying no atten- 
tion to the British side of the question, and dis- 
tributing so much praise to everybody that one is 
at a loss to know where it really belongs. Still, 
he is very useful, for he lived at the time of the 
events he narrates, and could get much informa- 
tion about them at first hand, from the actors them- 
selves. James is almost the only British authority 
on the subject; but he is not nearly as reliable 
as when dealing with the ocean contests, most of 
this part of his work being taken up with a succes- 
sion of acrid soliloquies on the moral defects of the 
American character. The British records for this 
extraordinary service on the lakes were not at all 
carefully kept, and so James is not hampered by 
the necessity of adhering more or less closely to 
official documents, but lets his imagination run 
loose. On the ocean and seaboard his account of 
the British force can generally be relied upon ; but 
on the lakes his authority is questionable in every- 
thing relating either to friends or foes. This is 
the more exasperating because it is done wilfully, 
when, if he had chosen, he could have written an 
invaluable history; he must often have known 
the truth when, as a matter of preference, he chose 
either to suppress or alter it. Thus he ignores 
all the small "cutting-out" expeditions in which 



Naval War of 1 812 179 

the Americans were successful, and where one 
would like to hear the British side. For example, 
Captain Yeo captured two schooners, the Julia 
and Growler, but Chauncy recaptured both. We 
have the American account of this recapture in 
full, but James does not even hint at it, and 
blandly puts down both vessels in the total 
"American loss" at the end of his smaller work. 
Worse still, when the Growler again changed hands, 
he counts it in again, in the total, as if it were an 
entirely different boat, although he invariably 
rules out of the American list all recaptured ves- 
sels. A more serious perversion of facts are his 
statements about comparative tonnage. This was 
at that time measured arbitrarily, the depth of 
hold being estimated at half the breadth of beam ; 
and the tonnage of our lake vessels was put down 
exactly as if they were regular ocean cruisers of 
the same dimensions in length and breadth. But 
on these inland seas the vessels really did not 
draw more than half as much water as those on the 
ocean, and the depth would of course be much less. 
James, in comparing the tonnage, gives that of the 
Americans as if they were regular ocean ships, 
but in the case of the British vessels carefully 
allows for their shallowness, although professing 
to treat the two classes in the same way ; and thus 
he makes out a most striking and purelv imaginary 
difference. The best example is furnished by his 



i8o Naval War of 1812 

accounts of the fleets on Lake Erie. The captured 
vessels were appraised by two captains and the 
ship-builder, Mr. Henry Eckford; their tonnage 
being computed precisely as the tonnage of the 
American vessels. The appraisement was re- 
corded in the Navy Department, and was first 
made public by Cooper, so that it could not have 
been done for effect. Thus measured, it was found 
that the tonnage was in round numbers as follows : 
Detroit, 490 tons; Queen Charlotte, 400; Lady 
Prevost, 230; Hunter, 180; Little Belt, 90; Chippe- 
way, 70. James makes them measure respectively 
305, 280, 120, 74, 54, and 32 tons, but carefully 
gives the American ships the regular sea tonnage. 
So, also, he habitually deducts about 25 per cent, 
from the real number of men on board the British 
ships ; as regards Lake Erie, he contradicts himself 
so much that he does not need to be exposed from 
outside sources. But the most glaring and least 
excusable misstatements are made as to the battle 
of Lake Champlain, where he gives the American 
as greatly exceeding the British force. He 
reaches this conclusion by the most marvellous 
series of garblings and misstatements. First, he 
says that the Confiance and the Saratoga were of 
nearly equal tonnage. The Confiance, being cap- 
tured, was placed on our naval lists, where for 
years she ranked as a 36-gun frigate, while the 
Saratoga ranked among the 24-gun corvettes; and 



Naval War of 1812 i8i 

by actual measurement the former was half as large 
again as the latter. He gives the Confiance but 
270 men; one of her officers, in a letter published 
in the London Naval Chronicle,'' gives her over 
300 ; more than that number of dead and prisoners 
were taken out of her. He misstates the calibre 
of her guns, and counts out two of them because 
they were used through the bow-ports; whereas, 
from the method in which she made her attack, 
these would have been peculiarly effective. The 
guns are given accurately by Cooper, on the au- 
thority of an officer "" who was on board the Con- 
fiance within fifteen minutes after the Linnet 
struck, and who was in charge of her for two 
months. 

Then James states that there were but 10 Brit- 
ish gallies, while Sir George Prevost's official ac- 
count, as well as all the American authorities, state 
the number to be 12. He says that the Finch 
grounded opposite an American battery before the 
engagement began, while in reality it was an hour 
afterward, and because she had been disabled by 
the shot of the American fleet. The gallies were 
largely manned by Canadians, and James, anxious 
to put the blame on these rather than the British, 
says that they acted in the most cowardly way, 

'Vol. xxxii., p. 272. The letter also says that hardly five 
of her men remained unhurt. 
2 Lieut. E. A. F. Lavallette, 



1 82 Naval War of 1812 

whereas in reality they caused the Americans 
more trouble than Downie's smaller sailing vessels 
did. His account of the armament of these ves- 
sels differs widely from the official reports. He 
gives the Linnet and Chubb a. smaller number of 
men than the number of prisoners that were actu- 
ally taken out of them, not including the dead. 
Even misstating Downie's force in guns, under- 
estimating the number of his men, and leaving 
out two of his gunboats, did not content James; 
and to make the figures show a proper dispropor- 
tion, he says (vol. vi., p. 504) that he shall exclude 
the Finch from the estimate, because she grounded, 
and half of the gunboats, because he does not 
think they acted bravely. Even were these as- 
sertions true, it would be quite as logical for an 
American writer to put the Chesapeake s crew down 
as only 200, and say he should exclude the other 
men from the estimate because they flinched ; and 
to exclude all the guns that were disabled by shot 
would be no worse than to exclude the Finch. 
James's manipulation of the figures is a really 
curious piece of audacity. Naturally, subsequent 
British historians have followed him without in- 
quiry. James's account of this battle, alone, 
amply justifies our rejecting his narrative en- 
tirely, as far as affairs on the lakes go, whenever 
it conflicts with any other statement, British or 
American. Even when it does not conflict, it 



Naval War of 1 812 183 

must be followed with extreme caution, for when- 
ever he goes into figures the only thing certain 
about them is that they are wrong. He gives no 
details at all of most of the general actions. Of 
these, however, we already possess excellent ac- 
counts, the best being those in the Manual of 
Naval Tactics, by Commander J. H. Ward, U.S.N. 
(1859), and in Lossing's Field-Book of the War of 
1812, and Cooper's Naval History. The chief 
difficulty occurs in connection with matters on 
Lake Ontario,' where I have been obliged to have 
recourse to a perfect patchwork of authors and 
even newspapers, for the details, using Niles's 
Register and James as mutual correctives. The 
armaments and equipments being so irregular, I 
have not, as in other cases, made any allowance 
for the short weight of the American shot, as here 
the British may have suffered under a similar dis- 
advantage ; and it may be as well to keep in mind 
that on these inland waters the seamen of the two 

^ The accounts of the two commanders on Lake Ontario are 
as difficult to reconcile as are those of the contending admirals 
in the battles which the Dutch waged against the English and 
French during the years 1672-1675. In every one of De 
Ruyter's last six battles each side regularly claimed the vic- 
tory, although there can be but little doubt that on the whole 
the strategical, and probably the tactical, advantage remained 
with De Ruyter. Every historian ought to feel a sense of the 
most lively gratitude toward Nelson ; in his various encounters 
he never left any possible room for dispute as to which side 
had come out first best. 



i84 Naval War of 1812 

navies seem to have been as evenly matched in 
courage and skill as was possible. They were of 
exactly the same stock, with the sole exception 
that among and under, but entirely distinct 
from, the Canadian-English, fought the descen- 
dants of the conquered Canadian-French; and 
even these had been trained by Englishmen, 
were led by English captains, fought on ships 
built by English gold, and with English weapons 
and discipline. 

ON LAKE ONTARIO 

There being, as already explained, three inde- 
pendent centres of inland riaval operations, the 
events at each will be considered separately. 

At the opening of the war. Lieutenant Woolsey, 
with the Oneida, was stationed at Sackett's Har- 
bor, which was protected at the entrance by a 
small fort with a battery composed of one long 32. 
The Canadian squadron of six ships, mounting 
nearly 80 guns, was of course too strong to be 
meddled with. Indeed, had the Royal George, 22, 
the largest vessel, been commanded by a regular 
British sea-officer, she would have been perfectly 
competent to take both the Oneida and Sackett's 
Harbor; but before the Canadian commodore, 
Earle, made up his mind to attack. Lieutenant 
Woolsey had time to make one or two short 



Naval War of 1 812 185 

cruises, doing some damage among the merchant 
vessels of the enemy. 

On the 19th of July, Earle's ships appeared off 
the harbor ; the Oneida was such a dull sailer that 
it was useless for her to try to escape, so she was 
hauled up under a bank where she raked the en- 
trance, and her off guns landed and mounted on 
the shore, while Lieutenant Woolsey took charge 
of the "battery," or long 32, in the fort. The 
latter was the only gun that was of much use, for 
after a desultory cannonade of about an hour, 
Earle withdrew, having suffered very little dam- 
age, inflicted none at all, and proved himself and 
his subordinates to be grossly incompetent. 

Acting under orders, Lieutenant Woolsey now 
set about procuring merchant schooners, to be 
fitted and used as gun vessels until more regular 
cruisers could be built. A captured British schooner 
was christened the Julia, armed with a long 32, 
and two 6's, manned with 30 men, under Lieu- 
tenant Henry Wells, and sent down to Ogdensburg. 
" On her way thither she encountered and actually 
beat off, without losing a man, the Moira of 14, 
and Gloucester, of 10 guns." ' Five other schoon- 
ers were also purchased ; the Hamilton, of 10 guns, 
being the largest, while the other four, the Gover- 
nor Tompkins, Growler, Conquest, and Pert had 
but II pieces between them. Nothing is more 

I James, vi., 350. 



1 86 Naval War of 1812 

difficult than to exactly describe the armaments 
of the smaller lake vessels. The American 
schooners were mere make-shifts, and their guns 
were frequently changed ' ; as soon as they could 
be dispensed with they were laid up, or sold, and 
forgotten. 

It was even worse with the British, who mani- 
fested the most indefatigable industry in inter- 
mittently changing the armament, rig, and name 
of almost every vessel, and, the records being very 
loosely kept, it is hard to find what was the force 
at any one time. A vessel which in one conflict 
was armed with long i8's, in the next would have 
replaced some of them with 6 8 -pound carronades; 
or, beginning life as a ship, she would do most of 
her work as a schooner, and be captured as a brig, 
changing her name even oftener than anything 
else. 

On the first of September, Commodore Isaac 
Chauncy was appointed commander of the forces 
on the lakes (except of those on Lake Champlain) , 
and he at once bent his energies to preparing an 
effective flotilla. A large party of ship-carpenters 

^ They were always having accidents happen to them that 
necessitated some alteration. If a boat was armed with a 
long 32, she rolled too much, and they substituted a 24; if she 
also had an 18-pound carronade, it upset down the hatchway 
in the middle of a fight, and made way for a long 12, which 
burst as soon as it was used, and was replaced by two medium 
6's. So a regular gamut of changes would be rung. 



Naval War of 1 812 187 

were immediately despatched to the Harbor ; and 
they were soon followed by about a hundred officers 
and seamen, with guns, stores, etc. The keel of a 
ship to mount twenty-four 3 2 -pound carronades, 
and to be called the Madison, was laid down, and 
she was launched on the 26th of November, just 
when navigation had closed on account of the ice. 
Late in the autumn, four more schooners were 
purchased, and named the Ontario, Scourge, Fair 
American, and Asp, but these were hardly used 
until the following spring. The cruising force of 
the Americans was composed solely of the Oneida 
and the six schooners first mentioned. The Brit- 
ish squadron was of nearly double this strength, 
and had it been officered and trained as it was 
during the ensuing summer, the Americans could 
not have stirred out of port. But as it was, it 
merely served as a kind of water militia, the very 
sailors, who subsequently did well, being then 
almost useless, and unable to oppose their well- 
disciplined foes, though the latter were so inferior 
in number and force. For the reason that it was 
thus practically a contest of regulars against 
militia, I shall not give numerical comparisons of 
the skirmishes in the autumn of 181 2, and shall 
touch on them but slightly. They teach the old 
lesson that, whether by sea or land, a small, well- 
officered, and well-trained force, cannot, except 
YQTy rarely, be resisted by a greater number of 



1 88 Naval War of 1 8i 2 

mere militia ; and that in the end it is true econ- 
omy to have the regular force prepared before- 
hand, without waiting until we have been forced 
to prepare it by the disasters happening to the ir- 
regulars. The Canadian seamen behaved badly, 
but no worse than the American land-forces did at 
the same time ; later, under regular training, both 
nations retrieved their reputations. 

Commodore Chauncy arrived at Sackett's Har- 
bor in October, and appeared on the lake on Nov- 
ember 8th, in the Oneida, Lieutenant Woolsey, 
with the six schooners Conquest, Lieutenant El- 
liott; Hamilton, Lieutenant McPherson; Tomp- 
kins, Lieutenant Brown; Pert, Sailing-master 
Arundel; Julia, Sailing-master Trant; Growler, 
Sailing-master Mix. The Canadian vessels were 
engaged in conveying supplies from the westward. 
Commodore Chauncy discovered the Royal George 
off the False Duck Islands, and chased her under 
the batteries of Kingston, on the 9th. Kingston 
was too well defended to be taken by such a force 
as Chauncy's; but the latter decided to make a 
reconnaissance, to discover the enemy's means of 
defence, and see if it was possible to lay the Royal 
George aboard. At 3 p.m. the attack was made. 
The Hamilton and Tompkins were absent chasing 
and did not arrive until the fighting had begun. 
The other four gunboats. Conquest, Julia, Pert, 
and Growler, led, in the order named, to open the 



Naval War of 1812 189 

attack with their heavy guns, and prepare the way 
for the Oneida, which followed. At the third dis- 
charge the Perfs gun burst, putting her nearly 
hors de combat, badly wounding her gallant com- 
mander, Mr. Arundel (who shortly afterward fell 
overboard and was drowned) , and slightly wound- 
ing four of her crew. The other gunboats engaged 
the five batteries of the enemy, while the Oneida 
pushed on without firing a shot till at 3.40 she 
opened on the Royal George, and after twenty 
minutes' combat actually succeeded in compelling 
her opponent, though of double her force, to cut 
her cables, run in, and tie herself to a wharf, where 
some of her people deserted her; here she was 
under the protection of a large body of troops, and 
the Americans could not board her in face of 
the land forces. It soon began to grow dusk, and 
Chauncy's squadron beat out through the channel, 
against a fresh head- wind. In this spirited attack 
the American loss had been confined to half a 
dozen men, and had fallen almost exclusively on 
the Oneida. The next day foul weather came on, 
and the squadron sailed for Sackett's Harbor. 
Some merchant vessels were taken, and the Simcq, 
8, was chased, but unsuccessfully. 

The weather now became cold and tempestuous, 
but cruising continued till the middle of Novem- 
ber. The Canadian commanders, however, utterly 
refused to fight ; the Royal George even fleeing from 



III 



1 90 Naval War of 1 8 1 2 

the Oneida, when the latter was entirely alone, 
and leaving the American commodore in undis- 
puted command of the lake. Four of the schoon- 
ers continued blockading Kingston till the middle 
of November; shortly afterward, navigation 
closed.' 

ON LAKE ERIE 

On Lake Erie there was no American naval 
force, but the army had fitted out a small brig, 
armed with six 6-pounders. This fell into the 
hands of the British at the capture of Detroit, and 
was named after that city, so that by the time a 
force of American officers and seamen arrived at 
the lake there was not a vessel on it for them to 
serve in, while their foes had eight. But we only 
have to deal with two of the latter at present. The 
Detroit, still mounting six 6-pounders, and with a 
crew of 56 men, under the command of Lieutenant 
of Marines Rolette, of the Royal Navy, assisted by 
a boatswain and gunner, and containing also 30 
American prisoners, and the Caledonia, a small 
brig mounting two 4-pounders on pivots, with a 
crew of 12 men, Canadian-English, under Mr. 
Irvine, and having aboard also 10 American 
prisoners, and a very valuable cargo of furs worth 

J These preliminary events were not very important, and 
the historians on both sides agree almost exactly, so that I 
have not considered it necessary to quote authorities. 



Naval War of 1 812 191 

about $200,000, moved down the lake, and on 
October 7th anchored under Fort Erie.' 

Commander Jesse D. Elliott had been sent up 
to Erie some time before with instructions from 
Commodore Chauncy to construct a naval force, 
partly by building two brigs of 300 tons each,"" and 
partly by purchasing schooners to act as gunboats. 
No sailors had yet arrived ; but on the very day on 
which the two brigs moved down and anchored 
under Fort Erie, Captain Elliott received news 
that the first detachment of the promised seamen, 
51 in number, including officers,^ was but a few 
miles distant. He at once sent word to have these 
men hurried up, but when they arrived they were 
found to have no arms, for which application was 
made to the military authorities. The latter not 
only gave a sufficiency of sabres, pistols, and 
muskets to the sailors, but also detailed enough 
soldiers, under Captain N. Towson and Lieutenant 
Isaac Roach, to make the total number of men 
that took part in the expedition 124. This force 

^ Letter of Captain Jesse D. Elliott to Secretary of Navy, 
Black Rock, October 5, 18 12. 

- That is, of 300 tons actual capacity; measured as if they 
had been ordinary sea vessels, they each tonned 480. Their 
opponent, the ship Detroit, similarly tonned 305 actual 
measurement, or 490, computing it in the ordinary manner. 

3 The number of men in this expedition is taken from Los- 
sing's Field-Book of the War of i8j2, by Benson J. Lossing, 
New York, 1869, p. 385, note, where a complete list of the 
names is given. 



192 Naval War of 181 2 

left Black Rock at one o'clock on the morning of 
the 8th in two large boats, one under the command 
of Commander Elliott, assisted by Lieutenant 
Roach, the other under Sailing-master George 
Watts and Captain Towson. After two hours' 
rowing they reached the foe, and the attack was 
made at three o'clock. Elliott laid his boat along- 
side the Detroit before he was discovered, and cap- 
tured her after a very brief struggle, in which he 
lost but one man killed, and Midshipman J. C. 
Cummings wounded with a bayonet in the leg. 
The noise of the scuffle roused the hardy provin- 
cials aboard the Caledonia, and they were thus 
enabled to make a far more effectual resistance to 
Sailing-master Watts than the larger vessel had to 
Captain Elliott. As Watts pulled alongside he 
was greeted with a volley of musketry, but at once 
boarded and carried the brig, the twelve Canadians 
being cut down or made prisoners ; one American 
was killed and four badly wounded. The wind 
was too light and the current too strong to enable 
the prizes to beat out and reach the lake, so the 
cables were cut and they ran down stream. The 
Caledonia was safely beached under the protection 
of an American battery near Black Rock. The 
Detroit, however, was obliged to anchor but four 
hundred yards from a British battery, which, to- 
gether with some flying artillery, opened on her. 
Getting all his guns on the port side, Elliott kept 



Naval War of 1 812 193 

up a brisk cannonade till his ammunition gave 
out, when he cut his cable and soon grounded on 
Squaw Island. Here the Detroit was commanded 
by the guns of both sides, and whichever party- 
took possession of her was at once driven out by 
the other. The struggle ended in her destruction, 
most of her guns being taken over to the American 
side. This was a very daring and handsome ex- 
ploit, reflecting great credit on Commander Elliott, 
and giving the Americans, in the Caledonia, the 
nucleus of their navy on Lake Erie; soon after- 
ward Elliott returned to Lake Ontario, a new de- 
tachment of seamen under Commander S. Angus 
having arrived. 

On the 28th of November, the American general. 
Smith, despatched two parties to make an attack 
on some of the British batteries. One of these 
consisted of ten boats, under the command of Cap- 
tain King of the 15th Infantry, with 150 soldiers, 
and with him went Mr. Angus with 82 sailors, in- 
cluding officers. The expedition left at one o'clock 
in the morning, but was discovered and greeted 
with a warm fire from a field battery placed in 
front of some British barracks known as the Red 
House. Six of the boats put back ; but the other 
four, containing about a hundred men, dashed on. 
While the soldiers were forming line and firing, the 
seamen rushed in with their pikes and axes, drove 
off the British, capturing their, commander, Lieu- 

VOL. I. — 13. 



194 Naval War of 1812 

tenant King of the Royal Army, spiked and threw 
into the river the guns, and then took the barracks 
and burned them, after a desperate fight. Great 
confusion now ensued, which ended in Mr. Angus 
and some of the seamen going off in the boats. 
Several had been killed ; eight, among whom were 
Midshipmen Wragg, Dudley, and Holdup, all 
under twenty years old, remained with the troops 
under Captain King, and, having utterly routed the 
enemy, found themselves deserted by their friends. 
After staying on the shore a couple of hours some 
of them found two boats and got over; but Cap- 
tain King and a few soldiers were taken prisoners. 
Thirty of the seamen, including nine of the twelve 
officers, were killed or wounded — among the 
former being Sailing-masters Sisson and Watts, 
and among the latter Mr. Angus, Sailing-master 
Carter, and Midshipmen Wragg, Holdup, Graham, 
Brailesford, and Irvine. Some twenty prisoners 
were secured and taken over to the American 
shore ; the enemy's loss was more severe . than 
ours, his resistance being very stubborn, and a 
good many cannon were destroyed, but the ex- 
pedition certainly ended most disastrously. The 
accounts of it are hard to reconcile, but it is diffi- 
cult to believe that Mr. Angus acted correctly. 

Later in the winter. Captain Oliver Hazard 
Perry arrived to take command of the forces on 
Lake Erie. 



CHAPTER V 
1813 

ON THE OCEAN 

Blockade of the American coast — The Essex in the South 
Pacific — The Hornet captures the Peacock — -American priva- 
teers cut out by British boats — Unsuccessful cruise of Com- 
modore Rodgers — The Chesapeake is captured by the Shannon 
— Futile gun-boat actions — Defence of Craney Island — Cutting 
out expeditions — The Argus is captured by the Pelican — The 
Enterprise captures the Boxer — Summary. 

BY the beginning of the year 18 13 the British 
had been thoroughly aroused by the Amer- 
ican successes, and active measures were 
at once taken to counteract them. The force on 
the American station was largely increased, and 
a strict blockade begun, to keep the American 
frigates in port. The British frigates now cruised 
for the most part in couples, and orders were 
issued by the Board of Admiralty that an 18- 
pounder frigate was not to engage an American 
24-pounder. Exaggerated accounts of the Amer- 
ican 44's being circulated, a new class of spar-deck 
frigates was constructed to meet them, rating 50 
and mounting 60 guns; and some 74's were cut 
down for the same purpose. ' These new ships were 
all much heavier than their intended opponents. 

'James, vi., p. 206. 
195 



196 Naval War of 181 2 

As New England's loyalty to the Union was, 
not unreasonably, doubted abroad, her coasts were 
at first troubled but little. A British squadron 
was generally kept cruising off the end of Long 
Island Sound, and another off Sandy Hook. Of 
course, America had no means of raising a block- 
ade, as each squadron contained generally a 74 or a 
razee, vessels too heavy for any in our navy to 
cope with. Frigates and sloops kept skirting the 
coasts of New Jersey, the Carolinas, and Georgia. 
Delaware Bay no longer possessed the importance 
it had during the Revolutionary War, and as the 
only war vessels in it were some miserable gun- 
boats, the British generally kept but a small force 
on that station. Chesapeake Bay became the 
principal scene of their operations; it was there 
that their main body collected, and their greatest 
efforts were made. In it a number of line-of- 
battle ships, frigates, sloops, and cutters had been 
collected, and early in the season Admiral Sir John 
Warren and Rear-Admiral Cockburn arrived to 
take command. The latter made numerous de- 
scents on the coast, and frequently came into con- 
tact with the local militia, who generally fled after 
a couple of volleys. These expeditions did not 
accomplish much, beyond burning the houses and 
driving off the live-stock of the farmers along 
shore, and destroying a few small towns — one of 
them, Hampton, being sacked with revolting 



Naval War of 1 812 197 

brutality/ The Government of the United States 
was, in fact, supported by the people in its war 
policy very largely on account of these excesses, 
which were much exaggerated by American 
writers. It was really a species of civil war, and 
in such a contest, at the beginning of this century, 
it was impossible that some outrages should not 
take place. 

The American frigate Constellation had by this 
time got ready for sea, 'and, under the command of 
Captain Stewart, she prepared to put out early in 
January. As the number of blockaders rendered 
a fight almost certain within a few days of her de- 
parture, her crew were previously brought to the 
highest state of discipline, the men being exer- 
cised with especial care in handling the great guns 
and in firing at a target. "* However, she never 
got out; for when she reached Hampton Roads 
she fell in with a British squadron of line-of -battle 
ships and frigates. She kedged up toward Nor- 
folk, and when the tide rose ran in and anchored 
between the forts; and a few days later dropped 
down to cover the forts which were being built at 
Craney Island. Here she was exposed to attacks 
from the great British force still lying in Hampton 

* James (vi., 340) says: "The conduct of the British troops 
on this occasion was ' revolting to human nature ' and ' dis- 
graceful to the flag.' " 

^ Life of Commodore Tatnall, by C. C. Jones, p. 15 (Savan- 
nah, 1878). 



198 Naval War of 181 2 

Roads, and, fearing they would attempt to carry 
her by surprise. Captain Stewart made every 
preparation for defence. She was anchored in the 
middle of the narrow channel, flanked by gun- 
boats, her lower ports closed, not a rope left hang- 
ing over the sides; the boarding nettings, boiled 
in half -made pitch till they were as hard as wire, 
were triced outboard toward the yard-arms, and 
loaded with kentledge to fall on the attacking 
boats when the tricing lines were cut, while the 
carronades were loaded to the muzzle with musket- 
balls, and depressed so as to sweep the water near 
the ship.' Twice, a force of British, estimated by 
their foes to number 2000 men, started off at night 
to carry the Constellation by surprise ; but on each 
occasion they were discovered and closely watched 
by her guard-boats, and they never ventured to 
make the attack. However, she was unable to 
get to sea, and remained blockaded to the close of 
the war. 

At the beginning of the year, several frigates and 
smaller craft were at sea. The Chesapeake, Cap- 
tain Evans, had sailed from Boston on December 
13, 1812.^ She ran down past Madeira, the Ca- 
naries, and Cape de Verde, crossed the equator, and 

^ For an admirable account of these preparations, as well 
as of the subsequent events, see Cooper, ii., 242. 

^Statistical History of the U. S. Navy, by Lieut. G. E. Em- 
mons. 



Naval War of 1 812 199 

for six weeks cruised to the south of the Hne be- 
tween longitudes 16° and 25°. Thence she steered 
to the west, passing near Surinam, over the same 
spot on which the Hornet had sunk the Peacock 
but a day previous. Cruising northward through 
the West Indies, she passed near the Bermudas, 
where she was chased by a 74 and a frigate; es 
caping from them she got into Boston on April 
9th, having captured five merchantmen, and 
chased unsuccessfully for two days a brig-sloop. 
The term of two years for which her crew were en- 
listed now being up, they, for the most part, left, 
in consequence of some trouble about the prize- 
money. Captain Evans being in ill-health, Cap- 
tain James Lawrence was appointed to command 
her. He reached Boston about the middle of 
May,' and at once set about enlisting a new crew, 
and tried, with but partial success, to arrange 
matters with the old sailors, who were now almost 
in open mutiny. 

When the year 181 2 had come to an end, the 
Essex, 32, was in the South Atlantic, and Captain 
Porter shortly afterward ran into St. Catharines 
to water. Being at a loss where to find his 

'He was still on the Hornet at New York on May loth, 
as we know from a letter of Biddle's, written on that date 
(in Letters of Masters-Commandant, 1813, No. 58), and so 
could hardly have been with the Chesapeake two weeks before 
he put out; and had to get his crew together and train them 
during that time. 



200 Naval War of 1812 

■ 

consorts, he now decided to adopt the exceed- 
ingly bold measure of doubling Cape Horn and 
striking at the British whalers in the Pacific. 
This was practically going into the enemy's 
waters, the Portuguese and Spanish countries 
being entirely under the influence of Britain, 
while there were no stations where Porter could 
revictual or repair in safety. However, the 
Essex started, doubled the Horn, and on March 
13th anchored in the harbor of Valparaiso. 
Her adventurous cruise in the Pacific was the 
most striking feature of the war; but as it has 
been most minutely described by Commodore 
Porter himself, by his son, Admiral Porter, by 
Admiral Farragut, and by Cooper, I shall barely 
touch upon it. 

On March 20th, the Essex captured the Peruvian 
corsair Nereyda, 16, hove her guns and small arms 
overboard, and sent her into port. She made the 
island of San Gallan, looked into Callao, and 
thence went to the Gallipagos, getting everything 
she wanted from her prizes. Then she went to 
Tumbez, and returned to the Gallipagos; thence 
to the Marquesas, and finally back to Valparaiso 
again. By this year's campaign in the Pacific, 
Captain Porter had saved all our ships in those 
waters, had not cost the Government a dollar, 
living purely on the enemy, and had taken from 
him nearly 4000 tons of shipping and 400 men, 



i 



Naval War of 1 812 201 

completely breaking up his whaling trade in the 
South Pacific. 

The cruise was something sui generis in modern 
warfare, recalling to mind the cruises of the early 
English and Dutch navigators. An American 
ship was at a serious disadvantage in having no 
harbor of refuge away from home ; while on almost 
every sea there were British, French, and Spanish 
ports into which vessels of those nations could run 
for safety. It was an unprecedented thing for a 
small frigate to cruise a year and a half in enemy's 
waters, and to supply herself during that time, 
purely from captured vessels, with everything — 
cordage, sails, guns, anchors, provisions, and 
medicines, and even money to pay the officers and 
men I Porter's cruise was the very model of what 
such an expedition should be, harassing the enemy 
most effectually at no cost whatever. Had the 
Essex been decently armed with long guns, in- 
stead of carronades, the end might have been as 
successful as it was glorious. The whalers were 
many of them armed letters-of-marque, and, 
though of course unable to oppose the frigate, 
several times smart skirmishes occurred in at- 
tacking them with boats, or in captured ships; 
as when Lieutenant Downs and 20 men in the 
prize Georgiana, after a short brush, captured 
the Hector, with 25 men, two of whom were 
killed and six wounded ; and when, under similar 



202 Naval War of 1812 

circumstances, the prize Greenwich, of 25 men, 
captured the Seringapatam of 40. The cruise of 
the Essex, the first American man-of-war ever in 
the Pacific, a year and a half out and many 
thousand miles away from home, was a good 
proof of Porter's audacity in planning the 
trip and his skill and resource in carrying 
it out. 

To return now to the Hornet. Thi ; vessel had 
continued blockading the Bonne Citoyenne until 
January 24th, when the Montagu, 74, arrived 
toward evening and chased her into port. As 
the darkness came on the Hornet wore, stood out 
to sea, passing into the open without molestation 
from the 74, and then steered toward the north- 
east, cruising near the coast, and making a few 
prizes, among which was a brig, the Resolution, 
with $23,000 in specie aboard, captured on Feb- 
ruary 14th. On the 24th of February, while near- 
ing the mouth of the Demerara River, Captain 
Lawrence discovered a brig to leeward, and chased 
her till he ran into quarter less five, when, having 
no pilot, he hauled off-shore. Just within the bar 
a man-of-war brig was lying at anchor ; and while 
beating round Caroband Bank, in order to get at 
her, Captain Lawrence discovered another sail 
edging down on his weather-quarter.' The brig 
at anchor was the Espiegle, of 18 guns, 32-pound 

' Letter of Captain Lawrence, March 29, 181 3. 



Naval War of 1 812 203 

carronades, Captain John Taylor ' ; and the sec- 
ond brig seen was the Peacock, Captain William 
Peake,^ which, for some unknown reason, had ex- 
changed her 32-pound carronades for 24's. She 
had sailed from the Espiegle's anchorage the same 
morning at 10 o'clock. At 4.20 p.m. the Peacock 
hoisted her colors; then the Hornet beat to 
quarters and cleared for action. Captain Law- 
rence kept close by the wind, in order to get the 
weather-gage; when he was certain he could 
weather the enemy, he tacked, at 5.10, and the 
Hornet hoisted her colors. The ship and the brig 
now stood for each other, both on the wind, the 
Hornet being on the starboard and the Peacock on 
the port tack, and at 5.25 they exchanged broad- 
sides, at half pistol-shot distance, while going in 
opposite directions, the Americans using their lee 
and the British their weather battery. The guns 
were fired as they bore, and the Peacock suffered 
severely, while her antagonist's hull was unin- 
jured, though she suffered sHghtly aloft and had 
her pennant cut off by the first shot fired.^ One 
of the men in the mizzen-top was killed by a round 
shot, and two more were wounded in the main- 
top.4 As soon as they were clear, Captain Peake 

^ James, vi., 278. ''Ibid. 

3 Cooper, p. 200. 

4 See entry in her log for this day (in " Log-Book of Hornet, 
Wasp, and Argus, from July 20, 1809, to October 6, 1813,") 
in the Bureau of Navigation, at Washington. 



204 Naval War of 1812 

put his helm hard up and wore, firing his star- 
board guns; but the Hornet had watched him 
closely, bore up as quickly, and coming down at 
5.35, ran him close aboard on the starboard quar- 
ter. Captain Peake fell at this moment, together 
with many of his crew, and, unable to withstand 
the Hornet's heavy fire, the Peacock surrendered 
at 5.39, just 14 minutes after the first shot; 
and directly afterward hoisted her ensign union- 
down in the fore-rigging as a signal of distress. 
Almost immediately, her mainmast went by the 
board. Both vessels then anchored, and Lieut. 
J. T. Shubrick, being sent on board the prize, 
reported her sinking. Lieut. D. Conner was 
then sent in another boat to try to save the 
vessel; but though they threw the guns over- 
board, plugged the shot holes, tried the pumps, 
and even attempted bailing, the water gained so 
rapidly that the Hornet's officers devoted them- 
selves to removing the wounded and other pris- 
oners ; and while thus occupied the short tropical 
twilight left them. Immediately afterward, the 
prize settled, suddenly and easily, in 5^ fathoms 
water, carrying with her three of the Hornet's 
people and nine of her own, who were rummaging 
below; meanwhile four others of her crew had 
lowered her damaged stern-boat, and in the con- 
fusion got off unobserved and made their way to 
the land. The foretop still remained above water, 



jiht. 



Naval War of 1812 205 

and four of the prisoners saved themselves by 
running up the rigging into it. Lieutenant Con- 
ner and Midshipman Cooper (who had also come 
on board) saved themselves, together with most 
of their people and the remainder of the Peacock's 
crew, by jumping into the launch, which was lying 
on the booms, and paddling her toward the ship 
with pieces of boards in default of oars. 

The Hornet's complement at this time was 150, 
of whom she had 8 men absent in a prize and 7 on 
the sick list,' leaving 1 3 5 fit for duty in the action ^ ; 
of these one man was killed and two wounded, all 
aloft. Her rigging and sails were a good deal cut, 
a shot had gone through the foremast, and the 
bowsprit was slightly damaged; the only shot 
that touched her hull merely glanced athwart her 
bows, indenting a plank beneath the cat-head. 
The Peacock's crew had amounted to 134, but 4 
were absent in a prize, and but 122 ^ fit for action; 
of these she lost her captain and 7 men killed and 
mortally wounded, and her master, i midshipman, 
and 28 men severely and slightly wounded, — in all 
8 killed and 30 wounded, or about 13 times her 
antagonist's loss. She suffered under the disad- 
vantage of light metal, having 24's opposed to 

* Letter of Captain Lawrence. 

2 Letter of Lieut. D. Conner, April 26, 1813. 

3 Letter of Lieut. F. W. Wright (of the Peacock) , April 
17, 1813. 



2o6 Naval War of 1812 

32's; but judging from her gunnery this was not 
much of a loss, as 6-pounders would have inflicted 
nearly as great damage. She was well handled 
and bravely fought; but her men showed a mar- 
vellous ignorance of gunnery. It appears that she 
had long been known as "the yacht," on account 
of the tasteful arrangement of her deck; the 
breechings of the carronades were lined with white 
canvas, and nothing could exceed in brilliancy 
the polish upon the traversing bars and elevating 
screws.' In other words. Captain Peake had con- 
founded the mere incidents of good discipline with 
the essentials.^ 

The Hornet's victory cannot be regarded in any 
other light than as due, not to the heavier metal, 
but to the far more accurate firing of the Amer- 
icans; "had the guns of the Peacock been of the 
largest size they could not have changed the re- 
sult, as the weight of shot that do not hit is of no 
great moment." Any merchant-ship might have 
been as well handled and bravely defended as she 
was ; and an ordinary letter-of-marque would have 
made as creditable a defence. 

During the entire combat the Espiegle was not 
more than four miles distant and was plainly visi- 
ble from the Hornet; but for some reason she did 

'James, vi., 280. 

2 Codrington {Memoirs, i., 310) comments very forcibly on 
the uselessness of a mere martinet. 




207 



2o8 Naval War of 1 812 

not come out, and her commander reported that 
he knew nothing of the action till the next day. 
Captain Lawrence, of course, was not aware of this, 
and made such exertions to bend on new sails, 
stow his boats, and clear his decks that by nine 
o'clock he was again prepared for action,' and at 
2 P.M. got under way for the N.W. Being now 
overcrowded with people and short of water, he 
stood for home, anchoring at Holmes's Hole in 
Martha's Vineyard on the 19th of March. 

On their arrival at New York the officers of the 
Peacock published a card expressing in the warm- 
est terms their appreciation of the way they and 
their men had been treated. Say they: "We 
ceased to consider ourselves prisoners ; and every- 
thing that friendship could dictate was adopted 
by you and the officers of the Hornet to remedy 
the inconvenience we would otherwise have ex- 
perienced from the unavoidable loss of the whole 
of our property and clothes owing to the sudden 
sinking of the Peacocks ^ This was signed by the 
first and second lieutenants, the master, surgeon, 
and purser. 

Weight 
Tonnage Guns Metal Men Loss 

Hornet 480 10 279 135 3 

Peacock 477 10 210 122 38 

' Letter of Captain Lawrence. 

^ Quoted in full in Niles's Register and Lossing's Field- 
Bok. 



Mi 



Naval War of 1 8 1 2 209 

Relative Relative Loss 

Force Inflicted 

Hornet i . oo i . oo 

Peacock 83 .08 

That is, the forces standing nearly as 13 is to 1 1, 
the relative execution was about as 13 is to i. 

The day after the capture, Captain Lawrence 
reported 277 souls aboard, including the crew of 
the English brig Resolution, which he had taken, 
and of the American brig Hunter, prize to the Pea- 
cock. As James, very ingeniously, tortures these 
figures into meaning what they did not, it may be 
well to show exactly what the 277 included. Of 
the Hornet's original crew of 150, 8 were absent in 
a prize, i killed, and 3 drowned, leaving (including 
7 sick) 138; of the Peacock's original 134, 4 were 
absent in a prize, 5 killed, 9 drowned, and 4 es- 
caped, leaving (including 8 sick and 3 mortally 
wounded) 112; there were also aboard 16 other 
British prisoners, and the Hunter's crew of 1 1 men 
— making just 277.' According to Lieutenant 
Conner's letter, written in response to one from 
Lieutenant Wright, there were in reality 139 in 
the Peacock's crew when she began action ; but it 
is, of course, best to take each commander's 

'The 277 men were thus divided into: Hornet's crew, 138; 
Peacock's crew, 112; Resolution' s crew , 16; Hunter's crew, 11. 
James quotes "270" men, which he divides as follows: 
Horn£t, 160; Peacock, loi; Hunter, g — leaving out the Reso- 
lution's crew, II of the Peacock's, and 2 of the Hunter's. 

VOL. I.— 14. 



2 10 Naval War of 1812 

account of the number of men on board his ship 
that were fit for duty. 

On January 17th, the Viper, 12, Lieut. J. D. 
Henly, was captured by the British frigate Nar- 
cissus, 32, Captain Lumly. 

On February 8th, while a British squadron, con- 
sisting of the four frigates Belvidera (Captain 
Richard Byron), Maidstone, Junon, and Statira, 
were at anchor in Lynhaven Bay, a schooner was 
observed in the northeast standing down Chesa- 
peake Bay.' This was the Lottery, letter-of- 
marque, of six 12 -pounder carronades and 25 men, 
Captain John Southcomb, bound from Baltimore 
to Bombay. Nine boats, with 200 men, under the 
command of Lieutenant Kelly Nazer, were sent 
against her, and, a calm coming on, overtook her. 
The schooner opened a well-directed fire of round 
and grape, but the boats rushed forward and 
boarded her, not carrying her till after a most ob- 
stinate struggle, in which Captain Southcomb and 
19 of his men, together with 13 of the assailants, 
were killed or wounded. The best war ship of a 
regular navy might be proud of the discipline and 
courage displayed by the captain and crew of the 
little Lottery. Captain Byron on this, as well as 
on many another occasion, showed himself to be 
as humane as he was brave and skilful. Captain 

^ James, vi., 325. 



Naval War of 1 8 1 2 211 

Southcomb, mortally wounded, was taken on 
board Byron's frigate, where he was treated with 
the greatest attention and most delicate courtesy, 
and when he died his body was sent ashore with 
every mark of the respect due to so brave an 
officer. Captain Stewart (of the Constellation) 
wrote Captain Byron a letter of acknowledgment 
for his great courtesy and kindness.' 

On March i6th, a British division of five boats 
and 105 men, commanded by Lieutenant James 
Polkinghorne, set out to attack the privateer 
schooner Dolphin of 12 guns and 70 men, and the 
letters-of -marque, Racer, Arab, and Lynx, each of 
six guns and 30 men. Lieutenant Polkinghorne, 
after pulling fifteen miles, found the four schooners 
all prepared to receive him, but in spite of his 
great inferiority in force he dashed gallantly at 
them. The Arab and Lynx surrendered at once; 
the Racer was carried after a sharp struggle, in 
which Lieutenant Polkinghorne was wounded, 
and her guns turned on the Dolphin. Most of the 
latter's crew jumped overboard; a few rallied 
round their captain, but they were at once scat- 
tered as the British seamen came aboard. The 
assailants had 13, and the privateersmen 16 men 
killed and wounded in the fight. It was certainly 

' The correspondence between the two captains is given in 
full in Niles's Register, which also contains fragmentary notes 
on the action, principally as to the loss incurred. 



212 Naval War of 1812 

one of the most brilliant and daring cutting-out 
expeditions that took place during the war, and 
the victors well deserved their success. The pri- 
vateersmen (according to the statement of the 
Dolphin's master, in Niles's Register) were panic- 
struck, and acted in anything but a brave man- 
ner. All irregular fighting-men do their work by 
fits and starts. No regular cruisers could behave 
better than did the privateers Lottery, Chasseur, 
and General Armstrong; none would behave as 
badly as the Dolphin, Lynx, and Arab. The same 
thing appears on shore. Jackson's irregulars at 
New Orleans did as well, or almost as well, as 
Scott's troops at Lundy's Lane; but Scott's 
troops would never have suffered from such a 
panic as overcame the militia at Bladensburg. 

On April 9th, the schooner Norwich, of 14 guns 
and 61 men. Sailing-master James Monk, captured 
the British privateer Caledonia, of 10 guns and 41 
men, after a short action, in which the privateer 
lost 7 men. 

On April 30th, Commodore Rodgers, in the 
President, 44, accompanied by Captain Smith in 
the Congress, 38, sailed on his third cruise.' On 
May 2d, he fell in with and chased the British sloop 
Curlew, 18, Captain Michael Head, but the latter 
escaped by knocking away the wedges of her 
masts and using other means to increase her rate 

* Letter of Commodore Rodgers, September 30, 1813. 



\ 



Naval War of 1812 213 

of sailing. On the 8th, in latitude 39° 30' N., 
long. 60° W., the Congress parted company, and 
sailed off toward the southeast, making four prizes, 
of no great value, in the North Atlantic ' ; when 
about in long. 35° W. she steered south, passing to 
the south of the line. But she never saw a man- 
of-war, and during the latter part of her cruise not 
a sail of any kind ; and, after cruising nearly eight 
months, returned to Portsmouth Harbor on De- 
cember 14th, having captured but four merchant- 
men. Being unfit to cruise longer, owing to her 
decayed condition, she was disarmed and laid up ; 
nor was she sent to sea again during the war.^ 

Meanwhile, Rodgers cruised along the eastern 
edge of the Grand Bank until he reached latitude 
48°, without meeting anything, then stood to the 
southeast, and cruised off the Azores till June 6th. 
Then he crowded sail to the northeast after a Ja- 
maica fleet of which he had received news, but 
which he failed to overtake, and on June 13th, in 
lat. 46° long. 28°, he gave up the chase and shaped 

^Letter of Captain Smith, December 15, 1813. 

* James states that she was "blockaded" in port by the 
Tenedos, during part of 18 14; but was too much awed by the 
fate of the Chesapeake to come out during the "long block- 
ade" of Captain Parker. Considering the fact that she was 
too decayed to put to sea, had no guns aboard, no crew, and 
was, in fact, laid up, the feat of the Tenedos was not very 
wonderful; a row-boat could have "blockaded" her quite as 
well. It is worth noticing, as an instance of the way James 
alters a fact by suppressing half of it. 



2 14 Naval War of 1 812 

his course toward the North Sea, still without any 
good luck befalling him. On June 27th, he put 
into North Bergen in the Shetlands for water, and 
thence passed the Orkneys and stretched toward 
the North Cape, hoping to intercept the Arch- 
angel fleet. On July 19th, when off the North 
Cape, in lat. 71° 52' N., long. 20° 18' E., he fell in 
with two sail of the enemy, who made chase; 
after four days' pursuit the commodore ran his 
opponents out of sight. According to his letter, 
the two sail were a line-of -battle ship and 'a frig- 
ate ; according to James, they were the 1 2 -pounder 
frigate Alexandria, Captain Cathcart, and Spit- 
fire, 16, Captain Ellis. James quotes from the 
logs of the two British ships, and it would seem 
that he is correct, as it would not be possible for 
him to falsify the logs so utterly. In case he is 
true, it was certainly carrying caution to an ex- 
cessive degree for the commodore to retreat be- 
fore getting some idea of what his antagonists 
really were. His mistaking them for so much 
heavier ships was a precisely similar error to that 
made by Sir George Collier and Lord Stuart at a 
later date about the Cyane and Levant. James 
wishes to prove that each party perceived the 
force of the other, and draws a contrast (p. 312) 
between the "gallantry of one party and pusil- 
lar<imity of the other." This is nonsense, and, as 
in similar cases, James overreaches himself by 



Naval War of 1 8 1 2 215 

proving too much. If he had made an 18- 
pounder frigate Hke the Congress flee from another 
i8-pounder, his narrative would be within the 
bounds of possibiHty, and would need serious 
examination. But the little 12 -pounder Alex- 
andria, and the ship-sloop with her 18-pound car- 
ronades, would not have stood the ghost of a 
chance in the contest. Any man who would have 
been afraid of them would also have been afraid 
of the Little Belt, the sloop Rodgers captured be- 
fore the war. As for Captains Cathcart and Ellis, 
had they known the force of the President, and 
chased her with a view of attacking her, their con- 
duct would have only been explicable on the 
ground that they were afflicted with emotional 
insanity. 

The President now steered southward and got 
into the mouth of the Irish Channel; on August 
2d she shifted her berth and almost circled Ireland ; 
then steered across to Newfoundland, and worked 
south along the coast. On September 23d, a little 
south of Nantucket, she decoyed under her guns 
and captured the British schooner Highflyer, 6, 
Lieutenant William Hutchinson, and 45 men ; and 
went into Newport on the 27th of the same month, 
having made some twelve prizes. 

On May 24th, Commodore Decatur, in theUnited 
States, which had sent ashore six carronades, and 
now mounted but 48 guns, accompanied by 



2i6 Naval War of 1812 

Captain Jones in the Macedonian, 38, and Captain 
Biddle in the Wasp, 20, left New York, passing 
through Hell Gate, as there was a large blockading 
force off the Hook. Opposite Hunter's Point the 
mainmast of the States was struck by lightning, 
which cut off the broad pendant, shot down the 
hatchway into the doctor's cabin, put out his 
candle, ripped up the bed, and, entering between 
the skin and ceiling of the ship, tore off two or 
three sheets of copper near the water-line, and 
disappeared without leaving a trace! The Mace- 
donian, which was close behind, hove all aback, in 
expectation of seeing the States blown up. 

At the end of the Sound, Commodore Decatur 
anchored to watch for a chance of getting out. 
Early on June ist he started; but in a couple of 
hours met the British Captain R. D. OHver's 
squadron, consisting of a 74, a razee, and a frigate. 
These chased him back, and all his three ships ran 
into New London. Here, in the mud of the 
Thames River, the two frigates remained block- 
aded till the close of the war ; but the little sloop 
slipped out later, to the enemy's cost. 

We left the Chesapeake, 38, being fitted out at 
Boston by Captain James Lawrence, late of the 
Hornet. Most of her crew, as already stated, 
their time being up, left, dissatisfied with the 
ship's ill luck, and angry at not having received 
their due share of prize-money. It was very hard 



Naval War of 1 8i 2 217 

to get sailors, most of the men preferring to ship 
in some of the numerous privateers where the 
discipHne was less strict and the chance of prize- 
money much greater. In consequence of this, an 
unusually large number of foreigners had to be 
taken, including about forty British and a num- 
ber of Portuguese. The latter were peculiarly 
troublesome; one of their number, a boatswain's 
mate, finally almost brought about a mutiny 
among the crew, which was only pacified by giving 
the men prize-checks. A few of the Constitution s 
old crew came aboard, and these, together with 
some of the men who had been on the Chesapeake 
during her former voyage, made an excellent 
nucleus. Such men needed very little training at 
either guns or sails ; but the new hands were un- 
practised, and came on board so late that the last 
draft that arrived still had their hammocks and 
bags lying in the boats stowed over the booms 
when the ship was captured. The officers were 
largely new to the ship, though the first lieutenant, 
Mr. A. Ludlow, had been the third in her former 
cruise; the third and fourth lieutenants were not 
regularly commissioned as such, but were only 
midshipmen acting for the first time in higher posi- 
tions. Captain Lawrence himself was of course 
new to all, both officers and crew.' In other 

' On the day on which he sailed to attack the Shannon, 
Lawrence writes to the Secretary of the Navy as follows; 



2i8 Naval War of 1812 

words, the Chesapeake possessed good material, 
but in an exceedingly unseasoned state. 

Meanwhile, the British frigate Shannon, 38, Cap- 
tain Philip Bowes Vere Broke, was cruising off the 
mouth of the harbor. To give some idea of the 
reason why she proved herself so much more for- 
midable than her British sister frigates, it may be 
well to quote, slightly condensing, from James : 

"There was another point in which the gener- 
ality of British crews, as compared with any one 
American crew, were miserably deficient ; that is, 
skill in the art of gunnery. While the American 
seamen were constantly firing at marks, the Brit- 
ish seamen, except in particular cases, scarcely 
did so once in a year; and some ships could be 
named on board which not a shot had been fired 
in this way for upward of three years. Nor was 
the fault wholly the captain's. The instructions 
under which he was bound to act forbade him to 
use, during the first six months after the ship had 
received her armament, more shots per month 
than amounted to a third in number of the upper- 
deck guns; and, after these six months, only half 

" Lieutenant Paige is so ill as to be unable to go to sea withr the 
ship. At the urgent request of Acting- Lieutenant Pierce, I 
have granted him, also, permission to go on shore; one in- 
ducement for my granting his request was his being at 
variance with every officer in his mess." — Captains' Letters, 
vol. xxix, No. I , in the Naval Archives at Washington. Neither 
officers nor men had shaken together. 



Naval War of 1812 219 

the quantity. Many captains never put a shot 
in the guns till an enemy appeared; they em- 
ployed the leisure time of the men in handling the 
sails and in decorating the ship." Captain Broke 
was not one of this kind. "From the day on 
which he had joined her, the 14th of September, 
1806, the Shannon began to feel the effect of her 
captain's proficiency as a gunner and zeal for the 
service. The laying of the ship's ordnance so 
that it may be correctly fired in a horizontal direc- 
tion is justly deemed a most important operation, 
as upon it depends in a great measure the true aim 
and destructive effect of the shot; this was at- 
tended to by Captain Broke in person. By 
draughts from other ships, and the usual means to 
which a British man-of-war is obliged to resort, 
the Shannon got together a crew; and, in the 
course of a year or two, by the paternal care and 
excellent regulations of Captain Broke, the ship's 
company became as pleasant to command as it 
was dangerous to meet." The Shannon's guns 
were all carefully sighted, and, moreover, " every 
da}^ for about an hour and a half in the fore- 
noon, when not prevented by chase or the state of 
the weather, the men were exercised at training the 
guns, and for the same time in the afternoon in the 
use of the broadsword, pike, musket, etc. Twice 
a week the crew fired at targets, both with great 
guns and musketry; and Captain Broke, as an 



2 20 Naval War of 1812 

additional stimulus beyond the emulation excited, 
gave a pound of tobacco to every man that put 
a shot through the bull's eye." He would fre- 
quently have a cask thrown overboard and sud- 
denly order some one gun to be manned to sink 
the cask. In short, the Shannon was very greatly 
superior, thanks to her careful training, to the 
average British frigate of her rate, while the 
Chesapeake, owing to her having a raw and in- 
experienced crew, was decidedly inferior to the 
average American frigate of the same strength. 

In force, the two frigates compared pretty 
equally,' the American being the superior in just 
about the same proportion that the Wasp was to 
the Frolic, or, at a later date, the Hornet to the 
Penguin. The Chesapeake carried 50 guns (26 in 
broadside), twenty-eight long i8's on the gun- 
deck, and on the spar-deck two long 12's, one long 
18, eighteen 32-pound carronades, and one 12- 
pound carronade (which was not used in the fight, 
however). Her broadside, allowing for the short 
weight of metal, was 542 lbs. ; her complement, 
379 men. The Shannon carried 52 guns (26 in 
broadside), twenty-eight long iS's on the gun- 
deck, and on the spar-deck four long 9's, one long 
6, sixteen 32-pound carronades, and three 12- 
pound carronades (two of which were not used in 
the fight). Her broadside was 550 lbs. ; her crew 
* Taking each commander's account for his own force. 



Naval War of 1812 221 

consisted of 330 men, 30 of whom were raw hands. 
Early on the morning of June ist, Captain Broke 
sent in to Captain Lawrence, by an American 
prisoner, a letter of challenge which, for courteous- 
ness, manliness, and candor, is the very model of 
what such an epistle should be. Before it reached 
Boston, however, Captain Lawrence had weighed 
anchor to attack the Shannon, which frigate was 
in full sight in the offing. It has been often said 
that he engaged against his judgment, but this 
may be doubted. His experience with the Bonne 
Citoyenne, Espiegle, and Peacock had not tended 
to give him a very high idea of the navy to which 
he was opposed, and there is no doubt that he was 
confident of capturing the Shannon."^ It was 
most unfortunate that he did not receive Broke's 
letter, as the latter in it expressed himself willing 
to meet Lawrence in any latitude and longitude he 
might appoint; and there would thus have been 
some chance of the American crew having time 
enough to get into shape. 

At midday of June i, 1813, the Chesapeake 
weighed anchor, stood out of Boston Harbor, and 

* In his letter written just before sailing (already quoted on 
p. 218), he says: "An English frigate is now in sight from our 
deck. ... I am in hopes to give a good account of her 
before night." My account of the action is mainly taken 
from James's Naval History and Brighton's Memoir of Ad- 
miral Broke (according to which the official letter of Captain 
Broke was tampered with) ; see also the letter of Lieutenant 



222 Naval War of 1812 

at I P.M. rounded the Light-house. The Shannon 
stood off under easy sail, and at 3.40 hauled up 
and reefed topsails. At 4 p.m., she again bore 
away with her foresail brailed up, and her main- 
topsail braced flat and shivering, that the Chesa- 
peake might overtake her. An hour later, Boston 
Light-house bearing west distant about six leagues, 
she again hauled up, with her head to the south- 
east, and lay to under topsails, topgallantsails, 
jib, and spanker. Meanwhile, as the breeze 
freshened, the Chesapeake took in her studding- 
sails, topgallantsails, and royals, got her royal 
yards on deck, and came down very fast under 
topsails and jib. At 5.00, to keep under com- 
mand and be able to wear if necessary, the 
Shannon filled her main-topsail and kept a close 
luff, and then again let the sail shiver. At 5.25 
the Chesapeake hauled up her foresail, and, with 
three ensigns flying, steered straight for the 
Shannon's starboard quarter. Broke was afraid 
that Lawrence would pass under the Shannon s 
stern, rake her, and engage her on the quarter; 
but, either overlooking or waiving this advantage, 
the American captain luffed up within 50 yards 
upon the Shannon's starboard quarter, and 

George Budd, June 15, 1813; the report of the Court of In- 
quir}% Commodore Bainbridge presiding, and the Court- 
martial held on board frigate United States, April 15, 1814, 
Commodore Decatur presiding. 



Naval War of 1812 223 

squared his main-yard. On board the Shannon, 
the captain of the 14th gun, WilHam Mindham, 
had been ordered not to fire till it bore into the 
second main-deck port forward; at 5.50 it was 
fired, and then the other guns in quick succession 
from aft forward, the Chesapeake replying with 
her whole broadside. At 5.53 Lawrence, finding 
he was forging ahead, hauled up a little. The 
Chesapeake's broadsides were doing great damage, 
but she herself was suffering even more than her 
foe; the men in the Shannon's tops could hardly 
see the deck of the American frigate through the 
cloud of splinters, hammocks, and other wreck 
that was flying across it. Man after man was 
killed at the wheel; the fourth lieutenant, the 
master, and the boatswain were slain ; and at 5.56 
having had her jib-sheet and fore-topsail tie shot 
away, and her spanker brails loosened so that the 
sail blew out, the Chesapeake came up into the 
wand somewhat, so as to expose her quarter to her 
antagonist's broadside, which beat in her stern- 
ports and swept the men from the after guns. 
One of the arm-chests on the quarter-deck was 
blown up by a hand-grenade thrown from the 
Shannon.^ The Chesapeake was now seen to have 

' This explosion may have had more effect than is com- 
monly supposed in the capture of the Chesapeake. Commo- 
dore Bainbridge, writing from Charlestown, Mass., on June 2, 
1813 (see Captains' Letters, vol. xxix., No. 10), says: "Mr. 



224 Naval War of 1812 

stern-way on and to be paying slowly off; so the 
Shannon put her helm a-starboard and shivered 
her mizzen-topsail, so as to keep off the wind and 
delay the boarding. But at that moment her jib- 
stay was shot away, and, her headsails becoming 
becalmed, she went off very slowly. In conse- 
quence, at 6 P.M. the two frigates fell aboard, the 
Chesapeake' s quarter pressing upon the Shannon s 
side just forward the starboard main-chains, and 
the frigates were kept in this position by the fluke 
of the Shannon's anchor catching in the Chesa- 
peake's quarter port. 

The Shannon's crew had suffered severely, but 
not the least panic or disorder existed among 
them. Broke ran forward, and seeing his foes 
flinching from the quarterdeck guns, he ordered 
the ships to be lashed together, the great guns to 
cease firing, and the boarders to be called. The 
boatswain, who had fought in Rodney's action, 

Knox, the pilot on board, left the Chesapeake at 5 p.m. . . . 
At 6 P.M., Mr. Knox informs me, the fire opened, and at 12 
minutes past six both ships were laying alongside one another 
as if in the act of boarding: at that moment an explosion took 
place on board the Chesapeake, which spread a fire on her 
upper deck from the foremast to the mizzen-mast, as high as 
her tops, and enveloped both ships in smoke for several min- 
utes. After it cleared away, they were seen separate, with the 
British flag hoisted on board the Chesapeake over the Amer- 
ican." James denies that the explosion was caused by a 
hand-grenade, though he says there were some of these 
aboard the Shannon. It is a point of no interest. 



Naval War of 1812 225 

set about fastening the vessels together, which the 
grim veteran succeeded in doing, though his right 
arm was hterally hacked off by a blow from a cut- 
lass. All was confusion and dismay on board the 
Chesapeake . Lieutenant Ludlow had been mor- 
tally wounded and carried below ; Lawrence him- 
self, while standing on the quarter-deck, fatally 
conspicuous by his full-dress uniform and com- 
manding stature, was shot down, as the vessels 
closed, by Lieutenant Law of the British marines. 
He fell dying, and was carried below, exclaiming : 
"Don't give up the ship!" — a phrase that has 
since become proverbial among his countrymen. 
The third lieutenant, Mr. W. S. Cox, came on 
deck, but, utterly demoralized by the aspect of 
affairs, he basely ran below without staying to 
rally the men, and was court-martialled afterward 
for so doing. At 6.02, Captain Broke stepped 
from the Shannon's gangway rail on to the muzzle 
of the Chesapeake' s aftermost carronade, and 
thence over the bulwark on to her quarter-deck, 
followed by about twenty men. As they came 
aboard, the Chesapeake's foreign mercenaries and 
the raw natives of the crew deserted their quarters ; 
the Portuguese boatswain's mate removed the 
gratings of the berth-deck, and he ran below, fol- 
lowed by many of the crew, among them one of 
the midshipmen named Deforest. On the quar- 
ter-deck almost the only man that made any 

VOL. I.— 15. 



2 26 Naval War of 1812 

resistance was the chaplain, Mr. Livermore, who 
advanced, firing his pistol at Broke, and in return 
nearly had his arm hewed off by a stroke from the 
latter' s broad Toledo blade. On the upper deck 
the only men who behaved well were the marines, 
but of their original number of 44 men, 14, includ- 
ing Lieutenant James Broom and Corporal Dixon, 
were dead, and 20, including Sergeants Twin and 
Harris, wounded, so that there were left but one 
corporal and nine men, several of whom had been 
knocked down and bruised, though reported un- 
wounded. There was thus hardly any resistance. 
Captain Broke stopping his men for a moment till 
they were joined by the rest of the boarders under 
Lieutenants Watt and Falkiner. The Chesa- 
peake's mizzen-topmen began firing at the board- 
ers, mortally wounding a midshipman, Mr. 
Samwell, and killing Lieutenant Watt ; but one of 
the Shannovis long 9's was pointed at the top and 
cleared it out, being assisted by the English main- 
topmen, under Midshipman Coshnahan. At the 
same time the men in the Chesapeake s maintop 
were driven out of it by the fire of the Shannon's 
fore-topmen, under Midshipman Smith. Lieuten- 
ant George Budd, who was on the main-deck, now 
for the first time learned that the English had 
boarded, as the upper-deck men came crowding 
down, and at once called on his people to follow 
him ; but the foreigners and novices held back, 



«l 



Naval War of 1 812 227 

and only a few of the veterans followed him up. 
As soon as he reached the spar-deck, Budd, fol- 
lowed by only a dozen men, attacked the British 
as they came along the gangways, repulsing them 
for a moment, and killing the British purser, Aid- 
ham, and captain's clerk, Dunn ; but the handful 
of Americans were at once cut down or dispersed, 
Lieutenant Budd being wounded and knocked 
down the main hatchway. "The enemy," writes 
Captain Broke, "fought desperately, but in dis- 
order." Lieutenant Ludlow, already mortally 
wounded, struggled up on deck, followed by two 
or three men, but was at once disabled by a sabre 
cut. On the forecastle a few seamen and marines 
turned to bay. Captain Broke was still leading 
his men with the same brilliant personal' courage 
he had all along shown. Attacking the first Amer- 
ican, who was armed with a pike, he parried a blow 
from it, and cut down the man; attacking an- 
other he was himself cut down, and only saved by 
the seaman Mindham, already mentioned, who 
slew his assailant. One of the American marines, 
using his clubbed musket, killed an Englishman, 
and so stubborn was the resistance of the little 
group that for a moment the assailants gave back, 
having lost several killed and wounded; but im- 
mediately afterward they closed in and slew their 
foes to the last man. The British fired a volley 
or two down the hatchway, in response to a couple 



2 28 Naval War of 1812 

of shots fired up ; all resistance was at an end, and 
at 6.05, just fifteen minutes after the first gun had 
been fired, and not five after Captain Broke had 
come aboard, the colors of the Chesapeake were 
struck. Of her crew of 379 men, 61 were killed or 
mortally wounded, including her captain, her 
first and fourth lieutenants, the lieutenant of 
marines, the master (White), boatswain (Adams), 
and three midshipmen, and 85 severely and 
slightly wounded,, including both her other lieu- 
tenants, 5 midshipmen, and the chaplain; total, 
148; the loss falling almost entirely upon the 
American portion of the crew. 

Of the Shannon's men, t,;^ were killed outright 
or died of their wounds, including her first 
lieutenant, purser, captain's clerk, and one mid- 
shipman, and 50 wounded, including the captain 
himself and the boatswain; total, 83. 

The Chesapeake was taken into Halifax, where 
Captain Lawrence and Lieutenant Ludlow were 
both buried with military honors. Captain Broke 
was made a baronet, very deservedly, and Lieu- 
tenants Wallis and Falkiner were both made 
commanders. 

The British writers accuse some of the American 
crew of treachery; the Americans, in turn, accuse 
the British of revolting brutality. Of course, in 
such a fight, things are not managed with urbane 
courtesy, and, moreover writers are prejudiced. 



Naval War of 1 812 259 

Those who would Hke to hear one side, are referred 
to James ; if they wish to hear the other, to the 
various letters from officers published in Niles's 
Register, especially vol. v., p. 142. 

Neither ship had lost a spar, but all the lower 
masts, especially the two mizzen-masts, were 
badly wounded. The Americans at that period 
were fond of using bar shot, which were of very 
questionable benefit, being useless against a ship's 
hull, though said to be sometimes of great help in 
unrigging an antagonist from whom one was de- 
sirous of escaping, as in the case of the President 
and Endymion. 



/ 



S.SO 

fJiO Vs.-*''"'"'' '"**' CHBSAPEAKt 









«./7< f.00 



SHANlfSN 



^^■tf S.S3 S.SO 

Chesapeake struck by Shannon struck by 

29 eighteen-pound shot, 12 eighteen-pound shot, 

25 thirty- two-pound shot, 13 thirty-two-pound shot, 

2 nine-pound shot, 14 bar shot, 

306 grape, 119 grape, 

362 shot. 158 shot. 

It is thus seen that the Shannon received from 

shot alone only about half the damage the 



230 Naval War of 1812 

Chesapeake did ; the latter was thoroughly 
beaten at the guns, in spite of what some 
American authors say to the contrary. And 
her victory was not in the slightest degree to 
be attributed to, though it may have been slightly 
hastened by, accident. Training and discipline 
won the victory, as often before; only in this 
instance the training and discipline were against 
us. 

It is interesting to notice that the Chesapeake 
battered the Shannon's hull far more than either 
the Java, Guerriere, or Macedonian did the hulls 
of their opponents, and that she suffered less in 
return (not in loss but in damage) than they did. 
The Chesapeake was a better fighter than either the 
Java, Guerriere, or Macedonian, and could have 
captured any one of them. The Shannon, of 
course, did less damage than any of the American 
44's, probably just about in the proportion of the 
difference in force. 

Almost all American writers have treated the 
capture of the Chesapeake as if it was due simply 
to a succession of unfortunate accidents; for ex- 
ample, Cooper, with his usual cheerful optimism, 
says that the incidents of the battle, excepting its 
short duration, are "altogether the results of the 
chances of war," and that it was mainly decided 
by "fortuitous events as unconnected with any 
particular merit on the one side as they are with 



Naval War of 1 812 231 

any particular demerit on the other." ' Most 
naval men consider it a species of treason to re- 
gard the defeat as due to anything but extraor- 
dinary ill-fortune. And yet no disinterested 
reader can help acknowledging that the true 
reason of the defeat was the very simple one that 
the Shannon fought better than the Chesapeake. 
It has often been said that up to the moment 
when the ships came together the loss and damage 
suffered by each were about the same. This is 
not true, and even if it was, would not affect the 
question. The heavy loss on board the Shannon 
did not confuse or terrify the thoroughly trained 
men, with their implicit reliance on their leaders ; 
and the experienced officers were ready to defend 
any point that was menaced. An equal or greater 
amount of loss aboard the Chesapeake disheartened 
and confused the raw crew, who simply had not 
had the time or chance to become well disciplined. 
Many of the old hands, of course, kept their wits 
and their pluck, but the novices and the disaffected 
did not. Similarly with the officers ; some, as the 
Court of Inquiry found, had not kept to their 
posts, and all being new to each other and the 

' The worth of such an explanation is very aptly gauged in 
General Alexander S. Webb's The Peninsula; ATcClellan's 
Campaign of 1862 (New York, 1881), p. 35, where he speaks 
of "those unforeseen or uncontrollable agencies which are 
vaguely described as the 'fortune of war,' but which usually 
prove to be the superior ability or resources of the antagonist." 



232 Naval War of 1812 

ship, could not show to their best. There is no 
doubt that the Chesapeake was beaten at the guns 
before she was boarded. Had the ships not come 
together, the fight would have been longer, the 
loss greater, and more nearly equal; but the re- 
sult would have been the same. Cooper says that 
the enemy entered with great caution, and so 
slowly that twenty resolute men could have re- 
pulsed him. It was no proof of caution for Cap- 
tain Broke and his few followers to leap on board, 
unsupported, and then they only waited for the 
main body to come up ; and no twenty men could 
have repulsed such boarders as followed Broke. 
The fight was another lesson, with the parties re- 
versed, to the effect that want of training and 
discipline is a bad handicap. Had the Chesa- 
peake's crew been in service as many months as 
the Shannon's had been years, such a captain as 
Lawrence would have had his men perfectly in 
hand; they would not have been cowed by their 
losses, nor some of the officers too demoralized to 
act properly, and the material advantages which 
the Chesapeake possessed, although not very great, 
would probably have been enough to give her a 
good chance of victory. It is well worth noticing 
that the only thoroughly disciplined set of men 
aboard (all according to James himself, by the 
way, native Americans), namely, the marines, did 
excellently, as shown by the fact that three 



Naval War of 1812 233 

fourths of their number were among the killed and 
wounded. The foreigners aboard the Chesapeake 
did not do as well as the Americans, but it is non- 
sense to ascribe the defeat in any way to them ; it 
was only rendered rather more disastrous by 
their actions. Most of the English authors give 
very fair accounts of the battle, except that they 
hardly allude to the peculiar disadvantages under 
which the Chesapeake suffered when she entered 
into it. Thus, James thinks the Java was un- 
prepared because she had only been to sea six 
weeks; but does not lay any weight on the fact 
that the Chesapeake had been out only as many 
hours. 

Altogether the best criticism on the fight is that 
written by M. de la Graviere.' " It is impossible 
to avoid seeing in the capture of the Chesapeake a 
new proof of the enormous power of a good organi- 
zation, when it has received the consecration of a 
few years' actual service on the sea. On this oc- 
casion, in effect, two captains equally renowned, 
the honor of two navies, were opposed to each 
other on two ships of the same tonnage and num- 
ber of guns. Never had the chances seemed better 
balanced, but Sir Philip Broke had commanded 
the Shannon for nearly seven years, while Captain 
Lawrence had only commanded the Chesapeake 
for a few days. The first of these frigates had 
' Guerres Maritimes, ii., 272. 



234 Naval War of 1 812 

cruised for eighteen months on the coast of 
America ; the second was leaving port. One had 
a crew long accustomed to habits of strict obedi- 
ence; the other was manned by men who had 
just been engaged in mutiny. The Americans 
were wrong to accuse fortune on this occasion. 
Fortune was not fickle; she was merely logical. 
The Shannon captured the Chesapeake on the ist 
of June, 181 3, but on the 14th of September, 1806, 
the day when he took command of his frigate, 
Captain Broke had begun to prepare the glorious 
termination to this bloody affair." 

Hard as it is to breathe a word against such a 
man as Lawrence, a very Bayard of the seas, who 
was admired as much for his dauntless bravery as 
he was loved for his gentleness and uprightness, it 
must be confessed that he acted rashly. And 
after he had sailed, it was, as Lord Howard Doug- 
lass had pointed out, a tactical error, however 
chivalric, to neglect the chance of lufhng across the 
Shannon's stern to rake her; exactly as it was a 
tactical error of his equally chivalrous antagonist 
to have let him have such an opportunity. Hull 
would not have committed either error, and would, 
for the matter of that, have been an overmatch 
for either commander. But it must always be 
remembered that Lawrence's encounters with the 
English had not been such as to give him a high 
opinion of them. The only foe he had fought had 



Naval War of 1812 



■6:i 



been inferior in strength, it is true, but had hardly 
made any effective resistance. Another sloop, of 
equal, if not superior force, had tamely submitted 
to blockade for several days, and had absolutely 
refused to fight. And there can be no doubt that 
the Chesapeake, unprepared though she was, would 
have been an overmatch for the Guerriere, Mace- 
donian, or Java. Altogether, it is hard to blame 
Lawrence for going out, and in every other re- 
spect his actions have never been, nor will be, 
mentioned, by either friend or foe, without the 
warmest respect. But that is no reason for in- 
sisting that he was ruined purely by an adverse 
fate. We will do far better to. recollect that as 
much can be learned from reverses as from vic- 
tories. Instead of flattering ourselves by saying 
the defeat was due to chance, let us try to find out 
what the real cause was, and then take care that it 
does not have an opportunity to act again. A 
little less rashness would have saved Lawrence's 
life and his frigate, while a little more audacity 
on one occasion would have made Commodore 
Chauncy famous forever. And whether a lesson 
is to be learned or not, a historian should remem- 
ber that his profession is not that of a panegyrist. 
The facts of the case unquestionably are: that 
Captain Broke, in fair fight, within sight of the en- 
emy's harbor, proved conqueror over a nominally 
equal and in reality sHghtly superior force ; and 



236 Naval War of 181 2 

that this is the only single-ship action of the war 
in which the victor was weaker in force than his 
opponent. So much can be gathered by reading 
only the x\merican accounts. Moreover, accident 
had little or nothing to do with the gaining of the 
victory. The explanation is perfectly easy : Law- 
rence and Broke were probably exactly equal in 
almost everything that goes to make up a first- 
class commander, but one had trained his crew for 
seven years, and the other was new to the ship, to 
the officers, and to the men, and the last to each 
other. The Chesapeake s crew must have been of 
fine material, or they would not have fought so 
well as they did. 

So much for the American accounts. On the 
other hand, the capture of the Chesapeake was, 
and is, held by many British historians to "con- 
clusively prove" a good many different things; 
such as, that if the odds were anything like equal, 
a British frigate could always whip an American, 
that in a hand-to-hand conflict such would in- 
variably be the case, etc. ; and as this was the 
only single-ship action of the war in which the 
victor was the inferior in force, most British writers 
insist that it reflected more honor on them than all 
the frigate actions of 1 8 1 2 put together did on the 
Americans. 

These assertions can be best appreciated by 
reference to a victory won by the French in the 



Naval War of 1812 237 

year of the battle of the Nile. On the 14th of 
December, 1798, after two hours' conflict, the 
French 24-gun corvette Bayonnaise captured, by 
boarding, the English 3 2 -gun frigate Ambuscade. 
According to James, the Ambuscade threw at a 
broadside 262 pounds of shot, and was manned by 
190 men, while the Bayonnaise threw 150 pounds, 
and had on board supernumeraries and passenger 
soldiers enough to make in all 250 men. According 
to the French historian Rouvier,' the broadside 
force was 246 pounds against 80 pounds; accord- 
ing to Troude,^ it was 270 pounds against 112. 
M. Leon Guerin, in his voluminous but exceedingly 
prejudiced and one-sided work,- makes the differ- 
ence even greater. At any rate, the English vessel 
was vastly the superior in force, and was captured 
by boarding, after a long and bloody conflict in 
which she lost 46, and her antagonist over 50, 
men. During all the wars waged with the Repub- 
lic and the Empire, no English vessel captured a 
French one as much superior to itself as the Am- 
buscade was to the Bayonnaise, precisely as in the 
War of 1 8 1 2 no American vessel captured a British 
opponent as much superior to itself as the Chesa- 

' Histoire des Marins Franfais sons la Republiqne, par 
Charles Rouvier, Lieutenant de Vaisseau, Paris, 1868. 

2 Rat a tiles Navales. 

3 Histoire Maritime de France (par Leon Guerin, Historien 
titulaire de la Marine, Membre de la Legion d'Honneur), vi., 
142 (Paris, 1S52). 



238 Naval War of 181 2 

peake was to the Shannon. Yet no sensible man 
can help acknowledging, in spite of these and a 
few other isolated instances, that at that time the 
French were inferior to the English, and the latter 
to the Americans. 

It is amusing to compare the French histories of 
the English with the English histories of the 
Americans, and to notice the similarity of the ar- 
guments they use to detract from their opponents' 
fame. Of course I do not allude to such writers as 
Lord Howard Douglass or Admiral de la Graviere, 
but to men like William James and Leon Guerin, 
or even O. Troude. James is always recounting 
how American ships ran away from British ones, 
and Guerin tells as many anecdotes of British ships 
who fled from French foes. James reproaches the 
Americans for adopting a "Parthian" mode of 
warfare, instead of " bringing to in a bold and be- 
coming manner." Precisely the same reproaches 
are used by the French writers, who assert that the 
English would not fight "fairly," but acquired an 
advantage by manoeuvring. James lays great 
stress on the American long guns ; so does Lieuten- 
ant Rouvier on the British carronades. James 
always tells how the Americans avoided the British 
ships, when the crews of the latter demanded to 
be led aboard; Troude says the British always 
kept at long shot, while the French sailors "de- 
manderent a grands cris, I'abordage. ' ' James says 



Naval War of 1812 239 

the Americans "hesitated to grapple" with their 
foes " unless they possessed a twofold superiority " ; 
Guerin that the English " never dared attack" ex- 
cept when they possessed ' ' une superiorite enor- 
me." The British sneer at the "mighty dollar"; 
the French at the "eternal guinea." The former 
consider Decatur's name as " sunk" to the level of 
Porter's or Bainbridge's ; the latter assert that the 
" presumptuous Nelson " was inferior to any of the 
French admirals of the time preceding the Repub- 
lic. Says James : " The Americans only fight well 
when they have the superiority of force on their 
side " ; and Lieutenant Rouvier : " Never have the 
English vanquished us with an undoubted in- 
feriority of force." 

On June 12, 1 8 1 3 , the small cutter Surveyor, of 
six 1 2 -pound carronades, was lying in York River, 
in the Chesapeake, under the command of Mr. Wil- 
liam S. Travis; her crew consisted of but 15 men.' 
At nightfall she was attacked by the boats of the 
Narcissus frigate, containing about 50 men, under 
the command of Lieutenant John Creerie.^ None 
of the carronades could be used ; but Mr. Travis 
made every preparation that he could for defence. 
The Americans waited till the British were within 
pistol-shot before they opened their fire ; the latter 

' Letter of W. S. Travis, June i6, 1813. 
2 James, vi., 334. 



240 Naval War of 1 8 1 2 

dashed gallantly on, however, and at once carried 
the cutter. But, though brief, the struggle was 
bloody ; 5 of the Americans were wounded, and of 
the British 3 were killed and 7 wounded. Lieu- 
tenant Creerie considered his opponents to have 
shown so much bravery that he returned Mr. 
Travis his sword, with a letter as complimentary 
to him as it was creditable to the writer.' 

As has been already mentioned, the Americans 
possessed a large force of gunboats at the begin- 
ning of the war. Some of these were fairly sea- 
worthy vessels, of 90 tons burden, sloop or 
schooner-rigged, and armed with one or two long, 
heavy guns, and sometimes with several light 
carronades to repel boarders.^ Gunboats of this 

' The letter, dated June 13th, is as follows: "Your gallant 
and desperate attempt to defend your vessel against more 
than double your number, on the night of the 12th instant, 
excited such admiration on the part of your opponents as I 
have seldom witnessed, and induced me to return you the 
sword you had so nobly used, in testimony of mine. Our 
poor fellows have suffered severely, occasioned chiefly, if not 
solely, by the precautions you had taken to prevent surprise. 
In short, I am at a loss which to admire most, the previous 
arrangement aboard the Surveyor, or the determined manner 
in which her deck was disputed inch by inch. I am, sir," etc. 

2 According to a letter from Captain Hugh G. Campbell (in 
the Naval Archives, Captains' Letters, 18 12, vol. ii., Nos. 21 
and 192), the crews were distributed as follows: ten men and 
a boy to a long 32, seven men and a boy to a long g, and five 
men and a boy to a carronade, exclusive of petty officers. 
Captain Campbell complains of the scarcity of men, and 



Naval War of 1812 241 

kind, together with the few small cutters owned by 
the Government, were serviceable enough. They 
were employed all along the shores of Georgia and 
the Carolinas, and in Long Island Sound, in pro- 
tecting the coasting trade by convoying parties of 
small vessels from one port to another, and pre- 
venting them from being molested by the boats of 
any of the British frigates. They also acted as 
checks upon the latter in their descents upon the 
towns and plantations, occasionally capturing 
their boats and tenders, and forcing them to be 
very cautious in their operations. They were very 
useful in keeping privateers off the coast, and 
capturing them when they came too far in. The 
exploits of those on the southern coast will be 
mentioned as they occurred. Those in Long Island 
Sound never came into collision with the foe, ex- 
cept for a couple of slight skirmishes at very long 
range; but in convoying little fleets of coasters, 
and keeping at bay the man-of-war boats sent to 
molest them, they were invaluable ; and they also 
kept the Sound clear of hostile privateers. 

Many of the gunboats were much smaller than 
those just mentioned, trusting mainly to their 
sweeps for motive power, and each relying for 
offence on one long pivot gun, a 12- or i8-pounder. 

rather naively remarks that he is glad the marines have been 
withdrawn from the gunboats, as this may make the com- 
manders of the latter keep a brighter lookout than formerly. 

VOL. I.— 16. 



242 Naval War of 1812 

In the Chesapeake there was quite a large number 
of these small gallies, with a few of the larger kind, 
and here it was thought that, by acting together 
in flotillas, the gunboats might in fine weather do 
considerable damage to the enemy's fleet by de- 
stroying detached vessels, instead of confining 
themselves to the more humble tasks in which 
their brethren elsewhere were fairly successful. At 
this period Denmark, having lost all her larger ships 
of war, was confining herself purely to gun-brigs. 
These were stout little crafts, with heavy guns, 
which, acting together, and being handled with 
spirit and skill, had on several occasions in calm 
weather captured small British sloops, and had 
twice so injured frigates as to make their return to 
Great Britain necessary; while they themselves 
had frequently been the object of successful cut- 
ting-out expeditions. Congress hoped that our 
gunboats would do as well as the Danish ; but for 
a variety of reasons they failed utterly in every 
serious attack that they made on a man-of-war, 
and were worse than useless for all but the various 
subordinate employments above mentioned. The 
main reason for this failure was in the gunboats 
themselves. They were utterly useless except in 
perfectly calm w^eather, for in any wind the heavy 
guns caused them to careen over so as to make it 
difficult to keep them right side up, and impossible 
to fire. Even in smooth water they could not be 



Naval War of 1812 243 

fought at anchor, requiring to be kept in position 
by means of sweeps ; and they were very unstable, 
the recoil of the guns causing them to roll so as to 
make it difficult to aim with any accuracy after the 
first discharge, while a single shot hitting one put 
it hors de combat. This last event rarely happened, 
however, for they were not often handled with any 
approach to temerity, and, on the contrary, usu- 
ally made their attacks at a range that rendered it 
as impossible to inflict as to receive harm. It does 
not seem as if they were very well managed ; but 
they were such ill-conditioned craft that the best 
officers might be pardoned for feeling uncomfort- 
able in them. Their operations throughout the 
war offer a painfully ludicrous commentary on 
Jefferson's remarkable project of having our navy 
composed exclusively of such craft. 

The first aggressive attempt made with the gun- 
boats was characteristically futile. On June 20th, 
15 of them, under Captain Tarbell, attacked the 
Junon, 38, Captain Sanders, then lying becalmed 
in Hampton Roads, with the Barossa, 36, and 
Laurestiniis, 24, near her. The gunboats, while 
still at very long range, anchored, and promptly 
drifted round so that they could n't shoot. Then 
they got under way, and began gradually to draw 
nearer to the Junon. Her defence w^as very 
feeble; after some hasty and ill-directed volleys 
she endeavored to beat out of the way. But 



244 Naval War of 1 812 

meanwhile, a slight breeze having sprung up, the 
Barossa, Captain Sherriff , approached near enough 
to take a hand in the affair, and at once made it 
evident that she was a more dangerous foe than 
the Junon, though a lighter ship. As soon as they 
felt the effects of the breeze the gunboats became 
almost useless, and, the Barossa's fire being ani- 
mated and well aimed, they withdrew. They had 
suffered nothing from the Junon, but during the 
short period she was engaged, the Barossa had 
crippled one boat and slightly damaged another; 
one man was killed and two wounded. The 
Barossa escaped unscathed and the Junon was 
but slightly injured. Of the combatants, the 
Barossa was the only one that came off with 
credit, the Junon behaving, if anything, rather 
worse than the gunboats. There was no longer 
any doubt as to the amount of reliance to be 
placed on the latter.' 

^ Though the flotilla men did nothing in the boats, they 
acted with the most stubborn bravery at the battle of Bla- 
densburg. The British Lieutenant Graig, himself a spectator, 
thus writes of their deeds on that occasion (Campaign at 
Washington, p. 119). "Of the sailors, however, it would be 
injustice not to speak in the terms which their conduct merits. 
They were employed as gunners, and not only did they serve 
their guns with a quickness and precision which astonished 
their assailants, but they stood till some of them were actually 
bayoneted with fuses in their hands; nor was it till their 
leader was wounded and taken, and they saw themselves 
deserted on all sides by the soldiers, that they quitted the 



Naval War of 1812 245 

On June 20, 1813, a British force of three 74's, 
one 64, four frigates, two sloops, and three trans- 
ports was anchored off Craney Island. On the 
northwest side of this island was a battery of 18- 
pounders, to take charge of which Captain Cassin, 
commanding the naval forces at Norfolk, sent 
ashore 100 sailors of the Constellation, under the 
command of Lieutenants Neale, Shubrick, and 
Saunders, and fifty marines under Lieutenant 
Breckenridge.' On the morning of the 2 2d they 
were attacked by a division of 1 5 boats, containing 
700 men,^ seamen, marines, chasseurs, and soldiers 
of the io2d regiment, the whole under the com- 
mand of Captain Pechell, of the San Domingo, 74. 
Captain Hanchett led the attack in the Diadem's 
launch. The battery's guns were not fired till the 
British were close in, when they opened with de- 
structive effect. While still some seventy yards 
from the guns the Diadenis launch grounded, and 
the attack was checked. Three of the boats were 
now sunk by shot, but the water was so shallow 
that they remained above water; and while the 
fighting was still at its height, some of the Con- 
stellation's crew, headed by Midshipman Tatnall, 

field." Certainly such men could not be accused of lack of 
courage. Something else is needed to account for the failure 
of the gun-boat system. 

^ Letter of Captain John Cassin, June 23, 1813. 

'James, vi., 337. 



246 Naval War of 181 2 

waded out and toolc possession of them/ A few of 
their crew threw away their arms and came ashore 
with their captors ; others escaped to the remain- 
ing boats, and immediately afterward the flotilla 
made off in disorder, having lost 91 men. The 
three captured barges were large, strong boats, 
one, called the Centipede, being fifty feet long, and 
more formidable than many of the American gun 
vessels. The Constellation's men deserve great 
credit for their defence, but the British certainly 
did not attack with their usual obstinacy. When 
the foremost boats were sunk, the water was so 
shallow and the bottom so good that the Americans 
on shore, as just stated, at once waded out to them ; 
and if, in the heat of the fight, Tatnall and his sea- 
men could get out to the boats, the 700 British ought 
to have been able to get in to the battery, whose 
150 defenders would then have stood no chance.^ 
On July 14, 18 13, the two small vessels Scorpion 

^ Life of Commodore Josiah Tatnall, by Charles C. Jones, Jr. 
(Savannah, 1878), p. 17. 

^ James comments on this repulse as "a defeat as discredit- 
able to those that caused it as honorable to those that suffered 
in it." "Unlike most other nations, the Americans in par- 
ticular, the British, when engaged in expeditions of this na- 
ture, always rest their hopes of success upon valor rather than 
on numbers." These comments read particularly well when 
it is remembered that the assailants outnumbered the assailed 
in the proportion of 5 to i. It is monotonous work to have 
to supplement a history by a running commentary on James's 
mistakes and inventions; but it is worth while to prove once 



Naval War of 1 812 247 

and Asp, the latter commanded by Mr. Sigourney, 
got under way from out of the Yeocomico Creek/ 
and at 10 a.m. discovered in chase the British 
brig-sloops Contest, Captain James Rattray, and 
Mohawk, Captain Henry D. Byng.^ The Scorpion 
beat up the Chesapeake, but the dull-sailing Asp 
had to re-enter the creek ; the two brigs anchored 
off the bar and hoisted out their boats, under the 
command of Lieutenant Rodger C. Curry ; where- 
upon the Asp cut her cable and ran up the creek 
some distance. Here she was attacked by three 
boats, which Mr. Sigourney and his crew of twenty 
men, with two light guns, beat off; but they were 
joined by two others, and the five carried the Asp, 
giving rlo quarter. Mr. Sigourney and 10 of his 
men were killed or wounded, while the British 
also suffered heavily, having 4 killed and 7 (includ- 
ing Lieutenant Curry) wounded. The surviving 
Americans reached the shore, rallied under Mid- 
shipman H. McClintock (second in command), 
and when the British retired, after setting the Asp 
on fire, at once boarded her, put out the flames, 

for all the utter unreliability of the author who is accepted 
in Great Britain as the great authority about the war. Still, 
James is no worse than his compeers. In the American Cog- 
geshall's History of Privateers, the misstatements are as gross 
and the sneers in as poor taste — the British, instead of the 
Americans, being the objects. 

^ Letter of Midshipman McClintock, July 15, 1813. 

2 James, vi., 343. 



248 Naval War of 181 2 

and got her in fighting order; but they were not 
again molested. 

On July 29th, while the Junon, 38, Captain 
Sanders, and Martin, 18, Captain Senhouse, were 
in Delaware Bay, the latter grounded on the out- 
side of Crow's Shoal ; the frigate anchored within 
supporting distance, and while in this position the 
two ships were attacked by the American flotilla 
in those waters, consisting of eight gunboats, 
carrying each 25 men and one long 32, and two 
heavier block-sloops,' commanded by Lieutenant 
Samuel Angus. The flotilla kept at such a dis- 
tance that an hour's cannonading did no damage 
whatever to anybody ; and during that time gun- 
boat No. 121, Sailing-master Shead, drifted a mile 
and a half away from her consorts. Seeing this, the 
British made a dash at her in seven boats, contain- 
ing 140 men, led by Lieutenant Philip Westphal. 
Mr. Shead anchored and made an obstinate defence 
but at the first discharge the gun's pintle gave 
way, and the next time it was fired the gun-car- 
riage was almost torn to pieces. He kept up a 
spirited fire of small-arms, in reply to the boat- 
carronades and musketry of the assailants; but 
the latter advanced steadily and carried the gun- 
boat by boarding, 7 of her people being wounded, 
while 7 of the British were killed and 13 wounded.^ 

' Letter of Lieutenant Angus, July 30, 1813. 
2 Letter of Mr. Shead, August 5, 1813. 



Naval War of 1812 249 

The defence of No. 121 was very creditable, but 
otherwise the honor of the day was certainly with 
the British; whether because the gunboats were 
themselves so worthless or because they were not 
handled boldly enough, they did no damage, even 
to the grounded sloop, that would seem to have 
been at their mercy.* 

On June i8th, the American brig-sloop Argus, 
commanded by Lieutenant William Henry Allen, 
late first of the United States, sailed from New York 
for France, with Mr. Crawford, minister for that 
country, aboard, and reached L'Orient on July 
nth, having made one prize on the way. On 
July 14th, she again sailed, and cruised in the chops 
of the Channel, capturing and burning ship after 
ship, and creating the greatest consternation 
among the London merchants; she then cruised 
along Cornwall and got into St. George's Channel, 
where the work of destruction went on. The labor 
was very severe and harassing, the men being able 
to get very little rest.^ On the night of August 

' The explanation possibly lies in the fact that the gun- 
boats had worthless powder. In the Naval Archives there is 
a letter from Mr. Angus (Masters-Commandant Letters, 1813, 
No. 3; see also No. 91), in which he says that the frigate's 
shot passed over them, while theirs could not even reach the 
sloop. He also encloses a copy of a paper, signed by the 
other gun-boat officers, which runs: "We, the officers of 
the vessels comprising the Delaware flotilla, protest against 
the powder as being unfit for service." 

' Court of Inquiry' into loss of Argus, 1815 



250 Naval War of 181 2 

13th, a brig laden with wine from Oporto was cap- 
tured and burnt, and, unluckily, many of the crew 
succeeded in getting at some of the cargo. At 5 
A.M. on the 14th, a large brig-of-war was discov- 
ered standing down under a cloud of canvas.' This 
was the British brig-sloop Pelican, Captain John 
Fordyce Maples, which, from information received 
at Cork three days previous, had been cruising es- 
pecially after the Argus, and had at last found 
her; St. David's Head bore east five leagues (lat. 
52°i5'N. and 5° 50' W.). 

The small, fine-lined American cruiser, with her 
lofty masts and long spars, could easily have es- 
caped frorii her heavier antagonist; but Captain 
Allen had no such intention, and, finding he could 
not get the weather-gage, he shortened sail and 
ran easily along on the starboard tack, while the 
Pelican came down on him with the wind (which 
was from the south) nearly aft. At 6 a.m., the 
Argus wore and fired her port guns within grape 
distance, the Pelican responding with her starboard 
battery, and the action began with great spirit on 
both sides. ^ At 6.04, a round shot carried off Cap- 
tain Allen's leg, inflicting a mortal wound, but he 
stayed on deck till he fainted from loss of blood. 
Soon the British fire carried away the main braces, 

' Letter of Lieutenant Watson, March 2, 18 15. 
^ Letter of Captain Maples to Admiral Thomborough, 
August 14, 1813. 



Naval War of 1 812 251 

mainspring-stay, gaff, and try-sail mast of the 
Argus; the first heutenant, Mr. Watson, was 
wounded in the head by a grape-shot and carried 
below; the second lieutenant, Mr. U. H. Allen (no 
relation of the captain) , continued to fight the ship 
with great skill. The Pelican's fire continued 
very heavy, the Argus losing her spritsail-yard and 
most of the standing rigging on the port side of the 
foremast. At 6.14, Captain Maples bore up to 
pass astern of his antagonist, but Lieutenant Allen 
luffed into the wind and threw the main-top sail 
aback, getting into a beautiful raking position ' ; 
had the men at the guns done their duty as well as 
those on the quarter-deck did theirs, the issue of 
the fight would have been very different; but, as 
it was, in spite of her favorable position, the raking 
broadside of the Argus did little damage. Two or 
three minutes afterward the Argus lost the use of 
her after-sails through having her preventer-main- 
braces and top sail tie shot away, and fell off be- 
fore the wind, when the Pelican at 6.18 passed her 
stem, raking her heavily, and then ranged up on 
her starboard quarter. In a few minutes the 
wheel-ropes and running-rigging of every descrip- 
tion were shot away, and the Argus became utterly 
unmanageable. The Pelican continued raking her 
with perfect impunity, and at 6.35 passed her 
broadside and took a position on her starboard 
^ Letter of Lieutenant Watson. 



252 Naval War of 1 8i 2 

bow, when at 6.45, the brigs fell together, and 
the British "were in the act of boarding when 
the Argus struck her colors," ' at 6.45 a.m. The 
Pelican carried, besides her regular armament, 
two long 6's as stern-chasers, and her broadside 
weight of metal was thus ^ : 

I X 
1x6 

I X 12 

8 X 32 

or 280 pounds against the Argus's: 

I X 12 . 

9 X 24 

or, subtracting as usual 7 per cent, for light weight 
of metal, 210 pounds. The Pelican's crew con- 
sisted of but 116 men, according to the British 
account, though the American reports make it 
much larger. The Argus had started from New 
York with 137 men, but having manned and sent 
in several prizes, her crew amounted, as near as 
can be ascertained, to 104. Mr. Low, in his Naval 
History, published just after the event, makes it 
' but 99. James makes it 121. As he placed the 
crew of the Enterprise at 125, when it was really 
102 ; that of the Hornet at 162, instead of 135; of 

' Letter of Captain Maples. 
^ James, vi., 320. 



Naval War of 1 812 253 

the Peacock at 185, instead of 166 ; of the Nautilus 
at 106 instead of 95, etc., it is safe to presume 
that he has overestimated it by at least 20, which 
brings the number pretty near to the American 
accounts. The Pelican lost but 2 men killed and 
5 wounded. Captain Maples had a narrow escape, 
a spent grape-shot striking him in the chest with 
some force, and then falling on the deck. One 
shot had passed through the boatswain's and one 
through the carpenter's cabin ; her sides were filled 
with grape-shot, and her rigging and sails much 
injured; her foremast, main-topmast, and royal 
masts were slightly wounded, and two of her car- 
ronades dismounted. 

The injuries of the Argus have already been de- 
tailed ; her hull and lower masts were also tolerably 
well cut up. Of her crew. Captain Allen, two mid- 
shipmen, the carpenter, and six seamen were killed 
or mortally wounded; her first lieutenant and 13 
seamen severely and slightly wounded; total, 10 
killed and 14 wounded. 

In reckoning the comparative force, I include 
the Englishman's 6-pound stern-chaser, which 
could not be fired in broadside with the rest of the 
guns, because I include the Argus's 12-pound bow- 
chaser, which also could not be fired in broadside 
as it was crowded into the bridle-port. James, of 
course, carefully includes the latter, though leaving 
out the former. 



254 



Naval War of 1812 



COMPARISON 

Weight 
Tons No. Guns Metal 

Argus 298 10 210 

Pelican 467 1 1 280 

Comparative 
Force 

Argus 82 

Pelican i . 00 



Men Lose 


104 24 


116 7 


Comparative Loss 


Inflicted 


.29 


1. 00 


Axcas 


6.00 At» 




v 



PBUCAM 



Of all the single-ship actions fought in the war, 
this is the least creditable to the Americans. The 
odds in force, it is true, were against the Argus, 
about in the proportion of 10 to 8, but this is 
neither enough to account for the loss inflicted 
being as 10 to 3, nor for her surrendering when she 
had been so little ill-used. It was not even as if 
her antagonist had been an unusually fine vessel of 
her class. The Pelican did not do as well as either 
the Frolic previously, or the Reindeer afterward, 
though perhaps rather better than the Avon, Pen- 
guin, or Peacock. With a comparatively unman- 
ageable antagonist, in smooth water, she ought to 
have sunk her in three quarters of an hour. But 
the Pelicans not having done particularly well 
merely makes the conduct of the Americans look 
worse; it is just the reverse of the Chesapeake's 



Naval War of 1 812 255 

case, where, paying the highest credit to the Brit- 
ish, we still thought the fight no discredit to us. 
Here we can indulge no such reflection. The 
officers did well, but the crew did not. Cooper 
says: "The enemy was so much heavier that it 
may be doubted whether the Argus would have 
captured her antagonist under any ordinary cir- 
cumstances." This I doubt; such a crew as the 
Wasp's or Hornet's probably would have been 
successful. The trouble with the guns of the 
Argus was not so much that they were too small, 
as that they did not hit; and this seems all the 
more incomprehensible when it is remembered that 
Captain Allen is the very man to whom Commo- 
dore Decatur, in his official letter, attributed the 
skilful gun-practice of the frigate United States. 
Cooper says that the powder was bad ; and it has 
also been said that the men of the Argus were 
over-fatigued and were drunk, in which case they 
ought not to have been brought into action. Be- 
sides unskilfulness, there is another very serious 
count against the crew. Had the Pelican been 
some distance from the Argus, and in a position 
where she could pour in her fire with perfect im- 
punity to herself, when the surrender took place, 
it would have been more justifiable. But, on the 
contrary, the vessels were touching, and the Brit- 
ish boarded just as the colors were hauled down ; it 
was certainly very disgraceful that the Americans 



256 



Naval War of 181 2 



did not rally to repel them, for they had still 
four fifths of their number absolutely untouched. 
They certainly ought to have succeeded, for board- 
ing is a difficult and dangerous experiment; and 
if they had repulsed their antagonists they might 
in turn have carried the Pelican. So that, in sum- 
ming up the merits of this action, it is fair to say 
that both sides showed skilful seamanship and un- 
skilful gunnery; that the British fought bravely 
and that the Americans did not. 

It is somewhat interesting to compare this fight, 
where a weaker American sloop was taken by a 
stronger British one, with two or three others, 
where both the comparative force and the result 
were reversed. Comparing it, therefore, with the 
actions between the Hornet and Peacock (British), 
the Wasp and Avon, and the Peacock (American) 
and Epervier, we get four actions, in one of which, 
the first-named, the British were victorious, and in 
the other three the Americans. 



Comparative 
Force 

Pelican (British) i . oo 

Argus (American) 82 

Hornet (American) i . 00 

Peacock (British) 83 

Wasp (American) i . 00 

Avon (British) 80 

Peacock (American) i . 00 

Epervier (British) 81 



Comparative Per cent. 
Loss Inflicted Loss 


I .00 


06 


.29 


23 


I .00 


02 


.07 


31 


I .00 


02 


.07 


33 


I .00 


01 


.08 


20 



Naval War of 1 812 257 

It is thus seen that in these sloop actions the 
superiority of force on the side of the victor was 
each time about the same. The Argus made a 
much more effectual resistance than did either the 
Peacock, Avon, or Epervier, while the Pelican did 
her work in poorer form than either of the vic- 
torious American sloops ; and, on the other hand, 
the resistance of the Argus did not by any means 
show as much bravery as was shown in the de- 
fence of the Peacock or Avon, although rather more 
than in the case of the Epervier. 

This is the only action of the war where it is 
almost impossible to find out the cause of the in- 
feriority of the beaten crew. In almost all other 
cases we find that one crew had been carefully 
drilled, and so proved superior to a less-trained 
antagonist; but it is incredible that the man to 
whose exertions, when first lieutenant of the States, 
Commodore Decatur ascribes the skilfulness of 
that ship's men, should have neglected to train his 
own crew; and this had the reputation of being 
composed of a fine set of men. Bad powder 
would not account for the surrender of the Argus 
when so little damaged. It really seems as if the 
men must have been drunk or over-fatigued, as has 
been so often asserted. Of course, drunkenness 
would account for the defeat, although not in the 
least altering its humiliating character. 

"Et tu quoque" is not much of an argument; 

VOL. 1. — 17 



258 Naval War of 181 2 

still it may be as well to call to mind here two en- 
gagements in which British sloops suffered much 
more discreditable defeats than the Argus did. 
The figures are taken from James ; as given by the 
French historians, they make even a worse show- 
ing for the British. 

A short time before our war, the British brig 
Carnation, 18, had been captured, by boarding, 
by the French brig, Palinure, 16, and the British 
brig Alacrity, 18, had been captured, also by 
boarding, by the corvette Aheille, 20. 

The following was the comparative force, etc., 
of the combatants : 

Weight Metal No. Crew Loss 

Carnation 262 

Palinure 174 

Alacrity 262 

Abeille 260 

In spite of the pride the British take in their 
hand-to-hand prowess, both of these ships were 
captured by boarding. The Carnation was cap- 
tured by a much smaller force, instead of by a much 
larger one, as in the case of the Argus; and if the 
Argus gave up before she had suffered greatly, the 
Alacrity surrendered when she had suffered still 
less. French historians asserted that the capture 
of the two brigs proved that ' ' French valor could 
conquer British courage"; and a similar opinion 



117 


40 


100 


20 


100 


18 


130 


19 



Naval War of 1812 259 

was very complacently expressed by British his- 
torians after the defeat of t;he Argus. All that the 
three combats really "proved" was, that in eight 
encounters between British and American sloops 
the Americans were defeated once; and in a far 
greater number of encounters between French and 
British sloops the British were defeated twice. No 
one pretends that either navy was invincible ; the 
question is : Which side averaged best ? 

At the opening of the war we possessed several 
small brigs ; these had originally been fast, handy 
little schooners, each armed with twelve long 6's, 
and with a crew of 60 men. As such, they were 
efYective enough ; but when afterward changed into 
brigs, each armed with a couple of extra guns, and 
given 40 additional men, they became too slow to 
run, without becoming strong enough to fight. 
They carried far too many guns and men for their 
size, and not enough to give them a chance with 
any respectable opponent; and they were almost 
all ignominiously captured. The single exception 
was the brig Enterprise. She managed to escape 
capture owing chiefly to good luck, and once 
fought a victorious engagement, thanks to the 
fact that the British possessed a class of vessels 
even worse than our own. She was kept near the 
land, and finally took up her station off the eastern 
coast, where she did good service in chasing away 



26o Naval War of 1 812 

or capturing the various Nova Scotian or New 
Brunswick privateers, which were smaller and less 
formidable vessels than the privateers of the 
United States, and not calculated for fighting. 

By crowding guns into her bridle-ports, and 
over-manning herself, the Enterprise, now under 
the command of Lieutenant William Burrows, 
mounted fourteen 18-pound carronades and two 
long 9's, with 102 men. On September 5th, while 
standing along shore near Penguin Point, a few 
miles to the eastward of Portland, Me., she discov- 
ered, at anchor inside, a man-of-war brig,' which 
proved to be H. M. S. Boxer, Captain Samuel Blyth, 
of 12 carronades, i8-pounders, and two long 6' s, 
with but 66 men aboard, 12 of her crew being ab- 
sent." The Boxer at once hoisted three British en- 
signs and bore up for the Enterprise, then standing 
in on the starboard tack ; but when the two brigs 
were still four miles apart it fell calm. At midday, 
a breeze sprang up from the southwest, giving the 
American the weather-gage, but the latter ma- 
noeuvred for some time to windward to try the 
comparative rates of sailing of the vessels. At 3 
P.M., Lieutenant Burrows hoisted three ensigns, 

' Letter from Lieutenant Edward R. McCall to Commodore 
Hull, September 5, 181 3. 

' James, Naval Occurrences, 264. The American accounts 
give the Boxer 104 men, on very insufficient grounds. Simi- 
larly, James gives the Enterprise 123 men. Each side will be 
considered authority for its own force and loss. 



Naval War of 1 812 261 

shortened sail, and edged away toward the enemy, 
who came gallantly on. Captain Blyth had nailed 
his colors to the mast, telling his men they should 
never be struck while he had life in his body . ' Both 
crews cheered loudly as they neared each other, 
and, at 3.15, the two brigs being on the starboard 
tack not a half pistol-shot apart, they opened fire, 
the American using the port, and the English the 
starboard, battery. Both broadsides were very 
destructive, each of the commanders falling at the 
very beginning of the action. Captain Blyth was 
struck by an 18-pound shot while he was standing 
on the quarter-deck ; it passed completely through 
his body, shattering his left arm and killing him 
on the spot. The command, thereupon, devolved 
on Lieutenant David McCreery. At almost the 
same time, his equally gallant antagonist fell. 
Lieutenant Burrows, while encouraging his men, 
laid hold of a gun-tackle fall to help the crew of a 
carronade run out the gun ; in doing so he raised one 
leg against the bulwark, when a canister shot struck 
his thigh, glancing into his body and inflicting a 
fearful wound. ^ In spite of the pain he refused to 
be carried below, and lay on the deck, crying out 
that the colors must never be struck. Lieutenant 
Edward McCall now took command. At 3.30, 
the Enterprise ranged ahead, roimded to on the 

' Naval Chronicle, xxxii., p. 462. 
' Cooper, Naval History, i., p. 259. 



A / 



262 Naval War of 181 2 

starboard tack, and raked the Boxer with the star- 
board guns. At 3.35, the Boxer lost her main-top- 
mast and topsail yard, but her crew still kept up 
the fight bravely, with the exception of four men 
who deserted their quarters, and were afterward 
court-martialed for cowardice.* The Enterprise 

EHIEUKlii 



S.39 



,,j^'j»iiu m >M. ^Gi' 




IAS , 

3.«S / 



^ 



■y 



^U ^''^ ^^--^BOXiK 



now set her foresail and took position on the 
enemy's starboard bow, delivering raking fires; 
and at 3.45 the latter surrendered, when entirely 
unmanageable and defenceless. Lieutenant Bur- 
rows would not go below until he had received the 
sword of his adversary, when he exclaimed: " I am 
satisfied; I die contented." 

Both brigs had suffered severely, especially the 
Boxer, which had been hulled repeatedly, and had 
three 18-pound shot through her foremast, her 
topgallant forecastle almost cut away, and several 
of her guns dismounted. Three men were killed 
and seventeen wounded, four mortally. The En- 

' Minutes of court-martial held aboard H. M. S. Surprise, 
January 8, 1814. 



Naval War of 1 812 263 

terprise had been hulled by one round and many- 
grape; one 1 8 -pound ball had gone through her 
foremast, and another through her mainmast, and 
she was much cut up aloft. Two of her men were 
killed and ten wounded, two of them (her com- 
mander and Midshipman Kervin Waters) mor- 
tally. The British court-martial attributed the 
defeat of the Boxer "to a superiority in the ene- 
my's force, principally in the number of men, as 
well as to a greater degree of skill in the direction 
of her fire, and to the destructive effects of the first 
broadside." But the main element was the su- 
periority in force, the difference in loss being very 
nearly proportional to it ; both sides fought with 
equal bravery and equal skill. This fact was ap- 
preciated by the victors, for at a naval dinner given 
in New York shortly afterward, one of the toasts 
oft'ered was : " The crew of the Boxer: enemies by 
law, but by gallantry brothers." The two com- 
manders were both buried at Portland, with all 
the honors of war. The conduct of Lieutenant 
Burrows needs no comment. He was an officer 
greatly beloved and respected in the service. 
Captain Blyth, on the other side, had not only 
shown himself on many occasions to be a man of 
distinguished personal courage, but was equally 
noted for his gentleness and humanity. He had 
been one of Captain Lawrence's pall-bearers, and 
but a month previous to his death had received a 



264 Naval War of 181 2 

public note of thanks from an American colonel, 
for an act of great kindness and courtesy.' 

The Enterprise, under Lieutenant-Commander 
Renshaw, now cruised off the southern coast, 
where she made several captures. One of them was 
a heavy British privateer, the Mars, of fourteen 
long 9's and 75 men, which struck after receiving 
a broadside that killed and wounded four of her 
crew. The Enterprise was chased by frigates on 
several occasions; being once forced to throw 
overboard all her guns but two, and escaping only 
by a shift in the wind. Afterward, as she was 
unfit to cruise, she was made a guardship at 
Charlestown ; for the same reason, the Boxer was 
not purchased into the service. 

On October 4th, some volunteers from the New- 
port flotilla captured, by boarding, the British 
privateer Dart,'' after a short struggle, in which 
two of the assailants were wounded and several of 
the privateersmen, including the first officer, were 
killed. 

On December 4th, Commodore Rodgers, still in 
command of the President, sailed again from Provi- 
dence, Rhode Island. On the 25th, in lat. 19° N. 
and long. 35° W., the President, during the night, 
fell in with two frigates, and came so close that the 

* Naval Chronicle, xxxii., 466. 

2 Letter of Mr. Joseph Nicholson, October 5, 1813. 



Naval War of 1 812 265 

headmost fired at her, when she made off. These 
were thought to be British, but were in reality the 
two French 40-gun frigates Nymphe and Meduse, 
one month out of Brest. After this Httle encoun- 
ter, Rodgers headed toward the Barbadoes, and 
cruised to windward of them. 

On the whole, the ocean warfare of 181 3 was de- 
cidedly in favor of the British, except during the 
first few months. The Hornet's fight with the 
Peacock was an action similar to those that took 
place in 181 2, and the cruise of Porter was unique 
in our annals, both for the audacity with which 
it was planned, and the success with which it was 
executed. Even later in the year, the Argus and 
the President made bold cruises in sight of the 
British coasts, the former working great havoc 
among the merchantmen. But by that time the 
tide had turned strongly in favor of our enemies. 
From the beginning of summer, the blockade was 
kept up so strictly that it was with difficulty any of 
our vessels broke through it; they were either 
chased back or captured. In the three actions 
that occurred, the British showed themselves 
markedly superior in two, and in the third the 
combatants fought equally well, the result being 
fairly decided by the fuller crew and slightly 
heavier metal of the Enterprise. The gunboats, 
to which many had looked for harbor defence, 



266 Naval War of 1812 

proved nearly useless, and were beaten ofi with 
ease whenever they made an attack. 

The lessons taught by all this were the usual 
ones. Lawrence's victory in the Hornet showed 
the superiority of a properly trained crew to one 
that had not been properly trained; and his de- 
feat in the Chesapeake pointed exactly the same 
way, demonstrating in addition the folly of taking 
a raw levy out of port, and, before they have had 
the slightest chance of getting seasoned, pitting 
them against skilled veterans. The victory of 
the Enterprise showed the wisdom of having the 
odds in men and metal in our favor, when our an- 
tagonist was otherwise our equal; it proved, what 
hardly needed proving, that, whenever possible, a 
ship should be so constructed as to be superior in 
force to the foes it would be likely to meet. As 
far as the capture of the Argus showed anything, 
it was the advantage of heavy metal and the abso- 
lute need that a crew should fight with pluck. 
The failure of the gunboats ought to have taught 
the lesson (though it did not) that too great econ- 
omy in providing the means of defence may prove 
very expensive in the end, and that good ofhcers 
and men are powerless when embarked in worth- 
less vessels. A similar point was emphasized by 
the strictness of the blockade, and the great in- 
convenience it caused : namely, that we ought to 
have had ships powerful enough to break it. 



Naval War of 1 812 267 

We had certainly lost ground during this year; 
fortunately, we regained it during the next two. 

BRITISH VESSELS SUNK OR TAKEN 

Name Guns Tonnage 

Peacock 20 477 

Boxer 14 181 

Highflyer 6 96 

40 754 

AMERICAN VESSELS SUNK OR TAKEN 

Name Guns Tonnage 

Chesapeake 50 1265 

Argus 20 298 

Viper 10 148 

80 17 1 1 

VESSELS BUILT OR PURCHASED 

Name Rig Guns Tonnage Where Built Cost 

Rattlesnake Brig 14 278 Medford, Pa. $18,000 

Alligator Sch'r 4 80 

Asp Sloop 3 56 2,600 

PRIZES MADE 

Name of Ship No. of Prizes 

President 13 

Congress 4 

Chesapeake 6 

Essex 14 

Hornet 3 

Argus 21 

Small craft 18 

79 



CHAPTER VI 
1813 

ON THE LAKES 

Ontario. — Comparison of the rival squadrons — Chauncy 
takes York and Fort George — Yeo is repulsed at Sackett's 
Harbor, but keeps command of the lake — Chauncv sails — - 
Yeo's partial victory off Niagara — Indecisive action off the 
Genesee — Chauncy's part al victory off Buriington, which 
gives him the command of the lake — Erie. — Perry's success 
in creating a fleet — His victory — Champlain. — Loss of the 
Growler and Eagle — Summary. 

ONTARIO 

WINTER had almost completely stopped 
preparations on the American side. 
Bad weather put an end to all com- 
munication with Albany or New York, and so pre- 
vented the transit of stores, implements, etc. It 
was worse still with the men, for the cold and ex- 
posure so thinned them out that the new arrivals 
could at first barely keep the ranks filled. It was, 
moreover, exceedingly difficult to get seamen to 
come from the coast to serve on the lakes, where 
work was hard, sickness prevailed, and there was 
no chance of prize-money. The British govern- 
ment had the great advantage of being able to 

268 



Naval War of 1 812 269 

move its sailors where it pleased, while in the 
American service, at that period, the men enlisted 
for particular ships, and the only way to get them 
for the lakes at all was by inducing portions of 
crews to volunteer to follow their officers thither/ 
However, the work went on in spite of interrup- 
tions. Fresh gangs of shipwrights arrived, and, 
largely owing to the energy and capacity of the 
head builder, Mr. Henry Eckford (who did as 
much as any naval officer in giving us an effective 
force on Ontario), the Madison was equipped, a 
small despatch sloop, the Lady of the Lake, pre- 
pared, and a large new ship, the General Pike, 28, 
begun, to mount 13 guns in each broadside and 2 
on pivots. 

Meanwhile, Sir George Prevost, the British com- 
mander in Canada, had ordered two 24-gun ships 
to be built, and they were begun; but he com- 
mitted the mistake of having one laid down in 
Kingston and the other in York, at the opposite 
ends of the lake. Earle, the Canadian commodore, 

^ Cooper, ii., 357. One of James's most comical misstate- 
ments is that on the lakes the American sailors were all 
"picked men." On p. 367, for example, in speaking of the 
battle of Lake Erie, he says: "Commodore Perry had picked 
crews to all his vessels." As a matter of fact, Perry had once 
sent in his resignation solely on account of the very poor 
quality of his crews, and had with difficulty been induced to 
withdraw it. Perry's crews were of hardly average excel- 
lence, but then the average American sailor was a very good 
specimen. 



270 Naval War of 181 2 

having proved himself so incompetent, was re- 
moved ; and, in the beginning of May, Captain Sir 
James Lucas Yeo arrived, to act as commander-in- 
chief of the naval forces, together with four cap- 
tains, eight lieutenants, twenty-four midshipmen, 
and about 450 picked seamen, sent out by the 
home government especially for service on the 
Canada lakes.' 

The comparative force of the two fleets or 
squadrons, it is hard to estimate. I have already 
spoken of the difficulty in finding out what guns 
were mounted on any given ship at a particular 
time, and it is even more perplexing with the 
crews. A schooner would make one cruise with 
but thirty hands; on the next it would appear 
with fifty, a number of militia having volunteered 
as marines. Finding the militia rather a nuisance, 
they would be sent ashore, and on her third cruise 
the schooner would substitute half a dozen frontier 
seamen in their place. It was the same with the 
larger vessels. The Madison might at one time 
have her full complement of 200 men; a month's 
sickness would ensue, and she would sail with but 
150 effectives. The Pike's crew of 300 men at one 
time would shortly afterward be less by a third, in 
consequence of a draft of sailors being sent to the 
upper lakes. So it is almost impossible to be per- 
fectly accurate ; but, making a comparison of the 

ijames, vi., 353. 



Naval War of 1812 



271 



various authorities, from Lieutenant Emmons to 
James, the following tables of the forces may be 
given as very nearly correct. In broadside force, 
I count every pivot gun, and half of those that 
were not on pivots. 



Name 
Pike... 



chauncy's squadron 

Broadside 
Rig Tonnage Crew Metal; lbs. Armament 

Ship 875 300 360 28 long 24's 



Madison. . 
Oneida . . . 
Hamilton. 



Scourge. . 
Conquest. 



Tompkins. 

Julia 

Growler. . . 
Ontario . . . 



Fair American. . 
Pert 

Asp 

Lady of the Lake 
14 



593 
Brig 243 
Sch'r 112 

no 

82 

96 

82 

81 

S3 

S3 
SO 

57 

89 



200 
100 

50 

50 
40 

40 

35 

35 

35 

30 
25 

25 

15 



364 
172 

80 

80 

56 

62 

44 

44 

44 

36 
24 

24 

9 



24 short 32 's 

16 " 24's 
j I long 32 



i 
( 8 



2576 980 1399 



24 
6's 

' ^^, 
short 12's 

long 32 
" 12 
" 6's 

" 32 
12 
6's 

" 32 
12 

" 32 
12 

" 32 
" 12 

" 24 
" 12 
" 24 

" 24 

" 9 



272 



Naval War of 1 8 1 2 



This is not materially different from James's 
account (p. 356), which gives Chauncy 114 guns, 
1 1 93 men, and 21 21 tons. The Lady of the Lake, 
however, was never intended for anything but a 
despatch boat, and the Scourge and Hamilton were 
both lost before Chauncy actually came into col- 
lision with Yeo. Deducting these, in order to 
compare the two foes, Chauncy had left 1 1 vessels 
of 2265 tons, with 865 men and 92 guns throwing 
a broadside of 1230 pounds. 



Name 



YEO'S SQUADRON 

Broadside 
Rig Tonnage Crew Metal; lbs. Armament 

I long 24 



Wolfe. 



Ship 637 220 



Royal George.. . . " 



Melville Brig 



510 

279 
262 



Moira " 

Sydney Smith.. . Sch'r 216 

Beresford " 187 



200 



100 



100 



80 



70 



8 " 18 
392 -j 4 short 68 

[1° " 32 
3 long 18 
360 J 2 short 68 
16 " 32 



210 



( 2 long 18 
I 12 short 32 
j 2 long 9 
^^^ I 12 short 24 

( 2 long 12 
^^^ ^ 10 short 32 

I long 24 

87 -I I " 9 
6 short i8's 



2091 770 1374 92 



Naval War of 1 812 273 

This differs but slightly from James, who gives 
Yeo 92 guns, throwing a broadside of 1374 pounds, 
but only 717 men. As the evidence in the court- 
martial held on Captain Barclay, and the official 
accounts (on both sides) of Macdonough's victory, 
convict him of very much underrating the force in 
men of the British on Erie and Champlain, it can 
be safely assumed that he has underestimated the 
force in men on Lake Ontario. By comparing the 
tonnage he gives to Barclay's and Downie's squad- 
rons with what it really was, we can correct his 
account of Yeo's tonnage. 

The above figures would apparently make the 
two squadrons about equal, Chauncy having 95 
men more, and throwing at a broadside 144 
pounds shot less than his antagonist. But the 
figures do not by any means show all the truth. 
The Americans greatly excelled in the number 
and calibre of their long guns. Compared thus, 
they threw at one discharge 694 pounds of long- 
gun metal and 536 pounds of carronade metal; 
while the British only threw from their long guns 
180 pounds, and from their carronades 1 194. This 
unequal distribution of metal was very much in 
favor of the Americans. Nor was this all. The 
Pike, with her fifteen long 24's in battery, was an 
overmatch for any one of the enemy's vessels, and 
bore the same relation to them that the Confiance, 
at a later date, did to Macdonough's squadron. 

VOL. I. — 18 



2 74 Naval War of 1812 

She should certainly have been a match for the 
Wolfe and Melville together, and the Madison and 
Oneida for the Royal George and Sydney Smith. In 
fact, the three heavy American vessels ought to 
have been an overmatch for the four heaviest of 
the British squadron, although these possessed the 
nominal superiority. And in ordinary cases the 
eight remaining American gun vessels would cer- 
tainly seem to be an overmatch for the two 
British schooners, but it is just here that the dififi- 
culty of comparing the forces comes in. When 
the water was very smooth and the wind light, the 
long 32's and 24's of the Americans could play 
havoc with the British schooners, at a distance 
which would render the carronades of the latter 
useless. But the latter were built for war, pos- 
sessed quarters, and were good cruisers, while 
Chauncy's schooners were merchant vessels, with- 
out quarters, crank, and so loaded down with 
heavy metal that whenever it blew at all hard 
they could with difficulty be kept from upsetting, 
and ceased to be capable even of defending them- 
selves. When Sir James Yeo captured two of 
them he would not let them cruise with his other 
vessels at all, but sent them back to act as gun- 
boats, in which capacity they were serving when 
recaptured ; this is a tolerable test of their value 
compared to their opponents. Another disad- 
vantage that Chauncy had to contend with, was 



Naval War of 1 812 275 

the difference in the speed of the various vessels. 
The Pike and Madison were fast, weatherly ships ; 
but the Oneida was a perfect slug, even going free, 
and could hardly be persuaded to beat to wind- 
ward at all. In this respect, Yeo was much better 
off; his six ships were regular men-of-war, with 
quarters, all of them seaworthy, and fast enough 
to be able to act with uniformity, and not needing 
to pay much regard to the weather. His force 
could act as a unit; but Chauncy's could not. 
Enough wind to make a good working breeze for 
his larger vessels put all his smaller ones hors de 
combat; and in weather that suited the latter, the 
former could not move about at all. When speed 
became necessary, the two ships left the brig hope- 
lessly behind, and either had to do without her, or 
else perhaps let the critical moment slip by while 
waiting for her to come up. Some of the schooners 
sailed quite as slowly ; and, finally, it was found 
out that the only way to get all the vessels into 
action at once was to have one half the fleet tow the 
other half. It was certainly difficult to keep the 
command of the lake when, if it came on to blow, 
the commodore had to put into port under penalty 
of seeing a quarter of his fleet founder before his 
eyes. These conflicting considerations render it 
hard to pass judgment ; but, on the whole, it would 
seem as if Chauncy was the superior in force, for, 
even if his schooners were not counted, his three 



276 Naval War of 181 2 

square-rigged vessels were at least a match for the 
four square-rigged British vessels, and the two 
British schooners would not have counted very 
much in such a conflict. In calm weather, he was 
certainly the superior. This only solves one of the 
points in which the official letters of the two com- 
manders differ: after every meeting each one in- 
sists that he was inferior in force, that the weather 
suited his antagonist, and that the latter ran away, 
and got the worst of it ; all of which will be con- 
sidered farther on. 

In order to settle toward which side the balance 
of success inclined, we must remember that there 
were two things the combatants were trying to 
do, viz. : 

( 1 ) To damage the enemy directly by capturing 
or destroying his vessels. This was the only ob- 
ject we had in view in sending out ocean cruisers, 
but on the lakes it was subordinated to — 

(2) Getting the control of the lake, by which in- 
valuable assistance could be rendered to the army. 
The most thorough way of accomplishing this, of 
course, was by destroying the enemy's squadron; 
but it could also be done by building ships too 
powerful for him to face, or by beating him in 
some engagement which, although not destroying 
his fleet, would force him to go into port. If one 
side was stronger, then the weaker party by skilful 
manoeuvring might baffle the foe, and rest sat- 



Naval War of 1 812 277 

isfied by keeping the sovereignty of the lake dis- 
puted; for, as long as one squadron was not un- 
disputed master it could not be of much assistance 
in transporting troops, attacking forts, or other- 
wise helping the military. 

In 181 3, the Americans gained the first point by 
being the first to begin operations. They were 
building a new ship, afterward the Pike, at Sack- 
ett's Harbor; the British were building two new 
ships, each about two thirds the force of the Pike, 
one at Toronto (then called York), one at Kings- 
ton. Before these were built, the two fleets were 
just on a par; the destruction of the Pike would 
give the British the supremacy; the destruction 
of either of the British ships, provided the Pike 
were saved, would give the Americans the su- 
premacy. Both sides had already committed 
faults. The Americans had left Sackett's Harbor 
so poorly defended and garrisoned that it invited 
attack, while the British had fortified Kingston 
very strongly, but had done little for York, and, 
moreover, ought not to have divided their forces 
by building ships in different places. 

Commodore Chauncy's squadron was ready for 
service on April 19th, and on the 25th he made 
sail with the Madison, Lieutenant-Commander El- 
liott, floating his own broad pennant; Oneida, 
Lieutenant Woolsey; Hamilton, Lieutenant Mc- 
Pherson; Scourge, Mr. Osgood; Tompkins, Lieu- 



2/8 Naval War of 1 812 

tenant Brown; Conquest, Lieutenant Pettigrew; 
Growler, Mr. Mix; jftUia, Mr. Trant; Asp, Lieuten- 
ant Smith; Pert, Lieutenant Adams; American, 
Lieutenant Chauncy ; Ontario, Mr. Stevens,; Lady 
of the Lake, Mr. Hinn ; and Raven, transport, hav- 
ing on board General Dearborn and 1 700 troops, to 
attack York, which was garrisoned by about 700 
British regulars and Canadian militia under Major- 
General Sheaf e. The new 24-gun ship was almost 
completed, and the Gloucester lo-gun brig was in 
port ; the guns of both vessels were used in defence 
of the port. The fleet arrived before York early 
on April 27th, and the debarkation began at about 
8 A.M. The schooners beat up to the fort under a 
heavy cannonade, and opened a spirited fire from 
their long guns; while the troops went ashore 
under the command of Brigadier- General Pike. 
The boats were blown to leeward by the strong 
east wind, and were exposed to a galling fire, but 
landed the troops under cover of the grape thrown 
by the vessels. The schooners now beat up to 
within a quarter of a mile from the principal work, 
and opened heavily upon it, while at the same 
time General Pike and the main body of the troops 
on shore moved forward to the assault, using their 
bayonets only. The British regulars and Cana- 
dian militia, outnumbered three to one (including 
the American sailors), and with no very good de- 
fensive works, of course had to give way, having 



Naval War of 1 812 279 

lost heavily, especially from the fire of the vessels. 
An explosion immediately afterward killed or 
wounded 2 50 of the victors, including General Pike. 
The Americans lost, on board the fleet, 4 killed, 
including midshipmen Hatfield and Thompson, 
and 8 wounded ' ; and of the army,^ 14 killed and 
32 wounded by the enemy's fire, and 52 killed and 
180 wounded by the explosion: total loss, 288. 
The British regulars lost 130 killed and wounded, 
including 40 by the explosion ^ ; together with 50 
Canadians and Indians, making a total of 180, be- 
sides 290 prisoners. The 24-gun ship was burned, 
her guns taken away, and the Gloucester sailed 
back to Sackett's Harbor with the fleet. Many 
military and naval stores were destroyed, and 
much more shipped to the Harbor. The great 
fault that the British had committed was in letting 
the defences of so important a place remain so 
poor, and the force in it so small. It was impos- 
sible to resist very long when Pike's troops were 
landed, and the fleet in position. On the other 
hand, the Americans did their work in good style ; 
the schooners were finely handled, firing with 
great precision and completely covering the troops, 
who, in turn, were disembarked and brought into 
action very handsomely. 

' Letter of Commodore Chauncy, April 28, 1813. 
^ ]ames. Military Occurrences {Loiidon, i8i8),i.,p. 151. 
3 Lossing's Field-Book of the War of 181 2, p. 581. The ac- 
counts vary somewhat. 



28o Naval War of 1812 

After being detained in York a week by bad 
weather, the squadron got out, and for the next 
fortnight was employed in conveying troops and 
stores to General Dearborn. Then it was deter- 
mined to make an attack on Fort George, where 
the British General Vincent was stationed with 
from 1000 I to 1800 ^ regulars, 600 militia, and 
about 100 Indians. The American troops num- 
bered about 4500, practically under the command 
of Colonel Scott. On May 26th, Commodore 
Chauncy carefully reconnoitred the place to be 
attacked, and in the night made soundings along 
the coast, and laid buoys so as to direct the small 
vessels, who were to do the fighting. At 3 a.m. on 
the 27th, the signal was made to weigh, the heavy 
land artillery being on the Madison, and the other 
troops on the Oneida, the Lady of the Lake, and in 
batteaux, many of which had been captured at 
York. The Julia, Growler, and Ontario moved in 
and attacked a battery near the light-house, open- 
ing a cross-fire which silenced it. The troops were 
to be disembarked farther along the lake, near a 
battery of one long 24, managed by Canadian 
militia. The Conquest and Tompkins swept in 
under fire to this battery, and in ten minutes killed 
or drove off the artillerymen, who left the gun 
spiked, and then opened on the British. "The 

^ James, Military Occurrences, i., p. 151. 
2 Lossing, 596. 



Naval War of 1 812 281 

American ships with their heavy discharges of 
round and grape too well succeeded in thinning 
the British ranks." ' Meanwhile, the troop-boats, 
under Captain Perry and Colonel Scott, dashed in, 
completely covered by a heavy fire of grape directed 
point-blank at the foe by the Hamilton, Scourge, 
and Asp. "The fire from the American shipping 
committed dreadful havoc among the British, and 
rendered their efforts to oppose the landing of the 
enemy ineffectual." = Colonel Scott's troops, thus 
protected, made good their landing and met the 
British regulars ; but the latter were so terribly cut 
up by the tremendous discharges of grape and 
canister from the schooners that, in spite of their 
gallantry and discipline, they were obliged to re- 
treat, blowing up and abandoning the fort. One 
sailor was killed and two wounded ^ ; seventeen 
soldiers were killed and forty-five wounded 4 ; mak- 
ing the total American loss sixty-five. Of the 
British regulars 52 were killed, 44 wounded, and 
262 "wounded and missing," s in addition to 
about forty Canadians and Indians hors de combat 
and nearly 500 militia captured; so that in this 
very brilliant affair the assailants suffered hardly 
more than a fifth of the loss in killed and wounded 

' James, Military Occurrences, i., p. 151. 

^ Loc. cit. 

3 Letter of Commodore Chauncy, May 29, 18 13. 

* Letter of General Dearborn, May 27, 18 13. 

s Letter of Brigadier-General Vincent, May 28, 1813. 



282 Naval War of 1812 

that the assailed did; which must be attributed 
to the care with which Chauncy had reconnoitred 
the ground and prepared the attack, the excellent 
handling of the schooners, and the exceedingly de- 
structive nature of their fire. The British bat- 
teries were very weak, and, moreover, badly 
served. Their regular troops fought excellently; 
it was impossible for them to stand against the fire 
of the schooners, which should have been engaged 
by the batteries on shore ; and they were too weak 
in numbers to permit the American army to land 
and then attack it when away from the boats. The 
Americans were greatly superior in force, and yet 
deserve very much credit for achieving their ob- 
ject so quickly, with such slight loss to them- 
selves, and at such a heavy cost to the foe. The 
effect of the victory was most important, the Brit- 
ish evacuating the whole Niagara frontier, and 
leaving the river in complete possession of the 
Americans for the time being. This offered the 
opportunity for despatching Captain Perry up 
above the falls to take out one captured brig (the 
Caledonia) and four purchased schooners, which had 
been lying in the river, unable to get past the Brit- 
ish batteries into Lake Erie. These five vessels 
were now carried into that lake, being tracked up 
against the current by oxen, to become a most im- 
portant addition to the American force upon it. 
While Chauncy's squadron was thus absent at 



Naval War of 1812 28^ 



o 



the west end of the lake, the Wolfe, 24, was 
launched and equipped at Kingston, making the 
British force on the lake superior to that of the 
Americans. Immediately, Sir George Prevost and 
Sir James Lucas Yeo, the commanders-in-chief of 
the land and water forces in the Canadas, decided 
to strike a blow at Sackett's Harbor and destroy 
the General Pike, 28, thus securing to themselves 
the superiority for the rest of the season. Ac- 
cordingly, they embarked on May 27th, in the 
Wolfe, Royal George, Moira, Prince Regent, Simco, 
and Seneca, with a large number of gunboats, 
barges, and batteaux; and on the next day saw 
and attacked a brigade of nineteen boats trans- 
porting troops to Sackett's Harbor, under com- 
mand of Lieutenant Aspinwall. Twelve boats 
were driven ashore, and 70 of the men in them 
captured; but Lieutenant Aspinwall and 100 men 
succeeded in reaching the Harbor, bringing up the 
total number of regulars there to 500 men. General 
Brown having been summoned to take the chief 
command. About 400 militia also came in, but 
were of no earthly service. There were, however, 
200 Albany volunteers, under Colonel Mills, who 
could be relied on. The defences were miserably 
inadequate, consisting of a battery of one long 
gun, and a block-house. 

On the 29th, Sir George Prevost and 800 regu- 
lars landed, being covered by the gunboats under 



284 Naval War of 181 2 

Sir James Lucas Yeo. The American militia fled 
at once, but the regulars and volunteers held their 
ground in and around the block-house. "At this 
point the further energies of the [British] troops 
became unavailing. The [American] block-house 
and stockade could not be carried by assault nor 
reduced by field-pieces, had we been provided 
with them; the fire of the gunboats proved in- 
sufficient to attain that end; light and adverse 
winds continued, and our larger vessels were still 
far off." ' The British re-embarked precipitately. 
The American loss amounted to 23 killed and 114 
wounded ; that of the British to 5 2 killed and 211 
wounded, 2 most of the latter being taken prisoners. 
During the fight some of the frightened Americans 
set fire to the store-houses, the Pike and Gloucester; 
the former were consumed, but the flames were 
extinguished before they did any damage to either 
of the vessels. This attack differed especially 
from those on Fort George and York, in that the 
attacking force was relatively much weaker; still, 
it ought to have been successful. But Sir George 
could not compare as a leader with Colonel Scott 
or General Pike ; and Sir James did not handle the 
gunboats by any means as well as the Americans 
did their schooners in similar attacks. The ad- 
mirers of Sir James lay the blame on Sir George, 

* Letter of Adjutant-General Baynes, May 30, 1813. 
2 James, Military Occurrences, p. 173. 



Naval War of 1812 285 

and vice versa; but, in reality, neither seems to have 
done particularly well. At any rate, the affair 
was the reverse of creditable to the British. 

The British squadron returned to Kingston, and 
Chauncy, having heard that they were out, came 
down the lake and went into port about June 2d. 
So far the Americans had had all the success, and 
had controlled the lake ; but now Yeo's force was 
too formidable to be encountered until the Pike 
was built, and the supremacy passed undisputed 
into his hands, while Chauncy lay in Sackett's 
Harbor. Of course, with the Pike soon to be 
built, Yeo's uncontested superiority could be of 
but short duration; but he used his time most 
actively. He sailed from Kingston on the 3d of 
June, to co-operate with the British army at the 
head of the lake, and intercept all supplies going 
to the Americans. On the 8th, he discovered a 
small camp of the latter near Forty Mile Creek, 
and attacked it with the Beresford, Sydney Smith, 
and gunboats, obliging the Americans to leave 
their camp, while their equipages, provisions, 
stores, and batteaux fell into the hands of the 
Britisli, whose troops occupied the post, thus 
assisting in the series of engagements which ended 
in the humiliating repulse of General Wilkin- 
son's expedition into Canada. On the 13th, two 
schooners and some boats bringing supplies to the 
Americans were captured, and, on the 1 6th, a depot 



286 Naval War of 1 812 

of provisions at the Genesee River shared the 
same fate. On the 19th, a party of British soldiers 
were landed by the fleet at Great Sodas, and took 
off 600 barrels of flour. Yeo then returned to 
Kingston, where he anchored on the 27th, having 
done good service in assisting the land forces.' As 
a small compensation, on the i8th of the same 
month, the Lady of the Lake, Lieutenant Wolcott 
Chauncy, captured off Presque Isle the British 
schooner Lady Murray, containing i ensign, 15 
soldiers, and 6 sailors, together with stores and 
ammunition. 

During the early part of July, neither squadron 
put out in force; although on the first of the 
month Commodore Yeo made an abortive attempt 
to surprise Sackett's Harbor, but abandoned it 
when it was discovered. Meanwhile, the Ameri- 
cans were building a new schooner, the Sylph, and 
the formidable corvette Pike was made ready to 
sail by July 21st. On the same day, the entire 
American squadron, or fleet, sailed up to the head 
of the lake and reached Niagara on the 27th. 
Here Colonel Scott and some of his regulars were 
embarked, and on the 30th a descent was made 
upon York, where 11 transports were destroyed, 

^ Letter of Sir James Lucas Yeo to Mr. Croker, June 29, 
1813. 

' Letter of Lieutenant Wolcott Chauncy to Commodore 
Chauncy, June 18, 1813. 



Naval War of 1 812 287 

5 cannon, a quantity of flour, and some ammuni- 
tion carried off, and the barracks burned On the 
3d of August, the troops were disembarked at the 
Niagara, and 1 1 1 officers and men were sent up to 
join Perry on Lake Erie. As this left the squad- 
ron much deranged, 150 miHtia were subsequently 
lent it by General Boyd, but they proved of no 
assistance (beyond swelling the number of men 
Yeo captured in the Growler and Julia from 70 
individuals to 80), and were again landed. 

Commodore Yeo sailed with his squadron from 
Kingston on August 2d, and, on the 7th, the two 
fleets, for the first time, came in sight of one 
another, the Americans at anchor off Fort Niagara, 
the British six miles to windward, in the W.N.W. 
Chauncy's squadron contained one corvette, one 
ship-sloop, one brig-sloop, and ten schooners, 
manned by about 965 men, and throwing at a 
broadside 1390 lbs. of shot, nearly 800 of which 
were from long guns. Yeo's included two ship- 
sloops, two brig-sloops, and two schooners, manned 
by 770 men, and throwing at a broadside 1374 lbs., 
but 1 80 being from long guns. But Yeo's vessels 
were all built with bulwarks, while ten of Chauncy's 
had none; and, moreover, his vessels could all 
sail and manoeuvre together, while, as already re- 
marked, one half of the American fleet spent a 
large part of its time towing the other half. The 
Pike would, at ordinary range, be a match for the 



288 Naval War of 1812 

Wolfe and Melville together ; yet, in actual weight 
of metal she threw less than the former ship alone. 
In calm weather, the long guns of the American 
schooners gave them a great advantage ; in rough 
weather, they could not be used at all. Still, on 
the whole, it could fairly be said that Yeo was 
advancing to attack a superior fleet. 

All through the day of the 7 th, the wind blew 
light and variable, and the two squadrons went 
through a series of manoeuvres, nominally to 
bring on an action. As each side flatly contra- 
dicts the other, it is hard to tell precisely what the 
manoeuvres were; each captain says the other 
avoided him, and that he made all sail in chase. 
At any rate, it was just the weather for Chauncy 
to engage in. 

That night the wind came out squally; and 
about I A.M. on the morning of the 8th, a heavy 
gust struck the Hamilton and Scourge, forcing 
them to careen over till the heavy guns broke 
loose, and they foundered, but sixteen men escap- 
ing; which accident did not open a particularly 
cheerful prospect to the remainder of the schoon- 
ers. Chauncy's force was, by this accident, re- 
duced to a numerical equality with Yeo's, having, 
perhaps, a hundred more men,' and throwing 144 

' This estimate as to men is a mere balancing of proba- 
bilities. If James underestimates the British force on On- 
tario as much as he has on Erie and Champlain, Yeo had as 



Naval War of 1 812 289 

lbs. less shot at a broadside. All through the two 
succeeding days the same manoeuvring went on; 
the question as to which avoided the fight is sim- 
ply one of veracity between the two commanders, 
and, of course, each side, to the end of time, will 
believe its own leader. But it is not of the least 
consequence, as neither accomplished anything. 

On the loth, the same tedious evolutions were 
continued, but at 7 p.m. the two squadrons were 
tolerably near one another, Yeo to windward, the 
breeze being fresh from the S.W. Commodore 
Chauncy formed his force in two lines on the port 
tack, while Commodore Yeo approached from be- 
hind and to windward, in single column, on the 
same tack. Commodore Chauncy' s weather line 
was formed of the Julia, Growler, Pert, Asp, Oyi- 
tario, and American, in that order; and the lee 
line of the Pike, Oneida, Madison, Tompkins, and 
Conquest. Chauncy formed his weather line of 
the smaller vessels, directing them, when the 
British should engage, to edge away and form to 
leeward of the second line, expecting that Sir 
James would fellow them down. At 11 the 

many men as his opponent. Chauncy, in one of his letters 
(preserved with the other manuscript letters in the Naval 
Archives) , says : "I enclose the muster-rolls of all my ships," 
but I have not been able to find them, and in any event the 
complements were continually changing completely. The 
point is not important, as each side certainly had plenty of 
men on this occasion. 

VOL. I. — 19 



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290 



Naval War of 1 812 291 

weather line opened fire at very long range; at 
1 1 . 1 5 it was returned, and the action became gen- 
eral and harmless; at 11.30, the weather line bore 
up and passed to leeward, except the Julia and 
Growler, which tacked. The British ships kept 
their luff and cut off the two that had tacked; 
while Commodore Chauncy's lee line " edged away 
two points, to lead the enemy down, not only to 
engage him to more advantage, but to lead him 
from the Julia and Grmuler." ' Of course, the 
enemy did not come down, and the Julia and 
Growler were not saved. Yeo kept on till he had 
cut off the two schooners, fired an ineffectual 
broadside at the other ships, and tacked after the 
Growler and Julia. Then, when too late, Chauncy 
tacked also, and stood after him. The schooners, 
meanwhile, kept clawing to windward till they 
were overtaken, and, after making a fruitless 
effort to run the gauntlet through the enemy's 
squadron by putting before the wind, were cap- 
tured. Yeo's account is simple: "Came within 
gunshot of Pike and Madison, when they imme- 
diately bore up, fired their stern-chase guns, and 
made all sail for Niagara, leaving two of their 
schooners astern, which we captured." '' The 
British had acted faultlessly, and the honor and 
profit gained by the encounter rested entirely 

^ Letter of Commodore Isaac Chauncy, August 13, 18 13. 
* Letter of Sir James Lucas Yeo, August 10, 18 13. 



292 Naval War of 1812 

with them. On the contrary, neither Chauncy 
nor his subordinates showed to advantage. 

Cooper says that the hne of battle was "singu- 
larly well adapted to draw the enemy down," and 
"admirable for its advantages and ingenuity." 
In the first place, it is an open question whether 
the enemy needed drawing down ; on this occasion 
he advanced boldly enough. The formation may 
have been ingenious, but it was the reverse of 
advantageous. It would have been far better to 
have had the strongest vessels to windward, and 
the schooners, with their long guns, to leeward, 
where they would not be exposed to capture by 
any accident happening to them. Moreover, it 
does not speak well for the discipline of the fleet 
that two commanders should have directly dis- 
obeyed orders. And when the two schooners did 
tack, and it was evident that Sir James would cut 
them off, it was an extraordinary proceeding for 
Chauncy to "edge away two points ... to 
lead the enemy from the Growler and Julian It 
is certainly a novel principle, that if part of a 
force is surrounded, the true way to rescue it is to 
run away with the balance, in hopes that the 
enemy will follow. Had Chauncy tacked at once, 
Sir James would have been placed between two 
fires, and it would have been impossible for him 
to capture the schooners. As it was, the British 
commander had attacked a superior force in 



Naval War of 1 812 293 

weather that, just suited it, and yet had cap- 
tured two of its vessels without suffering any in- 
jury beyond a few shot holes in the sails. The 
action, however, was in no way decisive. All next 
day, the nth, the fleets were in sight of one 
another, the British to windward, but neither 
attempted to renew the engagement. The wind 
grew heavier, and the villainous little American 
schooners showed such strong tendencies to upset, 
that two had to run into Niagara Bay to anchor. 
With the rest, Chauncy ran down the lake to Sack- 
ett's Harbor, which he reached on the 13th, pro- 
visioned his squadron for five weeks, and that 
same evening proceeded up the lake again. 

The advantage in this action had been entirely 
with the British, but it is simply nonsense to say, 
as one British historian does, that "on Lake On- 
tario, therefore, we at last secured a decisive pre- 
dominance, which we maintained until the end 
of the war." ^ This "decisive" battle left the 
Americans just as much in command of the lake 
as the British; and even this very questionable 
" predominance " lasted but six weeks, after which 
the British squadron was blockaded in port most 

' History of the British Navy, by Charles Duke Yonge (Lon- 
don, 1866), iii., p. 24. It is apparently not a work of any 
authority, but I quote it as showing probably the general feel- 
ing of British writers about the action and its results, which 
can only proceed from extreme partisanship and ignorance of 
the subject. 



294 Naval War of 1 812 

of the time. The action has a parallel in that 
fought on the 2 2d of July, 1805, by Sir Robert 
Calder's fleet of fifteen sail of the hne against the 
Franco-Spanish fleet of twenty sail of the line, 
under M. Villeneuve.' The two fleets engaged in a 
fog, and the English captured two ships, when both 
sides drew off, and remained in sight of each other 
the next day without either renewing the action. 
" A victory, therefore, it was that Sir Robert Cal- 
der had gained, but not a 'decisive' nor a 'bril- 
liant' victory." ' This is exactly the criticism 
that should be passed on Sir James Lucas Yeo's 
action of the loth of August. 

From the 13th of August to the loth of Septem- 
ber both fleets were on the lake most of the time, 
each commodore stoutly maintaining that he was 
chasing the other; and each expressing in his 
letters his surprise and disgust that his opponent 
should be afraid of meeting him, " though so much 
superior in force." The facts are, of course, diffi- 
cult to get at, but it seems pretty evident that 
Yeo was determined to engage in heavy, and 
Chauncy in light, weather; and that the party to 

I Batailles Navales de la France, par O. Troude, iii., 352. It 
seems rather ridiculous to compare these lake actions, fought 
between small flotillas, with the gigantic contests which the 
huge fleets of Europe waged in contending for the supremacy 
of the ocean ; but the difference is one of degree and not of 
kind, and they serve well enough for purposes of illustration 
or comparison. ^ James's Naval History, iv., 14. 



Naval War of 1 812 295 

leeward generally made off. The Americans had 
been reinforced by the Sylph schooner, of 300 tons 
and 70 men, carrying four long 32's on pivots, and 
six long 6's. Theoretically, her armament would 
make her formidable; but practically, her guns 
were so crowded as to be of little use, and the next 
year she was converted into a brig, mounting 24- 
pound carronades. 

On the I ith of September, a partial engagement, 
at very long range in light weather, occurred near 
the mouth of the Genesee River; the Americans 
suffered no loss whatever, while the British had 
one midshipman and three seamen killed and 
seven wounded, and afterward ran into Amherst 
Bay. One of their brigs, the Melville, received a 
shot so far under water that to get at and plug it, 
the guns had to be run in on one side and out on 
the other. Chauncy describes it as a running 
fight of three and a half hours, the enemy then 
escaping into Amherst Bay.' James (p. 38) says 
that ' ' at sunset a breeze sprang up from the west- 
ward, when Sir James steered for the American 
fleet; but the American commodore avoided a 
close action, and thus the affair ended." This is 
a good sample of James's trustworthiness; his 
account is supposed to be taken from Commodore 
Yeo's letter,^ which says: "At sunset a breeze 

^ Letter to the Secretary of the Navy, September 13, 1813. 
* Letter to Admiral Warren, September 12, 18 13. 



296 Naval War of 181 2 

sprang up from the westward, when I steered for 
the False Duck Islands, under which the enemy 
could not keep the weather-gage, but be obliged 
to meet us on equal terms. This, however, he 
carefully avoided doing." In other words, Yeo 
did not steer for, but away from Chauncy. Both 
sides admit that Yeo got the worst of it and ran 
away, and it is only a question as to whether 
Chauncy followed him or not. Of course, in such 
light weather, Chauncy' s long guns gave him a 
great advantage. He had present ten vessels, the 
Pike, Madison, Oneida, Sylph, Tompkins, Con- 
quest, Ontario, Pert, American, and Asp, throwing 
1 288 lbs. of shot, with a total of 98 guns. Yeo had 
92 guns, throwing at a broadside 1374 lbs. Never- 
theless, Chauncy told but part of the truth in writ- 
ing as he did : "I was much disappointed at Sir 
James refusing to fight me, as he was so much 
superior in point of force, both in guns and men, 
having upward of 20 guns more than we have, and 
heaves a greater weight of shot." His inferiority 
in long guns placed Yeo at a great disadvantage in 
such a very light wind ; but in his letter he makes 
a marvellous admission of how little able he was 
to make good use of even what he had. He says : 
"I found it impossible to bring them to close ac- 
tion. We remained in this mortifying situation 
five hours, having only six guns in all the squad- 
ron that would reach the enemy (not a carronade 



M 



Naval War of 1812 297 

being fired)." Now, according to James himself 
(Naval Occurrences, p. 297), he had in his squad- 
ron two long 24's, thirteen long i8's, two long 12's, 
and three long 9's, and, in a fight of five hours, at 
very long range, in smooth water, it was a proof 
of culpable incompetency on his part that he did 
not think of doing what Elliott and Perry did in 
similar circumstances on Lake Erie — substitute 
all his long guns for some of the carronades on 
the engaged side. Chauncy could place in broad- 
side seven long 32's, eighteen long 24's, four long 
12's, eight long 6's; so he could oppose 37 long 
guns, throwing 752 lbs. of shot, to Yeo's 20 
long guns, throwing 333 lbs. of shot. The odds 
were thus more than two to one against the Brit- 
ish in any case; and their commander's lack of 
resource made them still greater. But it proved 
a mere skirmish, with no decisive results. 

The two squadrons did not come in contact 
again till on the 28th, in York Bay. The Ameri- 
cans had the weather-gage, the wind being fresh 
from the east. Yeo tacked and stretched far out 
into the lake, while Chauncy steered directly for 
his centre. When the squadrons were still a 
league apart, the British formed on the port tack, 
with their heavy vessels ahead; the Americans 
got on the same tack and edged down toward 
them, the Pike ahead, towing the Asp; the Tomp- 
kins, under Lieutenant Bolton Finch, next; the 



298 Naval War of 181 2 

Madison next, being much retarded by having a 
schooner in tow; then the Sylph, with another 
schooner in tow, the Oneida, and the two other 
schooners. The British, fearing their stemmost 
vessels would be cut off, at 12.10 came round on 

ASP T 

to MP KIMS if\ ^^Sr- 





RQfAL CKQRGE 



WOLFE 







4 



4 



the starboard tack, beginning with the Wolfe, 
Commodore Yeo, and Royal George, Captain Wil- 
liam Howe Mulcaster, which composed the van of 
the line. They opened with their starboard guns 
as soon as they came round. When the Pike was 
a-beam of the Wolfe, which was past the centre of 



Naval War of 1 812 299 

the British line, the Americans bore up in succes- 
sion for their centre. 

The Madison was far back, and so was the Sylph, 
neither having cast off their tows; so the whole 
brunt of the action fell on the Pike, Asp, and 
Tompkins. The latter kept up a most gallant and 
spirited fire till her foremast was shot away. But 
already the Pike had shot away the Wolfe's main- 
topmast and main-yard, and inflicted so heavy a 
loss upon her that Commodore Yeo, not very 
heroically, put dead before the wind, crowding all 
the canvas he could on her forward spars, and she 
ran completely past all her own vessels, who, of 
course, crowded sail after her. The retreat of the 
commodore was most ably covered by the Royal 
George, under Captain Mulcaster, who was un- 
questionably the best British officer on the lake. 
He luft'ed up across the commodore's stern, and 
delivered broadsides in a manner that won the 
admiration even of his foes. The Madison and 
Sylph, having the schooners in tow, could not 
overtake the British ships, though the Sylph 
opened a distant fire ; the Pike kept on after them, 
but did not cast off the Asp, and so did not gain ; 
and at 3.15 the pursuit was relinquished,' when 
the enemy were running into the entirely unde- 
fended port of Burlington Bay, whence escape 
would have been impossible. The Tompkins had 

' Letter of Commodore Chauncy, September 28, 1813, 



300 Naval War of 1812 



o 



lost her foremast, and the Pike her fore-topgallant- 
mast, with her bowsprit and mainmast wounded ; 
and of her crew five men were killed or wounded, 
almost all by the guns of the Royal George. These 
were the only injuries occasioned by the enemy's 
fire, but the Pike's starboard bow-chaser burst, 
killing or wounding twenty-two men, besides 
blowing up the topgallant forecastle, so that the 
bow pivot-gun could not be used. Among the 
British ships, the Wolfe lost her main-topmast, 
mizzen-topmast, and main-yard; and the Royal 
George her fore-topmast; both suffered a heavy 
loss in killed and wounded, according to the report 
of the British officers captured in the transports 
a few days afterward. 

As already mentioned, the British authorities 
no longer published accounts of their defeats, so 
Commodore Yeo's report on the action was not 
made public. Brenton merely alludes to it as 
follows (vol. ii., p. 503) : "The action of the 28th 
of September, 18 13, in which Sir James Yeo in the 
Wolfe had his main- and mizzen-topmasts shot 
away, and was obliged to put before the wind, 
gave Mulcaster an opportunity of displaying a 
trait of valor and seamanship which elicited the 
admiration of friends and foes, when he gallantly 
placed himself between his disabled commo- 
dore and a superior enemy." James speaks in 
the vaguest terms. He first says: "Commodore 



Naval War of 1812 301 

Chauncy, having the weather-gage, kept his fav- 
orite distance," which he did because Commodore 
Yeo fled so fast that he could not be overtaken; 
then James mentions the injuries the Wolfe re- 
ceived, and says that "it was these and not, as 
Mr. Clark says, ' a manoeuvre of the commodore's' 
that threw the British in confusion." In other 
words, it was the commodore's shot and not his 
manoeuvring that threw the British into confu- 
sion — a very futile distinction. Next he says that 
"Commodore Chauncy would not venture within 
carronade range," whereas he was within carro- 
nade range of the Wolfe and Royal George, but the 
latter did not wait for the Madison and Oneida to 
get within range with their carronades. The rest 
of his article is taken up with exposing the ab- 
surdities of some of the American writings, mis- 
called histories, which appeared at the close of the 
war. His criticisms on these are very just, but 
afford a funny instance of the pot calling the 
kettle black. This much is clear, that the British 
were beaten and forced to flee, when but part of 
the American force was engaged. But in good 
weather the American force was so superior that 
being beaten would have been no disgrace to Yeo, 
had it not been for the claims advanced both by 
himself and his friends, that on the whole he was 
victorious over Chauncy. The Wolfe made any- 
thing but an obstinate fight, leaving almost all the 



302 Naval War of 1 812 

work to the gallant Mulcaster, in the Royal George, 
who shares with Lieutenant Finch of the Tomp- 
kins most of the glory of the day. The battle, if 
such it may be called, completely established 
Chauncy's supremacy, Yeo spending most of the 
remainder of the season blockaded in Kingston. 
So Chauncy gained a victory which established 
his control over the lakes; and, moreover, he 
gained it by fighting in succession, almost single- 
handed, the two heaviest ships of the enemy. But 
gaining the victory was only what should have 
been expected from a superior force. The ques- 
tion is, Did Chauncy use his force to the best 
advantage? And it cannot be said that he did. 
When the enemy bore up it was a great mistake 
not to cast off the schooners which were being 
towed. They were small craft, not of much use 
in the fight, and they entirely prevented the 
Madison from taking any part in the contest, and 
kept the Sylph at a great distance ; and, by keep- 
ing the Asp in tow, the Pike, which sailed faster 
than any of Yeo's ships, was distanced by them. 
Had she left the Asp behind and run in to engage 
the Royal George, she could have mastered, or, at 
any rate disabled, her ; and had the swift Madison 
cast off her tow she could also have taken an 
effective part in the engagement. If the Pike 
could put the British to flight almost single- 
handed, how much more could she not have done 



Naval War of 1 812 303 

when assisted by the Madison and Oneida ? The 
cardinal error, however, was made in discontinu- 
ing the chase. The British were in an almost 
open roadstead, from which they could not pos- 
sibly escape. Commodore Chauncy was afraid 
that the wind would come up to blow a gale, and 
both fleets would be thrown ashore; and, more- 
over, he expected to be able to keep a watch over 
the enemy, and to attack him at a more suitable 
time. But he utterly failed in this last ; and had 
the i\merican squadron cast off their tows and 
gone boldly in, they certainly ought to have been 
able to destroy or capture the entire British force 
before a gale could blow up. Chauncy would have 
done well to keep in mind the old adage, so pe- 
culiarly applicable to naval affairs, " L'audace ! 
tou jours l'audace! et encore l'audace!" Whether 
the fault was his or that of his subordinates, it is 
certain that while the victory of the 28th of Sep- 
tember definitely settled the supremacy of the 
lake in favor of the Americans, yet this victory 
was by no means so decided as it should have 
been, taking into account his superiority in force 
and advantage in position, and the somewhat 
spiritless conduct of his foe. 

Next day a gale came on to blow, which lasted 
till the evening of the 31st. There was no longer 
any apprehension of molestation from the British, 
so the troop transports were sent down the lake 



304 Naval War of 1812 

by themselves, while the squadron remained to 
watch Yeo. On October 2d he was chased, but 
escaped by his better sailing; and next day false 
information induced Chauncy to think Yeo had 
eluded him and passed down the lake, and he 
accordingly made sail in the direction of his sup- 
posed flight. On the 5th, at 3 p.m., while near the 
False Ducks, seven vessels were made out ahead, 
which proved to be British gunboats, engaged 
in transporting troops. All sail was made after 
them ; one was burned, another escaped, and five 
were captured, the Mary, Drmnmond, Lady Gore, 
Confiance, and Hamilton,^ — -the two latter being 
the rechristened Julia and Growler. Each gun 
vessel had from one to three guns, and they had 
aboard in all 264 men, including seven naval 
(three royal and four provincial) and ten military 
officers. These prisoners stated that in the action 
of the 28th the Wolfe and Royal George had lost 
very heavily. 

After this, Yeo remained in Kingston, blockaded 
there by Chauncy for most of the time; on No- 
vember loth he came out and was at once chased 
back into port by Chauncy, leaving the latter for 
the rest of the season entirely undisturbed. Ac- 
cordingly, Chauncy was able to convert his small 
schooners into transports. On the 17th, these 
transports were used to convey iioo men of the 

' Letter of Commodore Chauncy, October 8, 1813. 



M 



Naval War of 1812 305 

army of General Harrison from the mouth of 
the Genesee to Sackett's Harbor, while Chauncy 
blockaded Yeo in Kingston. The duty of trans- 
porting troops and stores went on until the 27th, 
when everything had been accomplished; and a 
day or two afterward navigation closed. 

As between the Americans and British, the suc- 
cess of the season was greatly in favor of the 
former. They had uncontested control over the 
lake from April 19th to June 3d, and from Sep- 
tember 28th to November 29th, in all, 107 days; 
while their foes only held it from June 3d to July 
2ist, or for 48 days; and from that date to Sep- 
tember 28th, for 69 days, the two sides were con- 
tending for the mastery. York and Fort George 
had been taken, while the attack on Sackett's 
Harbor was repulsed. The Americans lost but 
two schooners, both of which were recaptured; 
while the British had one 24-gun ship, nearly 
ready for launching, destroyed, and one lo-gun 
brig taken, and the loss inflicted upon each other 
in transports, gunboats, store-houses, stores, etc., 
was greatly in favor of the former. Chauncy's 
fleet, moreover, was able to co-operate with the 
army for over twice the length of time Yeo's could 
(107 days to 48). 

It is more difficult to decide between the respec- 
tive merits of the two commanders. We had 
shown so much more energy than the Anglo- 



VOL. I.— 20 



3o6 Naval War of 1 812 

Canadians, that at the beginning of the year we 
had overtaken them in the building race, and the 
two fleets were about equally formidable. The 
Madison and Oneida were not quite a match for 
the Royal George and Sydney Smith (opposing 
twelve 3 2 -pound and eight 24-pound carronades 
to two long i8's, one long 12, one 68-pound and 
thirteen 3 2 -pound carronades) ; and our ten gun 
schooners would hardly be considered very much 
of an overmatch for the Melville, Moira, and 
Beresford. Had Sir James Yeo been as bold and 
energetic as Barclay or Mulcaster he would cer- 
tainly not have permitted the Americans, when 
the forces were so equal, to hold uncontested sway 
over the lake, and, by reducing Fort George, to 
cause disaster to the British land forces. It would 
certainly have been better to risk a battle with 
equal forces than to wait till each fleet received 
an additional ship, which rendered Chauncy's 
squadron the superior by just about the superi- 
ority of the Pike to the Wolfe. Again, Yeo did 
not do particularly well in the repulse before 
Sackett's Harbor; in the skirmish off Genesee 
River, he showed a marked lack of resource ; and 
in the action of the 28th of September (popularly 
called the "Burlington Races," from the celerity 
of his retreat), he evinced an amount of caution 
that verged toward timidity, in allowing the en- 
tire brunt of the fighting to fall on Mulcaster in 



Naval War of 1 812 307 

the Royal George, a weaker ship than the Wolfe. 
On the other hand, he gave able co-operation to 
the army while he possessed control of the lake; 
he made a most gallant and successful attack on a 
superior force on the i oth of August ; and for six 
weeks subsequently, by skilful manoeuvring, he 
prevented this same superior force from acquiring 
the uncontested mastery. It was no disgrace to 
be subsequently blockaded; but it is very ludi- 
crous in his admirers to think that he came out 
first best. 

Chauncy rendered able, and invaluable assist- 
ance to the army all the while that he had control 
of the water; his attacks on York and Fort 
George were managed with consummate skill and 
success, and on the 28th of September he practi- 
cally defeated the opposing force with his own ship 
alone. Nevertheless, he can by no means be said 
to have done the best he could with the materials 
he had. His stronger fleet was kept two months 
in check by a weaker British fleet. When he first 
encountered the foe, on August loth, he ought to 
have inflicted such a check upon him as would at 
least have confined him to port and given the 
Americans immediate superiority on the lake; 
instead of which he suffered a mortifying, although 
not at all disastrous, defeat, which allowed the 
British to contest the supremacy with him for 
six weeks longer. On the 28th of September, 



3o8 Naval War of 1812 

when he only gained a rather barren victory, it 
was nothing but excessive caution that prevented 
him from utterly destroying his foe. Had Perry 
on that day commanded the American fleet, there 
would have been hardly a British ship left on 
Ontario. Chauncy was an average commander; 
and the balance of success inclined to the side of 
the Americans only because they showed greater 
energy and skill in ship-building, the crews and 
commanders on both sides being very nearly 
equal. 

LAKE ERIE 

Captain Oliver Hazard Perry had assumed com- 
mand of Erie and the upper lakes, acting under 
Commodore Chauncy. With intense energy, he at 
once began creating a naval force which should be 
able to contend successfully with the foe. As 
already said, the latter in the beginning had ex- 
clusive control of Lake Erie; but the Americans 
had captured the Caledonia, brig, and purchased 
three schooners, afterward named the Somers, 
Tigress, and Ohio; and a sloop, the Trippe. 
These at first were blockaded in the Niagara, but 
after the fall of Fort George and retreat of the 
British forces, Captain Perry was enabled to get 
them out, tracking them up against the current 
by the most arduous labor. They ran up to 
Presque Isle (now called Erie), where two 20-gun 



Naval War of 1812 309 

brigs were being constructed under the directions 
of the indefatigable captain. Three other schoon- 
ers, the Ariel, Scorpion, and Porcupine, were also 
built. 

The harbor of Erie was good and spacious, but 
had a bar on which there was less than seven feet 
of water. Hitherto this had prevented the enemy 
from getting in; now it prevented the two brigs 
from getting out. Captain Robert Heriot Barclay 
had been appointed commander of the British 
forces on Lake Erie; and he was having built at 
Amherstburg a 20 -gun ship. Meanwhile, he block- 
aded Perry's force, and as the brigs could not 
cross the bar with their guns in, or except in 
smooth water, they of course could not do so in 
his presence. He kept a close blockade for some 
time; but on the 2d of August he disappeared. 
Perry at once hurried forward everything; and 
on the 4th, at 2 p.m., one brig, the Lawrence, was 
towed to that point of the bar where the water was 
deepest. Her guns were whipped out and landed 
on the beach, and the brig got over the bar by a 
hastily improvised "camel." 

"Two large scows, prepared for the purpose, 
were hauled alongside, and the work of lifting the 
brig proceeded as fast as possible. Pieces of mas- 
sive timber had been run through the forward and 
after ports, and when the scows were sunk to the 
water's edge, the ends of the timbers were blocked 



3IO Naval War of 1812 

up, supported by these floating foundations. The 
plugs were now put in the scows, and the water 
was pumped out of them. By this process the 
brig was hfted quite two feet, though when she 
was got on the bar it was found that she still drew 
too much water. It became necessary, in conse- 
quence, to cover up everything, sink the scows 
anew, and block up the timbers afresh. This duty 
occupied the whole night." ^ 

Just as the Lawrence had passed the bar, at 8 
A.M. on the 5th, the enemy reappeared, but too 
late ; Captain Barclay exchanged a few shots with 
the schooners and then drew off. The Niagara 
crossed without difficulty. There were still not 
enough men to man the vessels, but a draft arrived 
from Lake Ontario, and many of the frontiersmen 
volunteered, while soldiers also were sent on board. 
The squadron sailed on the i8th in pursuit of the 
enemy, whose ship was now ready. After cruis- 
ing about some time, the Ohio was sent down the 
lake, and the other ships went into Put-in Bay. 
On the 9th of September, Captain Barclay put out 
from Amherstburg, being so short of provisions 
that he felt compelled to risk an action with the 
superior force opposed. On the loth of Septem- 
ber, his squadron was discovered from the mast- 
head of the Lawrence in the northwest. Before 
going into details of the action we will examine the 

^ Cooper, ii., 389. Perry's letter of August 5th is very brief. 



Naval War of 1812 311 

force of the two squadrons, as the accounts vary- 
considerably. 

The tonnage of the British ships, as already- 
stated, we know exactly, they having been all 
carefully appraised and measured by the builder, 
Mr. Henry Eckford, and two sea-captains. We 
also know the dimensions of the American ships. 
The Lawrence and Niagara measured 480 tons 
apiece. The Caledonia, brig, was about the size 
of the Hunter, or 180 tons. The Tigress, Somers, 
and Scorpion were subsequently captured by the 
foe and were then said to measure, respectively, 
96, 94, and 86 tons; in which case they were 
larger than similar boats on Lake Ontario. The 
Ariel was about the size of the Hamilton; the 
Porcupine and Trippe about the size of the Asp 
and Pert. As for the guns. Captain Barclay, in 
his letter, gives a complete account of those on 
board his squadron. He has also given a com- 
plete account of the American guns, which is most 
accurate, and, if anything, underestimates them. 
At least, Emmons, in his History, gives the Trippe 
a long 32, while Barclay says she had only a long 
24; and Lossing, in his Field-Book, says (but I do 
not know on what authority) that the Caledonia 
had three long 24's, while Barclay gives her two long 
24's and one 3 2 -pound carronade; and that the 
Somers had two long 32's, while Barclay gives her 
one long 32 and one 24-pound carronade. I shall 



312 Naval War of 1812 

take Barclay's account, which corresponds with 
that of Emmons; the only difference being that 
Emmons puts a 24-pounder on the Scorpion and a 
3 2. on the Trtppe, while Barclay reverses this. I 
shall also follow Emmons in giving the Scorpion a 
3 2 -pound carronade instead of a 24. 

It is more difficult to give the strength of the 
respective crews. James says the Americans had 
580, all "picked men." They were just as much 
picked men as Barclay's were, and no more; that 
is, the ships had "scratch" crews. Lieutenant 
Emmons gives Perry 490 men; and Lossing says 
he "had upon his muster-roll 490 names." In 
vol. xiv., p. 566, of the American State Papers, is 
a list of the prize-monies owing to each man (or 
to the survivors of the killed) , which gives a grand 
total of 532 men, including 136 on the Laivrence 
and 155 on the Niagara, 45 of whom were volun- 
teers — frontiersmen. Deducting these, we get 487 
men, which is pretty near Lieutenant Emmons's 
490. Possibly, Lieutenant Emmons did not in- 
clude these volunteers; and it may be that some 
of the men whose names were down on the prize- 
list had been so sick that they were left on shore. 
Thus, Lieutenant Yamall testified before a Court 
of Inquiry, in 181 5, that there were but 131 men 
and boys of every description on board the Law- 
rence in the action ; and the Niagara was said to 
have had but 140. Lieutenant Yamall also said 



i 



Naval War of 1 812 313 

that ' ' but 1 03 men on board the Lawrence were fit 
for duty"; as Captain Perry, in his letter, said 
that 31 were unfit for duty, this would make a 
total of 134. So I shall follow the prize-money 
list; at any rate, the difference in number is 
so slight as to be immaterial. Of the 532 men 
whose names the list gives, 45 were volunteers, or 
landsmen, from among the surrounding inhabi- 
tants ; 158 were marines or soldiers (I do not know 
which, as the list gives marines, soldiers, and 
privates, and it is impossible to tell which of the 
two former heads include the last), and 329 were 
officers, seamen, cooks, pursers, chaplains, and 
supernumeraries. Of the total number, there 
were on the day of action, according to Perry's 
report, 116 men unfit for duty, including 31 on 
board the Lawrence, 28 on board the Niagara, and 
57 on the small vessels. 

All the later American writers put the number 
of men in Barclay's fleet precisely at "502," but I 
have not been able to find out the original author- 
ity. James (Naval Occurrences, p. 289) says the 
British had but 345, consisting of 50 seamen, 85 
Canadians, and 210 soldiers. But the letter of 
Adjutant-General E. Baynes, November 24, 18 13, 
states that there were 250 soldiers aboard Bar- 
clay's squadron, of whom 23 were killed, 49 
wounded, and the balance (178) captured; and 
James himself on a previous page (284) states that 



314 Naval War of 1812 

there were 102 Canadians on Barclay's vessels, not 
counting the Detroit, and we know that Barclay 
originally joined the squadron with 19 sailors from 
the Ontario fleet, and that subsequently 50 sailors 
came up from the Dover. James gives at the end 
of his Naval Occurrences some extracts from the 
court-martial held on Captain Barclay. Lieuten- 
ant Thomas Stokes, of the Queen Charlotte, there 
testified that he had on board "between 120 and 
130 men, officers and all together," of whom "16 
came up from the Dover three days before." 
James, on p. 284, says her crew already consisted 
of no men; adding these 16 gives us 126 (almost 
exactly "between 120 and 130"). Lieutenant 
Stokes also testified that the Detroit had more men 
on account of being a larger and heavier vessel; 
to give her 150 is perfectly safe, as her heavier 
guns and larger size would at least need 24 men 
more than the Queen Charlotte. James gives the 
Lady Prevost 76, Hunter 39, Little Belt 15, and 
Chippeway 13 men, Canadians and soldiers, a total 
of 1 43 ; supposing that the number of British 
sailors placed on them was proportional to the 
amount placed on board the Queen Charlotte, we 
could add 2 1 . This would make a grand total of 
440 men, which must certainly be near the truth. 
This number is corroborated otherwise: General 
Baynes, as already quoted, says that there were 
aboard 250 soldiers, of whom 72 were killed or 



Naval War of 1812 



315 



wounded. Barclay reports a total loss of 135, of 
whom 63 must therefore have been sailors or 
Canadians, and if the loss suffered by these bore 
the same proportion to their whole number as 
in the case of the soldiers, there ought to have 
been 219 sailors and Canadians, making in all 469 
men. It can thus be said with certainty that 
there were between 440 and 490 men aboard, and 
I shall take the former number, though I have no 
doubt that this is too small. But it is not a point 
of very much importance, as the battle was fought 
largely at long range, where the number of men, 
provided there were plenty to handle the sails and 
guns, did not much matter. The following state- 
ment of the comparative force must therefore be 
very nearly accura:te: 



PERRY S SQUADRON 









Total 


Crew 


Broad- 






Name 


Rig 


Tons 


Crew 


fit for 
Duty 


side; 
lbs. 




Armament 


Lawrence. 


•Brig 


480 


136 


105 


300 




2 long 12's 
18 short 32's 


Niagara.. 


*' 


480 


155 


127 


300 




2 long 12's 
18 short 32's 


Caledonia 


" 


180 


53I 




80 




2 long 24's 
I short 32 


Artel. . . . 


Schooner 


I 12 


36 




48 




4 long 12's 


Scorpion . 




86 


35 




64 




I " 32 
I short 32 


Somers.. . 


t i 


94 


30 


184 


56 




I long 24 
I short 32 


Porcupine 


i t 


83 


25 




32 




I long 32 


Tigress. . 


1 i 


96 


27 




32 




I " 32 


Trippe.. . 


Sloop 


60 


35J 




24 




I " 24 



9 vessels 



1671 532 416 936 lbs. 



i6 



Naval War of 1812 



During the action, however, the Lawrence and 
Niagara each fought a long 12 instead of one of 
the carronades on the engaged side, making a 
broadside of 896 lbs., 288 lbs. being from long 



guns. 



Name 



BARCLAY S SQUADRON 

Broadside; 



Rig 



Detroit Ship 



Tons Crew 



490 150 



lbs 



138 



J 



I 



Queen Charlotte.. " 400 

Lady Prevost . . . Schooner 230 



Hunter Bri 



"g 



180 



Chippeway Schooner 70 

Little Belt Sloop 90 



126 
86 

45 

15 
18 



189 



Armament 

1 long 18 

2 " 24's 
12 s 

8 " 9's 
I short 24 
I " 18 

1 long 12 

2 " 9's 
[14 short 24's 
I I long 9 

75 -( 2 " 6's 
I o short 1 2 's 
4 long 6's 
2 " 4's 
2 " 2's 
2 short 1 2's 
I long 9 



30 



9 
18 



j I " 12' 

■j 2 " 6's 



6 vessels 



1460 440 459 lbs. 



These six vessels thus threw at a broadside 459 
lbs., of which 195 were from long guns. 

The superiority of the Americans in long-gun 
metal was therefore nearly as three is to two, and 
in carronade metal greater than two to one. The 



Naval War of 1 812 2>^7 

chief fault to be found in the various American 
accounts is that they sedulously conceal the com- 
parative weight of metal, while carefully specifying 
the number of guns. Thus, Lossing says: " Bar- 
clay had 35 long guns to Perry's 15, and possessed 
greatly the advantage in action at a distance"; 
which he certainly did not. The tonnage of the 
fleets is not so very important; the above tables 
are probably pretty nearly right. It is, I suppose, 
impossible to tell exactly the number of men in 
the two crews. Barclay almost certainly had 
more than the 440 men I have given him, but in 
all likelihood some of them were unfit for duty, 
and the number of his effectives was most prob- 
ably somewhat less than Perry's. As the battle 
was fought in such smooth water, and part of the 
time at long range, this, as already said, does not 
much matter. The Niagara might be considered 
a match for the Detroit, and the Laurence and 
Caledonia for the five other British vessels ; so the 
Americans were certainly very greatly superior in 
force. 

At daylight, on September loth, Barclay's squad- 
ron was discovered in the N.W., and Perry at once 
got under weigh; the wind soon shifted to the 
N.E., giving us the weather-gage, the breeze being 
ver>^ light. Barclay lay to in a close column, 
heading to the S.W. in the following order: Chip- 
peway, Master's Mate J. Campbell; Detroit, Capt. 



3i8 Naval War of 1812 

R. H. Barclay; Hunter, Lieut. G. Bignall; Queen 
Charlotte, Capt. R. Finnis; Lady Prevost, Lieut. 
Edward Buchan; and Little Belt, by whom com- 
manded is not said. Perry came down with the 
wind on his port beam, and made the attack in 
column ahead, obliquely. First in order came the 
Ariel, Lieutenant John H. Packet; and Scorpion, 
Sailing-master Stephen Champlin, both being on 
the weather-bow of \he. Lawrence, Q.Si.'pt. O. H. Perry ; 
next came the Caledonia, Lieutenant Daniel Tur- 
ner; Niagara, Captain Jesse D. Elliott; Somers, 
Lieut. A. H. M. Conklin; Porcupine, Acting-master 
George Serrat; Tigress, Sailing-master Thomas C. 
Almy; and Trippe, Lieutenant Thomas Holdup.' 
As, amid light and rather baffling winds, the 
American squadron approached the enemy, Perry's 
straggling line formed an angle of about fifteen 
degrees with the more compact one of his foes. 

' The accounts of the two commanders tally almost exactly. 
Barclay's letter is a model of its kind for candor and gener- 
osity. Letter of Capt. R. H. Barclay to Sir James Yeo, Sep- 
tember 2, 1 813; of Lieutenant IngHs to Captain Barclay, 
September loth; of Captain Perry to the Secretary of the 
Navy, September loth and September 13th, and to General 
Harrison, September nth and September 13th. I have re- 
lied mainly on Lossing's Field-Book of the War of 1F12 (es- 
pecially for the diagrams furnished him by Commodore 
Champlin), on Commander Ward's Naval Tactics, p. 76, and 
on Cooper's Naval History. Extracts from the court-martial 
on Captain Barclay are given in James's Naval Occurrences, 
Ixxxiii. 



Naval War of 1 812 3^9 

At 11.45, the Detroit opened the action by a shot 
from her long 24, which fell short; at 11.50, she 
fired a second which went crashing through the 
Lawrence, and was replied to by the Scorpion's 
long 32. At 11.55, the Lawrence, having shifted 
her port bow-chaser, opened with both the long 
12's, and at meridian began with her carronades, 
but the shot from the latter all fell short. At the 
same time, the action became general on both 
sides, though the rearmost American vessels were 
almost beyond the range of their own guns, and 
quite out of range of the guns of their antagonists. 
Meanwhile, the Lawrence was already suffering 
considerably as she bore down on the enemy. It 
was twenty minutes before she succeeded in get- 
ting within good carronade range, and during that 
time the action at the head of the line was between 
the long guns of the Chippeivay and Detroit, 
throwing 123 pounds, and those of the Scorpion, 
Ariel, and Lawrence, throwing 104 pounds. As 
the enemy's fire was directed almost exclusively 
at the Lawrence, she suffered a great deal. The 
Caledonia, Niagara, and Somers were meanwhile 
engaging, at long range, the Hunter and Queen 
Charlotte, opposing from their long guns 96 pounds 
to the 39 pounds of their antagonists, while from 
a distance the three other American gun vessels 
engaged the Prevost and Little Belt. By 12.20, the 
Lawrence had worked down to close quarters, and 



^20 Naval War of 1812 



o 



at 12.30 the action was going on with great fury 
between her and her antagonists, within canister 
range. The raw and inexperienced American 
crews committed the same fault the British so 
often fell into on the ocean, and overloaded their 
carronades. In consequence, that of the Scorpion 
upset down the hatchway in the middle of the 
action, and the sides of the Detroit were dotted 
with marks from shot that did not penetrate. 
One of the ArieVs long 12's also burst. Barclay 
fought the Detroit exceedingly well, her guns being 
most excellently aimed, though they actually had 
to be discharged by flashing pistols at the touch- 
holes, so deficient was the ship's equipment. 
Meanwhile, the Caledonia came down, too, but the 
Niagara was wretchedly handled, Elliott keeping 
at a distance which prevented the use either of his 
carronades or of those of the Queen Charlotte, his 
antagonist; the latter, however, suffered greatly 
from the long guns of the opposing schooners, and 
lost her gallant commander. Captain Finnis, and 
first lieutenant, Mr. Stokes, who were killed early 
in the action; her next in command. Provincial 
Lieutenant Irvine, perceiving that he could do no 
good, passed the Hunter and joined in the attack 
on the Lawrence at close quarters. The Niagara, 
the most efficient and best-manned of the Ameri- 
can vessels, was thus almost kept out of the action 
by her captain's misconduct. At the end of the 



Naval War of 1 812 321 

line the fight went on at long range between the 
Somers, Tigress, Porcupine, and Trippe on one side, 
and Little Belt and Lady Prevost on the other ; the 
Lady Prevost making a very noble fight, although 
her 1 2 -pound carronades rendered her almost help- 
less against the long guns of the Americans. She 
was greatly cut up, her commander, Lieutenant 
Buchan, was dangerously, and her acting first 
lieutenant, Mr. Roulette, severely, wounded, and 
she began falling gradually to leeward. 

The fighting at the head of the line w^as fierce 
and bloody to an extraordinary degree. The 
Scorpion, Ariel, Lawrence, and Caledonia, all of 
them handled with the most determined courage, 
were opposed to the Chippeway, Detroit, Queen 
Charlotte, and Hunter, which were fought to the 
full as bravely. At such close quarters the two 
sides engaged on about equal terms, the Ameri- 
cans being superior in weight of metal, and inferior 
in number of men. But the Lawrence had re- 
ceived such damage in working down as to make 
the odds against PeiTy. On each side, almost the 
whole fire was directed at the opposing large ves- 
sel or vessels; in consequence, the Queen Charlotte 
was almost disabled, and the Detroit was also 
frightfully shattered, especially by the raking fire 
of the gunboats, her first lieutenant, Mr. Gar- 
land, being mortally wounded, and Captain Bar- 
clay so severely injured that he was obliged to 



VOL. I.— 21 



3^2 Naval War of 1 8i 2 

quit the deck, leaving his ship in the command of 
Lieutenant George IngHs. But on board the Law- 
rence matters had gone even worse, the combined 
fire of her adversaries having made the grimmest 
carnage on her decks. Of the 103 men who were 
fit for duty when she began the action, 83, or over 
four fifths, were killed or wounded. The vessel 
was shallow, and the ward-room, used as a cock- 
pit, to which the wounded were taken, was mostly 
above water, and the shot came through it con- 
tinually, killing and wounding many men under 
the hands of the surgeon. 

The first lieutenant, Yarnall, was three times 
wounded, but kept to the deck through all; the 
only other lieutenant on board. Brooks, of the 
marines, was mortally wounded. Every brace 
and bowline was shot away, and the brig almost 
completely dismantled ; her hull was shattered to 
pieces, many shot going completely through it, 
and the guns on the engaged side were by degrees 
all dismounted. Perry kept up the fight with 
splendid courage. As the crew fell one by one, 
the commodore called down through the skylight 
for one of the surgeon's assistants; and this call 
was repeated and obeyed till none were left ; then 
he asked, "Can any of the wounded pull a rope? " 
and three or four of them crawled up on deck to 
lend a feeble hand in placing the last guns. Perry 
himself fired the last effective heavy gun, assisted 



Naval War of 1 812 323 

only by the purser and chaplain. A man who did 
not possess his indomitable spirit would have then 
struck. Instead, however, although failing in the 
attack so far. Perry merely determined to win by 
new methods, and remodelled the line accordingly. 
Mr. Turner, in the Caledonia, when ordered to 
close, had put his helm up, run down on the oppos- 
ing line, and engaged at very short range, though 
the brig was absolutely without quarters. The 
Niagara had thus become the next in line astern 
of the Lawrence, and the sloop Trippe, having 
passed the three schooners in front of her, was 
next ahead. The Niagara now, having a breeze, 
steered for the head of Barclay's line, passing over 
a quarter of a mile to windward of the Lawrence, 
on her port beam. She was almost uninjured, hav- 
ing so far taken very little part in the combat, 
and to her Perry shifted his flag. Leaping into a 
row-boat, with his brother and four seamen, he 
rowed to the fresh brig, where he arrived at 2.30, 
and at once sent Elliott astern to hurry up the 
three schooners. The Trippe was now very near 
the Caledonia. The Lawrence, having but four- 
teen sound men left, struck her colors, but could 
not be taken possession of before the action re- 
commenced. She drifted astern, the Caledonia 
passing between her and her foes. At 2.45 the 
schooners having closed up. Perry, in his fresh 
vessel, bore up to break Barclay's line. 



324 Naval War of 1812 

The British ships had fought themselves to a 
standstill. The Lady Prevost was crippled and 
sagged to leeward, though ahead of the others. 
The Detroit and Queen Charlotte were so disabled 
that they could not effectually oppose fresh an- 
tagonists. There could thus be but little resist- 
ance to Perry, as the Niagara stood down and 
broke the British line, firing her port guns into the 
Chippeway, Little Belt, and Lady Prevost, and the 
starboard ones into the Detroit, Queen Charlotte, 
and Hunter, raking on both sides. Too disabled 
to tack, the Detroit and Charlotte tried to wear, the 
latter running up to leeward of the former; and 
both vessels having every brace and almost every 
stay shot away, they fell foul. The Niagara 
luffed athwart their bows, within half pistol-shot, 
keeping up a terrific discharge of great guns and 
musketry, while on the other side the British ves- 
sels were raked by the Caledonia and the schooners 
so closely that some of their grape-shot, passing 
over the foe, rattled through Perry's spars. Noth- 
ing further could be done, and Barclay's flag was 
struck at 3 p.m., after three and a quarter hours' 
most gallant and desperate fighting. The Chippe- 
way and Little Belt tried to escape, but were over- 
taken and brought to, respectively, by the Trippe 
and Scorpion, the commander of the latter, Mr. 
Stephen Champlin, firing the last, as he had the 
first, shot of the battle. "Captain Perry has 



Naval War of 1812 325 

behaved in the most humane and attentive man- 
ner, not only to myself and officers, but to all the 
wounded," writes Captain Barclay. 

The American squadron had suffered severely, 
more than two thirds of the loss falling upon the 
Lawrence, which was reduced to the condition of 
a perfect wreck, her starboard bulwarks being 
completely beaten in. She had, as already stated, 
22 men killed, including Lieutenant of Marines 
Brooks and Midshipman Lamb; and 61 wounded, 
including Lieutenant Yamall, Midshipman (acting 
second lieutenant) Forrest, Sailing-master Tay- 
lor, Purser Hambleton, and Midshipmen Swart- 
out and Claxton. The Niagara lost 2 killed and 
25 wounded (almost a fifth of her effectives), 
including among the latter the second lieutenant, 
Mr. Edwards, and Midshipman Cummings. The 
.Caledonia had 3, the Soniers 2, and Trippe 2, men 
wounded. The Ariel had i killed and 3 wounded; 
the Scorpion 2 killed, including Midshipman Lamb. 
The total loss was 123; 27 were killed and 96 
wounded, of whom 3 died. 

The British loss, falling most heavily on the 
Detroit and Queen Charlotte, amounted to 41 killed 
(including Capt. S. J. Garden, R.N., and Capt. 
R. A. Finnis) ; and 94 wounded (including Capt. 
Barclay and Lieutenants Stokes, Buchan, Rou- 
lette, and Bignall) : in all 135. The first and 
second in command on every vessel were killed or 



o 



26 Naval War of 181 2 



wounded, a sufficient proof of the desperate nature 
of the defence. 

The victory of Lake Erie was most important, 
both in its material results and in its moral effect. 
It gave us complete command of all the upper 
lakes, prevented any fears of invasion from that 
quarter, increased our prestige with the foe and 
our confidence in ourselves, and ensured the con- 
quest of Upper Canada; in all these respects 
its importance has not been overrated. But the 
"glory" acquired by it most certainly has been 
estimated at more than its worth. Most Ameri- 
cans, even the well educated, if asked which was 
the most glorious victory of the war, would point 
to this battle. Captain Perry's name is more 
widely known than that of any other commander. 
Every school-boy reads about him, if of no other 
sea-captain; yet he certainly stands on a lower 
grade than either Hull or Macdonough, and not a 
bit higher than a dozen others. On Lake Erie 
our seamen displayed great courage and skill ; but 
so did their antagonists. The simple truth is, 
that, where on both sides the officers and men 
were equally brave and skilful, the side which 
possessed the superiority in force, in the propor- 
tion of three to two, could not well help winning. 
The courage with which the Lawrence was de- 
fended has hardly ever been surpassed, and may 
fairly be called heroic; but equal praise belongs 



iJ 



Naval War of 1812 



327 



to the men on board the Detroit, who had to 

The following diagrams will serve to explain the movements : 



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Naval War of 1812 



discharge the great guns by flashing pistols at the 
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Naval War of 1 812 329 

defence. Courage is only one of the many ele- 
ments which go to make up the character of 
a first-class commander; something more than 
bravery is needed before a leader can be really 
called great. 

There happened to be circumstances which ren- 
dered the bragging of our writers over the victory 
somewhat plausible. Thus they could say with 
an appearance of truth that the enemy had 63 
guns to our 54, and outnumbered us. In reality, 
as well as can be ascertained from the conflicting 
evidence, he was inferior in number; but a few 
men more or less mattered nothing. Both sides 
had men enough to work the guns and handle the 
ships, especially as the fight was in smooth water 
and largely at long range. The important fact 
was that, though we had nine guns less, yet, at a 
broadside, they threw half as much metal again 
as those of our antagonist. With such odds in our 
favor it would have been a disgrace to have been 
beaten. The water was too smooth for our two 
brigs to show at their best ; but this very smooth- 
ness rendered our gunboats more formidable than 
any of the British vessels, and the British testimony 
is unanimous that it was to them the defeat was 
primarily due. The American fleet came into 
action in worse form than the hostile squadron, the 
ships straggling badly, either owing to Perry hav- 
ing formed his line badly, or else to his having 



330 Naval War of 1 8 1 2 

failed to train the subordinate commanders how to 
keep their places. The Niagara was not fought 
well at first, Captain Elliott keeping her at a dis- 
tance #that prevented her from doing any damage 
to the vessels opposed, which were battered to 
pieces by the gunboats without the chance of re- 
plying. It certainly seems as if the small vessels 
at the rear of the line should have been closer up, 
and in a position to render more effectual assist- 
ance ; the attack was made in too loose order, and, 
whether it was the fault of Perry or of his subor- 
dinates, it fails to reflect credit on the Americans. 
Cooper, as usual, praises all concerned ; but in this 
instance not with very good judgment. He says 
the line-of -battle was highly judicious, but this 
may be doubted. The weather was peculiarly 
suitable for the gunboats, with their long, heavy 
guns; and yet the line-of -battle was so arranged 
as to keep them in the rear, and let the brunt of 
the assault fall on the Lawrence, with her short 
carronades. Cooper again praises Perry for steer- 
ing for the head of the enemy's line, but he could 
hardly have done anything else. In this battle 
the firing seems to have been equally skilful on 
both sides, the Detroit's long guns being peculiarly 
well served ; but the British captains manoeuvred 
better than their foes at first and supported one 
another better, so that the disparity in damage 
done on each side was not equal to the disparity 



Naval War of 1812 



33 



in force. The chief merit of the American com- 
mander and his followers was indomitable cour- 
age and determination not to be beaten. This is 
no slight merit; but it may well be doubted if it 
would have ensured victory had Barclay's force 
been as strong as Perry's. Perry made a head- 
long attack; his superior force, whether through 
his fault or his misfortune can hardly be said, 
being brought into action in such a manner that 
the head of the line was crushed by the inferior 
force opposed. Being literally hammered out of 
his own ship. Perry brought up its powerful twin- 
sister, and the already shattered hostile squadron 
was crushed by sheer weight. The manoeuvres 
which marked the close of the battle, and which 
ensured the capture of all the opposing ships, were 
unquestionably ver}'- fine. 

The British ships were fought as resolutely as 
their antagonists, not being surrendered till they 
were crippled and helpless, and almost all the 
officers and a large proportion of the men placed 
hors de combat. Captain Barclay handled his 
ships like a first-rate seaman. It was impossible 
to arrange them so as to be superior to his an- 
tagonist, for the latter' s force was of such a nature 
that in smooth water his gunboats gave him a 
great advantage, while in any sea his two brigs 
were more than a match for the whole British 
squadron In short, our victory was due to our 



332 Naval War of 1812 

heavy metal. As regards the honor of the affair, 
in spite of the amount of boasting it has given rise 
to, I should say it was a battle to be looked upon 
as in an equally high degree creditable to both 
sides. Indeed, if it were not for the fact that the 
victory was so complete, it might be said that the 
length of the contest and the trifling disparity in 
loss reflected rather the most credit on the British. 
Captain Perry showed indomitable pluck and 
readiness to adapt himself to circumstances; but 
his claim to fame rests much less on his actual vic- 
tory than on the way in which he prepared the 
fleet that was to win it. Here his energy and 
activity deserve all praise, not only for his success 
in collecting sailors and vessels and in building the 
two brigs, but above all for the manner in which 
he succeeded in getting them out on the lake. On 
that occasion he certainly out-generalled Barclay; 
indeed, the latter committed an error that the 
skill and address he subsequently showed could 
not retrieve. But it will always be a source of 
surprise that the American public should have so 
glorified Perry's victory over an inferior force, and 
have paid comparatively little attention to Mac- 
donough's victory, which really was won against 
decided odds in ships, men, and metal. 

There are always men who consider it unpatri- 
otic to tell the truth, if the truth is not very flat- 
tering; but, aside from the morality of the case, 



Naval War of 1812 33 



o 



we never can learn how to produce a certain effect 
unless we know rightly what the causes were that 
produced a similar effect in times past. Lake 
Erie teaches us the advantage of having the odds 
on our side; Lake Champlain, that, even if they 
are not, skill can still counteract them. It is 
amusing to read some of the pamphlets written 
"in reply" to Cooper's account of this battle, the 
writers apparently regarding him as a kind of 
traitor for hinting that the victory was not " Nel- 
sonic," "unsurpassed," etc. The arguments are 
stereotyped : Perry had nine fewer guns and also 
fewer men than the foe. This last point is the 
only one respecting which there is any doubt. 
Taking sick and well together, the Americans un- 
questionably had the greatest number in crew; 
but a quarter of them were sick. Even deducting 
these, they were still, in all probability, more 
numerous than their foes. 

But it is really not a point of much consequence, 
as both sides had enough, as stated, to serve the 
guns and handle the ships. In sea-fights, after 
there are enough hands for those purposes, addi- 
tional ones are not of so much advantage. I have 
in all my accounts summed up as accurately as 
possible the contending forces, because it is so 
customary with British writers to follow James's 
minute and inaccurate statements, that I thought 
it best to give everything exactly; but it was 



334 Naval War of 1812 

really scarcely necessary, and, indeed, it is impos- 
sible to compare forces numerically. Aside from 
a few exceptional cases, the number of men, after 
a certain point was reached, made little difference. 
For example, the Java would fight just as effectu- 
ally with 377 men, the number James gives her, as 
with 426, the number I think she really had. 
Again, my figures make the Wasp slightly supe- 
rior in force to the Frolic, as she had twenty-five 
men the most ; but, in reality, as the battle was 
fought under very short sail, and decided purely 
by gunnery, the difference in number of crew was 
not of the least consequence. The Hornet had 
nine men more than the Penguin, and it would be 
absurd to say that this gave her much advantage. 
In both the latter cases, the forces were practically 
equal, although, numerically expressed, the odds 
were in favor of the Americans. The exact re- 
verse is the case in the last action of the Constitu- 
tion. Here, the Levant and Cyane had all the men 
they required, and threw a heavier broadside 
than their foe. Expressed in numbers, the odds 
against them were not great, but numbers could 
not express the fact that carronades were opposed 
to long guns, and two small ships to one big one. 
Again, though in the action on Lake Champlain 
numbers do show a slight advantage both in 
weight of metal and number of men on the British 
side, they do not make the advantage as great as 



Naval War of 1 8i 2 335 

it really was, for they dq not show that the British 
possessed a frigate with a main-deck battery of 
24-pounders, which was equal to the two chief 
vessels of the Americans, exactly as the Constitu- 
tion was superior to the Cyane and Levant.^ And 
on the same principles I think that every fair- 
minded man must admit the great superiority of 
Perry's fleet over Barclay's, though the advantage 
was greater in carronades than in long guns. 
But to admit this, by no means precludes us 

' It must always be remembered that these rules cut both 
ways. British writers are very eloquent about the disad- 
vantage in which carronades placed the Cyane and Levant, 
but do not hint that the Essex suffered from a precisely similar 
cause, in addition to her other misfortunes; either they 
should give the Constitution more credit or the Phcebe less. 
So the Confiance, throwing 480 pounds of metal at a broad- 
side, was really equal to both the Eagle and Saratoga, who 
jointly threw 678. From her long guns she threw 384 pounds; 
from her carronades, 96. Their long guns threw 168; their 
carronades, 510. Now, the 32-pound carronade, mounted on 
the spar-deck of a 38-gun frigate, was certainly much less 
formidable than the long 18 on the main-deck; indeed, it 
probably ranked more nearly with a long 1 2 , in the ordinary 
chances of war (and it must be remembered that Downie was 
the attacking party and chose his own position, so far as 
Macdonough's excellent arrangements would let him). So 
that, in comparing the forces, the carronades should not be 
reckoned for more than half the value of the long guns, and 
we get, as a mere approximation, 384-]- 48 = 432, against 
168 -f 255 = 423. At any rate, British writers, as well as 
Americans, should remember that if the Constitution was 
greatly superior to her two foes, then the Confiance was cer- 
tainly equal to the Eagle and Saratoga; and vice versa. 



33^ Naval War of 1 812 

from taking credit for t^e victory. Almost all 
the victories gained by the English over the Dutch 
in the seventeenth century were due purely to 
great superiority in force. The cases have a curi- 
ous analogy to this lake battle. Perry won with 
54 guns against Barclay's 63 ; but the odds were 
largely in his favor. Blake won a doubtful vic- 
tory on the 1 8th of February, 1653, with 80 ships 
against Tromp's 70; but the English vessels were 
twice the size of the Dutch, and in number of men 
and weight of metal greatly their superior. The 
English were excellent fighters, but no better than 
the Dutch, and none of their admirals of that 
period deserve to rank with De Ruyter. Again, 
the great victory of La Hogue was won over a very 
much smaller French fleet, after a day's hard 
fighting, which resulted in the capture of one ves- 
sel ! This victory was most exultingly chronicled, 
yet it was precisely as if Perry had fought Barclay 
all day and only succeeded in capturing the Little 
Belt. Most of Lord Nelson's successes were cer- 
tainly won against heavy odds by his great genius 
and the daring skill of the captains who served 
under him; but the battle of the Baltic, as far as 
the fighting went, reflected as much honor on the 
defeated Danes as on the mighty sea-chief who 
conquered them. Many a much- vaunted victory, 
both on sea and land, has really reflected less credit 
on the victors than the battle of Lake Erie did on 



Naval War of 1 812 ^37 

the Americans. And it must always be remem- 
bered that a victory, honorably won, if even over a 
weaker foe, does reflect credit on the nation by 
whom it is gained. It was creditable to us as a 
nation that our ships were better made and better 
armed than the British frigates, exactly as it was 
creditable to them that a few years before their 
vessels had stood in the same relation to the Dutch 
ships." It was greatly to our credit that we had 
been enterprising enough to fit out such an effec- 
tive little flotilla on Lake Erie, and for this Perry 
deserves the highest praise.^ 

Before leaving the subject it is worth while 
making a few observations on the men who com- 
posed the crews. James, who despised a Cana- 
dian as much as he hated an American, gives, as 
one excuse for the defeat, the fact that most of Bar- 
clay's crew were Canadians, whom he considers to 
be "sorry substitutes." On each side the regular 

• 

^ After Lord Duncan's victory at Camperdown, James 
chronicled the fact that all the captured line-of-battle ships 
were such poor craft as not to be of as much value as so many 
French frigates. This at least showed that the Dutch sailors 
must have done well to have made such a bloody and 
obstinate fight as they did, with the materials they had. Ac- 
cording to his own statements the loss was about propor- 
tional to the forces in action. It was another parallel to 
Perry's victory. 

^ Some of my countrymen will consider this but scant ap- 
probation, to which the answer must be that a history is not 
a panegyric. 

vol.. I, — 22 



'» -1 



38 Naval War of 1 812 



sailors, from the seaboard, were not numerous 
enough to permit the battle to be fought purely 
by them. Barclay took a number of soldiers of 
the regular army, and Perry a number of militia, 
aboard ; the former had a few Indian sharp- 
shooters, the latter quite a number of negroes. A 
great many men in each fleet were lake sailors, 
frontiersmen, and these were the especial objects 
of James's contempt; but it may be doubted if 
they, thoroughly accustomed to lake navigation, 
used to contests with Indians and whites, natu- 
rally forced to be good sailors and skilful in the use 
of rifle and cannon, were not, when trained by 
good men and on their own waters, the very best 
possible material. Certainly, the battle of Lake 
Erie, fought mainly by Canadians, was better con- 
tested than that of Lake Champlain, fought mainly 
by British. 

The difference between the American and Brit- 
ish seamen on the Atlantic was small, but on the 
lakes what little there was disappeared. A New 
Englander and an Old Englander differed little 
enough, but they differed more than a frontiers- 
man bom north of the line did from one south of 
it. These last two resembled one another more 
nearly than either did the parent. There had 
been no long-established naval school on the lakes, 
and the British sailors that came up there were 
the bt st of their kind : so the combatants were 



Naval War of 1 812 339 

really so evenly matched in courage, skill, and all 
other fighting qualities, as to make it impossible 
to award the palm to either for these attributes. 
The dogged obstinacy of the fighting, the skilful fir- 
ing and manoeuvring, and the daring and coolness 
with which cutting-out expeditions were planned 
and executed, were as marked on one side as on 
the other. The only un-English element in the 
contest was the presence among the Canadian 
English of some of the descendants of the Latin 
race from whom they had conquered the country. 
Otherwise, the men were equally matched, but the 
Americans owed their success — for the balance of 
success was largely on their side — to the fact that 
their officers had been trained in the best and 
most practical, although the smallest, navy of the 
day. The British sailors on the lakes were as good 
as our own, but no better. None of their com- 
manders compare with Macdonough. 

Perry deserves all praise for the manner in which 
he got his fleet ready; his victory over Barclay, 
was precisely similar to the quasi-victories of 
Blake over the Dutch, which have given that ad- 
miral such renown. Blake's success in attacking 
Spanish and Algerian forts is his true title to fame. 
In his engagements with the Dutch fleets (as well 
as in those of Monk, after him) his claim to merit is 
no greater and no less than Perry's. Each made 
a headlong attack, with furious, stubborn courage, 



340 Naval War of 1812 



J 



and by dint of sheer weight crushed or disabled a 
greatly inferior foe. In the fight that took place 
on February 18, 1653, De Ruyter's ship carried 
but 34 guns,' and yet with it he captured the 
Prosperous of 5 4 ; which vessel was stronger than 
any in the Dutch fleet. The fact that Blake's 
battles were generally so indecisive must be 
ascribed to the fact that his opponents were, 
though inferior in force, superior in skill. No de- 
cisive defeat was inflicted on the Dutch until 
Tromp's death. Perry's operations were on a 
very small, and Blake's on a very large, scale ; but 
whereas Perry left no antagonists to question his 
claim to victory, Blake's successes were suffi- 
ciently doubtful to admit of his antagonists in 
almost every instance claiming that they had won, 
or else that it was a draw. Of course, it is absurd 
to put Perry and Blake on a par, for one worked 
with a fleet forty times the strength of the other's 
flotilla ; but the way in which the work was done 
was very similar. And it must always be remem- 
bered that when Perry fought this battle he was 
but twenty-seven years old ; and the commanders 
of his other vessels were younger still. 

' La Vie et Les Actions Memorables de Lt.-Amiral Michel 
De Ruyter (Amsterdam, 1677), p. 23. By the way, why is 
Tromp always called Van Tromp by English writers? It 
would be quite as correct for a Frenchman to speak of Mac- 
Nelson. 



iAA 



Naval War of 1 812 341 

CHAMPLAIN 

The commander on this lake at this time was 
Lieutenant Thomas Macdonough, who had super- 
ceded the former commander, Lieutenant Sydney- 
Smith, whose name was a curious commentary on 
the close inter-relationship of the two contest- 
ing peoples. The American naval force now con- 
sisted of two sloops, the Growler and Eagle, each 
mounting eleven guns, and six gallies, mount- 
ing one gun each. Lieutenant Smith was sent 
down with his two sloops to harass the British 
gunboats, which were stationed round the head of 
Sorel River, the outlet to Lake Champlain. On 
June 3d he chased three gunboats into the river, 
the wind being aft, up to within sight of the fort 
of Isle aux Noix. A strong British land-force, 
under Major-General Taylor, now came up both 
banks of the narrow stream, and joined the three 
gunboats in attacking the sloops. The latter tried 
to beat up the stream, but the current was so 
strong and the wind so light that no headway could 
be made. The gunboats kept out of range of the 
sloop's guns, while keeping up a hot fire from 
their long 24's, to which no reply could be made; 
but the galling fire of the infantry who lined the 
banks was responded to by showers of grape. 
After three hours' conflict, at 12.30, a 24-pound 
shot from one of the gallies struck the Eagle under 



342 Naval War of 1 812 

her starboard quarter, and ripped out a whole 
plank under water. She sank at once, but it was 
in such shoal water that she did not settle entirely, 
and none of the men were drowned. Soon after- 
ward the Growler had her forestay and main-boom 
shot away, and, becoming unmanageable, ran 
ashore and was also captured. The Growler had 
I killed and 8 wounded, the Eagle 1 1 wounded ; 
their united crews, including 34 volunteers, 
amounted to 112 men. The British gunboats suf- 
fered no loss; of the troops on shore three were 
wounded, one dangerously, by grape. i Lieuten- 
ant Smith had certainly made a very plucky fight, 
but it was a great mistake to get cooped up in a 
narrow channel, with wind and current dead 
against him. It was a very creditable success to 
the British, and showed the effectiveness of well- 
handled gunboats under certain circumstances. 
The possession of these two sloops gave the com- 
mand of the lake to the British. Macdonough at 
once set about building others, but, with all his 
energy, the materials at hand were so deficient 
that he could not get them finished in time. On 
July 31st, 1000 British troops, under Colonel J. 
Murray, convoyed by Captain Thomas Everard, 

' Letter from Major-General Taylor (British) to Major- 
General Stone, June 3, 1813. Lossing says the loss of the 
British was "probably at least one hundred," — on what au- 
thority, if any, I do not know. 



Naval War of 1 812 343 

with the sloops Chubb and Finch (late Growler and 
Eagle) and three gunboats, landed at Plattsburg 
and destroyed all the barracks and stores both 
there and at Saranac. For some reason, Colonel 
Murray left so precipitately that he overlooked a 
picket of twenty of his men, who were captured; 
then he made descents on two or three other 
places and returned to the head of the lake by 
August 3d. Three days afterward, on August 
6th, Macdonough completed his three sloops, the 
President, Montgomery, and Preble, of seven guns 
each, and also six gunboats; which force enabled 
him to prevent any more plundering expeditions 
taking place that summer, and to convoy Hamp- 
ton's troops when they made an abortive effort to 
penetrate into Canada by the Sorel River on Sep- 
tember 2 1 St. 

BRITISH LOSS ON THE LAKES DURING 1813 

Nainc Tons Guns Remarks 

Ship 600 24 Burnt on stocks. 

Gloucester i8o lo Taken at York. 

Mary 80 3 Burnt. 

Drmumond 80 3 Captured. 

Lady Gore 80 3 

Schooner 80 3 

Detroit 490 19 

Queen Charlotte 400 17 

Lady Prevost 230 13 

Hunter 180 10 

CJiippeway , 70 i 

Little Belt. ,,,,.,.,,. 90 3 " 

12 vessels 2560 109 



344 



Naval War of 1812 



AMERICAN LOSS ' 



Name 
Growler. . 
Eagle.. . . 



Tons 


Guns 


Remarks 


112 


1 1 


Captured. 


1 10 


1 1 





2 vessels . 222 22 

* Excluding the Growler and Julia, which were recaptured. 



END OF VOLUME I. 



NEW LIBRARY EDITION 



THE 

NAVAL WAR OF 1812 



OR THE 

History of the United States Navy during the last 

WAR WITH Great Britain, to which is appended 

AN account of the Battle of New Orleans 



BY 

THEODORE ROOSEVELT 



two volumes in one 
part II 



G. p. PUTNAM'S SONS 

new YORK AND LONDON 



Copyright, 1883 

by 

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 



Copyright, ipio 

BY 

THEODORE ROOSEVELT 
(In renewal of copyright originally registered in 1882.) 



Made in the United States of America 



AUTHORITIES REFERRED TO IN 
CHAPTER IV 



Alison, Sir A. History of Europe. Ninth edition. 20 
vols. London, 1852. 

Butler, Adjutant-General Robert. Official Report for the 
Morning of January 8, 181 j. 

Codrington, Admiral Sir Edward, Memoir of . by Lady Bour- 
chier. London, 1873. 

Cole, John William. Monoirs of Briiisli Generals Dis- 
tinguished During the Peninsular War. London, 1856. 

Court of Inquiry on Conduct of General Morgan. Official 
Report. 

Gleig, Ensign H. R. Narrative of the Campaigns of the 
BriiisJi Army at Washington, Baltimore, and New Orleans. 
Philadelphia, 182 1. 

Jackson, Andrew. As a Public Man. A sketch by W. G. 
Sumner. Boston, 1882. 

Jackson, General Andrew. Official Letters. 

James, William. Military Occurrences of the Late War. 2 
vols. London, 1818. 

Keane, Major-General John. Letter, December 26, 18 14. 

Lambert, General. Letters, January 10 and 28, 1815. 

Latour, Major A. Lacarriex. Historical Memoir of the 
War in West Florida and Louisiana. Translated from the 
French by H. P. Nugent. Philadelphia, 1816. 

Lossing, Benson J. field-Book of the War of 1813. New 
York, 1859. 

Patterson, Com. Daniel G. Letters, December 20, 18 14, 
and January 13, 1815. 

Mo}iroe, James. Sketch of his Life, b)' Daniel C. Gilman. 
i6mo. Boston, 1883. 

Napier, Maj.-Gen. Sir W. F. P. History of the War in 
the Peninsula. 5 vols. New York, 1882. 

Scott, Lieut.-Gen. W . Memoirs, by himself. 2 vols. New 
York, 1864. 

Thornton, Col. W. Letter, January 8, 18 15. 

iii 



I 



CONTENTS 



CHAPTER I 

1S14 

ON THE OCEAN 

Strictness of the blockade — Cruise of Rodgers — Cruise of 
the Constitution — Chased into Marblehead — Attempt to cut 
out the Alligator — The Essex captured after an engagement 
with Pluvbe and Cherub — The Frolic captured — The Peacock 
captures the Epervier — -Commodore Barney's flotilla afloat 
— The British in the Chesapeake — Capture of Washington, 
and burning of the public buildings — The \Vasp> captures 
the Reindeer — The Wasp sinks the Avon — Cruise and loss of 
the Adams — The privateer General Ar)nstro}i^ — The privateer 
Prince de Neufchdtel— Loss of the gunboats on Lake Borgne 
— Fighting near New Orleans — Summary 1-85 

CHAPTER II 
1814 

ON THE LAKES 

Ontario — The contest one of ship-building merely — 
Statistics of the two squadrons — -Serious sickness among the 
Americans — Extreme caution of the commanders, verging 
on timidity — Yeo takes Oswego and blockades Sackett's 
Harbor — British gunboats captured — Chauncy blockades 
Kingston. — Erie — Captain Sinclair burns St. Joseph — 
Makes unsuccessful expedition against Mackinaw — Daring 



vl Contents 

and successful cutting-out expeditions of the British — Cap- 
ture of the Ohio and Soiners. — Champlain — Macdonough's 
and Downie's squadrons — ^James's erroneous statements con- 
cerning them — Gallant engagement and splendid victory of 
Macdonough — Macdonough one of the greatest of American 
sea-captains 86-143 

CHAPTER III 

1S15 

CONCLUDING OPERATIONS 

The President captured by Captain Hayes's squadron — 
Successful cutting-out expedition of the Americans — Ameri- 
can privateer Chasseur captures St. Lawrence — The Consti- 
tution engages the Cyane and the Levant and captures both — 
Escapes from a British squadron — The Hornet captures the 
Penguiji and escapes from pursuit of the Cornwallis — The 
Peacock's wanton attack on the Nautilus — Wanton attack on 
American gunboat after treaty of peace — Summary of events 
in 1S15 — Remarks on the war — Tal)les of comparative loss, 
etc. — Compared with results of Anglo-French struggle, 

144-210 

CHAPTER IV 

1815 

THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS 

The war on land generally disastrous — British send great 
expedition against New Orleans — Jackson prepares for the 
defence of the city — Night attack on the British advance 
guard — Artillery duels — Great battle of January 8, 18 15 — 
Slaughtering repulse of the main attack — Rout of the Ameri- 
cans on the right bank of the river — Final retreat of the 
British — Observations on the character of the troops and 
commanders engaged 21 1-260 

Appendix 261 

Index 299 



THE 
NAVAL WAR OF 1812 



NAVAL WAR OF i8iz 



CHAPTER I 
1814 

ON THE OCEAN 

Strictness of the blockade — Cruise of Rodgers — Cruise of 
the Constitution — Her unsuccessful chase of La Pique — 
Attack on the Alligator — The Essex captured — The Frolic 
captured — The Peacock captures the Epervier — Commodore 
Barney's flotilla — The British in the Chesapeake — The Wasp 
captures the Reindeer and sinks the Avon — Cruise and loss 
of the Adams — The privateer General Armstrong — The pri- 
vateer Prince de Nettfchdiel — Loss of the gunboats on Lake 
Borgne — Fighting near New Orleans — Summary. 

DURING this year the blockade of the Ameri- 
can coast was kept up with ever increasing 
rigor. The British frigates hovered like 
hawks off every seaport that was known to harbor 
any fighting craft; they almost invariably went 
in couples, to support one another and to lighten, 
as far as was possible, the severity of their work. 
On the northern coasts, in particular, the intense 
cold of the furious winter gales rendered it no easy 
task to keep the assigned stations ; the ropes were 

VOL. 11.— I 



2 Naval War of 1812 

turned into stiff and brittle bars, the hulls were 
coated with ice, and many, both of men and offi- 
cers, were frost-bitten and crippled. But no stress 
of weather could long keep the stubborn and 
hardy British from their posts. With ceaseless 
vigilance they traversed continually the allotted 
cruising .grounds, capturing the privateers, harry- 
ing the coasters, and keeping the more powerful 
ships confined to port ; " no American frigate could 
proceed singly to sea without imminent risk of 
being crushed by the superior force of the nu- 
merous British squadrons." ' But the sloops of 
war, commanded by officers as skilful as they were 
daring, and manned by as hardy seamen as ever 
sailed salt water, could often slip out ; generally, 
on some dark night, when a heavy gale was blow- 
ing, they would make the attempt under storm 
canvas, and with almost invariable success. The 
harder the weather, the better was their chance ; 
once clear of the coast the greatest danger ceased, 
though throughout the cruise the most untiring 
vigilance was needed. The new sloops that I have 
mentioned as being built proved themselves the 
best possible vessels for this kind of work; they 
were fast enough to escape from most cruisers of 
superior force, and were over-matches for any 
British flush-decked ship, that is, for anything 
below the rank of the frigate-built corvettes of the 
Cyane's class. The danger of recapture was too 

' Captain Broke's letter of challenge to Captain Lawrence. 



Naval War of 1 812 3 

great to permit of the prizes being sent in, so they 
were generally destroyed as soon as captured ; and 
as the cruising grounds were chosen right in the 
track of commerce, the damage done and conster- 
nation caused were very great. 

Besides the numerous frigates cruising along the 
coast in couples or small squadrons, there were 
two or three places that were blockaded by a 
heavier force. One of these was New London, 
before which cruised a squadron under the direc- 
tion of Sir Thomas Hardy, in the 74-gun ship 
Ramillies. Most of the other cruising squadrons 
off the coast contained razees or two-deckers. 
The boats of the Hague, 74, took part in the de- 
struction of some coasters and fishing-boats at 
Pettipauge in April; and those of the Superb, 74, 
shared in a similar expedition against Wareham 
in June.' The command on the coast of North 
America was now given to Vice-Admiral Sir Alex- 
ander Cochrane. The main British force con- 
tinued to lie in the Chesapeake, where about fifty 
sail were collected. During the first part of this 
year these were under the command of Sir Robert 
Barrie, but in May he was relieved by Rear-Ad- 
miral Cockburn.^ 

The President, 44, Commodore Rodgers, at the 
beginning of 1814 was still out, cruising among 
the Barbadoes and West Indies, only making a 
few prizes of not much value. She then turned 

^ James, vi., 474. ^ James, vi., 437. 



4 Naval War of 1 812 

toward the American coast, striking soundings 
near St. Augustine, and thence proceeding north 
along the coast to Sandy Hook, which was reached 
on February i8th. The hght was passed in the 
night, and shortly afterward several sail were 
made out, when the President was at once cleared 
for action/ One of these strange sail was the 
Loire, 38 (British), Captain Thomas Brown, which 
ran down to close the President, unaware of her 
force; but, on discovering her to be a 44, hauled 
to the wind and made off/ The President did not 
pursue, another frigate and a gun-brig being in 
sight/ This rencontre gave rise to nonsensical 
boastings on both sides ; one American writer calls 
the Loire the Plantagenet, 74; James, on the other 
hand, states that the President was afraid to en- 
gage the 38-gun frigate, and that the only reason 
the latter declined the combat was because she 
was short of men. The best answer to this is a 
quotation from his own work (vol. vi., p. 402), that 
"the admiralty had issued an order that no 18- 
pounder frigate was voluntarily to engage one of 
the 24-pounder frigates of America." Coupling 
this order with the results of the combats that 
had already taken place between frigates of these 
classes, it can always be safely set down as sheer 
bravado when any talk is made of an American 44 

^ Letter of Commodore Rodgers, February 20, 18 14. 

* James, vi., 412. 

3 Naval Monument, p. 235. 



Naval War of 1 8i 2 5 

refusing to give battle to a British 38 ; and it is 
even more absurd to say that a British hne-of- 
battle ship would hesitate for a minute about en- 
gaging any frigate. 

On January ist, the Constitution, which had 
been lying in Boston harbor undergoing complete 
repairs, put out to sea under the command of 
Captain Charles Stewart. The British 38-gun 
frigate Nymphe had been lying before the port, 
but she disappeared long before the Constitution 
was in condition, in obedience to the order already 
mentioned. Captain Stewart ran down toward 
the Barbadoes, and on the 14th of February cap- 
tured and destroyed the British 14-gun schooner 
Pictoti, with a crew of seventy-five men. After 
making a few other prizes and reaching the coast 
of Guiana she turned homeward, and on the 23d 
of the same month fell in, at the entrance to the 
Mona passage, with the British 36-gun frigate 
Pique (late French Pallas), Captain Maitland. 
The Constitution at once made sail for the Pique, 
steering free ' ; the latter at first hauled to the 
wind and waited for her antagonist, but when the 
latter was still three miles distant she made out 
her force and immediately made all sail to escape ; 
the Constitution, however, gained steadily till 8 
P.M., when the night and thick squally weather 
caused her to lose sight of the chase. Captain 
Maitland had on board the prohibitory order 
* Letter of Captain Stewart, April 8, 1814. 



Ikili 



6 Naval War of 1 812 

issued by the admiralty/ and acted correctly. 
His ship was altogether too light for his antagon- 
ist. James, however, is not satisfied with this, 
and wishes to prove that both ships were desirous 
of avoiding the combat. He says that Captain 
Stewart came near enough to count "13 ports and 
a bridle on the Pique s main-deck," and "saw at 
once that she was of a class inferior to the Gner- 
Here or Java,'' but "thought the Pique's i8's were 
24's, and therefore did not make an effort to bring 
her to action." He portrays very picturesquely 
the grief of the Pique's crew when they find they 
are not going to engage; how they come aft and 
request to be taken into action; how Captain 
Maitland reads them his instructions, but "fails to 
persuade them that there had been any necessity 
of issuing them"; and, finally, how the sailors, 
overcome by woe and indignation, refuse to take 
their supper-time grog, — which was certainly re- 
markable. As the Constitution had twice cap- 
tured British frigates "with impunity," according 
to James himself, is it likely that she would now 
shrink from an encounter with a ship which she 
"saw at once was of an inferior class" to those 
already conquered? Even such abject cowards 
as James's Americans would not be guilty of so 
stupid an action. Of course, neither Captain 
Stewart nor any one else supposed for an instant 

^ James, vi., 477. 



Naval War of 1812 7 

that a 36-gun frigate was armed with 24-pounders. 

It is worth while mentioning, as an instance of 
how utterly untrustworthy James is in dealing 
with American affairs, that he says (p. 476) the 
Constitution had now "what the Americans would 
call a bad crew," whereas, in her previous battles, 
all her men had been "picked." Curiously 
enough, this is the exact reverse of the truth. 
In no case was an American ship manned with a 
'picked' " crew, but the nearest approach to such 
was the crew the Constitution carried in this and 
the next cruise, when ' ' she probably possessed as 
fine a crew as ever manned a frigate. They were 
principally New England men, and it has been 
said of them that they were almost qualified to 
fight the ship without her of^cers." ^ The state- 
ment that such men, commanded by one of the 
bravest and most skilful captains of our navy, 
would shrink from attacking a greatly inferior 
foe, is hardly worth while denying; and, fortun- 
ately, such denial is needless. Captain Stewart's 
account being fully corroborated in the Memoir of 
Admiral Durham, written by his nephew. Captain 
Murray, London, 1846. 

The Constitution arrived off the port of Marble- 
head on April 3d, and at 7 a.m. fell in with the 
two British 38-gun frigates Junon, Captain Upton, 
and Tenedos, Captain Parker. "The American 

' Cooper, ii., 463. 



Ui 



8 Naval War of 1 8i 2 

frigate was standing to the westward with the 
wind about north by west and bore from the two 
British frigates about northwest by west. The 
Junon and Tenedos quickly hauled up in chase, 
and the Constitution crowded sail in the direc- 
tion of Marblehead. At 9.30, finding the Tenedos 
rather gaining upon her, the Constitution started 
her water and threw overboard a quantity of pro- 
visions and other articles. At 11.30 she hoisted 
her colors, and the two British frigates, who were 
now dropping slowly in the chase, did the same. 
At 1.30 P.M. the Constitution anchored in the har- 
bor of Marblehead. Captain Parker was anxious 
to follow her into the port, which had no defences ; 
but the Tenedos was recalled by a signal from the 
Junon.'' Shortly afterward the Constitution 
again put out and reached Boston unmolested. 

On January 29, 1814, the small U. S. coasting 
schooner Alligator, of 4 guns and 40 men, Sailing- 
master R. Basset, was lying at anchor in the 
mouth of Stone River, S. C, when a frigate and a 
brig were perceived close inshore near the break- 
ers. Judging from their motions that they would 
attempt to cut him out when it was dark, Mr. 
Basset made his preparations accordingly.^ At 
half-past seven six boats were observed approach- 
ing cautiously under cover of the marsh, with 

^ James, vi., 479. 

* Letter of Sailing-master Basset, January 31, 18 14. 



Naval War of 1 812 9 

muffled oars; on being hailed they cheered and 
opened with boat carronades and musketry, com- 
ing on at full speed; whereupon the Alligator cut 
her cable and made sail, the wind being light from 
the southwest; while the crew opened such a 
heavy fire on the assailants, who were then not 
thirty yards off, that they stopped the advance 
and fell astern. At this moment the Alligator 
grounded, but the enemy had suffered so severely 
that they made no attempt to renew the attack, 
rowing off down stream. On board the Alligator 
two men were killed and two wounded, including 
the pilot, who was struck down by a grape-shot 
while standing at the helm ; and her sails and rig- 
ging were much cut. The extent of the enemy's 
loss was never known ; next day one of his cutters 
was picked up at North Edisto, much injured and 
containing the bodies of an officer and a seaman.' 
For his skill and gallantry, Mr. Basset was pro- 
moted to a lieutenancy, and for a time his exploit 
put a complete stop to the cutting-out expedi- 
tions along that part of the coast. The Alligator 
herself sank in a squall on July ist, but was after- 
ward raised and refitted. 

It is much to be regretted that it is almost im- 
possible to get at the British account of any of 
these expeditions which ended successfully for the 
Americans ; all such cases are generally ignored by 

^ Letter from Commander J. H. Dent, February 21, 18 14. 



lo Naval War of 1812 

the British historians; so that I am obhged to 
rely solely upon the accounts of the victors, who, 
with the best intentions in the world, could hardly 
be perfectly accurate. 

At the close of 1813, Captain Porter was still 
cruising in the Pacific. 

Early in January, the Essex, now with 255 men 
aboard, made the South American coast, and on 
the 12 th of that month anchored in the harbor of 
Valparaiso. She had in company a prize, re- 
christened the Essex Junior, with a crew of 60 
men, and 20 guns, ten long 6's, and ten 18-pound 
carronades. Of course, she could not be used in a 
combat with regular cruisers. 

On February 8th, the British frigate Phoshe, 36, 
Captain James Hilyar, accompanied by the Cherub 
18, Captain Thomas Tudor Tucker, the former 
carrying 300, and the latter 140, men,' made their 
appearance, and apparently proposed to take the 
Essex by a coup de main. They hauled into the 
harbor on a wind, the Cherub falling to leeward; 
while the Phcebe made the port quarters of the 
Essex, and then, putting her helm down, luffed 
upon her starboard bow, but ten or fifteen feet 
distant. Porter's crew were all at quarter, the 
powder-boys with slow matches ready to discharge 

' They afterward took on board enough men from British 
merchant vessels to raise their complements, respectively, to 
320 and 180. 



i 



Naval War of 1 8 1 2 n 

the guns, the boarders standing by, cutlass in 
hand, to board in the smoke; everything was 
cleared for action on both frigates. Captain Hil- 
yar now probably saw that there was no chance of 
carrying the Essex by surprise, and, standing on 
the after-gun, he inquired after Captain Porter's 
health; the latter returned the inquiry, but 
warned Hilyar not to fall foul. The British cap- 
tain then braced back his yards, remarking that 
if he did fall aboard it would be purely acci- 
dental. " Well," said Porter, "you have no busi- 
ness where you are; if you toilch a rope-yarn of 
this ship I shall board instantly." ' The Phccbe, 
in her then position, was completely at the mercy 
of the American ships, and Hilyar, greatly agi- 
tated, assured Porter that he meant nothing hos- 
tile; and the Phcehe backed down, her yards 
passing over those of the Essex without touching 
a rope, and anchored half a mile astern. Shortly 
afterwards the two captains met on shore, when 
Hilyar thanked Porter for his behavior, and, on 
his inquiry, assured him that after thus owing 
his safety to the latter' s forbearance. Porter need 
be under no apprehension as to his breaking the 
neutrality. 

The British ships now began a blockade of the 
port. On February 27th, the Phoebe being hove 
to close off the port, and the Cherub a league to 

* Life of Farragut, p. 33. 



12 Naval War of 1812 

leeward, the former fired a weather-gun; the 
Essex interpreted this as a challenge, took the 
crew of the Essex Junior aboard and went out to 
attack the British frigate. But the latter did not 
await the combat ; she bore up, set her studding- 
sails, and ran down to the Cherub. The American 
officers were intensely irritated over this, and 
American writers have sneered much at " a British 
36 refusing combat with an American 32." But 
the armaments of the two frigates were so wholly 
dissimilar that it is hard to make comparison. 
When the fight really took place, the Essex was 
so crippled and the water so smooth that the 
British ships fought at their own distance ; and as 
they had long guns to oppose to Porter's carro- 
nades, this really made the Cherub more nearly 
suited to contend with the Essex than the latter 
was to fight the Phoebe. But when the Essex, in 
fairly heavy weather, with the crew of the Essex 
Junior aboard, was to windward, the circum- 
stances were very different; she carried as many 
men and guns as the Phabe, and in close combat, 
or in a hand-to-hand struggle, could probably have 
taken her. Still, Hilyar's conduct in avoiding 
Porter except when the Cherub was in company 
was certainly over-cautious, and very difficult to 
explain in a man of his tried courage. 

On March 27th, Porter decided to run out of the 
harbor on the first opportunity, so as to draw 



Naval War of 1812 13 

away his two antagonists in chase, and let the 
Essex Junior escape. This plan had to be tried 
sooner than was expected. The two vessels were 
always ready, the Essex only having her proper 
complement of 255 men aboard. On the next 
day, the 28th, it came on to blow from the south, 
when the Essex parted her port cable and dragged 
the starboard anchor to leeward ; so she got under 
way, and made sail ; by several trials it had been 
found that she was faster than the Phaehe, and 
that the Cherub was very slow indeed, so Porter 
had little anxiety about his own ship, only fearing 
for his consort. The British vessels were close in 
with the weathermost point of the bay, but Porter 
thought he could weather them, and hauled up 
for that purpose. Just as he was rounding the 
outermost point, which, if accomplished, would 
have secured his safety, a heavy squall struck the 
Essex, and, when she was nearly gunwale under, 
the main-topmast went by the board. She now 
wore and stood in for the harbor, but the wind 
had shifted, and on account of her crippled con- 
dition she could not gain it; so she bore up and 
anchored in a small bay, three miles from Valpar- 
aiso, and half a mile from a detached Chilian 
battery of one gun, the Essex being within pistol- 
shot of the shore.' The Phcebe and Cherub now 
bore down upon her, covered with ensigns, union- 

' Letter of Captain David Porter, July 3, 18 14. 



kli 



14 Naval War of 1812 

jacks, and motto flags; and it became evident 
that Hilyar did not intend to keep his word, as 
soon as he saw that Porter was disabled. So the 
Essex prepared for action, though there could be 
no chance whatever of success. Her flags were 
flying from every mast, and everything was made 
ready as far as was possible. The attack was 
made before springs could be got on her cables. 
She was anchored so near the shore as to preclude 
the possibility of Captain Hilyar' s passing ahead 
of her ' ; so his two ships came cautiously down, 
the Cherub taking her position on the starboard 
bow of the Essex, and the Phcebe under the latter's 
stern. The attack began at 4 p.m.^ Some of the 
bow-guns of the American frigate bore upon 
the Cherub, and, as soon as she found this out, the 
sloop ran down and stationed herself near the 
Phoebe. The latter had opened with her broadside 
of long i8's, from a position in which not one of 
Porter's guns could reach her. Three times 
springs were got on the cables of the Essex, in 
order to bring her round till her broadside bore; 
but in each instance they were shot away, as soon 
as they were hauled taut. Three long 12's were 
got out of the stern-ports, and with these an ani- 
mated fire was kept up on the two British ships, 

' Letter of Captain James Hilyar, March 30, 1S14. 

' Mean time. Porter says 3.54; Hilyar a few minutes past 
4. The former says the first attack lasted half an hour; the 
latter, but ten minutes. I accordingly make it twenty. 



Naval War of 1 8 1 2 15 

the aim being especially to cripple their rigging. 
A good many of Porter's crew were killed during 
the first five minutes, before he could bring any 
guns to bear; but afterward he did not suffer 
much, and at 4.20, after a quarter of an hour's 
fight between the three long 12's of the Essex and 
the whole 36 broadside guns of the Phcsbe and 
Cherub, the latter were actually driven off. They 
wore, and again began with their long guns ; but, 
these producing no visible effect, both of the Brit- 
ish ships hauled out of the fight at 4.30. "Hav- 
ing lost the use of mainsail, jib, and mainstay, 
appearances looked a little inauspicious," writes 
Captain Hilyar. But the damages were soon re- 
paired, and his two ships stood back for the 
crippled foe. Both stationed themselves on her 
port quarter, the Phosbe at anchor, with a spring, 
firing her broadside, while the Cherub kept under 
way, using her long bow-chasers. Their fire was 
very destructive, for they were out of reach of the 
Essex's carronades, and not one of her long guns 
could be brought to bear on them. Porter now 
cut his cable, at 5.20, and tried to close with his 
antagonists. After many ineffectual efforts, sail 
was made. The flying- jib halyards were the only 
serviceable ropes uncut. That sail was hoisted, 
and the fore-topsail and foresail let fall, though 
the want of sheets and tacks rendered them almost 
useless. Still the Essex drove down on her assail • 



i6 Naval War of 1812 

ants, and for the first time got near enough to 
use her carronades ; for a minute or two the firing 
was tremendous, but after the first broadside the 
Cherub hauled out of the fight in great haste, and 
during the remainder of the action confined her- 
self to using her bow-guns from a distance. Im- 
mediately afterward, the Phcehe also edged off, and 
by her superiority of sailing, her foe being now 
almost helpless, was enabled to choose her own 
distance, and again opened from her long i8's, 
out of range of Porter's carronades.' The carnage 
on board the Essex had now made her decks 
look like shambles. One gun was manned three 
times, fifteen men being slain at it; its captain 
alone escaped without a wound. There were but 
one or two instances of flinching; the wounded, 
many of whom were killed by flying splinters 
while under the hands of the doctors, cheered on 
their comrades, and themselves worked at the 
guns like fiends as long as they could stand. At 
one of the bow-guns was stationed a young Scotch- 
man, named Bissly, who had one leg shot off close 

^ American writers often sneer at Hilyar for keeping away 
from the Essex, and out of reach of her short guns; but his 
condtict was eminently proper in this respect. It was no 
part of his duty to fight the Essex at the distance which best 
suited her; but, on the contrary, at that which least suited 
her. He, of course, wished to win the victory with the least 
possible loss to himself, and acted accordingly. His conduct 
in the action itself could not be improved upon. 



Naval War of 1812 17 

by the groin. Using his handkerchief as a tourni- 
quet, he said, turning to his American shipmates: 
" I left my own country and adopted the United 
States, to fight for her. I hope I have this day 
proved myself worthy of the country of my adop- 
tion. I am no longer of any use to you or to her, 
so good-by!" With these words he leaned over 
the sill of the port, and threw himself overboard.' 
Among the very few men who flinched was one 
named William Roach; Porter sent one of his 
midshipmen to shoot him, but he was not to be 
found. He was discovered by a man named 
William Call, whose leg had been shot off and 
was hanging by the skin, and who dragged the 
shattered stump all round the bag-house, pistol in 
hand, trying to get a shot at him. Lieut. J. G. 
Cowell had his leg shot off above the knee, and 
his life might have been saved had it been ampu- 
tated at once ; but the surgeons already had rows 
of wounded men waiting for them, and when it 
was proposed to him that he should be attended 
to out of order, he replied: " No, doctor, none of 
that; fair play's a jewel. One man's life is as 
dear as another's; I would not cheat any poor 
fellow out of his turn." So he stayed at his post, 
and died from loss of blood. 

Finding it hopeless to try to close, the Essex 

' This and most of the anecdotes are taken from the in- 
valuable Life of Farragut, pp. 37-46. 

VOL. II.— 2 



i8 Naval War of 1812 

stood for the land, Porter intending to run her 
ashore and burn her. But when she had drifted 
close to the bluffs the wind suddenly shifted, took 
her flat aback and paid her head off shore, ex- 
posing her to a raking fire. At this moment 
Lieutenant Downes, commanding the Junior, 
pulled out in a' boat, through all the fire, to see if 
he could do anything. Three of the men with 
him, including an old boatswain's mate, named 
Kingsbury, had come out expressly "to share the 
fate of their old ship" ; so they remained aboard, 
and, in their places. Lieutenant Downes took some 
of the wounded ashore, while the Cherub kept up 
a tremendous fire upon him. The shift of the 
wind gave Porter a faint hope of closing; and 
once more the riddled hulk of the little American 
frigate was headed for her foes. But Hilyar put 
his helm up to avoid close quarters; the battle 
was his already, and the cool old captain was too 
good an officer to leave anything to chance. See- 
ing he could not close. Porter had a hawser bent 
on the sheet anchor and let go. This brought 
the ship's head around, keeping her stationary 
and from such of her guns as were not dismounted 
and had men enough left to man them, a broad- 
side was fired at the Phoebe. The wind was now 
very light, and the Phcebe, whose main- and miz- 
zen-masts and mainyard were rather seriously 
wounded, and who had suffered a great loss of 



Naval War of 1 812 19 

canvas and cordage aloft, besides receiving a num- 
ber of shot between wind and water,' and was 
thus a good deal crippled, began to drift slowly 
to leeward. It was hoped that she would drift 
out of gunshot, but this last chance was lost by 
the parting of the hawser, which left the Essex at 
the mercy of the British vessels. Their fire was 
deliberate and destructive, and could only be 
occasionally replied to by a shot from one of the 
long 12's of the Essex. The ship caught fire, and 
the flames came bursting up the hatchway, and a 
quantity of powder exploded below. IMany of 
the crew were knocked overboard by shot, and 
drowned; others leaped into the water, thinking 
the ship was about to blow up, and tried to swim 
to the land. Some succeeded; among them was 
one man who had sixteen or eighteen pieces of 
iron in his leg, scales from the muzzle of his gun. 
The frigate had been shattered to pieces above 
the water-line, although from the smoothness 
of the sea she was not harmed enough below it to 
reduce her to a sinking condition. ^ The carpenter 
reported that he alone of his crew was fit for duty ; 

* Captain Hilyar's letter. James says the Phcrbe had seven 
shot between wind and water, and one below the water-line. 
Porter says she had eighteen 12-pound shot below the water- 
line. The latter statement must have been an exaggeration; 
and James is probably further wrong still. 

^ An exactly analogous case to that of the British sloop 
Reindeer. 



20 Naval War of 1812 

the others were dead or disabled. Lieutenant 
Wilmer was knocked overboard by a spHnter, and 
drowned; his Httle negro boy, "Ruff," came up 
on deck, and, hearing of the disaster, deHberately 
leaped into the sea and shared his master's fate. 
Lieutenant Odenheimer was also knocked over- 
board, but afterward regained the ship. A shot, 
glancing upward, killed four of the men who were 
standing by a gun, striking the last one in the 
head and scattering his brains over his comrades. 
The only commissioned officer left on duty was 
Lieutenant Decatur McKnight. The sailing-mas- 
ter, Barnwell, when terribly wounded, remained 
at his post till he fainted from loss of blood. Of 
the 255 men aboard the Essex when the battle 
began, 58 had been killed, 66 wounded, and 31 
drowned ("missing"), while 24 had succeeded in 
reaching shore. But 76 men were left un wounded, 
and many of these had been bruised or otherwise 
injured. Porter himself was knocked down by 
the windage of a passing shot. While the young 
midshipman, Farragut, was on the ward-room 
ladder, going below for gun-primers, the captain 
of the gun directly opposite the hatchway was 
struck full in the face by an 18-pound shot, and 
tumbled back on him. They fell down the hatch 
together, Farragut being stunned for some minutes. 
Later, while standing by the man at the wheel, an 
old quartermaster named Francis Bland, a shot 



Naval War of 1 812 21 

coming over the foreyard took off the quarter- 
master's right leg, carrying away at the same 
time one of Farragut's coat tails. The old fellow 
was helped below, but he died for lack of a tourni- 
quet, before he could be attended to. 

Nothing remained to be done, and at 6.20 
the Essex surrendered and was taken possession 
of. The Phoebe had lost four men killed, includ- 
ing her first lieutenant, William Ingram, and 7 
wounded; the Cherub, i killed, and 3, including 
Captain Tucker, wounded. Total, 5 killed and 10 
wounded.' The difference in loss was natural, 
as, owing to their having long guns and the choice 
of position, the British had been able to fire ten 
shot to the Americans' one. 

The conduct of the two English captains in at- 
tacking Porter as soon as he was disabled, in 
neutral waters, while they had been very careful 
to abstain from breaking the neutrality while he 
was in good condition, does not look well; at the 
best it shows that Hilyar had only been withheld 
hitherto from the attack by timidity, and it looks 
all the worse when it is remembered that Hilyar 

' James says that most of the loss was occasioned by the 
first three broadsides of the Essex; this is not surprising, as 
in all she hardly fired half a dozen, and the last were dis- 
charged when half of the guns had been disabled, and there 
were scarcely men enough to man the remainder. Most of 
the time her resistance was limited to firing such of her six long 
guns as would bear. 



22 Naval War of 1812 

owed his ship's previous escape entirely to Porter's 
forbearance on a former occasion, when the British 
frigate was entirely at his mercy, and that the 
British captain had afterward expressly said that 
he would not break the neutrality. Still, the 
British in this war did not act very differently from 
the way we ourselves did on one or two occasions in 
the Civil War, — witness the capture of the Florida. 
And after the battle was once begun the sneers 
which most of our historians, as well as the par- 
ticipators in the fight, have showered upon the 
British captains, for not foregoing the advantages 
which their entire masts and better artillery gave 
them by coming to close quarters, are decidedly 
foolish. Hilyar's conduct during the battle, as 
well as his treatment of the prisoners afterward, 
was perfect, and as a minor matter it may be 
mentioned that his official letter is singularly just 
and fair-minded. Says Lord Howard Douglass ' : 
"The action displayed all that can reflect honor 
on the science and admirable conduct of Captain 
Hilyar and his crew, which, without the assistance 
of the Cherub, would have ensured the same ter- 
mination. Captain Porter's sneers at the respectful 
distance the Phccbe kept are in fact acknow- 
ledgments of the ability with which Captain 
Hilyar availed himself of the superiority of his 
arms; it was a brilliant affair." While endorsing 

^ Naval Gunnery, p. 149. 



ii 



Naval War of 1 812 23 

this criticism, it may be worth while to compare 
it with some of the author's comments upon the 
other actions, as that between Decatur and the 
Macedonian. To make the odds here as great 
against Garden as they were against Porter, it 
would be necessary to suppose that the Mace- 
donian had lost her main-topmast, had but six 
long i8's to oppose to her antagonist's 24's, and 
that the latter was assisted by the corvette Adams; 
so that, as a matter of fact, Porter fought at fully 
double or treble the disadvantage Garden did, 
and, instead of surrendering when he had lost 
a third of his crew, fought till three fifths of 
his men were dead or wounded, and, moreover, 
inflicted greater loss and damage on his antag- 
onists than Garden did. If, then, as Lord Douglass 
says, the defence of the Macedonian brilliantly 
upheld the character of the British navy for 
courage, how much more did that of the Essex 
show for the American navy; and if Hilyar's 
conduct was " brilliant," that of Decatur was 
more so. 

This was an action in which it is difficult to tell 
exactly how to award praise. Gaptain Hilyar 
deserves it, for the coolness and skill with which 
he made his approaches and took his positions so 
as to destroy his adversary with least loss to him- 
self; and also for the precision of his fire. The 
Cherub's behavior was more remarkable for ex- 



24 Naval War of 1812 

treme caution than for anything else. As regards 
the mere fight, Porter certainly did everything a 
man could do to contend successfully with the 
overwhelming force opposed to him, and the few 
guns that were available were served with the 
utmost precision. As an exhibition of dogged 
courage it has never been surpassed since the 
time when the Dutch captain, Klaeson, after 
fighting two long days, blew up his disabled ship, 
devoting himself and all his crew to death, rather 
than surrender to the hereditary foes of his race, 
and was bitterly avenged afterward by the grim 
"sea-beggars" of Holland; the days when Drake 
singed the beard of the Catholic king, and the 
small English craft were the dread and scourge 
of the great floating castles of Spain. Any man 
reading Farragut's account is forcibly reminded 
of some of the deeds of "derring do" in that, the 
heroic age of the Teutonic navies. Captain Hil- 
yar, in his letter, says : ' ' The defence of the Essex, 
taking into consideration our superiority of force 
and the very discouraging circumstance of her 
having lost her main-topmast and being twice on 
fire, did honor to her brave defenders, and most 
fully evinced the courage of Captain Porter and 
those under his command. Her colors were not 
struck until the loss in killed and wounded was 
so awfully great and her shattered condition so 
seriously bad as to render all further resistance 



Naval War of i8i 2 25 

unavailing." ' He also bears very candid testi- 
mony to the defence of the Essex having been 
effective enough to at one time render the result 
doubtful, saying :" Our first attack . . . pro- 
duced no visible effect. Our second . . . was 
not more successful; and having lost the use 
of our mainsail, jib, and mainstay, appearances 
looked a little inauspicious." Throughout the 
w-ar no ship was so desperately defended as the 
Essex, taking into account the frightful odds 

'James (p. 419) says: "The Essex, as far as is borne out 
by proof (the only safe way where an American is concerned) , 
had 24 men killed and 45 wounded. But Captain Porter, 
thinking by exaggerating his loss to prop up his fame, talks 
of 58 killed and mortally wounded, 39 severely, 27 slightly," 
etc. This would be no more worthy of notice than any 
other of his falsifications, were it not followed by various 
British writers. Hilyar states that he has 161 prisoners, has 
found 23 dead, that three wounded were taken off, between 
20 and 30 reached the shore, and that the "remainder are 
either killed or wounded." It is by wilfully preserving 
silence about this last sentence that James makes out his 
case. It will be observed that Hilyar enumerates 161 + 23 -(- 
3 -J- 25 (say) or 212, and says the remainder were either 
killed or wounded ; Porter having 255 men at first, this 
remainder was 43. Hilyar stating that of his 161 prisoners, 
42 were wounded, his account thus gives the Americans iii 
killed and wounded. James's silence about Hilyar's last 
sentence enables him to make the loss but 69, and his wilful 
omission is quite on a par with the other meannesses and 
falsehoods which utterly destroy the reliability of his work. 
By Hilyar's own letter, it is thus seen that Porter's loss in 
killed and wounded was certainly iii, perhaps 116, or if 
Porter had, as James says, 265 men, 126. There still remain 



26 Naval War of 1812 

against which she fought, which always enhances 
the merit of a defence. The Lawrence, which 
suffered even more, was backed by a fleet; the 
Frolic was overcome by an equal foe; and the 
Reindeer fought at far less of a disadvantage, and 
suffered less. None of the frigates, British or 
American, were defended with anything like the 
resolution she displayed. 

But it is perhaps permissible to inquire whether 

some discrepancies between the official accounts, which can be 
compared in tabular form: 

Hilyar Porter 

Prisoners unwounded iig Prisoners unwounded 75 

wounded 42 " slightly wounded. . . 27 

Taken away wounded 3 " severely wounded.. . 39 

Those who reached shore 25 Killed 58 

Remainder killed or wounded. 43 Missing 31 

Killed 23 Reached shore 25 

255 255 

The explanation probably is that Hilyar's "wounded" do 
not include Porter's "27 slightly wounded," and that his 
"161 prisoners" include Porter's "25 who reached shore," 
and his "25 who reached shore" comes under Porter's "31 
missing." This would make the accounts nearly tally. At 
any rate, in Porter's book are to be found the names of all his 
killed, wounded, and missing; and their relatives received 
pensions from the American government, which, if the returns 
were false, would certainly have been a most elaborate piece 
of deception. It is far more likel)'^ that Hilyar was mistaken; 
or he may have counted in the Essex Junior's crew, which 
would entirely account for the discrepancies. In any event, 
it must be remembered that he makes the American killed 
and wounded iii (Porter, 124), and not 69, as James says. 
The latter's statement is wilfully false, as he had seen Hilyar's 
letter. 



Naval War of 1 812 27 

Porter's course, after the accident to his topmast 
occurred, was altogether the best that could have 
been taken. On such a question no opinion 
could have been better than Farragut's, although, 
of course, his judgment was ex post facto, as he 
was very young at the time of the fight. 

"In the first place, I consider our original 
and greatest error was in attempting to regain 
the anchorage; being greatly superior in sailing 
powers, we should have borne up and run before 
the wind. If we had come in contact with the 
Phashe we should have carried her by boarding; 
if she avoided us, as she might have done by her 
greater ability to manoeuvre, then we should have 
taken her fire and passed on, leaving both vessels 
behind until we had replaced our topmast, by 
which time they would have been separated, as 
unless they did so it would have been no chase, the 
Cherub being a dull sailer. 

"Secondly, when it was apparent to every- 
body that we had no chance of success under the 
circumstances, the ship should have been run 
ashore, throwing her broadside to the beach to 
prevent raking, and fought as long as was con- 
sistent with humanity, and then set on fire. But, 
having determined upon anchoring, we should 
have bent a spring on to the ring of the anchor, 
instead of to the cable, where it was exposed, and 
could be shot away as fast as put on." 



28 Naval War of 1 812 

But it must be remembered that when Porter 
decided to anchor near shore, in neutral water, 
he could not anticipate Hilyar's deliberate and 
treacherous breach of faith. I do not allude to 
the mere disregard of neutrality. Whatever in- 
ternational moralists may say, such disregard is a 
mere question of expediency. If the benefits to 
be gained by attacking a hostile ship in neutral 
waters are such as to counterbalance the risk of 
incurring the enmity of the neutral power, why 
then the attack ought to be made. Had Hilyar, 
when he first made his appearance off Valparaiso, 
sailed in with his two ships, the men at quarters 
and guns out, and at once attacked Porter, con- 
sidering the destruction of the Essex as outweigh- 
ing the insult to Chili, why, his behavior would 
have been perfectly justifiable. In fact, this is 
unquestionably what he intended to do; but he 
suddenly found himself in such a position that, 
in the event of hostilities, his ship would be the 
captured one, and he owed his escape purely 
to Porter's over-forbearance, under great provoca- 
tion. Then he gave his word to Porter that he 
would not infringe on the neutrality ; and he never 
dared to break it, until he saw Porter was disabled 
and almost helpless! This may seem strong lan- 
guage to use about a British officer, but it is justly 
strong. Exactly as any outsider must consider 
Warrington's attack on the British brig Nautilus 



k\ 



Naval War of 1 812 29 

in 18 1 5 as a piece of needless cruelty, so any out- 
sider must consider Hilyar as having most treach- 
erously broken faith with Porter. 

After the fight Hilyar behaved most kindly and 
courteously to the prisoners ; and, as already said, 
he fought his ship most ably, for it would have 
been quixotic to a degree to forego his advantages. 
But previous to the battle his conduct had been 
over-cautious. It was to be expected that the 
Essex would make her escape as soon as practica- 
ble, and so he should have used every effort to 
bring her to action. Instead of this, he always 
declined the fight when alone; and he owed his 
ultimate success to the fact that the Essex, instead 
of escaping, as she could several times have done, 
stayed, hoping to bring the Phccbe to action single- 
handed. It must be remembered that the Essex 
was almost as weak compared to the Phoebe as the 
Cherub was compared to the Essex. The latter 
was just about midway between the British ships, 
as may be seen by the following comparison. In 
the action the Essex fought all six of her long 
12's, and the Cherub both her long 9's, instead of 
the corresponding broadside carronades which the 
ships regularly used. This gives the Essex a better 
armament than she would have had fighting her 
guns as they were regularly used; but it can be 
seen how great the inequality still was. It must 
also be kept in mind that, while in the battles 



so 



Naval War of 1812 



between the American 44's and British 38's, the 
short weight 24-pounders of the former had in 
reality no greater range or accuracy than the 
full weight i8's of their opponents, in this case 
the Phoebe's full weight i8's had a very much 
greater range and accuracy than the short weight 
12's of the Essex. 



COMPARATIVE FORCE 



Phcebe. . 



Cherub. 



Essex. . . 



Men 


Broadside Guns 


Weight 


(Total) 


320 


13 long iS's 


234 lbs. 




I " 12 


12 " 




I '' 9 


9 " (255) 




7 short 32 's 


224 •' 




I " 18 
23 guns, 


18 " 


(242) 




497 lbs. 


180 


2 long 9's 


18 lbs. (18) 




2 short iS's 


36 " 




9 " 32's 


288 " (324) 




13 guns. 


342 lbs. 


500 men, 


36 guns, 


839 lbs. metal. 
(273 long. ) 
(566 short, f 












[Taking 7 


25s 


6 long 12's 


66 lbs. 


percent, of? 




17 short 32's 


504 " 


for short 








.weight. 


255 men, 


23 guns. 


570 lbs. 





All accounts agree as to the armament of the Es- 
sex. I have taken that of the Phcebe and Cherub 



Naval War of 1812 31 

from James; but Captain Porter's official letter 
and all the other American accounts make the 
Phcshe's broadside fifteen long i8's and eight short 
32's, and give the Cherub, in all, eighteen short 32's, 
eight short 24's, and two long 9's. This would 
make their broadside 904 lbs., 288 long, 616 short. 
I would have no doubt that the American accounts 
were right if the question rested solely on James's 
veracity; but he probably took his figures from 
official sources. At any rate, remembering the 
difference between long guns and carronades, it 
appears that the Essex was really nearly inter- 
mediate in force between the Phoebe and the 
Cherub. The battle being fought, with a very 
trifling exception, at long range, it was in reality 
a conflict between a crippled ship throwing a 
broadside of 66 lbs. of metal, and two ships throw- 
ing 273 lbs., who, by their ability to manoeuvre, 
could choose positions where they could act with 
full effect, while their antagonist could not return 
a shot. Contemporary history does not afford a 
single instance of so determined a defence against 
such frightful odds. 

The official letters of Captains Hilyar and 
Porter agree substantially in all respects; the 
details of the fight, as seen in the Essex, are found 
in the Life of Farragut. But, although the British 
captain does full justice to his foe, British his- 
torians have universally tried to belittle Porter's 



32 Naval War of i8i2 

conduct. It is much to be regretted that we have 
no British account worth paying attention to of 
the proceedings before the fight, when the Phoebe 
declined single combat with the Essex. James, 
of course, states that the Phoebe did not decline it, 
but he gives no authority, and his unsupported 
assertion would be valueless even if uncontra- 
dicted. His account of the action is grossly in- 
accurate, as he has inexcusably garbled Hilyar's 
report. One instance of this I have already men- 
tioned, as regards Hilyar's account of Porter's 
loss. Again, Hilyar distinctly states that the 
Essex was twice on fire, yet James (p. 418) utterly 
denies this, thereby impliedly accusing the British 
captain of falsehood. There is really no need of 
the corroboration of Porter's letter, but he has 
it most fully in the Life of Farragut, p. 37 : " The 
men came rushing up from below, many with 
their clothes burning, which were torn from them 
as quickly as possible, and those for whom this 
could not be done were told to jump overboard 
and quench the flames. . . . One man swam 
to shore with scarcely a square inch of his body 
which had not been burned, and, although he was 
deranged for some days, he ultimately recovered, 
and afterward served with me in the West Indies." 
The third unfounded statement in James's account 
is that buckets of spirits were found in all parts 
of the main-deck of the Essex, and that most of 



Naval War of 1 812 33 

the prisoners were drunk. No authority is cited 
for this, and there is not a shadow of truth in it. 
He ends by stating that "few even in his own 
country will venture to speak well of Captain 
David Porter." After these various paragraphs 
we are certainly justified in rejecting James's ac- 
count in toto. An occasional mistake is perfectly 
excusable, and gross ignorance of a good many 
facts does not invalidate a man's testimony with 
regard to some others with which he is acquainted ; 
but a wilful and systematic perversion of the truth 
in a number of cases throws a very strong doubt 
on a historian's remaining statements, unless they 
are supported by unquestionable authority. 

But if British historians have generally given 
Porter much less than his due, by omitting all 
reference to the inferiority of his guns, his lost 
topmast, etc., it is no worse than Americans have 
done in similar cases. The latter, for example, 
will make great allowances in the case of the 
Essex for her having carronades only, but utterly 
fail to allude to the Cyane and Levant as having 
suffered under the same disadvantage. They 
should remember that the rules cut both ways. 

The Essex having suffered chiefly above the 
water-line, she was repaired sufficiently in Val- 
paraiso to enable her to make the voyage to Eng- 
land, where she was added to the British navy. 
The Essex Junior was disarmed and the American 

VOL. 11.-3 



34 Naval War of 1 812 

prisoners embarked in her for New York, on 
parole. But Lieutenant McKnight, Chaplain 
Adams, Midshipman Lyman, and eleven seamen 
were exchanged on the spot for some of the British 
prisoners on board the Essex Junior. McKnight 
and Lyman accompanied the Phcsbe to Rio Janeiro, 
where they embarked on a Swedish vessel, were 
taken out of her by the Wasp, Captain Blakely, 
and were lost with the rest of the crew of that 
vessel. The others reached New York in safety. 
Of the prizes made by the Essex, some were burnt 
or sunk by the Americans, and some retaken by 
the British. And so, after nearly two years' un- 
interrupted success, the career of the Essex ter- 
minated amid disasters of all kinds. But at least 
her officers and crew could reflect that they had 
afforded an example of courage in adversity that 
it would be difficult to match elsewhere. 

The first of the new heavy sloops of war that 
got to sea was the Frolic, Master-Commandant 
Joseph Bainbridge, which put out early in Feb- 
ruary. Shortly afterward, she encountered a large 
Carthagenian privateer, which refused to sur- 
render and was sunk by a broadside, nearly a 
hundred of her crew being drowned. Before day- 
light on the 20th of April, lat. 24° 12' N., long. 
81° 25' W., she fell in with the British 36-gun 
frigate Orpheus, Captain Pigot, and the 12-gun 



Naval War of 1 812 35 

schooner Shelburne, Lieutenant Hope, both to lee- 
ward. The schooner soon weathered the Frolic, 
but of course was afraid to close, and the American 
sloop continued beating to windward, in the effort 
to escape, for nearly thirteen hours; the water 
was started, the anchors cut away, and finally the 
guns thrown overboard — a measure by means of 
which the Hornet, the Rattlesnake, and the Adams 
succeeded in escaping under similar circumstan- 
ces, — but all was of no avail, and she was finally 
captured. The Court of Inquiry honorably ac- 
quitted both officers and crew. As was to be 
expected, James considers the surrender a dis- 
graceful one, because the guns were thrown over- 
board. As I have said, this was a measure which 
had proved successful in several cases of a like 
nature ; the criticism is a piece of petty meanness. 
Fortunately, we have Admiral Codrington's dictum 
on the surrender (Memoirs, vol. i., p. 310), which 
he evidently considered as perfectly honorable. 

A sister ship to the Frolic, the Peacock, Cap- 
tain Lewis Warrington, sailed from New York on 
March 12th, and cruised southward; on the 28th 
of April, at seven in the morning, lat. 17° 47' N., 
long. 80° 7' W., several sail were made to the 
windward.' These were a small convoy of mer- 
chantmen, bound for the Bermudas, under the pro- 
tection of the i8-gun brig-sloop Epervier, Captain 

' Official letter of Captain Warrington, April 29, 1814. 



36 Naval War of 1812 

Wales, 5 days out of Havana, and with $118,000 
in specie on board.' The Epervier,- when discov- 
ered, was steering north by east, the wind being 
from the eastward; soon afterward, the wind 
veered gradually round to the southward, and the 
Epervier hauled up close on the port tack, while 
the convoy made all sail away, and the Peacock 
came down with the wind on her starboard 
quarter. At 10 a.m., the vessels were within gun- 
shot, and the Peacock edged away to get in a rak- 
ing broadside, but the Epervier frustrated this by 
putting her helm up until close on her adversary's 
bow, when she rounded to and fired her starboard 
guns, receiving in return the starboard broadside 
of the Peacock at 10.20 a.m. These first broad- 
sides took effect aloft, the brig being partially 
dismantled, while the Peacock's foreyard was 
totally disabled by two round shot in the star- 
board quarter, which deprived the ship of the use 
of her foresail and fore-topsail, and compelled 
her to run large. However, the Epervier eased 
away ^ when abaft her foe's beam, and ran off 
alongside of her (using her port guns, while the 
American still had the starboard battery engaged) 
at 10.35. The Peacock's fire was now very hot, 
and directed chiefly at her adversary's hull, on 
which it told heavily, while she did not suffer at 

' James, vi., 424. 

* According to some accounts, she at this time tacked. 



Naval War of 1 812 n 

all in return. The Epervier coming up into the 
wind, owing somewhat to the loss of head-sail, 
Captain Wales called his crew aft to try boarding, 

A/ 



PcACOC/f 





Ji.OS 







ia.3S 



/ 



/O.IO 



I 



but they refused, saying "she's too heavy for 

us," ' and then, at 11.05 the colors were hauled 

down. 

'James, Naval Occurrences, p. 243. 



kk 



38 Naval War of 1 812 

Except the injury to her foreyard, the Peacock's 
damages were confined to the loss of a few top- 
mast and topgallant backstays, and some shot- 
holes through her sails. Of her crew, consisting, 
all told, of 166 men and boys,' only two were 
wounded, both slightly. The Epervier, on the 
other hand, had 45 shot-holes in her hull, 5 feet 
of water in her hold, main-topmasts over the side, 
mainmast nearly in two, main-boom shot away, 
bowsprit wounded severely, and most of the fore- 
rigging and stays shot away; and of her crew of 
128 men (according to the list of prisoners given 
by Captain Warrington; James says 118, but he 
is not backed up by any ofBcial report), 9 were 
killed and mortally wounded and 14 severely 
and slightly wounded. Instead of two long 6's 
for bow-chasers and a shifting carronade, she had 
two 18-pound carronades (according to the Amer- 
ican prize-lists ''; Captain Warrington says 32's). 
Otherwise she was armed as usual. She was, like 
the rest of her kind, very " tubby," being as broad 
as the Peacock, though ten feet shorter on deck. 
Allowing, as usual, seven per cent, for short weight 
of the American shot, we get the 

' Niles's Register, vi., 196, says only 160; the above is taken 
from Warrington's letter of June ist, preserved with the other 
manuscript letters in the Naval Archives. The crew con- 
tained about ten boys, was not composed of picked men, and 
did not number 185 — vide James. 

^ American State Papers, xiv., p. 427. 



Naval War of 1 812 39 



COMPARATIVE FORCE 



Tons 


No. Broadside Weight 
Guns Metal 


Crew 


Loss 


509 


II 315 


166 


2 


477 


9 274 


128 


23 



Peacock 

Epervier 477 

That is, the relative force being as 12 is to 10, the 
relative execution done was as 1 2 is to i , and the 
Epervier surrendered before she had lost a fifth of 
her crew. The case of the Epervier closely resem- 
bles that of the Argus. In both cases the officers 
behaved finely ; in both cases, too, the victorious 
foe was heavier, in about the same proportion, 
while neither the crew of the Argus, nor the crew 
of the Epervier fought with the determined brav- 
ery displayed by the combatants in almost every 
other struggle of the war. But it must be added 
that the Epervier did worse than the Argus, and 
the Peacock (American) better than the Pelican. 
The gunnery of the Epervier was extraordinarily 
poor; "the most disgraceful part of the affair 
was that our ship was cut to pieces and the 
enemy hardly scratched." ' James states that 
after the first two or three broadsides several 
carronades became unshipped, and that the 
others were dismounted by the fire of the Peacock; 
that the men had not been exercised at the guns ; 
and, most important of all, that the crew (which 
contained several "foreigners," but was chiefly 

^Memoirs of Admiral Codrington, i., 322. 



40 Naval War of 1812 

British; as the Argus's was chiefly American) was 
disgracefully bad. The Peacock, on the contrary, 
showed skilful seamanship as well as excellent 
gunnery. In 45 minutes after the fight was over 
the foreyard had been sent down and fished, the 
foresail set up, and everything in complete order 
again ' ; the prize was got in sailing order by dark, 
though great exertions had to be made to prevent 
her sinking. Mr. Nicholson, first of the Peacock, 
was put in charge as prize-master. The next day 
the two vessels were abreast of Amelia Island 
when two frigates were discovered in the north, 
to leeward. Captain Warrington at once directed 
the prize to proceed to St. Mary's, while he 
separated and made sail on a wind to the south, 
intending to draw the frigates after him, as he 
was confident that the Peacock, a very fast vessel, 
could outsail them.^ The plan succeeded per- 
fectly, the brig reaching Savannah on the first of 
May, and the ship three days afterward. The 
Epervier was purchased for the U. S. Navy, under 
the same name and rate. The Peacock sailed 
again on June 4th, ^ going first northward to the 
Grand Banks, then to the Azores: then she 
stationed herself in the mouth of the Irish Channel, 
and afterward cruised off Cork, the mouth of the 

' Letter of Captain Warrington, April 29, 1814. 

^ Letter of Captain Warrington, May 4, 1814. 

3 Letter of Captain Warrington, October 30, 1814. 



Naval War of 1 812 41 

Shannon, and the North of Ireland, capturing 
several very valuable prizes and creating great 
consternation. She then changed her station, to 
elude the numerous vessels that had been sent 
after her, and sailed southward, off Cape Ortegal, 
Cape Finisterre, and finally among the Barba- 
does reaching New York, October 29th. During 
this cruise she encountered no war vessel smaller 
than a frigate ; but captured 1 4 sail of merchant- 
men, some containing valuable cargoes, and 
manned by 148 men. 

On April 29th, H.M.S. schooner Ballahou, 6, 
Lieutenant King, while cruising off the American 
coast was captured by the Perry, privateer, a 
much heavier vessel, after an action of ten 
minutes' duration. 

The general peace prevailing in Europe allowed 
the British to turn their energies altogether to 
America; and in no place was this increased 
vigor so much felt as in Chesapeake Bay, where 
a great number of line-of-battle ships, frigates, 
sloops, and transports had assembled, in prepara- 
tion for the assault on Washington and Baltimore. 
The defence of these waters was confided to Cap- 
tain Joshua Barney,' with a flotilla of gunboats. 

' He was born at Baltimore, July 6, 1759; James, with 
habitual inaccuracy, calls him an Irishman. He makes Deca- 
tur, by the way, commit the geographical solecism of being 
bom in "Maryland, Virginia." 



42 Naval War of 1812 

These consisted of three or four sloops and schoon- 
ers, but mainly of barges, which were often smaller 
than the ship's boats that were sent against them. 
These gunboats were manned by from 20 to 40 
men each, and each carried, according to its size, 
one or two long 24-, 18-, or 12 -pounders. They 
were bad craft at best; and, in addition, it is 
difficult to believe that they were handled to the 
fullest advantage. 

On June ist. Commodore Barney, with the 
block sloop Scorpion and 14 smaller "gunboats," 
chiefly row gallies, passed the mouth of the 
Patuxent, and chased the British schooner St. 
Lawrence and seven boats, under Captain Barrie, 
until they took refuge with the Dragon, 74, which 
in turn chased Barney's flotilla into the Patuxent, 
where she blockaded it in company with the 
Albion, 74. They were afterward joined by the 
Loire, 38, Narcissus, 32, and Jasseur, 18, and 
Commodore Barney moved two miles up St, 
Leonard's Creek, while the frigates and sloop 
blockaded its mouth. A deadlock now ensued; 
the gunboats were afraid to attack the ships, and 
the ships' boats were just as afraid of the gunboats. 
On the 8th, 9th, and nth, skirmishes occurred; 
on each occasion the British boats came up till 
they caught sight of Barney's flotilla, and were 
promptly chased off by the latter, which, how- 
ever, took good care not to meddle with the 



Naval War of 1 8 1 2 43 

larger vessels. Finally, Colonel Wadsworth, of the 
artillery, with two long 18-pound.ers, assisted by 
the marines, under Captain Miller, and a few 
regulars, offered to co-operate from the shore 
while Barney assailed the two frigates with the 
flotilla. On the 26th, the joint attack took place 
most successfully ; the Loire and Narcissus were 
driven off, although not much damaged, and 
the flotilla rowed out in triumph, with a loss of 
but 4 killed and 7 wounded. But in spite of 
this small success, which was mainly due to Col- 
onel Wadsworth, Commodore Barney made no 
more attempts with his gunboats. The bravery 
and skill which the flotilla men showed at Bladens- 
burg prove conclusively that their ill success on 
the water was due to the craft they were in, 
and not to any failing of the men. At the same 
period the French gunboats were even more un- 
successful, but the Danes certainly did very well 
with theirs. 

Barney's flotilla in the Patuxent remained quiet 
until August 2 2d, and then was burned when the 
British advanced on Washington. The history 
of this advance, as well as of the unsuccessful one 
on Baltimore, concerns less the American than 
the British navy, and will be but briefly alluded 
to here. On August 20th, Major-General Ross 
and Rear-Admiral Cockburn, with about 5000 
soldiers and marines, moved on Washington by 



44 Naval War of 1812 

land ; while a squadron composed of the Seahorse, 
38, Euryalus, 36, bombs Devastation, ALtna, and 
Meteor, and rocket-ship Erebus, under Captain 
James Alexander Gordon, moved up the Potomac 
to attack Fort Washington, near Alexandria ; and 
Sir Peter Parker, in the Menelaus, 38, was sent 
"to create a diversion" above Baltimore. Sir 
Peter's "diversion " turned out most unfortunately 
for him: for, having landed to attack 120 Mary- 
land militia, under Colonel Reade, he lost his 
own life, while fifty of his followers were placed 
hors de combat and the remainder chased back 
to the ship by the victors, who had but three 
wounded. 

The American army, which was to oppose Ross 
and Cockburn, consisted of some seven thousand 
militia, who fled so quickly that only about 1500 
British had time to become engaged. The fight 
was really between these 1500 British regulars 
and the American flotilla men. These consisted 
of 78 marines, under Captain Miller, and 370 
sailors, some of whom served under Captain Bar- 
ney, who had a battery of two i8's and three 12's, 
while the others were armed with muskets and 
pikes and acted with the marines. Both sailors 
and marines did nobly, inflicting most of the loss 
the British suffered, which amounted to 256 men, 
and in return lost over a hundred of their own 
men, including the two captains, who were 



Naval War of 1 812 45 

wounded and captured, with the guns.' Ross 
took Washington and burned the public buildings ; 
and the panic-struck Americans foolishly burned 
the Columbia, 44, and Argus, 18, which were nearly 
ready for service. 

Captain Gordon's attack on Fort Washington 
was conducted with great skill and success. Fort 
Washington was abandoned as soon as fired upon, 
and the city of Alexandria surrendered upon most 
humiliating conditions. Captain Gordon was now 
joined by the Fairy, 18, Captain Baker, who 
brought him orders from Vice-Admiral Cochrane 
to return ; and the squadron began to work down 
the river, which was very difficult to navigate. 
Commodore Rodgers, with some of the crew of the 
two 44 's, Guerriere and Java, tried to bar their 
progress, but had not sufficient means. On Sep- 
tember I St, an attempt was made to destroy the 
Devastation by fire-ships, but it failed; on the 
4th the attempt was repeated by Commodore 
Rodgers, with a party of some forty men, but 
they were driven off and attacked by the British 
boats, under Captain Baker, who in turn was re- 
pulsed with the loss of his second lieutenant killed 
and some twenty -five men killed or wounded. 
The squadron also had to pass and silence a bat- 

^ The optimistic Cooper thinks that two regular regiments 
would have given the Americans this battle — which is open 
to doubt. 



46 Naval War of 1 812 

tery of light field-pieces on the 5th, where they suf- 
fered enough to raise their total loss to seven 
killed and thirty -five wounded. Gordon's inland 
expedition was thus concluded most successfully, 
at a very trivial cost ; it was a most venturesome 
feat, reflecting great honor on the captains and 
crews engaged in it. 

Baltimore was threatened actively by sea and 
land early in September. On the 13th, an inde- 
cisive conflict took place between the British 
regulars and American militia, in which the former 
came off with the honor, and the latter with the 
profit. The regulars held the field, losing 350 
men, including General Ross ; the militia retreated 
in fair order with a loss of but 200. The water 
attack was also unsuccessful. At 5 a.m. on the 
13th, the bomb vessels Meteor, Mtna, Terror, 
Volcano, and Devastation, the rocket-ship Erebus, 
and the frigates Severn, Euryalus, Havannah, and 
Hehrus opened on Fort McHenry, some of the 
other fortifications being occasionally fired at. A 
furious but harmless cannonade was kept up be- 
tween the forts and ships until 7 a.m. on the 14th, 
when the British fleet and army retired. 

I have related these events out of their natural 
order because they really had very little to do 
with our navy, and yet it is necessary to mention 
them in order to give an idea of the course of 
events. The British and American accounts of 



Naval War of 1 812 47 

the various gun-boat attacks differ widely ; but it 
is very certain that the gunboats accompHshed 
little or nothing of importance. On the other 
hand, their loss amounted to nothing, for many 
of those that were sunk were afterward raised, 
and the total tonnage of those destroyed would 
not much exceed that of the British barges cap- 
tured by them from time to time or destroyed 
by the land batteries. 

The purchased brig Rattlesnake, 16, had been 
cruising in the Atlantic with a good deal of suc- 
cess; but in lat. 40° N., long. t,t,° W., was chased 
by a frigate from which Lieutenant Renshaw, the 
brig's commander, managed to escape only by 
throwing overboard all his guns except two long 
nines; and on June 2 2d he was captured by the 
Leander, 50, Captain Sir George Ralph Collier, 
K. C. B. 

The third of the new sloops to get to sea was the 
Wasp, 22, Captain Johnston Blakely, which left 
Portsmouth on May ist, with a very fine crew 
of 173 men, almost exclusively New Englanders; 
there was said not to have been a single foreign 
seaman on board. It is, at all events, certain 
that during the whole war no vessel was ever 
better manned and commanded than this daring 
and resolute cruiser. The Wasp slipped unper- 
ceived through the blockading frigates, and ran 



4^ Naval War of i8i2 

into the mouth of the Enghsh Channel, right in 
the thick of the Enghsh cruisers; here she re- 
mained several weeks, burning and scuttling many- 
ships. Finally, on June 28th, at 4 a.m., in lat. 
48° 36' N., long. 11° 15' W.,' while in the chase 
of two merchantmen, a sail was made on the 
weather beam. This was the British brig-sloop. 
Reindeer, 18, Captain William Manners,^ with a 
crew of 118, as brave men as ever sailed or fought 
on the narrow seas. Like the Peacock (British) 
the Reindeer was only armed with 24-pounders, 
and Captain Manners must have known well that 
he was to do battle with a foe heavier than him- 
self; but there was no more gallant seaman in 
the whole British navy, fertile as it was in men 
who cared but little for odds of size or strength. 
As the day broke, the Reindeer made sail for the 
Wasp, then lying in the west-southwest. 

The sky was overcast with clouds, and the 
smoothness of the sea was hardly disturbed by 
the light breeze that blew out of the northeast. 
Captain Blakely hauled up and stood for his an- 
tagonist, as the latter came slowly down with the 
wind nearly aft, and so light was the weather 
that the vessels kept almost on even keels. It 
was not till quarter past one that the Wasp's 
drum rolled out its loud challenge as it beat to 

' Letter of Captain Blakely, July 8, 1814. 
^ James, vi., 429. 



Naval War of 1 8 1 2 49 

quarters, and a few minutes afterward the ship 
put about and stood for the foe, thinking to 
weather him; but at 1.50 the brig also tacked 
and stood away, each of the cool and skilful cap- 
tains being bent on keeping the weather-gage. 
At half-past two, the Reindeer again tacked, and, 
taking in her staysails, stood for the Wasp, who 
furled her royals; and, seeing that she would be 
weathered, at 2.50 put about in her turn and ran 
off, with the wind a little forward the port beam, 
brailing up the mizzen, while the Reindeer hoisted 
her flying-jib, to close, and gradually came up on 
the Wasp's weather quarter. At 17 minutes past 
three, when the vessels were not sixty yards apart, 
the British opened the conflict, firing the shifting 
12-pound carronade, loaded with round and grape. 
To this the Americans could make no return, and 
it was again loaded and fired, with the utmost 
deliberation; this was repeated five times, and 
would have been a trying ordeal to a crew less 
perfectly disciplined than the Wasp's. At 3.26, 
Captain Blakely, finding his enemy did not get on 
his beam, put his helm a-lee and luffed up, firing 
his guns from aft forward as they bore. For ten 
minutes the ship and the brig lay abreast, not 
twenty yards apart, while the cannonade was 
terribly destructive. The concussion of the ex- 
plosions almost deadened what little way the ves- 
sels had on, and the smoke hung over them like 



50 Naval War of 1 812 

a pall. The men worked at the guns with 
desperate energy, but the odds in weight of 
metal (3 to 2) were too great against the Reindeer, 
where both sides played their parts so manfully. 
Captain Manners stood at his post, as resolute as 
ever, though wounded again and again. A grape- 
shot passed through both his thighs, bringing 
him to the deck; but, maimed and bleeding to 
' death, he sprang to his feet, cheering on the sea- 
men. The vessels were now almost touching, 
and, putting his helm a weather, he ran the Wasp 
aboard on her port ' quarter, while the boarders 
gathered forward, to try it with the steel. But 
the Carolina captain had prepared for this with 
cool confidence ; the marines came aft ; close under 
the bulwarks crouched the boarders, grasping in 
their hands the naked cutlasses, while behind 
them were drawn up th^ pikemen. As the vessels 
came grinding together the men hacked and 
thrust at one another through the open port- 
holes, while the black smoke curled up from 
between the hulls. Then through the smoke ap- 
peared the grim faces of the British sea-dogs, and 
the fighting was bloody enough ; for the stubborn 
English stood well in the hard hand-play. But 
those who escaped the deadly fire of the topmen, 

' Letter of Captain Blakely, July 8, 1814. Cooper says 
starboard; it is a point of little importance; all accounts 
agree as to the relative positions of the craft. 



Naval War of 1 8i 2 51 

escaped only to be riddled through by the long 
Yankee pikes; so, avenged by their own hands, 
the foremost of the assailants died, and the others 
gave back. The attack was foiled, though the 
Reindeer's marines kept answering well the 
American fire. Then the English captain, already 
mortally wounded, but with the indomitable 
courage that nothing but death could conquer, 
cheering and rallying his men, himself sprang, 
sword in hand, into the rigging, to lead them on; 
and they followed him with a will. At that in- 
stant a ball from the Wasp's maintop crashed 
through his skull, and, still clenching in his right 
hand the sword he had shown he could wear so 
worthily, with his face to the foe, he fell back on 
his own deck dead, while above him yet floated 
the flag for which he had given his life. No 
Norse Viking, slain over shield, ever died better. 
As the British leader fell and his men recoiled. 
Captain Blakely passed the word to board; with 
wild hurrahs the boarders swarmed over the ham- 
mock nettings, there was a moment's furious 
struggle, the surviving British were slain or driven 
below, and the captain's clerk, the highest o^cer 
left, surrendered the brig at 3.44, just 27 minutes 
after the Reindeer had fired the first gun, and 
just 18 after the Wasp had responded. 

Both ships had suffered severely in the short 
struggle; but, as with the Shannon and Chesa- 



52 Naval War of 1812 

peake, the injuries were much less severe aloft 
than in the hulls. All the spars were in their 
places. The Wasp's hull had received 6 round, 
and many grape; a 24-pound shot had passed 
through the foremast; and of her crew of 173, 



f 



.S.4C 



REINDEER _^ 3/7 lZ' 



WASP.. 



■^-- 



i.2S 



SJ7 



II were killed or mortally wounded, and 15 
wounded severely or slightly. The Reindeer was 
completely cut to pieces in a line with her ports ; 
her upper works, boats, and spare spars being 
one entire wreck. Of her crew of 118 men, -^-^ 
were killed outright or died later, and 34 were 
wounded, nearly all severely. 



COMPARATIVE FORCE 





Tons 


Broadside 
Guns 


Weight 
Metal 


No. 
Men 


Loss 


Wasp 

Reindeer 


-•• 509 
. .. 477 


II 
10 


210 


173 
118 


26 
67 



It is thus seen that the Reindeer fought at 
a greater disadvantage than any other of the 
various British sloops that were captured in single 



Naval War of 1 812 53 

action during the war ; and yet she made a better 
fight than any of them (though the Frolic, and 
the Frolic only, was defended with the same des- 
perate courage) — a pretty sure proof that heax'y 
metal is not the only factor to be considered in 
accounting for the American victories. "It is 
difficult to say which vessel behaved the best in 
this short but gallant combat." ' I doubt if the 
war produced two better single-ship commanders 
than Captain Blakely and Captain Manners; and 
an equal meed of praise attaches to both crews. 
The British could rightly say that they yielded 
purely to heavy odds in men and metal; and 
the Americans, that the difference in execution 
was fully proportioned to the difference in force. 
It is difficult to know which to admire most, the 
wary skill with which each captain manoeuvred 
before the fight, the perfect training and discipline 
that their crews showed, the decision and prompti- 
tude with which Captain Manners tried to retrieve 
the day by boarding, and the desperate bravery 
with which the attempt was made; or the readi- 
ness with which Captain Blakely made his prepara- 
tions, and the cool courage with which the assault 
was foiled. All people of the English stock, no 
matter on which side of the Atlantic they live, if 
they have any pride in the many feats of fierce 
prowess done by the men of their blood and race, 

' Cooper, ii., 287. 



54 Naval War of 1812 

should never forget this fight; although we can- 
not but feel grieved to find that such men — men 
of one race and one speech ; brothers in blood as 
well as in bravery — should ever have had to turn 
their weapons against one another. 

The day after the conflict the prize's foremast 
went by the board, and, as she was much damaged 
by shot. Captain Blakely burned her, put a por- 
tion of his wounded prisoners on board a neutral, 
and with the remainder proceeded to France, 
reaching I'Orient on the 8th day of July, 

On July 4th, Sailing-master Percival and 30 
volunteers of the New York flotilla * concealed 
themselves on board a fishing-smack, and carried 
by surprise the Eagle tender, which contained a 
3 2 -pound howitzer and 14 men, 4 of whom were 
wounded. 

On July 1 2th, while off the west coast of South 
Africa, the American brig Syren was captured 
after a chase of 1 1 hours by the Medway, 74, 
Captain Brine. The chase was to windward dur- 
ing the whole time, and made every effort to 
escape, throwing overboard all her boats, anchors, 
cables, and spare spars. "" Her commander. Cap- 
tain Parker, had died, and she was in charge of 
Lieut. N. J. Nicholson. By a curious coincidence, 

' Letter of Commodore J. Lewis, July 6, 1814. 
* Letter of Captain Brine to Vice-Admiral Tyler, July 12, 
1814- 



Naval War of 1 812 55 

on the same day, July 12th, H. M. cutter Land- 
rail, 4/ of 20 men, Lieut. Lancaster, was captured 
by the American privateer Syren, a schooner 
mounting i long heavy gun, with a crew of 70 
men; the Landrail had 7, and the Syren 3 men 
wounded. 

On July 14th, Gunboat No. 88, Sailing-master 
George Clement, captured, after a short skirmish, 
the tender of the Tenedos frigate, with her second 
lieutenant, 2 midshipmen, and 10 seaman. ^ 

The Wasp stayed in 1' Orient till she was thor- 
oughly refitted, and had filled, in part, the gaps 
in her crew, from the American privateers in port. 
On August 27th, Captain Blakely sailed again, 
making two prizes during the next three days. On 
September ist, she came up to a convoy of 10 sail 
under the protection of the Armada, 74, all bound 
for Gibraltar; the swift cruiser hovered round 
the merchantmen like a hawk, and though chased 
off again and again by the line-of-battle ship, 
always returned the instant the pursuit stopped, 
and finally actually succeeded in cutting off and 
capturing one ship, laden with iron and brass 
cannon, muskets, and other military stores of 
great value. At half -past six on the evening of 
the same day, in lat. 47° 30' N., long. 11° W., 

'James, vi., 436; his statement is wrong as regards the 
privateer. 

^ Letter of Captain Isaac Hull, July 15, 1814. 



56 Naval War of 1 812 

while running almost free, four sail, two on the 
starboard bow, and two on the port, rather more 
to leeward, were made out.' Captain Blakely at 
once made sail for the most weatherly of the four 
ships in sight, though well aware that more than 
one of them might prove to be hostile cruisers, 
and they were all of unknown force. But the 
determined Carolinian was not one to be troubled 
by such considerations. He probably had several 
men less under his command than in the former 
action, but had profited by his experience with 
the Reindeer in one point, having taken aboard her 
1 2 -pounder boat carronade, of whose efficacy he 
had had very practical proof. 

The chase, the British brig-sloop Avon, 18, 
Captain the Honorable James Arbuthnot," was 
steering almost southwest; the wind, which was 
blowing fresh from the southeast, being a little 
abaft the port beam. At 7.00, the Avon began 
making night signals with the lanterns, but the 
Wasp, disregarding these, came steadily on; at 
8.38 the Avon fired a shot from her stern-chaser,^ 
and shortly afterward another from one of her lee 
or starboard guns. At twenty minutes past 9, 
the Wasp was on the port or weather quarter of 
the Avon, and the vessels interchanged several 

' Official letter of Captain Blakely, September 8, 1814. 

2 James, vi., 432 

3 James, vi., 432. 



Naval War of 1812 57 

hails ; one of the American officers then came for- 
ward on the forecastle and ordered the brig to 
heave to, which the latter declined doing, and set 
her port fore-topmast studding-sail. The Wasp 
then, at 9.29, fired the 12-pound carronade into 
her, to which the Avon responded with her stern- 
chaser and the aftermost port guns. Cap- 
tain Blakely then put his helm up, for fear his 
adversary would try to escape, and ran to lee- 
ward of her, and then ranged up alongside, having 
poured a broadside into her quarter. A close and 
furious engagement began, at such short range 
that the only one of the Wasp's crew who was 
wounded, was hit by a wad; four round shot 
struck her hull, killing two men, and she suffered 
a good deal in her rigging. The men on board 
did not know the name of their antagonist; but 
they could see through the smoke and the gloom 
of the night, as her black hull surged through the 
water, that she was a large brig ; and aloft, against 
the sky, the sailors could be discerned, clustering 
in the tops.' In spite of the darkness the Wasp's 
fire was directed with deadly precision ; the Avon's 
gaff was shot away at almost the first broadside, 
and most of her main-rigging and spars followed 
suit. She was hulled again and again, often be- 
low water-line; some of her carronades were dis- 
mounted, and, finally, the mainmast went by the 
^ Captain Blakely's letter. 



58 Naval War of 1 8i 2 

board. At lo.oo, after 31 minutes of combat, her 
fire had been completely silenced and Captain 
Blakely hailed to know if she had struck. No 
answer being received, and the brig firing a few 
random shot, the action recommenced; but, at 
10.12, the Avon was again hailed, and this time 
answered that she had struck. While lowering 
away a boat to take possession, another sail 






t 



(H. B. M. brig-sloop Castilian, 18, Captain 
Braimer) was seen astern. The men were again 
called to quarters, and everything put in readiness 
as rapidly as possible; but, at 10.36, two more 
sail were seen (one of which was H. B. M. Tar- 
tarus, 20'). The braces being cut away, the 
Wasp was put before the wind until new ones 
could be rove. The Castilian pursued till she 
* Niles's Register, vi., 216. 



Naval War of 1B12 59 

came up close, when she fired her lee guns into, or 
rather over, the weather quarter of the Wasp, 
cutting her rigging slightly. Repeated signals of 
distress having now been made by the Avon 
(which had lost 10 men killed and 32 wounded), 
the Castilian tacked and stood for her, and on 
closing found out she was sinking. Hardly had 
her crew been taken off when she went down. 

Counting the Wasp's complement as full (though 
it was probably two or three short), taking James's 
statement of the crew of the Avon as true, includ- 
ing the boat carronades of both vessels, and con- 
sidering the Avon's stem-chaser to have been a 
six-pounder, we get the 

COMPARATIVE FORCE 

Weight 
Tons No. Guns Metal No. Men Loss 

Wasp 509 12 327 160 3 

Avon 477 II 280 117 42 

It is self-evident that in the case of this action 
the odds, 14 to 11, are neither enough to account 
for the loss inflicted being as 14 to i, nor for the 
rapidity with which, during a night encounter, 
the Avon was placed in a sinking condition. " The 
gallantry of the Avon's officers and crew cannot 
for a moment be questioned ; but the gunnery of 
the latter appears to have been not one whit better 
than, to the discredit of the British navy, had fre- 



6o Naval War of 1812 

quently before been displayed in combats of this 
kind. Nor, judging from the specimen given by 
the Castilian, is it likely that she would have per- 
formed any better." ' On the other hand, "Cap- 
tain Blakely's conduct on this occasion had all 
the merit shown in the previous action, with the 
additional claim of engaging an enemy under 
circumstances which led him to believe that her 
consorts were in the immediate vicinity. The 
steady, officer-like way in which the Avon was 
destroyed, and the coolness with which he pre- 
pared to engage the Castilian within ten minutes 
after his first antagonist had struck, are the best 
encomiums on this officer's character and spirit, 
as well as on the school in which he had been 
trained." ^ 

The Wasp now cruised to the southward and 
westward, taking and scuttling one or two prizes. 
On September 21st, lat. 33° 12' N., long. 14° 56' 
W., she captured the brig Atalanta, 8, with 19 
men, which proved a valuable prize, and was sent 
in with one of the \ midshipmen, Mr. Geisinger, 
aboard, as prize-master, who reached Savannah 
in safety on November 4th. Meanwhile, the Wasp 
kept on toward the southeast. On October 9th, 
in lat. 18° 35' N., long. 30° 10' W., she spoke and 
boarded the Swedish brig Adonis, and took out 
of her Lieutenant McKnight and Mr. Lyman, a 

* James, vi., 435. ^ Cooper, ii., 291. 



Naval War of 1 812 61 

master's mate, both late of the Essex, on their 
way to England from Brazil. 

This was the last that was ever heard of the 
gallant but ill-fated Wasp. How she perished, 
none ever knew; all that is certain is that she 
was never seen again. She was as good a ship, 
as well manned, and as ably commanded as any 
vessel in our little navy; and it may be doubted 
if there was at that time any foreign sloop of war 
of her size and strength that could have stood 
against her in a fair fight. 

As I have said, the Wasp was manned almost 
exclusively by Americans. James says they were 
mostly Irish ; the reason he gives for the assertion 
being that Captain Blakely spent the first sixteen 
months of his life in Dublin. This argument is 
quite on a par with another piece of logic which 
I cannot resist noticing. The point he wishes to 
prove is that Americans are cowards. Accord- 
ingly, on p. 475 : " On her capstan the Constitution 
now mounted a piece resembling seven musket 
barrels, fixed together with iron bands. It was 
discharged by one lock, and each barrel threw 
twenty-five balls. . . . What could have im- 
pelled the Americans to invent such extraordinary 
implements of war but fear, downright fear?" 
Then a little farther on : " The men were provided 
with leather boarding-caps, fitted with bands of 
iron, . , . another strong symptom of fear ! " 



62 Naval War of 1812 

Now, such a piece of writing as this is simply 
evidence of an unsound mind; it is not so much 
malicious as idiotic. I only reproduce it to help 
prove what I have all along insisted on, that any 
of James's unsupported statements about the 
Americans, whether respecting the tonnage of 
the ships or the courage of the crews, are not 
worth the paper they are written on ; on all points 
connected purely with the British navy, or which 
can be checked off by official documents or ships' 
logs, or where there would be no particular object 
in falsifying, James is an invaluable assistant, 
from the diligence and painstaking care he shows, 
and the thoroughness and minuteness with which 
he goes into details. 

A fair-minded and interesting English critic,* 
whose remarks are generally very just, seems to 
me to have erred somewhat in commenting on 
this last sloop action. He says that the Avon 
was first crippled by dismantling shot from long 
guns. Now, the Wasp had but one long gun on 
the side engaged, and, moreover, began the action 
with the shortest and lightest of her carronades. 
Then he continues that the Avon, like the Pea- 
cock, "was hulled so low that the shot-holes could 
not be got at, and yielded to this fatal circum- 
stance only." It certainly cannot be said, when 

^ Lord Howard Douglass, Treatise on Naval Gunnery, p. 
416. 



Naval War of 1 812 63 

a brig has been dismasted, has had a third of her 
crew placed hors de combat, and has been rendered 
an unmanageable hulk, that she yields only be- 
cause she has received a few shot below the water- 
line. These shot-holes undoubtedly hastened the 
result, but both the Peacock and the Avon would 
have surrendered even if they had remained abso- 
lutely water-tight. 

The Adams, 28, had been cut down to a sloop 
of war at Washington, and then lengthened into 
a flush-decked, heavy corvette, mounting on each 
side 13 medium i8's, or columbiads, and i long 
12, with a crew of 220 men, under the command 
of Captain Charles Morris, late first lieutenant of 
the Constitution .^ She slipped out of the Potomac 
and past the blockaders on January 18th, and 
cruised eastward to the African coast and along 
it from Cape Mount to Cape Palmas, thence to 
the Canaries and Cape de Verde. She returned 
very nearly along the Equator, thence going to- 
ward the West Indies. The cruise was unlucky, 
but a few small prizes, laden with palm-oil and 
ivory, being made. In hazy weather, on March 
25th, a large Indiaman (the Woodhridge) was cap- 
tured; but while taking possession the weather 
cleared up, and Captain Morris found himself to 

^Autobiography of Commodore Morris, Annapolis, 1880, p. 
172. 



64 Naval War of 1812 

leeward of 25 sail, two of which, a two-decker and 
a frigate, were making for him, and it took him 
till the next day to shake them off. He entered 
Savannah on May ist and sailed again on the 8th, 
standing to the Gulf Stream, between Makanilla 
and Florida, to look out for the Jamaica fleet. 
He found this fleet on the 24th, but the discovery 
failed to do him much good, as the ships were 
under the convoy of a 74, two frigates, and three 
brigs. The Adams hovered on their skirts for a 
couple of days, but nothing could be done with 
them, for the merchantmen sailed in the closest 
possible order and the six war vessels exercised 
the greatest vigilance. So the corvette passed 
northward to the Newfoundland Banks, where 
she met with nothing but fogs and floating ice, 
and then turned her prow toward Ireland. On 
July 4th, she made out and chased two sail, who 
escaped into the mouth of the Shannon. After 
this the Adams, heartily tired of fogs and cold, 
stood to the southward and made a few prizes; 
then, in lat. 44° N., long. 10° W., on July 15th, 
she stumbled across the i8-pounder 36-gun frigate 
Tigress, Captain Henderson. The frigate was to 
leeward, and a hard chase ensued. It was only 
by dint of cutting away her anchors and throwing 
overboard some of her guns that the Adams held 
her own till sunset, when it fell calm. Captain 
Morris and his first lieutenant, Mr. Wadsworth, 



Naval War of 1 812 65 

had been the first and second Heutenants of Old 
Ironsides in Hull's famous cruise, and they proved 
that they had not forgotten their early experience, 
for they got out the boats to tow, and employed 
their time so well that by sunrise the frigate was 
two leagues astern. After eighteen hours' more 
chase the Adams dropped her. But in a day or 
two she ran across a couple more, one of which, 
an old bluff -bows, was soon thrown out ; but the 
other was very fast, and kept close on the cor- 
vette's heels. As before, the frigate was to lee- 
ward. The Adams had been built by contract; 
one side was let to a sub-contractor of economical 
instincts, and accordingly turned out rather 
shorter than the other; the result was, the ship 
sailed a good deal faster on one tack than on the 
other. In this chase she finally got on her good 
tack in the night, and so escaped.' Captain 
Morris now turned homeward. During his two 
cruises he had made but ten prizes (manned by 
161 men), none of very great value. His luck 
grew worse and worse. The continual cold and 
damp produced scurvy, and soon half of his crew 
were prostrated by the disease; and the weather 
kept on foggy as ever. Off the Maine coast a 
brig-sloop (the Rifleman, Captain Pearce) was 

' This statement is somewhat traditional ; I have also seen 

it made about the John Adams. But some old officers have told 

me positively that it occurred to the Adams on this cruise. 
VOL. n.— 4 



66 Naval War of 1B12 

discovered and chased, but it escaped in the thick 
weather. The fog grew heavier, and early on the 
morning of August 1 7th the Adams struck land- 
literally struck it, too, for she grounded on the 
Isle of Haute, and had to throw over provisions, 
spare spars, etc., before she could be got off. Then 
she entered the Penobscot, and sailed twenty- 
seven miles up it to Hampden. The Rifleman 
meanwhile conveyed intelligence of her where- 
abouts to a British fleet, consisting of two line-of- 
battle ships, three frigates, three sloops, and ten 
troop transports, under the joint command of 
Rear-Admiral Griffith and Lieutenant-General 
Sherbrooke.^ 

This expedition accordingly went into the 
Penobscot and anchored off Castine. Captain 
Morris made every preparation he could to 
defend his ship, but his means were very limited; 
seventy of his men were dead or disabled by the 
scurvy; the remainder, many of them also 
diseased, were mustered out, to the number of 
130 officers and seamen (without muskets) and 
20 marines. He was joined, however, by 30 
regulars, and later by over 300 militia armed with 
squirrel guns, ducking- and fowling-pieces, etc., — 
in all between 500 and 550 men,^ only 180 of 
whom, with 50 muskets among them, could be 

^ James, vi., 479. 

^ Autobiography of Commodore Morris, 



Naval War of 1 812 67 

depended upon. On September 3d, the British 
advanced by land and water, the land-force being 
under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel John, 
and consisting of 600 troops, 80 marines, and 80 
seamen.' The flotilla was composed of barges, 
launches, and rocket-boats, under the command 
of Captain Barry of the Dragon, 74. In all, there 
were over 1500 men. The seamen of the Adams, 
from the wharf, opened fire on the flotilla, which 
returned it with rockets and carronades; but the 
advance was checked. Meanwhile, the British 
land-forces attacked the militia, who acted up to 
the traditional militia standard, and retreated 
with the utmost promptitude and celerity, omit- 
ting the empty formality of firing. This left 
Captain Morris surrounded by eight times his 
number, and there was nothing to do but set fire 
to the corvette and retreat. The seamen, marines, 
and regulars behaved well, and no attempt was 
made to molest them. None of Captain Morris's 
men were hit; his loss was confined to one sailor 
and one marine, who were too much weakened by 
scurvy to retreat with the others, who marched 

^ James, vi., 481. Whenever militia are concerned, James 
has not much fear of official documents and lets his imagina- 
tion run riot; he here says the Americans had 1400 men, 
which is as accurate as he generally is in writing about this 
species of force. His aim being to overestimate the number 
of the Americans in the various engagements, he always sup- 
plies militia ad libitiim to make up any possible deficiency. 



68 Naval War of 1 812 

to Portland, 200 miles off. The British lost ten 
men killed or wounded. 

On September 9th, Gunboats Nos. 160 and 151, 
commanded by Mr. Thomas M. Pendleton, cap- 
tured off Sapelo Bar, Ga., the British privateer 
Fortune of War, armed with two heavy pivot guns, 
and 35 men. She made a brief resistance, losing 
two of her men.' 

On September 15th, the British 20-gun ship- 
sloops Hermes and Carron, and i8-gun brig-sloops 
Sophie and Childers, and a force of 200 men on 
shore,^ attacked Fort Bowyer, on Mobile Point, 
but were repulsed without being able to do any 
damage whatever to the Americans. The Hermes 
was sunk and the assailants lost about 80 men. 

On the 26th of September, while the privateer- 
schooner General Armstrong, of New York, Cap- 
tain Samuel C. Reid, of one long 24, eight long 
9's, and 90 men, was lying at anchor in the road 
of Fayal, a British squadron, composed of the 
Plantagenet, 74, Captain Robert Floyd, Rota, 38, 
Captain Philip Somerville, and Carnation, 18, 
Captain George Bentham, hove in sight. 3 One 
or more boats were sent in by the British, to 

' Letter from Commodore H. G. Campbell, St. Mary's, 
September 12, 18 14. 

' James, vi., 527. 

3 Letter of Capt. S. C. Reid, October 7, 1814; and of John 
B Dabney, Consul at Fayal, October 5, 18 14. 



Naval War of 1 812 69 

reconnoitre the schooner, as they asserted, or, 
according to the American accounts, to carry her 
by a coup de main. At any rate, after repeatedly 
warning them off, the privateer fired into them, 
and they withdrew. Captain Reid then anchored, 
with springs on his cables, nearer shore, to await 
the expected attack, which was not long deferred. 
At 8 p. M. four boats from the Plantagenet and 
three from the Rota, containing in all 180 men,' 
under the command of Lieutenant William Matter- 
face, first of the Rota, pulled in toward the road, 
while the Carnation accompanied them to attack 
the schooner if she got under way. The boats 
pulled in under cover of a small reef of rocks, where 
they lay for some time, and about midnight made 
the attack. The Americans opened with the pivot 
gun, and immediately afterward with their long 9's, 
while the boats replied with their carronades, and, 
pulling spiritedly on amidst a terrific fire of 
musketry from both sides, laid the schooner 
aboard on her bow and starboard quarter. The 
struggle was savage enough, the British hacking 
at the netting and trying to clamber up on deck, 
while the Americans fired their muskets and 
pistols in the faces of their assailants and thrust 

^ James, vi., 509. Both American accounts say 12 boats, 
with 400 men, and give the British loss at 250. According 
to my usual rule, I take each side's statement of its own 
force and loss. 



70 Naval War of 1812 

the foremost through with their long pikes. The 
boats on the quarter were driven off; but on the 
forecastle all three of the American lieutenants 
were killed or disabled, and the men were giving 
back when Captain Reid led all the after-division 
up and drove the British back into their boats. 
This put an end to the assault. Two boats were 
sunk, most of the wounded being saved, as the 
shore was so near ; two others were captured, and 
but three of the scattered flotilla returned to the 
ships. Of the Americans, two were killed, includ- 
ing the second lieutenant, Alexander O. Williams, 
and 7 were wounded, including the first and 
third lieutenants, Frederick A. Worth and Robert 
Johnson. Of the British, 34 were killed and 86 
were wounded; among the former being the 
Rota's first and third lieutenants, William Matter- 
face and Charles R. Norman, and among the 
latter her second lieutenant and first lieutenant 
of marines, Richard Rawle and Thomas Park. 
The schooner's long 24 had been knocked off its 
carriage by a carronade shot, but it was replaced 
and the deck cleared for another action. Next 
day the Carnation came in to destroy the priva- 
teer, but was driven off by the judicious use the 
latter made of her "Long Tom." But affairs 
being now hopeless, the General Armstrong was 
scuttled and burned, and the Americans retreated 
to the land. The British squadron was bound 



Naval War of 1 812 71 

for New Orleans, and on account of the delay 
and loss it had suffered, it was late in arriving, 
so that this action may be said to have helped 
in saving the Crescent City. Few regular com- 
manders could have done as well as Captain Reid. 

On October 6th, while Gunboat No. 160 was 
convoying some coasters from Savannah, it was 
carried by a British tender and nine boats.' The 
gun vessel was lying at anchor about eight 
leagues from St. Mary's, and the boats approached 
with muffled oars early in the morning. They 
were not discovered till nearly aboard, but the 
defence though short was spirited, the British 
losing about 20 men. Of the gunboat's 30 men 
but 16 were fit for action; those, under Sailing- 
master Thomas Paine, behaved well. Mr. Paine, 
especially, fought with the greatest gallantry; 
his thigh was broken with a grape-shot at the 
very beginning, but he hobbled up on his other 
leg to resist the boarders, fighting till he was thrust 
through by a pike and had received two sabre 
cuts. Any one of his wounds would have been 
enough to put an ordinary man hors de combat. 

On October nth, another desperate privateer 
battle took place. The brigantine Prince de 
Neufchdtel, Captain Ordronaux, of New York, 
was a superbly built vessel of 310 tons, mounting 

' Letter from Commander H. G. Campbell, October 1-2, 
1S14. 



72 Naval War of 1 812 

17 guns, and originally possessing a crew of 150 
men/ She had made a very successful cruise, 
having on board goods to the amount of $300,000, 
but had manned and sent in so many prizes that 
only 40 of her crew were left on board, while 37 
prisoners were confined in the hold. One of her 
prizes was in company, but had drifted off to such 
a distance that she was unable to take part in the 
fight. At mid-day, on the nth of October, while 
off Nantucket, the British frigate Endyniion, 40, 
Captain Henry Hope, discovered the privateer 
and made sail in chase. ^ At 8.30 p.m., a calm 
having come on, the frigate despatched 5 boats, 
containing in men, 3 under the command of the 
first lieutenant, Abel Hawkins, to take the brig- 
antine; while the latter triced up the boarding 
nettings, loaded the guns with grape and bull- 
ets, and prepared herself in every way for the 
coming encounter. She opened fire on the boats 
as they drew near, but they were soon alongside, 
and a most desperate engagement ensued. Some 
of the British actually cut through the nettings 
and reached the deck, but were killed by the 

^ History of American Privateers , by George Coggeshall, 
p. 241, New York, 1876. ^ James, vi., p. 527. 

3 According to Captain Ordronaux; James does not give 
the number, but says 28 were killed, 37 wounded, and the 
crew of the launch captured. Ten of the latter were un- 
wounded, and 18 wounded. I do not know if he included 
these last among his "37 wounded." 



Naval War of 1 812 73 

privateersmen ; and in a few minutes one boat 
was sunk, three others drifted off, and the launch, 
which was under the brigantine's stern, was taken 
possession of. The slaughter had been frightful, 
considering the number of the combatants. The 
victorious privateersmen had lost 7 killed, 15 
badly and 9 slightly wounded, leaving but 9 un- 
touched! Of the Endymions men, James says 
28, including the first lieutenant and a midship- 
man, were killed, and 37, including the second 
lieutenant and a master's mate, wounded; "be- 
sides which the launch was captured and the crew 
made prisoners." I do not know if this means 
37 wounded, besides the wounded in the launch, 
or not'; of the prisoners captured 18 were 
wounded and 10 unhurt, so the loss was either 
28 killed, 55 wounded, and 10 unhurt prisoners; 
or else 28 killed, 37 wounded, and 10 prisoners; 
but whether the total was 93 or 75 does not much 
matter. It was a most desperate conflict, and, 
remembering how short-handed the brigantine 
was, it reflected the highest honor on the American 
captain and his crew. 

After their repulse before Baltimore, the British 
concentrated their forces for an attack upon 
New Orleans. Accordingly, a great fleet of line- 

' I think James does not include the wounded in the launch, 
as he says 28 wounded were sent aboard the Saturn; this could 
hardly have included the men who had been captured. 



74 Naval War of 1 812 

of-battle ships, frigates, and smaller vessels, under 
Vice-Admiral Cochrane, convoying a still larger 
number of store-ships and transports containing 
the army of General Packenham, appeared off 
the Chandeleur Islands on December 8th. The 
American navy in these parts consisted of the ship 
Louisiana and schooner Carolina in the Miss- 
issippi River, and in the shallow bayous a few 
gunboats, of course without quarters, low in the 
water, and perfectly easy of entrance. There 
were also a few tenders and small boats. The 
British frigates and sloops anchored off the broad 
shallow inlet called Lake Borgne on the 12th; 
on this inlet there were 5 gunboats and 2 small 
tenders, under the command of Lieutenant 
Thomas Catesby Jones. It was impossible for 
the British to transport their troops across Lake 
Borgne, as contemplated, until this flotilla was 
destroyed. Accordingly, on the night of the 12th, 
42 launches, armed with 24-, 18-, and 12-pounder 
carronades, and 3 unarmed gigs, carrying 980 
seamen and marines, under the orders of Captain 
Lockyer,' pushed off from the Armida, 38 in three 
divisions; the first under the command of Captain 
Lockyer, the second under Captain Montresor, 
and the third under Captain Roberts.^ Lieuten- 

' James, vi., 521. 

^ Letter of Captain Lockyer to Vice-Admiral Cochrane, 
December 18, 1814. 



Naval War of 1 812 75 

ant Jones was at anchor with his boats at the 
Malheureux Islands, when he discovered, on the 
13th, the British flotilla advancing toward Port 
Christian. He at once despatched the Seahorse 
of one 6-pounder and 14 men, under Sailing- 
master William Johnston, to destroy the stores 
at Bay St. Louis. She moored herself under the 
bank, where she was assisted by two 6-pounders. 
There the British attacked her with seven of their 
smaller boats, which were repulsed after sustain- 
ing for nearly half an hour a very destructive fire.' 
However, Mr. Johnston had to burn his boat to 
prevent it from being taken by a larger force. 
Meanwhile, Lieutenant Jones got under way with 
the five gun vessels, trying to reach Les Petites 
Coquilles, near a small fort at the mouth of a 
creek. But as the wind was light and baffling, 
and the current very strong, the effort was given 
up, and the vessels came to anchor off Malheureux 
Island passage at i a.m. on the i4th.^ The other 
tender, the Alligator, Sailing-master Sheppard, of 
one 4-pounder and 8 men, was discovered next 
morning trying to get to her consorts and taken 
with a rush by Captain Roberts and his division. 
At daybreak, Lieutenant Jones saw the British 
boats about nine miles to the eastward, and 
moored his five gun vessels abreast in the channel, 

I James, vi., 521. 

^ Official letter of Lieutenant Jones, March 12, 1815. 



76 Naval War of 1812 

with their boarding-nettings triced up, and every- 
thing in readiness; but the force of the current 
drifted two of them, Nos. 156 and 163, a hundred 
yards down the pass and out of hne, No. 156 being 
the headmost of all. Their exact force was as 
follows: No. 156, Lieutenant Jones, 41 men and 
5 guns (one long 24 and four 1 2 -pound carronades) ; 
No. 163, Sailing-master George Ulrick, 21 men, 3 
guns (one long 24 and two 12 -pound carronades) ; 
No. 162, Lieutenant Robert Speddes, 35 men, 5 
guns (one long 24 and four light 6's); No. 
5, Sailing-master John D. Ferris, 36 men, 5 guns 
(one long 24, four 12-pound carronades); No. 23, 
Lieutenant Isaac McKeever, 39 men and 5 guns 
(one long 32 and four light 6's). , There were 
thus, in all, 182 men and a broadside of 14 guns, 
throwing 212 pounds of shot. The British forces 
amounted, as I have said, to '980 men, and (sup- 
posing they had equal numbers of 24's, i8's, and 
12's) the flotilla threw seven hundred and fifty- 
eight pounds of shot. The odds, of course, were 
not as much against the Americans as these 
figures would make them, for they were station- 
ary, and had some long, heavy guns and boarding- 
nettings; on the other hand, the fact that two of 
their ' vessels had drifted out of line was a very 
serious misfortune. At any rate, the odds were 
great enough, considering that he had British 
sailors to deal with, to make it anything but a 



Naval War of 1 812 ^1 

cheerful look-out for Lieutenant Jones ; but, nowise 
daunted by the almost certain prospect of defeat, 
the American officers and seamen prepared very 
coolly for the fight. In this connection, it should 
be remembered that simply to run the boats on 
shore would have permitted the men to escape, 
if they had chosen to do so. 

Captain Lockyer acted as coolly as his antago- 
nist. When he had reached a point just out of 
gunshot, he brought the boats to a grapnel to let 
the sailors eat breakfast and get a little rest after 
the fatigue of their long row. When his men 
were rested and in good trim, he formed the boats 
in open order, and they pulled gallantly on against 
the strong current. At 10.50, the Americans 
opened fire from their long guns, and in about 
fifteen minutes the cannonade became general 
on both sides.' At 11.50, Captain Lockyer's 
barge was laid alongside No. 156, and a very obsti- 
nate struggle ensued, "in which the greater part 
of the officers and crew of the barge were killed or 
wounded,"^ including among the latter the gallant 
captain himself, severely, and his equally gallant 
first lieutenant, Mr. Pratt, of the Seahorse frigate, 
mortally. At the same time Lieutenant Tatnall 
(of the Tonnant) also laid his barge aboard the 
gunboat, only to have it sunk; another shared 
the same fate ; and the assailants were for the mo- 

^ Lieutenant Jones's letter. ^ Captain Lockyer's letter. 



78 Naval War of 1 8 1 2 

ment repulsed. But at this time Lieutenant 
Jones, who had shown as much personal bravery 
during the assault as forethought in preparing for 
it, received a dangerous and disabling wound, 
while many of his men received the same fate; 
the boarding-nettings, too, had all been cut or 
shot away. Several more barges at once assailed 
the boats, the command of which had devolved 
on a young midshipman, Mr. George Parker; the 
latter, fighting as bravely as his commander, was 
like him severely wounded, whereupon the boat 
was carried at 12.10. Its guns were turned on No. 
163, and this, the smallest of the gunboats, was 
soon taken ; then the British dashed at No. 162 and 
carried it, after a very gallant defence, in which 
Lieutenant Speddes was badly wounded. No. 5 
had her long 24 dismouted by the recoil, and was 
next carried; finally, No. 23, being left entirely 
alone, hauled down her flag at 1 2.30.' The Ameri- 
cans had lost 6 killed and 35 wounded ; the British 
17 killed and 77 (many mortally) wounded. The 
greater part of the loss on both sides occurred in 
boarding No. 156, and also the next two gunboats. 
I have in this case, as usual, taken each com- 
mander 's account of his own force and loss. Lieu- 
tenant Jones states the British force to have been 
1000, which tallies almost exactly with their own 
account ; but believes that they lost 300 in killed 

' Minutes of the Court of Inquiry, held May 15, 1851. 



Naval War of 1 8 1 2 79 

and wounded. Captain Lockyer, on the other 
hand, gives the Americans 225 men and three addi- 
tional Hght guns. But on the main points the two 
accounts agree perfectly. The victors certainly 
deserve great credit for the perseverance, gallantry, 
and dash they displayed; but still more belongs 
to the vanquished for the cool skill and obstinate 
courage with which they fought, although with 
the certainty of ultimate defeat before them, — 
which is always the severest test of bravery. No 
comment is needed to prove the effectiveness of 
their resistance. Even James says that the Amer- 
icans made an obstinate struggle, that Lieutenant 
Jones displayed great personal bravery, and that 
the British loss was very severe. 

On the night of December 23d, General Jack- 
son beat up the quarters of the British encamped 
on the bank of the Mississippi. The attack was 
opened by Captain Patterson in the schooner Caro- 
lina, 14 ; she was manned by 70 men, and mounted 
on each side six 12 -pound carronades and one 
long 12. Dropping down the stream unobserved 
till opposite the bivouac of the troops, and so 
close to the shore that his first command to fire 
was plainly heard by the foe, Patterson opened a 
slaughtering cannonade on the flank of the British, 
and kept it up without suffering any loss in re- 
turn, as long as the attack lasted. But, on the 
27th, the British had their revenge, attacking the 



8o 



Naval War of 1812 



little schooner as she lay at anchor, unable to as- 
cend the stream on account of the rapid current 
and a strong head-wind. The assailants had a 
battery of five guns, throwing hot shot and shell, 
while the only gun of the schooner's that would 
reach was the long 12. After half an hour's fight- 
ing the schooner was set on fire and blown up; 
the crew escaped to the shore with the loss of 7 
men killed and wounded. The only remaining 
vessel, exclusive of some small, unarmed row-boats 
was the Louisiana, 16, carrying on each side eight 
long 24's. She was of great assistance in the 
battle of the 28th, throwing during the course of 
the cannonade over 800 shot, and suffering very 
little in return.' Afterward, the American seamen 
and marines played a most gallant part in all the 
engagements on shore; they made very efficient 
artillerists. 

SUMMARY 

The following vessels were got ready for sea during this year^ : 



Name 


Rig 


Where Built 


Cost 
$77,459-60 


c 
160 


CA 

c 

3 
22 


C 



509 


Remarks 


Wasp. 


Ship 


Newburyport 


Built 


Frolic, 


" 


Boston 


72,094.82 


•■ 


•' 


" 


•• 


Peacock, 


•• 


New York 


75.644-.l6 


" 


" 


■■ 


" 


Ontario, 


" 


Baltimore 


59.343-69 


•• 


" 


■' 


»• 


Erie, 


" 




56,174-36 


" 


" 


'• 


i( 



' Cooper, ii., p. 320. 

2 Anierican State Papers, xiv., p. 828; also, Emmons's 57a- 
tistical History. 



Naval War of 1812 



81 



SUMMARY (continued) 



Name 


Rig 


Where Built 


Cost 


C 

V 

S 
90 


C 

3 

12 


C 

260 


Remarks 


Tom Bowline, 


Schooner 


Portsmouth 


$1 3,000.00 


Purchased 


Lynx, 


•• 


Washington 




50 


6 




Built 


Epervier, 


Brig 


England 


50,000.00 


130 


18 


477 


Captured 


Flambeau, 


" 


Baltimore 


14,000.00 


90 


14 


300 


Purchased 




'Spark, 


" 


•• 


17,389.00 


•• 


" 




'• 




Firefly, 


" 


" 


17,435-00 


" 


" 


333 


" 


■ 


Torch, 

Spitfire, 


Schooner 


: 


13,000.00 
20,000.00 


60 


12 


260 
286 


4( 




.Eagle, 


«« 


NO. 




" 


•• 


270 


it 




Prometheus, 


«i 


Philadelphia 


20,000.00 


" 


" 


290 


t« 


H 


Chippeway, 


Brig 


R. I. 


5 2,000.00 


90 


14 


3QO 


i* 


Saranac, 


" 


Middleton 


26,000.00 


" 


•• 


360 


" 




, Boxer, 


«i 


" 


26,000.00 


'• 


" 


370 


t( 


Despatch, 


Schooner 






23 


2 


52 





The first five small vessels that are bracketed 
were to cruise under Commodore Porter; the 
next four under Commodore Perry ; but the news 
of peace arrived before either squadron put to sea. 
Some of the vessels under this catalogue were 
really almost ready for sea at the end of 1813; 
and some that I have included in the catalogue 
of 181 5 were almost completely fitted at the end of 
1 814, — but this arrangement is practically the 
best. 



vol.. II.- 6 



82 Naval War of 1812 

LIST OF VESSELS LOST TO THE BRITISH 

I. Destroyed by British Armies 

Name Tons Guns 

Columbia 1 508 52 j Destroyed to prevent 

Adams 760 28 [■ them falling into hands 

Argus 509 22 ) of enemy. 

Carolina 230 14 Destroyed by battery. 

3007 116 

2. Captured, etc., by British Navy on Ocean 

Name Tons Guns 

Essex 860 46 Captured by frigate and corvette. 

Frolic 509 22 " by frigate and schooner. 

Rattlesnake. . 258 16 " by frigate. 

Syren 250 16 " by seventy-four. 

4877 100 
Total, 7884 tons. 216 guns. 

There were also a good many gunboats, which 
I do not count, because, as already said, they were 
often not as large as the barges that were sunk 
and taken in attacking them, as at Craney Island, 
etc. 

LIST OF VESSELS TAKEN FROM BRITISH 

I. Captured by American Privateers 

Name Tons Guns 

Ballahou 86 4 

Landrail 76 4 

162 8 



Naval War of 1812 8^ 



v) 



2. Captured, etc., by American Navy on Ocean 

Name Tons Guns 

Epervier . ... 477 18 Captured by sloop Peacock. 

Avon 477 20 Sunk " " Wasp. 

Reindeer.... 477 19 " 

Pictdu 300 14 Captured by frigate. 

3. Sunk in Attacking Fort 

Name Tons Guns 

Hermes 500 22 

Total, 2393 tons. 10 1 guns. 

Taking into account the losses on the lakes, 
there was not very much difference in the amount 
of damage done to each combatant by the other ; 
but, both as regards the material results and the 
moral effects, the balance inclined largely to the 
Americans. The chief damage done to our navy 
was by the British land forces, and consisted 
mainly in forcing us to bum an unfinished frigate 
and sloop. On the ocean, our three sloops were 
captured in each case by an overwhelming force, 
against which no resistance could be made, and 
the same was true of the captured British schooner. 
The Essex certainly gained as much honor as her 
opponents. There were but three single-ship ac- 
tions, in all of which the Americans were so su- 
perior in force as to give them a very great 
advantage ; nevertheless, in two of them the vic- 
tory was won with such perfect impunity, and the 



84 Naval War of 1812 

difference in the loss and damage inflicted was so 
very great, that I doubt if the result would have 
been affected if the odds had been reversed. In 
the other case, that of the Reindeer, the defeated 
party fought at a still greater disadvantage, "and 
yet came out of the conflict with full as much 
honor as the victor. No man with a particle of 
generosity in his nature can help feeling the most 
honest admiration for the unflinching courage 
and cool skill displayed by Captain Manners and 
his crew. It is worthy of notice (remembering 
the sneers of so many of the British authors at 
the "wary circumspection" of the Americans) 
that Captain Manners, who has left a more hon- 
orable name than any other British commander 
of the war, excepting Captain Broke, behaved 
with the greatest caution as long as it would serve 
his purpose, while he showed the most splendid 
personal courage afterward. It is this combination 
of courage and skill that made him so dangerous 
an antagonist; it showed that the traditional 
British bravery was not impaired by refusing 
to adhere to the traditional British tactics of 
rushing into a fight "bull-headed." Needless 
exposure to danger denotes not so much pluck as 
stupidity. Captain Manners had no intention 
of giving his adversary any advantage he could 
prevent. No one can help feeling regret that he 
was killed; but if he was to fall, what more 



Naval War of 1 8i 2 85 

glorious death could he meet? It must be re- 
membered that, while paying all homage to Cap- 
tain Manners, Captain Blakely did equally well. 
It was a case where the victory between two com- 
batants, equal in courage and skill, was decided 
by superior weight of metal and number of men. 

PRIZES MADE 

Name of ship Number of prizes 

President 3 

Constitution 6 

Adams lo 

Frolic 2 

Wasp 15 

Peacock 15 

Hornet i 

Small craft 35 

87 



. 



CHAPTER II 
1814 

ON THE LAKES 

Ontario — The contest one of ship-building merely — Ex- 
treme caution of the commanders, verging on timidity — Yeo 
takes Oswego, and blockades Sackett's Harbor — British gun- 
boats captured — Chauncy blockades Kingston. — Erie— Cap- 
tain Sinclair's unsuccessful expedition — Daring and successful 
cutting-out expeditions of the British. — Champlain — Mac- 
donough's victory. 

ONTARIO 

THE winter was spent by both parties in 
preparing more formidable fleets for 
the ensuing summer. All the American 
schooners had proved themselves so unfit for ser- 
vice that they were converted into transports, ex- 
cept the Sylph, which was brig-rigged and armed 
like the Oneida. Sackett's Harbor possessed but 
slight fortifications, and the Americans were kept 
constantly on the alert, through fear lest the 
British should cross over. Commodore Chauncy 
and Mr. Eckford were as unremitting in their ex- 
ertions as ever. In February, two 22-gun brigs, 
the Jefferson and Jones, and one large frigate of 
50 guns, the Superior, were laid; afterward a 

86 



Naval War of 1 812 87 

deserter brought in news of the enormous size of 
one of the new British frigates, and the Superior 
was enlarged to permit her carrying 62 guns. 
The Jefferson was launched on April 7th, the 
Jones on the loth, and the Superior on May 2d — 
an attempt on the part of the British to blow her 
up having been foiled a few days before. An- 
other frigate, the Mohawk, 42, was at once begun. 
Neither guns nor men for the first three ships had 
as yet arrived, but they soon began to come in, 
as the roads got better and the streams opened. 
Chauncy and Eckford, besides building ships that 
were literally laid down in the forest, and seeing 
that they were armed with heavy guns, which, 
as well as all their stores, had to be carried over- 
land hundreds of miles through the wilderness, 
were obliged to settle quarrels that occurred among 
the men, the most serious being one that arose 
from a sentinel's accidentally killing a shipwright, 
whose companions instantly struck work in a 
body. What was more serious, they had to con- 
tend with such constant and virulent sickness, 
that it almost assumed the proportions of a plague. 
During the winter it was seldom that two thirds 
of the force were fit for duty, and nearly a sixth 
of the whole number of men in the port died be- 
fore navigation opened.' 

' Cooper mentions that in five months the Madison buried 
a fifth of her crew. 



88 



Naval War of 1812 



Meanwhile, Yeo had been nearly as active at 
Kingston, laying down two frigates and a huge 
line-of -battle ship, but his shipwrights did not 
succeed in getting the latter ready much before 
navigation closed. The Prince Regent, 58, and 
Princess Charlotte, 42, were launched on April 
15th. I shall anticipate somewhat by giving 
tabular lists of the comparative forces, after 
the two British frigates, the two American 
frigates, and the two American brigs had all been 
equipped and manned. Commodore Yeo's origi- 
nal six cruisers had been all renamed, some of 
them rearmed, and both the schooners changed 
into brigs. The Wolfe, Royal George, Melville, 
Moira, Beresford, and Sydney Smith, were now 
named, respectively, Montreal, Niagara, Star, 
Charwell, Netly, and Magnet. On the American 
side, there had been but slight changes, beyond 
the alteration of the Sylph into a brig armed like 
the Oneida. Of the Superior's 62 guns, 4 were 
very shortly sent on shore again. 

chauncy's squadron 











Broadside 




Name 


Rig 


Tonnage 


Crew 


Metal 


Armament 
■30 long 32's 


Superior... 


. Ship 


1580 


500 


1050 lbs. 


• 2 " 24's 

.26 short 42 's 

26 long 24's 


Mohawk... 


(1 

• 


1350 


35° 


554 " 


2 " iS's 
14 short 32's 



Naval War of 1812 



chauncy's squadron (continued) 



89 



Name 
Pike.... 



Madison. . 
Jones 

Jefjerson . 
Sylph. . . . 
Oiieida. . . 



Rig 

Ship 



Brig 



Tonnage Crew 
875 300 



Broadside 

Metal 



Armament 



593 



500 



500 



300 



243 



200 



160 



160 



100 



100 



360 lbs. i^6 1°"- ^4 
(2 " 24 

364 " 



332 
332 
180 
180 



\ 2 " 12 
I 22 short 32 
(j 2 long 12 
] 20 short 32 
j 2 long 12 
I 20 short 32 
j 2 long 12 
} 14 short 24 
2 long 1 2 
14 short 24 



8 vessels 



5941 1870 3352 lbs. 



228 guns 



This is considerably less than James makes it, 
as he includes all the schooners, which were 
abandoned as cruisers, and only used as gunboats 
or transports. Similarly Sir James had a large 
number of gunboats, which are not included in 
his cruising force. James thus makes Chauncy's 
force 2321 men, and a broadside of 4188 lbs. 



YEO S SQUADRON 



Name . 


Rig 


Tonnag 


Prince 

Regent . . . 


Ship 


1450 


Princess 






Charlotte. . 


(t 


1215 


Montreal. . . 


<< 


637 



Broadside 
Metal 



485 



315 



220 



872 lbs. ) 



Armament 
|- 32 long 24 
^ 4 short 68 



I 22 ' 32 
f 26 long 24 



604 " 
258 " 



) 



2 short 68 
I 14 " 32 
\ 7 long 24 
\ 18 " 18 



90 



Naval War of 1812 



YEo's SQUADRON (continued) 



Name 
Niagara . 

Charwell. , 

Star 

Netly 

Magnet.. . 

8 vessels 



Rig Tonnage Crew 
Ship 510 200 



Broadside 

Metal 



Armament 



Brig 



279 
262 
216 
187 



no 



1 10 



100 



80 



332 lbs. \ ^ l°"g ^^ 
I 20 short 32 

236 " i ' ^°"g ^2 
\ 14 short 32 

236 ' 



ISO 



156 



4756 1620 2874 lbs. 



j 2 long 12 

I 14 short 32 

2 long 1 2 

14 short 24 

2 long 12 

12 short 24's 

209 guns 



This tallies pretty well with James's statement, 
which (on p. 488) is 15 17 men, and a broadside 
of 2752 lbs. But there are very probably errors 
as regards the armaments of the small brigs, 
which were continually changed. At any rate, 
the American fleet was certainly the stronger, 
about in the proportion of six to five. The dis- 
proportion was enough to justify Sir James in his 
determination not to hazard a battle, although the 
odds were certainly not such as British command- 
ers had been previously accustomed to pay much 
regard to. Chauncy would have acted exactly 
as his opponent did, had he been similarly placed. 
The odds against the British commodore 
were too great to be overcome, where the com- 
batants were otherwise on a par, although the 
refusal to do battle against them would certainly 



Naval War of 1 812 91 

preclude Yeo from advancing any claims to supe- 
riority in skill or courage. The Princess Charlotte 
and Niagara were just about equal to the Mohawk 
and Madison, and so were the Charwell and Netly 
to the Oneida and Sylph; but both the Star and 
Magnet together could hardly have matched either 
the Jones or the Jefferson, while the maindeck 32's 
of the Superior gave her a great advantage over 
the Prince Regent's 24's, where the crews were so 
equal ; and the Pike was certainly too heavy for 
the Montreal. A decided superiority in the effec- 
tiveness of both crews and captains could alone 
have warranted Sir James Lucas Yeo in engaging, 
and this superiority he certainly did not possess. 
This year, the British architects outstripped ours 
in the race for supremacy, and Commodore Yeo 
put out of port with his eight vessels long before 
the Americans were ready. His first attempt 
was a successful attack on Oswego. This town 
is situated some sixty miles distant from Sackett's 
Harbor, and is the first port on the lake which 
the stores, sent from the seaboard to Chauncy, 
reached. Accordingly, it was a place of some 
little importance, but was very much neglected 
by the American authorities. It was insufficiently 
garrisoned, and was defended only by an entirely 
ruined fort of six guns, two of them dismounted. 
Commodore Yeo sailed from Kingston to attack 
it on the 3d of May, having on board his ships a 



92 Naval War of 1812 

detachment of 1080 troops. Oswego was garri- 
soned by less than 300 men/ chiefly belonging to 
a light artillery regiment, with a score or two of 
militia ; they were under the command of Colonel 
Mitchell. The recaptured schooner Growler was 
in port, with seven guns destined for the harbor; 
she was sunk by her commander, but afterward 
raised and carried off by the foe. 

On the 5th, Yeo appeared off Oswego and sent 
in Captain Collier and 13 gunboats to draw the 
fort's fire ; after some firing between them and the 
four guns mounted in the fort (two long 24's, one 
long 12, and one long 6), the gunboats retired. 
The next day the attack was seriously made. The 
Princess Charlotte, Montreal, and Niagara engaged 
the batteries, while the Charwell and Star scoured 
the woods with grape to clear them of the militia.^ 
The debarkation of the troops was superintended 
by Captain O'Connor, and until it was accom- 
plished the Montreal sustained almost the whole 
fire of the fort, being set on fire three times, and 
much cut up in hull, masts, and rigging. ^ Under 
this fire, 800 British troops were landed, under 
Lieutenant-Colonel Fischer, assisted by 200 sea- 
men, armed with long pikes, under Captain Mul- 

^ General order of General Jacob Brown, by R. Jones, 
Assistant Adjutant-General, May 12, 1814. 

^ Letter of General Gordon Drummond, May 7, 1814. 
3 Letter of Sir James Lucas Yeo, May 17, 18 14. 



Naval War of 1 812 93 

caster. They moved gallantly up the hill, under a 
heavy fire, and carried the fort by assault ; Mitch- 
ell then fell back unmolested to the Falls, about 
twelve miles above the town, where there was a 
large quantity of stores. But he was not again 
attacked. The Americans lost 6 men killed, in- 
cluding Lieutenant Blaeny, 38 wounded, and 25 
missing, both of these last falling into the enemy's 
hands. The British lost 22 soldiers, marines, and 
seamen (including Captain Hollaway) killed, and 
73 (including the gallant Captain Mulcaster dan- 
gerously, and Captain Popham slightly) wounded,' 
the total loss being 75 — nearly a third of the 
American force engaged. General Drummond, in 
his official letter, reports that "the fort being 
everywhere almost open, the whole of the garrison 
. . . effected their escape, except about 60 
men, half of them wounded." No doubt the fort's 
being "everywhere almost open" afforded excel- 
lent opportunities for retreat ; but it was not much 
of a recommendation of it as a structure intended 
for defence. 

The British destroyed the four guns in the bat- 
tery, and raised the Growler and carried her off, 
with her valuable cargo of seven long guns. They 

^Letter of Lieutenant-Colonel V. Fischer, May 17, 1814. 
James says " 18 killed and 64 wounded," why, I do not know; 
the ofificial report of Colonel Fischer, as quoted, says: "Of the 
army, 19 killed and 62 wounded; of the navy, 3 killed and 
II wounded." 



94 Naval War of 1 812 

also carried off a small quantity of ordnance 
stores and some flour, and burned the barracks; 
otherwise but little damage was done, and the 
Americans reoccupied the place at once. It cer- 
tainly showed great lack of energy on Commodore 
Yeo's part that he did not strike a really impor- 
tant blow by sending an expedition up to destroy 
the quantity of stores and ordnance collected at 
the Falls. But the attack itself was admirably 
managed. The ships were well placed, and kept 
up so heavy a fire on the fort as to effectually 
cover the debarkation of the troops, which was 
very cleverly accomplished ; and the soldiers and 
seamen behaved with great gallantry and steadi- 
ness, their officers leading them, sword in hand, up 
a long, steep hill, under a destructive fire. It was 
similar to Chauncy's attacks on York and Fort 
George, except that in this case the assailants 
suffered a much severer loss compared to that in- 
flicted on the assailed. Colonel Mitchell managed 
the defence with skill, doing all he could with his 
insufficient materials. 

After returning to Kingston, Yeo sailed with his 
squadron for Sackett's Harbor, where he appeared 
on May 19th and began a strict blockade. This 
was especially troublesome, because most of the 
guns and cables for the two frigates had not yet 
arrived, and though the lighter pieces and stores 
could be carried overland, the heavier ones could 



Naval War of 1 812 95 

only go by water, which route was now made dan- 
gerous by the presence of the blockading squad- 
ron. The very important duty of convoying these 
great guns was entrusted to Captain Woolsey, an 
officer of tried merit. He decided to take them 
by water to Stony Creek, whence they might be 
carried by land to the Harbor, which was but 
three miles distant ; and on the success of his en- 
terprise depended Chauncy's chances of regaining 
command of the lake. On the 28th of May, at 
sunset, Woolsey left Oswego with 19 boats, carry- 
ing twenty-one long 32's, ten long 24's, three 
42 -pound carronades and ten cables — one of the 
latter for the Superior, being a huge rope 2 2 inches 
in circumference and weighing 9600 pounds. The 
boats rowed all through the night, and at sunrise 
on the 29th, 18 of them found themselves off the 
Big Salmon River, and, as it was unsafe to travel 
by daylight, Woolsey ran up into Big Sandy 
Creek, eight miles from the Harbor. The other 
boat, containing two long 24's and a cable, got 
out of line, ran into the British squadron, and was 
captured. The news she brought induced Sir 
James Yeo at once to send out an expedition to 
capture the others. He accordingly despatched 
Captains Popham and Spilsbury in two gunboats, 
one armed with one 68-pound and one 24-pound 
carronade, and the other with a long 32, accom- 
panied by three cutters and a gig, mounting be- 



96 Naval War of 1 8 1 2 

tween them two long 12's and two brass 6's, with 
a total of 180 men.' They rode up to Sandy 
Creek and lay off its mouth all the night, and be- 
gan ascending it shortly after daylight on the 30th. 
Their force, however, was absurdly inadequate 
for the accomplishment of their object. Captain 
Woolsey had been reinforced by some Oneida 
Indians, a company of light artillery, and some 
militia, so that his only care was, not to repulse, 
but to capture the British party entire, and even 
this did not need any exertion. He accordingly 
despatched Major Appling down the river with 
120 riflemen and some Indians to lie in ambush.^ 
When going up the creek the British marines, 
under Lieutenant Cox, were landed on the left 
bank, and the small-arm men, under Lieutenant 
Brown, on the right bank ; while the two captains 
rowed up the stream between them, throwing 
grape into the bushes to disperse the Indians. 
Major Appling waited until the British were close 
up, when his riflemen opened with so destructive 

'James, vi., 487; while Cooper says 186, James says the 
British loss was 18 killed and 50 wounded; Major Appling 
says: "14 were killed, 28 wounded, and 27 marines and 106 
sailors captured." 

2 Letter from Major D. Appling, May 30, 1814. 

3 Letter of Capt. M. T. Woolsey, June i, 1814. There were 
about 60 Indians; in all, the American force amounted to 
180 men. James adds 30 riflemen, 140 Indians, and "a 
large body of militia and cavalry," — none of whom were 
present. 



Naval War of 1 812 97 

a volley as to completely demoralize and "stam- 
pede" them, and their whole force was captured 
with hardly any resistance, the Americans hav- 
ing only one man slightly wounded. The British 
loss was severe, — 18 killed and 50 dangerously 
wounded, according to Captain Popham's report, 
as quoted by James ; or "14 killed and 28 
wounded," according to Major Appling's letter. 
It was a very clever and successful ambush. 

On June 6th, Yeo raised the blockade of the 
Harbor, but Chauncy's squadron was not in con- 
dition to put out till six weeks later, during which 
time nothing was done by either fleet, except that 
two very gallant cutting-out expeditions were 
successfully attempted by Lieutenant Francis H. 
Gregory, U. S. N. On June i6th, he left the Har- 
bor, accompanied by Sailing-masters Vaughan and 
Dixon and 22 seamen, in three gigs, to intercept 
some of the enemy's provision schooners; on the 
19th he was discovered by the British gunboat 
Black Snake, of one 18-pound carronade and 18 
men, commanded by Captain H. Landon. Lieu- 
tenant Gregory dashed at the gunboat and carried 
it without the loss of a man; he was afterward 
obliged to burn it, but he brought the prisoners, 
chiefly royal marines, safely into port. On the 
ist of July, he again started out, with Messrs. 
Vaughan and Dixon and two gigs. The plucky 
little party suffered greatly from hunger, but on 



VOL. n. 



qS Naval War of 1 812 

the 5th, he made a sudden descent on Presque 
Isle, and burned a 14-gun schooner just ready 
for launching; he was off before the foe could 
assemble and reached the Harbor in safety next 
day. 

On July 31st, Commodore Chauncy sailed with 
his fleet ; some days previously the larger British 
vessels had retired to Kingston, where a loo-gun 
two-decker was building. Chauncy sailed up to 
the head of the lake, where he intercepted the 
small brig Magnet. The Sylph was sent in to 
destroy her, but her crew ran her ashore and 
burned her. The Jefferson, Sylph, and Oneida 
were left to watch some other small craft in the 
Niagara ; the Jones was kept cruising between the 
Harbor and Oswego, and with the four larger ves- 
sels Chauncy blockaded Yeo's four large vessels 
lying in Kingston. The four American vessels 
were in the aggregate of 4398 tons, manned by 
rather more than 1350 men, and presenting in 
broadside 77 guns, throwing 2328 lbs. of shot. 
The four British vessels measured in all about 
3812 tons, manned by 1220 men, and presenting 
in broadside 74 guns, throwing 2066 lbs. of shot. 
The former were thus superior by about 15 per 
cent., and Sir James Yeo very properly declined to 
fight with the odds against him, although it was a 
nicer calculation than British commanders had 
been accustomed to enter into. 



Naval War of 1 812 99 

Major-General Brown had written to Commo- 
dore Chauncy on July 13th: "I do not doubt 
my ability to meet the enemy in the field and to 
march in any direction over his country, your fleet 
carrying for me the necessary supplies. We can 
threaten Forts George and Niagara, and carry 
Burlington Heights and York, and proceed direct 
to Kingston and carry that place. For God's 
sake, let me see you: Sir James will not fight." 
To which Chauncy replied : "I shall afford every 
assistance in my power to co-operate with the 
army whenever it can be done without losing 
sight of the great object for the attainment of 
which this fleet has been created, — the capture 
or destruction of the enemy's fleet. But that I 
consider the primary object. . . . We are 
intended to seek and fight the enemy's fleet, and 
I shall not be diverted from my efforts to effec- 
tuate it by any sinister attempt to render us sub- 
ordinate to, or an appendage of, the army." That 
is, by any "sinister attempt" to make him co- 
operate intelligently in a really well-concerted 
scheme of invasion. In further support of these 
noble and independent sentiments, he writes to the 
Secretary of the Navy on August loth': " I told 
him [General Brown] that I should not visit the 
head of the lake unless the enemy's fleet did so. 

' See Niles, vii., 12, and other places (under "Chauncy," in 
index) . 



loo Naval War of 1812 

To deprive the enemy of an apology for 
not meeting me, I have sent ashore four guns from 
the Superior to reduce her armament in number 
to an equality with the Prince Regent, yielding 
the advantage of their 68-pounders. The Mo- 
hawk mounts two guns less than the Princess 
Charlotte, and the Montreal and Niagara are 
equal to the Pike and Madison." He here justi- 
fies his refusal to co-operate with General Brown 
by saying that he was of only equal force with Sir 
James, and that he has deprived the latter of "an 
apology" for not meeting him. This last was 
not at all true. The Mohawk and Madison were 
just about equal to the Princess Charlotte and 
Niagara; but the Pike was half as strong again 
as the Montreal; and Chauncy could very well 
afford to "yield the advantage of their 68-pound- 
ers," when, in return, Sir James had to yield the 
advantage of Chauncy 's long 32's and 42 -pound 
carronades. The Superior was a 3 2 -pounder frig- 
ate, and, even without her four extra guns, was 
about a fourth heavier than the Prince Regent 
with her 24-pounders. Sir James was not acting 
more warily than Chauncy had acted during June 
and July, 181 3. Then he had a fleet which 
tonned 1701, was manned by 680 men, and threw 
at a broadside 1099 lbs. of shot; and he declined 
to go out of port or in any way try to check the 
operation of Yeo's fleet, which tonned 2091, was 



Naval War of 1 812 loi 

manned by 770 men, and threw at a broadside 
1374 lbs. of shot. Chauncy then acted perfectly 
proper, no doubt, but he could not afford to sneer 
at Yeo for behaving in the same way. Whatever 
either commander might write, in reality he well 
knew that his officers and crew were, man for man, 
just about on a par with those of his antagonists, 
and so, after the first brush or two, he was ex- 
ceedingly careful to see that the odds were not 
against him. Chauncy, in his petulant answers 
to Brown's letter, ignored the fact that his supe- 
riority of force would prevent his opponent from 
giving battle, and would, therefore, prevent any- 
thing more important than a blockade occurring. 
His ideas of the purpose for which his com- 
mand had been created were erroneous and very 
hurtful to the American cause. That purpose 
was not, except incidentally, "the destruction 
of the enemy's fleet"; and, if it was, he entirely 
failed to accomplish it. The real purpose was to 
enable Canada to be successfully invaded, or to 
assist in repelling an invasion of the United States. 
These services could only be efficiently per- 
formed by acting in union with the land forces, 
for his independent action could evidently have 
little effect. The only important services he had 
performed had been in attacking Forts George 
and York, where he had been rendered "subor- 
dinate to, and an appendage of, the army." His 



I02 Naval War of 1812 

only chance of accomplishing anything lay in 
similar acts of co-operation, and he refused to do 
these. Had he acted as he ought to have done, 
and assisted Brown to the utmost, he would cer- 
tainly have accomplished much more than he did, 
and might have enabled Brown to assault King- 
ston, when Yeo's fleet would, of course, have been 
captured. The insubordination, petty stickling for 
his own dignity, and lack of appreciation of the 
necessity of acting in concert that he showed, 
were the very faults which proved most fatal to the 
success of our various land commanders in the 
early part of the war. Even had Chauncy's as- 
sistance availed nothing, he could not have ac- 
complished less than he did. He remained off 
Kingston blockading Yeo, being once or twice 
blown off by gales. He sent Lieutenant Gregory, 
accompanied by Midshipman Hart and six men, 
in to reconnoitre on August 25th; the lieutenant 
ran across two barges containing thirty men, and 
was captured after the midshipman had been 
killed and the lieutenant and four men wounded. 
On September 21st, he transported General Izard 
and 3000 men from Sackett's Harbor to the Gen- 
esee; and then again blockaded Kingston until 
the two-decker was nearly completed, when he 
promptly retired to the Harbor. 

The equally cautious Yeo did not come out on 
the lake till October 15th; he did not indulge in 



Naval War of 1 812 103 

the empty and useless formality of blockading 
his antagonist, but assisted the British army on 
the Niagara frontier till navigation closed, about 
November 21st. A couple of days before, Mid- 
shipman McGowan headed an expedition to blow 
up the two-decker (named the St. Lawrence) with 
a torpedo, but was discovered by two of the 
enemy's boats, which he captured and brought 
in; the attempt was abandoned, because the St. 
Lawrence was found not to be lying in Kingston. 
For this year, the material loss again fell heavi- 
est on the British, amounting to one 14-gun brig 
burned by her crew, one lo-gun schooner burned 
on the stocks, three gunboats, three cutters, and 
one gig captured; while, in return, the Americans 
lost one schooner loaded with seven guns, one boat 
loaded with two, and a gig captured and four guns 
destroyed at Oswego. In men, the British loss 
was heavier still, relatively to that of the Ameri- 
cans, being in killed, wounded, and prisoners, 
about 300 to 80. But in spite of this loss and 
damage, which was too trivial to be of any account 
to either side, the success of the season was with 
the British, inasmuch as they held command 
over the lake for more than four months, during 
which time they could co-operate with their army ; 
while the Americans held it for barely two months 
and a half. In fact, the conduct of the two fleets 
on Lake Ontario during the latter part of the war 



I04 Naval War of 1812 

was almost farcical. As soon as one, by building, 
acquired the superiority, the foe at once retired 
to port, where he waited until he had built another 
vessel or two, when he came out, and the other 
went into port in turn. Under such circumstances 
it was hopeless ever to finish the contest by a 
stand-up sea-fight, each commander calculating 
the chances with mathematical exactness. The 
only hope of destroying the enemy's fleet was by 
co-operating with the land forces in a successful 
attack on his main post, when he would be forced 
to be either destroyed or to fight- and this co- 
operation Chauncy refused to give. He seems 
to have been an excellent organizer, but he did 
not use (certainly not in the summer of 18 13) 
his materials by any means to the best advan- 
tage. He was hardly equal to his opponent, 
and the latter seems to have been little more 
than an average officer. Yeo blundered several 
times, as in the attack on Sackett's Harbor, 
in not following up his advantage at Oswego, in 
showing so little resource in the action off the 
Genesee, etc., and he was not troubled by any 
excess of daring; but during the period when he 
was actually cruising against Chauncy on the 
lake, he certainly showed to better advantage than 
the American did. With an inferior force he won 
a partial victory over his opponent off Niagara, 
and then kept him in check for six weeks; while 



Naval War of 1 812 105 

Chauncy, with his superior force, was not only 
partially defeated once, but, when he did gain a 
partial victory, failed to take advantage of it. 

In commenting upon the timid and dilatory 
tactics of the two commanders on Ontario, how- 
ever, it must be remembered that the indecisive 
nature of the results attained had been often 
paralleled by the numerous similar encounters 
that took place on the ocean during the wars of 
the preceding century. In the War of the Amer- 
ican Revolution, the English fought some nineteen 
fleet actions with the French, Dutch, and Span- 
iards; one victory was gained over the French, 
and one over the Spaniards, while the seventeen 
others were all indecisive, both sides claiming the 
victory, and neither winning it. Of course, some 
of them, though indecisive as regards loss and 
damages, were strategetical victories; thus, Ad- 
miral Arbuthnot beat back Admiral Barras off 
the Chesapeake, in March of 1781 ; and near the 
same place in September of the same year the 
French had their revenge in the victory (one at 
least in its results) of the Comte de Grasse over Sir 
Thomas Graves. In the five desperate and bloody 
combats which De Suffrein waged with Sir Ed- 
ward Hughes in the East Indies, the laurels were 
very evenly divided. These five conflicts were not 
rendered indecisive by any overwariness in ma- 
noeuvring, for De Suffrein' s attacks were carried 



fell 



io6 Naval War of 1812 

out with as much boldness as skill, and his stub- 
born antagonist was never inclined to baulk him 
of a fair battle; but the two hardy fighters were 
so evenly matched that they would pound one 
another till each was helpless to inflict injury. 
Very different were the three consecutive battles 
that took place in the same waters on the 25 th 
of April, 1758, the 3d of August, 1758, and on the 
loth of September, 1759, between Pocock and 
d'Ache,' where, by skilful manoeuvring, the French 
admiral saved his somewhat inferior force from 
capture, and the English admiral gained inde- 
cisive victories. M. Riviere, after giving a most 
just and impartial account of the battles, sums 
up with the following excellent criticism^: 

"It is this battle, won by Hawke, the 20th of 
November, 1757, and the combats of Pocock and 
d'Ache, from which date two distinct schools in 
the naval affairs of the eighteenth century: one 
of these was all for promptness and audacity, 
which were regarded as the indispensable con- 
ditions for victory; the other, on the contrary, 
praised skilful delays and able evolutions, and 
created success by science united to prudence. 

^ La Marine Frangaise sous le Regne de Louis XV., par 
Henri Riviere, Lieutenant de Vaisseau, Chevalier de la 
Legion d'Honneur. (Paris et Toulon, 1859). Pp. 385 and 

439- 

^ Ibid., p. 425. I pay more attention to the sense than to 

the letter in my translation. 



Naval War of 1 812 107 

. . . But these two schools were true only 
according to circumstances, not absolutely. When 
two fleets of equal worth are facing one another, 
as in the War of the American Revolution, then 
tactics should come into play, and audacity 
would often be mere foolhardiness. If it happens, 
on the other hand, as in the Republic, or during 
the last years of Louis XV., that an irresolute 
fleet, without organization, has to contend with 
a fleet prepared in every way, then, on the part of 
this last, audacity is wisdom and prudence would 
be cowardice, for it would give an enemy who 
distrusts himself time to become more hardy. 
The only school always true is that one which, 
freed from all routine, produces men whose genius 
will unite in one, in knowing how to apply them 
appropriately, the audacity which will carry off 
victory, and the prudence which knows how to ob- 
tain it in preparing for it." 

These generalizations are drawn from the results 
of might}^ battles, but they apply just as well to 
the campaigns carried on on a small scale, or even 
to single-ship actions. Chauncy, as already said, 
does not deserve the praise which most American 
historians, and especially Cooper, have lavished 
on him, as well as on all our other ofBcers of that 
period. Such indiscriminate eulogy entirely de- 
tracts from the worth of the writer's favorable 
criticisms. Our average commander was, I firmly 



io8 Naval War of 1812 

believe, at that time superior to the average com- 
mander of any other nation; but to get at this 
average we must include Chauncy, Rodgers, and 
Angus, as well as Hull, Macdonough, Perry, 
Porter, Bainbridge, Biddle, Lawrence, and War- 
rington. 

Sir James Yeo did to the full as well as his op- 
ponent, and like him was a good organizer; but 
he did little enough. His campaigns must be con- 
sidered as being conducted well or ill, according as 
he is believed to have commanded better men than 
his opponent, or not. If, as many British writers 
contend, his crews were an overmatch for the 
Americans, man for man, even to a slight degree, 
then Yeo's conduct was very cowardly; if, on the 
contrary, the officers and men of the two fleets 
were on a par, then he acted properly and out- 
generalled his opponent. It is to be regretted 
that most of the histories written on the subject, 
on either side of the Atlantic, should be of the 
"hurrah" order of literature, with no attempt 
whatever to get at the truth, but merely to explain 
away the defeats or immensely exaggerate the 
victories suffered or gained by their own side. 

ERIE AND THE UPPER LAKES 

Hitherto the vessels on these lakes (as well as on 
Ontario) had been under the command of Com- 
modore Chauncy; but they were now formed 



Naval War of 1 812 109 

into a separate department, under Captain Arthur 
Sinclair. The Americans had, of course, com- 
plete supremacy, and no attempt was seriously 
made to contest it with them ; but they received 
a couple of stinging, if not very important 
defeats. It is rather singular that here the 
British, who began with a large force, while there 
was none whatever to oppose it, should have had 
it by degrees completely annihilated ; and should 
have then, and not till then, when apparently 
rendered harmless, have turned round and par- 
tially revenged themselves by two cutting-out 
expeditions which were as boldly executed as 
they were skilfully planned. 

Captain Sinclair sailed into Lake Huron with 
the Niagara, Caledonia, Ariel, Scorpion, and 
Tigress, and on July 20th burned the fort and 
barracks of St. Joseph, which were abandoned by 
their garrison. On August 4th, he arrived off the 
fort of Machilimacinac (Mackinaw), which was 
situated on such an eminence that the guns of 
the vessels could not reach it. Accordingly, the 
troops under Colonel Croghan were landed, cov- 
ered by the fire of the schooners, very successfully ; 
but when they tried to carry the fort they were 
driven back with the loss of seventy men. Thence 
Sinclair sailed to the Nattagawassa Creek, at- 
tacked and destroyed a block-house three miles 
up it, which mounted three light guns and also a 



no Naval War of 1 8i 2 

schooner called the Nancy; but the commander 
of the schooner, Lieutenant Worsley, with his 
crew, escaped up the river. Captain Sinclair then 
departed for Lake Erie, leaving the Scorpion, 
Lieutenant Turner, and Tigress, Sailing-master 
Champlin, to blockade the Nattagawassa. News 
was received by the British from a party of Indians 
that the two American vessels were five leagues 
apart, and it was at once resolved to attempt 
their capture. On the first of September, in the 
evening, four boats started out, one manned by 
20 seamen, under Lieutenant Worsley, the three 
others by 72 soldiers under Lieutenants Bulger, 
Armstrong, and Raderhurst of the army — in all 
92 men and two guns, a 6- and a 3 -pounder. A 
number of Indians accompanied the expedition but 
took no part in the fighting. At sunset on the 
2d, the boats arrived at St. Mary's Strait, and 
spent twenty-four hours in finding out where the 
American schooners were. At 6 p.m., on the 
3d, the nearest vessel, the Tigress, was made 
out, six miles off, and they pulled for her. It 
was very dark, and they were not discovered till 
they had come within fifty yards, when Champlin 
at once fired his long 24 at them; before it could 
be reloaded the four boats had dashed up, those 
of Lieutenants Worsley and Armstrong placing 
themselves on the starboard, and those of Lieu- 
tenants Bulger and Raderhurst on the port side. 



Naval War of 1 8i 2 m 

There was a short, sharp struggle, and the 
schooner was carried. Of her crew of 28 men, 3 
were killed and 5, including Mr. Champlin, dan- 
gerously wounded. The assailants lost three sea- 
men killed. Lieutenant Bulger, seven soldiers and 
several seamen wounded.' "The defence of this 
vessel," writes Lieutenant Bulger, "did credit to 
her officers, who were all severely wounded." 
Next day, the prisoners were sent on shore, and 
on the 5th, the Scorpion was discovered working 
up to join her consort, entirely ignorant of what 
had happened. She anchored about two miles 
from the Tigress; and next morning at 6 o'clock 
the latter slipped her cable and ran down under 
the jib and foresail, the American ensign and 
pendant still flying. When within ten yards of 
the Scorpion, the concealed soldiers jumped up, 
poured a volley into her which killed two and 
wounded two men, and the next moment carried 
her, her surprised crew of thirty men making no 
resistance. The whole affair reflected great credit 
on the enterprise and pluck of the British, without 
being discreditable to the Americans. It was like 
Lieutenant Elliott's capture of the Detroit and 
Caledonia. 

Meanwhile, a still more daring cutting-out expe- 

^ Letter of Lieut. A. H. Bulger, September 7, 18 14. James 
says only 3 killed and 8 wounded; but Lieutenant Bulger 
distinctly says, in addition, "and several seamen wounded." 



112 Naval War of 1 812 

dition had taken place at the foot of Lake Erie. 
The three American schooners, Ohio, Somers, and 
Porcupine, each with thirty men, under Lieuten- 
ant ConkHng, were anchored just at the outlet of 
the lake, to cover the flank of the works at Fort 
Erie. On the night of August 12, Captain Dobbs, 
of the Charwell, and Lieutenant Radcliffe, of the 
Netly, with seventy-five seamen and marines 
from their two vessels, which were lying off Fort 
Erie, resolved to attempt the capture of the 
schooners. The seamen carried the captain's gig 
upon their shoulders from Queenstown to French- 
man's Creek, a distance of twenty miles; thence, 
by the aid of some militia, five batteaux as well as 
the gig were carried eight miles across the woods 
to Lake Erie, and the party (whether with or 
without the militia, I do not know) embarked in 
them. Between 11 and 12 the boats were dis- 
covered a short distance ahead of the Somers and 
hailed. They answered " Provision boats," which 
deceived the officer on deck, as such boats had 
been in the habit of passing and repassing con- 
tinually during the night. Before he discovered 
his mistake the boats drifted across his hawse, 
cut his cables, and ran him aboard with a volley 
of musketry, which wounded two of his men, 
and before the others could get on deck the 
schooner was captured. In another moment, the 
British boats were alongside the Ohio, Lieutenant 



Naval War of 1 812 113 

Conkling's vessel. Here the people had hurried on 
deck, and there was a moment's sharp struggle, 
in which the assailants lost Lieutenant Radcliffe 
and one seaman killed and six seamen and marines 
wounded; but on board the Ohio Lieutenant 
Conkling and Sailing-master M. Cally were shot 
down, one seaman killed, and four wounded, and 
Captain Dobbs carried her, sword in hand. The 
Porcupine was not molested, and made no effort 
to interfere with the British in their retreat; so 
they drifted down the rapids with their two prizes 
and secured them below. The boldness of this 
enterprise will be appreciated when it is remem- 
bered that but 75 British seamen (unless there 
were some militia along), with no artillery, at- 
tacked and captured two out of three fine 
schooners, armed each with a long 32 or 24, and 
an aggregate of 90 men; and that this had been 
done in waters where the gig and five batteaux of 
the victors were the only British vessels afloat. 

CHAMPLAIN 

This lake, which had hitherto played but an 
inconspicuous part, was now to become the scene 
of the greatest naval battle of the war. A British 
army of 11,000 men, under Sir George Prevost, 
undertook the invasion of New York by advancing 
up the western bank of Lake Champlain. This 

VOL, II. — 8 



114 Naval War of 1 812 

advance was impracticable unless there was a 
sufficiently strong British naval force to drive 
back the American squadron at the same time. 
Accordingly, the British began to construct a 
frigate, the Con-fiance, to be added to their already 
existing force, which consisted of a brig, two 
sloops, and twelve or fourteen gunboats. The 
Americans already possessed a heavy corvette, a 
schooner, a small sloop, and ten gunboats or row- 
gallies ; they now began to build a large brig, the 
Eagle, which was launched about the i6th of 
August. Nine days later, on the 25th, the Con- 
fiance was launched. The two squadrons were 
equally deficient in stores, etc. ; the Confiance 
having locks to her guns, some of which could not 
be used, while the American schooner Ticonderoga 
had to fire her guns by means of pistols flashed 
at the touch-holes (like Barclay on Lake Erie). 
Macdonough and Downie were hurried into action 
before they had time to prepare themselves thor- 
oughly; but it was a disadvantage common to 
both, and arose from the nature of the case, which 
called for immediate action. The British army 
advanced slowly toward Plattsburg, which was 
held by General Macomb with less than 2000 eft'ec- 
tive American troops. Captain Thomas' Mac- 
donough, the American commodore, took the lake 
a day or two before his antagonist, and came to 
anchor in Plattsburg Harbor. The British fleet, 



Naval War of 1 8 1 2 115 

under Captain George Downie, moved from Isle 
aux Noix, on September 8th, and on the morning 
of the nth sailed into Plattsburg Harbor. 

The American force consisted of the ship Sara- 
toga, Captain T. Macdonough, of about 734 tons,' 
carrying eight long 24-pounders, six 42-pound and 
twelve 3 2 -pound carronades; the brig Eagle, Cap- 
tain Robert Henly, of about 500 tons, carrying 
eight long i8's and twelve 32-pound carronades; 
schooner Ticonderoga, Lieutenant - Commander 
Stephen Cassin, of about 350 tons, carrying eight 
long i2-pounders, four long i8-pounders, and five 
3 2 -pound carronades; sloop Preble, Lieutenant 
Charles Budd, of about 80 tons, mounting seven 
long 9's; the row-gallies Borer, Centipede, Nettle, 
Allen, Viper, and Burrows, each of about 70 tons, 
and mounting one long 24- and one short 18- 
pounder; and the row-gallies Wilmer, Ludlow, 
Aylwin, and Ballard, each of about 40 tons, and 
mounting one long 12. James puts down the 

' In the Naval Archives (Masters-Commandant Letters, 
1814, i., No. 134) is a letter from Macdonough in which he 
states that the Saratoga is intermediate in size between the 
Pike, of 875, and the Madison, of 593 tons, this would make 
her 734. The Eagle was very nearly the size of the Lawrence 
or Niagara, on Lake Erie. The Ticonderoga was originally 
a small steamer, but Commodore Macdonough had her 
schooner-rigged because he found that her machinery got out 
of order on almost every trip that she took. Her tonnage is 
only approximately known, but she was of the same size as 
the Linnet. 



hi 



ii6 Naval War of 1 8i 2 

number of men on board the squadron as 950, — ■ 
merely a guess, as he gives no authority. Cooper 
says "about 850 men, including officers, and a 
small detachment of soldiers to act as marines." 
Lossing (p. 866, note i) says 882 in all. Vol. 
xiv. of the American State Papers contains on 
page 572 the prize-money list presented by the 
purser, George Beale, Jr. This numbers the men 
(the dead being represented by their heirs or ex- 
ecutors) up to 915, including soldiers and seamen, 
but many of the numbers are omitted, probably 
owing to the fact that their owners, though belong- 
ing on board, happened to be absent on shore or 
in the hospital ; so that the actual number of names 
tallies very closely with that given by Lossing; 
and, accordingly, I shall take that.' The total 
number of men in the gallies (including a number 
of soldiers, as there were not enough sailors) was 

' In the Naval Archives are numerous letters from Mac- 
donough, in which he states continually that, as fast as they 
arrive, he substitutes sailors for the soldiers with which the 
vessels were originally manned. Men were continually being 
sent ashore on account of sickness. In the Bureau of Navi- 
gation is the log-book of "sloop of war Surprise, Captain 
Robert Henly" {Surprise was the name the Eagle originally 
went by). It mentions from time to time that men were 
buried and sent ashore to the hospital (five being sent ashore 
on September 2d) ; and finally mentions that the places of 
the absent were partially filled by a draft of twenty-one 
soldiers, to act as marines. The notes on the day of battle 
are verv brief. 



Naval War of 1 8i 2 117 

350. The exact proportions in which this force 
was distributed among the gunboats cannot be 
told, but it may be roughly said to be 41 in each 
large galley, and 26 in each small one. The com- 
plement of the Saratoga was 210; of the Eagle 130, 
of the Ticonderoga, 100, and of the Preble, 30; but 
the first three had also a few soldiers distributed 
between them. The following list is probably 
pretty accurate as to the aggregate; but there 
may have been a score or two fewer men on the 
gunboats, or more on the larger vessels. 



MACDONOUGH S FORCE 



Name Tons 

Saratoga 734 

Eagle 500 



Crew 


Broadside 


240 


414 lbs. 


150 


264 " 


112 


180 " 


30 


36 " 


246 


252 " 


104 


48 " 



Metal, from long 
or short guns 

long, 96 

short, 318 

long, 72 

short, 192 



Ticonderoga 350 112 180 " ) ^*' '^ 

I short, 96 

Preble 80 30 3^ " lo^gi 36 

Six gunboats 420 246 252 " \ ^^^ 

\ short, 108 

Four gunboats 160 104 48 " long, 48 



In all, fourteen vessels of 2244 tons and 882 
men, with 86 guns throwing at a broadside 1194 
lbs. of shot — 480 from long, and 714 from short 
guns. 

The force of the British squadron in guns and 
ships is known accurately, as most of it was cap- 



ii8 Naval War of 1812 

tured. The Confiance rated for years in our lists as 
a frigate of the class of the Constellation, Congress, 
and Macedonian; she was thus of over 1200 tons. 
(Cooper says more, "nearly double the tonnage 
of the Saratoga.") She carried on her main-deck 
thirty long 24's, fifteen in each broadside. She 
did not have a complete spar-deck; on her poop 
which came forward to the mizzen-mast, were 
two 3 2 -pound (or possibly 42 -pound) carronades, 
and on her spacious topgallant forecastle were 
four 32- (or 42-) pound carronades, and a long 24 
on a pivot.' She had aboard her a furnace for 
heating shot; eight or ten of which heated shot 
were found with the furnace.^ This was, of 
course, a perfectly legitimate advantage. The 
Linnet, Captain Daniel Pring, was a brig of the 
same size as the Ticonderoga, mounting sixteen 
long 12's. The Chubb and Finch, Lieutenants 
James McGhie and William Hicks, were formerly 
the American sloops Growler and Eagle, of 112 
and no tons, respectively. The former mounted 

' This is her armament as given by Cooper, on the authority 
of Lieut. E. A. F. Lavallette, who was in charge of her for 
three months, and went aboard her ten minutes after the 
Linnet struck. 

* James stigmatizes the statement of Commodore Mac- 
donough about the furnace as "as gross a falsehood as ever 
was uttered"; but he gives no authority for the denial, and 
it appears to have been merely an ebullition of spleen on his 
part. Every American officer who went aboard the Confiance 
saw the furnace and the hot shot. 



Naval War of 1 8 1 2 119 

ten 18-pound carronades and one long 6; the 
latter six 18-pound carronades, four long 6's, and 
one short 18. There were twelve gunboats.' 
Five of these were large, of about 70 tons each; 
three mounted a long 24 and a 3 2 -pound carronade 
each; one mounted a long 18 and a 3 2 -pound 
carronade; one a long 18 and a short 18. Seven 
were smaller, of about 40 tons each ; three of these 
carried each a long 18, and four carried each a 
32-pound carronade. There is greater difficulty 
in finding out the number of men in the Brit- 
ish fleet. American historians are unanimous in 
stating it at from 1000 to iioo; British historians 
never do anything but copy James bHndly. Mid- 
shipman Lee of the Confiance, in a letter (already 
quoted) published in the London Naval Chronicle, 
vol. xxxii., p. 292, gives her crew as 300; but 
more than this amount of dead and prisoners 
were taken out of her. The number given her 
by Commander Ward, in his Naval Tactics, is 
probably nearest right — 325." The Linnet had 
about 125 men, and the Chubb and Finch 
about 50 men each. According to Admiral 

' Letter of General George Prevost, September ii, 1814. 
All the American accounts say 13 ; the British official account 
had best be taken. James says only ten, but gives no author- 
ity; he appears to have been entirely ignorant of all things 
connected with this action. 

^ James gives her but 270 men, without stating his au- 
thority. 



I20 Naval War of 1 812 

Paulding (given by Lossing, in his Field-Book of 
the War of 1812, p. 868) their gunboats averaged 
50 men each. This is probably true, as they were 
manned largely by soldiers, any number of whom 
could be spared from Sir George Prevost's great 
army; but it may be best to consider the large 
ones as having 41, and the small 26 men, which 
were the complements of the American gunboats 
of the same sizes. 

The following, then, is the force of 

downie's squadron 

From what guns. 
Name Tonnage Crew Broadside long or short 

Confiance 1200 325 480 lbs. \ &• 3 4 

{ short, 96 

Linnet 350 125 96 

Chubb 112 50 96 



Finch no 50 84 

Five gunboats 350 205 254 

Seven gunboats.. . . 280 182 182 



long, 96 
6 
short, 90 
long, 12 
short, 72 
j long, 12 
I short, 72 
j long, 54 
I short, 128 



In all, 16 vessels, of about 2402 tons, with 937 
men,' and a total of 92 guns, throwing at a broad- 
side 1 192 lbs., 660 from long and 532 from short 
pieces. 

These are widely different from the figures that 

' About; there were probably more rather than less. 



Naval War of 1 812 121 

appear in the pages of most British historians, 
from Sir Archibald AHson down and up. Thus, 
in the History of the British Navy, by C. D. Yonge 
(already quoted), it is said that on Lake Cham- 
plain "our (the British) force was manifestly and 
vastly inferior, . , . their (the American) 
broadside outweighing ours in more than the pro- 
portion of three to two, while the difference in 
their tonnage and in the number of their crews 
was still more in their favor." None of these 
historians, or quasi-historians, have made the 
faintest effort to find out the facts for themselves, 
following James's figures with blind reliance, and, 
accordingly, it is only necessary to discuss the 
latter. This reputable gentleman ends his ac- 
count (Naval Occurrences, p. 424) by remarking 
that Macdonough wrote as he did because " he 
knew that nothing would stamp a falsehood with 
currency equal to a pious expression, 
his falsehoods equalling in number the lines of 
his letter." These remarks are interesting as 
showing the unbiassed and truthful character of 
the author, rather than for any particular weight 
they will have in influencing any one's judgment 
on Commodore Macdonough. James gives the 
engaged force of the British as "eight vessels, of 
1426 tons, with 537 men, and throwing 765 lbs. 
of shot." To reduce the force down to this, he 
first excludes the Finch, because she "grounded 



122 Naval War of 1812 

opposite an American battery before the engage- 
ment commenced," which reads especially well 
in connection with Captain Pring's official letter: 
" Lieutenant Hicks, of the Finch, had the morti- 
fication to strike on a reef of rocks to the east- 
ward of Crab Island about the middle of the 
engagement." ' What James means cannot be im- 
agined ; no stretch of language will convert "about 
the middle of" into "before." The Finch struck 
on the reef in consequence of having been disabled 
and rendered helpless by the fire from the Ticon- 
deroga. Adding her force to James's statement 
(counting her crew only as he gives it), we get nine 
vessels, 1536 tons, 577 men, 849 lbs. of shot. 
James also excludes five gunboats, because they 
ran away almost as soon as the action com- 
menced (vol. vi., p. 501). This assertion is by 
no means equivalent to the statement in Captain 
Pring's letter "that the flotilla of gunboats had 
abandoned the object assigned to them," and, if 
it was, it would not warrant his excluding the 
five gunboats. Their flight may have been dis- 
graceful, but they formed part of the attacking 
force, nevertheless ; almost any general could say 
that he had won against superior numbers if he 
refused to count in any of his own men whom he 
suspected of behaving badly. James gives his ten 

' The italics are mine. The letter is given in full in the 
Naval Chronicle. 



Naval War of 1812 123 

gunboats 294 men and 13 guns (two long 24's, five 
long i8's, six 3 2 -pound carronades), and makes 
them average 45 tons; adding on the five he 
leaves out, we get 14 vessels of 1761 tons, with 
714 men, throwing at a broadside 1025 lbs. of shot 
(591 from long guns, 434 from carronades). But 
Sir George Prevost, in the letter already quoted, 
says there were 12 gunboats, and the American 
accounts say more. Supposing the two gunboats 
James did not include at all to be equal, respec- 
tively to one of the largest and one of the smallest 
of the gunboats, as he gives them (Naval Occur- 
rences, p. 417) — that is, one to have had 35 men, 
a long 24, and a 3 2 -pound carronade, the other, 
25 men and a 3 2 -pound carronade — we get for 
Downie's force 16 vessels, of 185 1 tons, with 774 
men, throwing at a broadside 11 13 lbs. of shot 
(615 from long guns, 498 from carronades). It 
must be remembered that so far I have merely 
corrected James by means of the authorities from 
which he draws his account — the official letters oi 
the British commanders. I have not brought up 
a single American authority against him, but 
have only made such alterations as a writer could 
with nothing whatever but the accounts of Sir 
George Prevost and Captain Pring before him to 
compare with James. Thus it is seen that, accord- 
ing to James himself, Downie really had 774 men 
to Macdonough's 882, and threw at a broadside 



124 Naval War of 1 812 

1 1 13 lbs. of shot to Macdonough's 1194 lbs. 
James says (Naval Occurrences, pp. 410, 413): 
" Let it be recollected, no musketry was employed 
on either side," and "The marines were of no 
use, as the action was fought out of the range of 
musketry"; the 106 additional men on the part 
of the Americans were thus not of much conse- 
quence, the action being fought at anchor, and 
there being men enough to manage the guns and 
perform every other duty. So we need only at- 
tend to the broadside force. Here, then, Downie 
could present at a broadside 615 lbs. of shot from 
long guns to Macdonough's 480, and 498 lbs. from 
carronades to Macdonough's 714; or, he threw 
135 lbs. of shot more from his long guns, and 216 
less from his carronades. This is equivalent to 
Downie 's having seven long i8's and one long 9, 
and Macdonough's having one 24-pound and six 
3 2 -pound carronades. A 3 2 -pound carronade is 
not equal to a long 18; so that even by James's 
own showing Downie' s force was slightly the superior. 
Thus far, I may repeat, I have corrected James 
solely by the evidence of his own side; now I 
shall bring in some American authorities. These 
do not contradict the British official letters, for 
they virtually agree with them ; but they do go 
against James's unsupported assertions, and, being 
made by naval officers of irreproachable reputa- 
tion, will certainly outweigh them. In the first 



Naval War of 1 812 125 

place, James asserts that on the main-deck of 
the Con fiance but 13 guns were presented in 
broadside, two 3 2 -pound carronades being thrust 
through the bridle-, and two others through the 
stem-ports ; so he excludes two of her guns from 
the broadside. Such guns would have been of 
great use to her at certain stages of the combat, 
and ought to be included in the force. But be- 
sides this, the American officers positively say 
that she had a broadside of 15 guns. Adding 
these two guns, and making a trifling change in 
the arrangement of the guns in the row-gallies, 
we get a broadside of 1192 lbs., exactly as I 
have given it above. There is no difficulty in 
accounting for the difference of tonnage as given 
by James and by the Americans, for we have con- 
sidered the same subject in reference to the battle 
of Lake Erie. James calculates the American 
tonnage as if for sea-vessels of deep holds, while, 
as regards the British vessels, he allows for the 
shallow holds that all the lake craft had; that 
is, he gives in one the nominal, in the other the 
real, tonnage. This fully accounts for the dis- 
crepancy. It only remains to account for the 
difference in the number of men. From James 
we can get 772. In the first place, we can reason 
by analogy. I have already shown that, as re- 
gards the battle of Lake Erie, he is convicted (by 
English, not by American, evidence) of having 



126 Naval War of 1812 

underestimated Barclay's force by about 25 per 
cent. If he did the same thing here, the Brit- 
ish force was over 1000 strong, and I have no 
doubt that it was. But we have other proofs. 
On p. 417 of Naval Occurrences he says the com- 
plement of the four captured British vessels 
amounted to 420 men, of whom 54 were killed in 
action, leaving 366 prisoners, including the 
wounded. But the report of prisoners, as given 
by the American authorities, gives 369 officers 
and seamen unhurt or but slightly wounded, 57 
wounded men paroled, and other wounded whose 
number was unspecified. Supposing this number 
to have been 82, and adding 54 dead, we would 
get in all 550 men for the four ships, the number 
I have adopted in my list. This would make the 
British wounded 129 instead of 116, as James 
says; but neither the Americans nor the British 
seem to have enumerated all their wounded in 
this fight. Taking into account all these con- 
siderations, it will be seen that the figures I have 
given are probably approximately correct, and, 
at any rate, indicate pretty closely the relative 
strength of the two squadrons. The slight differ- 
ences in tonnage and crews (158 tons and 55 men, 
in favor of the British) are so trivial that they 
need not be taken into account and we will 
merely consider the broadside force. In absolute 
weight of metal, the two combatants were evenly 



Naval War of 1812 127 

matched — almost exactly; but, whereas from 
Downie's broadside of 1192 lbs. 660 were from 
long and 532 from short guns, of Macdonough's 
broadside of 1194 lbs. but 480 were from long 
and 714 from short pieces. The forces were thus 
equal, except that Downie opposed 180 lbs. from 
long guns to 182 from carronades; as if ten long 
i8's were opposed to ten 18-pound carronades. 
This would make the odds on their face about 10 
to 9 against the Americans; in reality they were 
greater, for the possession of the Conflance was a 
very great advantage. The action is, as regards 
metal, the exact reverse of those between Chauncy 
and Yeo. Take, for example, the fight off Bur- 
lington on September 28, 1813. Yeo's broadside 
was 1374 lbs. to Chauncy's 1288; but whereas 
only 180 of Yeo's was from long guns, of Chauncy's 
but 536 was from carronades. Chauncy's fleet was 
thus much the superior. At least, we must say 
this: if Macdonough beat merely an equal force, 
then Yeo made a most disgraceful and cowardly 
flight before an inferior foe; but if we contend 
that Macdonough's force was inferior to that of 
his antagonist, then we must admit that Yeo's 
was in like manner inferior to Chauncy's. These 
rules work both ways. The Conflance was a heav- 
ier vessel than the Pike, presenting in broadside 
one long 24- and three 3 2 -pound carronades more 
than the latter. James (vol. vi., p. 355) says; 



128 Naval War of 1812 

" The Pike alone was nearly a match for Sir James 
Yeo's squadron," and Brenton says (vol. ii., 503): 
"The General Pike was more than a match for 
the whole British squadron." Neither of these 
writers means quite as much as he says, for the 
logical result would be that the Confiance alone was 
a match for all of Macdonough's force. Still, it 
is safe to say that the Pike gave Chauncy a great 
advantage, and that the Confiance made Downie's 
fleet much superior to Macdonough's. 

Macdonough saw that the British would be 
forced to make the attack in order to get the 
control of the waters. On this long, narrow lake 
the winds usually blow pretty nearly north or 
south, and the set of the current is of course 
northward ; all the vessels, being flat and shallow, 
could not beat to windward well, so there was 
little chance of the British making the attack 
when there was a southerly wind blowing. So 
late in the season there was danger of sudden and 
furious gales, which would make it risky for 
Downie to wait outside the bay till the wind 
suited him; and inside the bay the wind was 
pretty sure to be light and baffling. Young Mac- 
donough (then but twenty-eight years of age) cal- 
culated all these chances very coolly and decided 
to await the attack at anchor in Plattsburg Bay, 
with the head of his line so far to the north that 
it could hardly be turned ; and then proceeded to 



.1 



Naval War of 1 812 129 

make all the other preparations with the same 
foresight. Not only were his vessels provided 
with springs, but also with anchors to be used 
astern in any emergency. The Saratoga was fur- 
ther prepared for a change of wind, or for the 
necessity of winding ship, by having a kedge 
planted broad off on each of her bows, with a 
hawser and preventer hawser (hanging in bights 
under water) leading from each quarter to the 
kedge on that side. There had not been time to 
train the men thoroughly at the guns; and to 
make these produce their full effect the constant 
supervision of the officers had to be exerted. The 
British were laboring under this same disadvan- 
tage, but neither side felt the want very much, as 
the smooth water, stationary position of the ships, 
and fair range, made the fire of both sides very 
destructive. 

Plattsburg Bay is deep and opens to the south- 
ward; so that a wind which would enable the 
British to sail up the lake would force them to 
beat when entering the bay. The east side of 
the mouth of the bay is formed by Cumberland 
Head; the entrance is about a mile and a half 
across, and the other boundary, southwest from 
the Head, is an extensive shoal, and a small, low 
island. This is called Crab Island, and on it was 
a hospital and one six-pounder gun, which was to 
be manned, in case of necessity, by the strongest 

VOL. II.— 9 



130 



Naval War of 1 8 1 2 



patients. Macdonough had anchored in a north- 
and-south hne a Httle to the south of the outlet 
of the Saranac, and out of range of the shore bat- 
teries, being two miles from the western shore. The 
head of his line was so near Cumberland Head 
that an attempt to turn it would place the op- 
ponent under a very heavy fire, while to the south 
the shoal prevented a flank attack. The Eagle 
lay to the north, flanked on each side by a couple 
of gunboats; then came the Saratoga, with three 
gunboats between her and the Ticonderoga, the 
next in line; then came three gunboats and the 
Preble. The four large vessels were at anchor; 
the gallies being under their sweeps and forming a 
second line about forty yards back, some of them 
keeping their places and some not doing so. By 
this arrangement his line could not be doubled 
upon, there was not room to anchor on his broad- 
side out of reach of his carronades, and the enemy 
was forced to attack him by standing in bows on. 
The morning of September nth opened with a 
light breeze from the northeast. Downie's fleet 
weighed anchor at daylight, and came down the 
lake with the wind nearly aft, the booms of the 
two sloops swinging out to starboard. At half- 
past seven,' the people in the ships could see their 

' The letters of the two commanders conflict a little as to 
time, both absolutely and relatively. Pring says the action 
lasted two hours and three quarters; the American accounts, 



Naval War of 1 812 1^,1 



o 



adversaries' upper sails across the narrow strip of 
land ending in Cumberland Head, before the Brit- 
ish doubled the latter. Captain Downie hove to 
with his four large vessels when he had fairly 
opened the bay, and waited for his gallies to over- 
take him. Then his four vessels filled on the star- 
board tack and headed for the American line, 
going abreast, the Chubb to the north, heading 
well to windward of the Eagle, for whose bows the 
Linnet was headed, while the Confiance was to be 
laid athwart the hawse of the Saratoga; the Finch 
was to leeward with the twelve gunboats, and was 
to engage the rear of the American line. 

As the English squadron stood bravely in, young 
Macdonough, who feared his foes not at all, but 
his God a great deal, knelt for a moment, with his 
officers, on the quarter-deck; and then ensued a 
few minutes of perfect quiet, the men waiting 
with grim expectancy for the opening of the fight. 
The Eagle spoke first with her long i8's, but to no 
effect, for the shot fell short. Then, as the Linnet 
passed the Saratoga, she fired her broadside of long 
12's, but her shot also fell short, except one that 
struck a hen-coop which happened to be aboard 
the Saratoga. There was a game-cock inside, 
and, instead of being frightened at his sudden re- 
two hours and twenty minutes. Pring says it began at 8.00; 
Macdonough says a few minutes before nine, etc. I take the 
mean time. 



IS2 Naval War of 1812 



lease, he jumped up on a gun-slide, clapped his 
wings, and crowed lustily. The men laughed and 
cheered ; and immediately afterward Macdonough 
himself fired the first shot from one of the long 
guns. The 24-pound ball struck the Confiance 
near the hawse-hole and ranged the length of her 
deck, killing and wounding several men. All the 
American long guns now opened and were replied 
to by the British gallies. 

The Confiance stood steadily on without reply- 
ing. But she was baffled by shifting winds, and 
was soon so cut up, having both her port bow- 
anchors shot away, and suffering much loss, that 
she was obliged to port her helm and come to 
while still nearly a quarter of a mile distant from 
the Saratoga. Captain Downie came to anchor in 
grand style, — securing everything carefully be- 
fore he fired a gun, and then opening with a 
terribly destructive broadside. The Chubb and 
Linnet stood farther in, and anchored forward the 
Eagle s beam. Meanwhile, the Finch got abreast 
of the Ticonderoga, under her sweeps, supported 
by the gunboats. The main fighting was thus to 
take place between the vans, where the Eagle, 
Saratoga, and six or seven gunboats were engaged 
with the Chubb, Linnet, Confiance, and two or 
three gunboats ; while, in the rear, the Ticonderoga, 
the Preble, and the other American gallies en- 
gaged the Finch and the remaining nine or ten 



Naval War of 1812 133 

English gallies. The battle at the foot of the 
line was fought on the part of the Americans to 
prevent their flank being turned, and on the part 
of the British to effect that object. At first, the 
fighting was at long range, but gradually the Brit- 
ish gallies closed up, firing very well. The Amer- 
ican gallies at this end of the line were chiefly the 
small ones, armed with one 12 -pounder apiece, 
and they by degrees drew back before the heavy 
fire of their opponents. About an hour after the 
discharge of the first gun had been fired, the Finch 
closed up toward the Ticonderoga, and was com- 
pletely crippled by a couple of broadsides from the 
latter. She drifted helplessly down the line and 
grounded near Crab Island ; some of " the con- 
valescent patients manned the 6-pounder and 
fired a shot or two at her, when she struck, nearly 
half of her crew being killed or wounded. About 
the same time the British gunboats forced the 
Preble out of line, whereupon she cut her cable 
and drifted inshore out of the fight. Two or three 
of the British gunboats had already been suffi- 
ciently damaged by some of the shot from the 
Ticonderoga' s long guns to make them wary ; and 
the contest at this part of the line narrowed down 
to one between the American schooner and the re- 
maining British gunboats, who combined to make 
a most determined attack upon her. So hastily 
had the squadron been fitted out that many of 



134 Naval War of 1812 

the matches for her guns were at the last mo- 
ment found to be defective. The captain of one 
of the divisions was a midshipman, but sixteen 
years old, Hiram Paulding. When he found the 
matches to be bad he fired the guns of his section 
by having pistols flashed at them, and continued 
this through the whole fight. The Ticonderoga' s 
commander, Lieutenant Cassin, fought his schooner 
most nobly. He kept walking the taffrail amidst 
showers of musketry and grape, coolly watching 
the movements of the gallies, and directing the 
guns to be loaded with canister and bags of bullets, 
when the enemy tried to board. The British gal- 
lies were handled with determined gallantry, 
under the command of Lieutenant Bell. Had 
they driven off the Ticonderoga they would have 
won the day for their side, and they pushed up 
till they were not a boat-hook's length distant, to 
try to carry her by boarding; but every attempt 
was repulsed and they were forced to draw off, 
some of them so crippled by the slaughter they had 
suffered that they could hardly man the oars. 

Meanwhile, the fighting at the head of the line 
had been even fiercer. The first broadside of the 
Confiance, fired from sixteen long 24's, double- 
shotted, coolly sighted, in smooth water, at point- 
blank range, produced the most terrible effect on 
the Saratoga. Her hull shivered all over with the 
shock, and when the crash subsided nearly half of 



Naval War of 1 812 135 

her people were seen stretched on deck, for many 
had been knocked down who were not seriously 
hurt. Among the slain was her first lieutenant, 
Peter Gamble ; he was kneeling down to sight the 
bow-gun, when a shot entered the port, split the 
quoin, and drove a portion of it against his side, 
killing him without breaking the skin. The sur- 
vivors carried on the fight with undiminished 
energy. Macdonough himself worked like a com- 
mon sailor, in pointing and handling a favorite 
gun. While bending over to sight it a round shot 
cut in two the spanker-boom, which fell on his 
head and struck him senseless for two or three 
minutes ; he then leaped to his feet and continued 
as before, when a shot took off the head of the cap- 
tain of the gun and drove it in his face with such a 
force as to knock him to the other side of the deck. 
But after the first broadside not so much injury 
was done; the guns of the Confiance had been 
levelled to point-blank range, and as the quoins 
were loosened by the successive discharges they 
were not properly replaced, so that her broad- 
sides kept going higher and higher and doing less 
and less damage. Very shortly after the begin- 
ning of the action her gallant captain was slain. 
He was standing behind one of the long guns when 
a shot from the Saratoga struck it and threw it 
completely off the carriage against his right groin, 
killing him almost instantly. His skin was not 



136 Naval War of 181 2 

broken; a black mark, about the size of a small 
plate, was the only visible injury. His watch 
was found flattened, with its hands pointing to 
the very second at which he received the fatal 
blow. As the contest went on, the fire gradually 
decreased in weight, the guns being disabled. 
The inexperience of both crews partly caused this. 
The American sailors overloaded their carronades 
so as to very much destroy the effect of their fire ; 
when the officers became disabled, the men would 
cram the guns with shot till the last projected 
from the muzzle. Of course, this lessened the 
execution, and also gradually crippled the guns. 
On board the Confiance the confusion was even 
worse: after the battle the charges of the guns 
were drawn, and on the side she had fought one 
was found with a canvas bag containing two 
round of shot rammed home and wadded without 
any powder ; another with two cartridges and no 
shot ; and a third with a wad below the cartridge. 
At the extreme head of the line, the advantage 
had been with the British. The Chubb and Linnet 
had begun a brisk engagement with the Eagle and 
American gunboats. In a short time the Chubb 
had her cable, bowsprit, and main-boom shot 
away, drifted within the American lines, and was 
taken possession of by one of the Saratoga s mid- 
shipmen. The Linnet paid no attention to the 
American gunboats, directing her whole fire 



Naval War of 1812 137 

against the Eagle, and the latter was, in addition, 
exposed to part of the fire of the Confiance. After 
keeping up a heavy fire for a long time her springs 
were shot away, and she came up into the wind, 
hanging so that she could not return a shot to the 
well-directed broadsides of the Linnet. Henly ac- 
cordingly cut his cable, started home his topsails, 
ran down, and anchored by the stern between the 
inshore of the Confiance and Ticonderoga, from 
which position he opened on the Confiance. The 
Linnet now directed her attention to the American 
gunboats, which at this end of the line were very 
well fought, but he soon drove them off, and then 
sprung her broadside so as to rake the Saratoga on 
her bows, 

Macdonough by this time had his hands full, 
and his fire was slackening; he was bearing the 
whole brunt of the action, with the frigate on his 
beam and the brig raking him. Twice his ship 
had been set on fire by the hot shot of the Con- 
fance; one by one his long guns were disabled by 
shot, and his carronades were either treated the 
same way or else rendered useless by excessive 
overcharging. Finally, but a single carronade was 
left in the starboard batteries, and on firing it the 
naval-bolt broke, the gun flew off the carriage and 
fell down the main hatch, leaving the commodore 
without a single gun to oppose to the few the 
Confiance still presented. The battle would have 



I ;,8 Naval War of 1 8 1 2 



been lost had not Macdonough's foresight pro- 
vided the means of retrieving it. The anchor 
suspended astern of the Saratoga was let go, and 
the men hauled in on the hawser that led to the 
starboard quarter, bringing the ship's stern up 
over the kedge. The ship now rode by the kedge 
and by a line that had been bent to a bight in 
the stream cable, and she was raked badly by the 
accurate fire of the Linnet. By rousing on the 
line the ship was at length got so far round that 
the aftermost gun of the port broadside bore on 
the Confiance. The men had been sent forward 
to keep as much out of harm's way as possible, and 
now some were at once called back to man the 
piece, which then opened with effect. The next 
gun was treated in the same manner ; but the ship 
now hung and would go no farther round. The 
hawser leading from the port quarter was then 
got forward under the bows and passed aft to the 
starboard quarter, and a minute afterward the 
ship's whole port battery opened with fatal effect. 
The Confiance meanwhile had also attempted to 
round. Her springs, like those of the Linnet, 
were on the starboard side, and so of course could 
not be shot away as the Eagle's were ; but, as she 
had nothing but springs to rely on, her efforts did 
little beyond forcing her forward, and she hung 
with her head to the wind. She had lost over half 
of her crew, most of her guns on the engaged side 



Naval War of 1 812 139 

were dismounted, and her stout masts had been 
splintered till they looked like bundles of matches ; 
her sails had been torn to rags, and she was forced 
to strike, about two hours after she had fired the 
first broadside.' Without pausing a minute, the 
Saratoga again hauled on her starboard hawser till 
her broadside was sprung to bear on the Linnet, 
and the ship and brig began a brisk fight, which 
the Eagle from her position could take no part in, 
while the Ticonderoga was just finishing up the 
British gallies. The shattered and disabled state 
of the Linnet's masts, sails, and yards precluded 
the most distant hope of Captain Pring's effecting 
his escape by cutting his cable ; but he kept up a 
most gallant fight with his greatly superior foe, 
in hopes that some of the gunboats would come 
and tow him off, and despatched a heutenant to 
the Con-fiance to ascertain her state. The lieu- 
tenant returned with news of Captain Downie's 
death, while the British gunboats had been driven 
half a mile off ; and, after having maintained the 
fight single-handed for fifteen minutes, until, from 
the number of shot between wind and water, the 
water had risen a foot above her lower deck, the 
plucky little brig hauled down her colors, and 
the fight ended, a little over two hours and a half 

' Midshipman Lee, in his letter already quoted, says "not 
five men were left unhurt"; this would, of course, include 
bruises, etc., as hurts. 



HO Naval War of 1812 

after the first gun had been fired. Not one of the 
larger vessels had a mast that would bear canvas, 
and the prizes were in a sinking condition. The 
British gallies drifted to leeward, none with their 
colors up; but as the Saratogas boarding-officer 
passed along the deck of the Conflance he acci- 
dentally ran against a lock-string of one of her 
starboard guns,' and it went off. This was ap- 
parently understood as a signal by the gallies, 
and they moved slowly off, pulling but a very few 
sweeps, and not one of them hoisting an ensign. 

On both sides the ships had been cut up in the 
most extraordinary manner; the Saratoga had 55 
shot-holes in her hull, and the Confiance 105 in hers, 
and the Eagle and Linnet had suffered in propor- 
tion. The number of killed and wounded cannot 
be exactly stated ; it was probably about 200 on 
the American side, and over 300 on the British.^ 

' A sufficient commentary, by the way, on James's assertion 
that the guns of the Confiance had to be fired by matches, as 
the gun-locks did not fit ! 

2 Macdonough returned his loss as follows: 

Killed Wounded 

Saratoga 28 29 

Eagle 13 20 

Ticonderoga 6 6 

Preble 2 

Boxer 3 i 

Centipede i 

Wilmer i 

A total of 52 killed and 58 wounded; but the latter had 



4 



Naval War of 1812 141 

Captain Macdonough at once returned the 
British officers their swords. Captain Pring 
writes: " I have much satisfaction in making you 
acquainted with the humane treatment the 
wounded have received from Commodore Mac- 
donough ; they were immediately removed to his 
own hospital on Crab Island, and furnished with 
every requisite. His generous and polite atten- 
tion to myself, the officers, and men, will ever 
hereafter be gratefully remembered." The effects 

apparently only included those who had to go to the hospital. 
Probably about 90 additional were more or less slightly 
wounded. Captain Pring, in his letter of September 12th, 
says the Confiance had 41 killed and 40 wounded; the Linnet, 
10 killed and 14 wounded; the Chubb, 6 killed and 16 
wounded; the Finch, 2 wounded: in all, 57 killed and 72 
wounded. But he adds "that no opportunity has offered to 
muster . . . this is the whole as yet ascertained to be 
killed or wounded." The Americans took out 180 dead and 
wounded from the Confiance, 50 from the Linnet, and 40 
from the Chubb and Finch; in all, 270. James (Naval Occur- 
rences, p. 412) says the Confiance had 83 wounded. As 
Captain Pring wrote his letter in Plattsburg Bay the day 
after the action, he of course could not give the loss aboard 
the British gunboats; so James at once assumed that they 
suffered none. As well as could be found out, they had be- 
tween 50 and 100 killed and wounded. The total British 
loss was between 300 and 400, as nearly as can be ascertained. 
For this action, as already shown, James is of no use whatever. 
Compare his statements, for example, with those of Mid- 
shipman Lee, in the Naval Chronicle. The comparative loss, 
as a means of testing the competitive prowess of the com- 
batants, is not of much consequence in this case, as the 
weaker party, in point of force conquered. 



142 Naval War of 1 812 

of the victory were immediate and of the highest 
importance. Sir George Prevost and his army at 
once fled in great haste and confusion back to 
Canada, leaving our northern frontier clear for 
the remainder of the war ; while the victory had a 
very great effect on the negotiations for peace. 

In this battle the crews on both sides behaved 
with equal bravery, and left nothing to be de- 
sired in this respect ; but from their rawness they 
of course showed far less skill than the crews of 
most of the American and some of the British 
ocean cruisers, such as the Constitution, United 
States, or Shannon, the Hornet, Wasp, or Reindeer. 
Lieutenant Cassin handled the Ticonderoga, and 
Captain Pring the Linnet, with the utmost gal- 
lantry and skill, and, after Macdonough, they 
divided the honors of the day. But Macdonough 
in this battle won a higher fame than any other 
commander of the war, British or American. He 
had a decidedly superior force to contend against, 
the officers and men of the two sides being about 
on a par in every respect ; and it was solely owing 
to his foresight and resource that we won the vic- 
tory. He forced the British to engage at a dis- 
advantage by his excellent choice of position; 
and he prepared beforehand for every possible 
contingency. His personal prowess had already 
been shown at the cost of the rovers of Tripoli, and 
in this action he helped fight the guns as ably as 



Naval War of 1812 



143 



the best sailor. His skill, seamanship, quick eye, 
readiness of resource, and indomitable pluck, are 
beyond all praise. Down to the time of the Civil 
War, he is the greatest figure in our naval history. 
A thoroughly religious man, he was as generous 
and humane as he was skilful and brave; one of 
the greatest of our sea-captains, he has left a 
stainless name behind him. 



BRITISH LOSS 

Name Tons Guns 

Brig 100 10 

Magnet 187 12 

Black Snake 30 i 

Gunboat 50 2 

50 3 

Conflance 1200 37 

Linnet 350 16 

Chubb 112 II 

Finch no 11 

9 vessels 2189 103 

AMERICAN LOSS 

Name Tons Guns 

Growler 81 7 

Boat 50 2 

Tigress 96 i 

Scorpion 86 2 

Ohio 94 I 

Somers 98 2 

6 vessels 505 15 



Remarks 

\ Burnt by 

( Lieut. Gregory. 

Burnt by her crew. 

Captured. 



Remarks 
Captured. 






I 



CHAPTER III 
1815 

CONCLUDING OPERATIONS 

President captured by Captain Hayes's squadron — Success- 
ful cutting-out expeditions of the Americans — Privateer brig 
Chasseur captures St. Laivreiice schooner — Constitution cap- 
tures Cyane and Levant — -Escapes from a British squadron— 
The Hornet captures the Penguin, and escapes from a 74 — 
The Peacock and the Nautilus — Summary — Remarks on the 
war — Tables of comparative loss, etc. — Compared with re- 
sults of Anglo-French struggle. 

THE treaty of peace between the United 
States and Great Britain was signed at 
Ghent, December 24, 18 14, and ratified 
at Washington, February 18, 181 5. But during 
these first two months of 181 5, and until the l| 
news reached the cruisers on the ocean, the war- p 
fare went on with much the same characteristics L 
as before. The blockading squadrons continued ]ij 
standing on and off before the ports containing .'j 
warships with the same unwearying vigilance; but 
the ice and cold prevented any attempts at harry- 
ing the coast except by the few frigates scattered 
along the shores of the Carolinas and Georgia. 
There was no longer any formidable British fleet 

144 



• i 



Naval War of 1 812 145 

in the Chesapeake or Delaware, while at New 
Orleans the only available naval force of the 
Americans consisted of a few small row-boats, 
with which they harassed the rear of the retreating 
British. The Constitution, Captain Stewart, was 
already at sea, having put out from Boston on the 
1 7th of December, while the blockading squadron 
(composed of the same three frigates she subse- 
quently encountered) was temporarily absent. 

The Hornet, Captain Biddle, had left the port 
of New London, running in heavy weather through 
the blockading squadron, and had gone into New 
York, where the President, Commodore Decatur, 
and Peacock, Captain Warrington, with the Tom 
Bowline, brig, were already assembled, intending 
to start on a cruise for the East Indies. The 
blockading squadron off the port consisted of 
the 56-gun razee Majestic, Captain Hayes; 
24-pounder frigate Endymion, Captain Hope; 
i8-pounder frigate Pomone, Captain Lumly; and 
1 8-pounder frigate Tenedos, Captain Parker.' On 
the 14th of January, a severe snow-storm came on 
and blew the squadron off the coast. Next day 
it moderated, and the ships stood off to the north- 
west to get into the track which they supposed the 
Americans would take if they attempted to put 
out in the storm. Singularly enough, at the in- 
stant of arriving at the intended point, an hour 

^ Letter of Rear- Admiral Hotham, January 23, 18 15. 

VOL. II. — 10 



146 Naval War of 181 2 

before daylight on the 15th, Sandy Hook bearing 
W.N.W. 15 leagues, a ship was made out on 
the Majestic's weather-bow, standing S.E.' This 
ship was the unlucky President. On the evening 
of the 14th she had left her consorts at anchor, 
and put out to sea in a gale. But by a mistake 
of the pilots, who were to place boats to beacon 
the passage, the frigate struck on the bar, where 
she beat heavily for an hour and a half,^ spring- 
ing her masts and becoming very much hogged 
and twisted.^ Owing to the severity of her in- 
juries, the President would have put back to port, 
but was prevented by the westerly gale.'^ Ac- 
cordingly, Decatur steered at first along Long 
Island then shaped his course to the S.E., and in 
the dark ran into the British squadron, which, 
but for his unfortunate accident, he would have 
escaped. At daylight, the President, which had 
hauled up and passed to the northward of her 
opponents, 5 found herself with the Majestic and 
Endymion astern, the Pomone on the port, and 
the Tenedos on the starboard quarter.^ The chase 
now became very interesting.^ During the early 
part of the day, while the wind was still strong, 
the Majestic led the Endymion and fired occasion- 

' Letter of Captain Hayes, January 17, 1815. 

2 Letter of Commodore Decatur, January iS, 18 15. 

3 Report of Court-martial, Alex. Murray presiding, April 
20,1815. 4 Decatur's letter, January 1 8th. ^ Ibid. 

6 James, vi., 529. 7 Letter of Captain Hayes. 



Naval War of 1 812 147 

ally at the President, but without effect/ The 
Pomone gained faster than the others, but bv 
Captain Hayes's orders was signalled to go in 
chase of the Tenedos, whose character the captain 
could not make out ^ ; and this delayed her 
several hours in the chase. ^ In the afternoon, the 
wind coming out light and baffling, the Endymion 
left the Majestic behind,^ and, owing to the Presi- 
dent's disabled state and the amount of water she 
made in consequence of the injuries received while 
on the bar, gained rapidly on her,s although she 
lightened ship and did everything else that was 
possible to improve her sailing.^ But a shift of 
wind helped the Endymion,'^ and the latter was 
able, at about 2.30, to begin skirmishing with her 
bow-chasers, answered by the stern-chasers of the 
Presidents At 5.30, the Endymion began close 
action," within half point-blank shot on the Presi- 
dent's starboard quarter,'" where not a gun of the 
latter could bear." The President continued in 
the same course, steering east by north, the wind 
being northwest, expecting the Endymion soon to 
come up abeam; but the latter warily kept her 

'Letter of Commodore Decatur. ^ James, vi., 529. 

3 Log of Pomone, published at Beimuda, January 29th, and 
quoted in full in the Naval Chronicle, xxxiii., 370. 

4 Letter of Captain Hayes. ' s Letter of Decatur. 
(> Ibid. 7 Cooper, ii., 466. ^ hog oi Pomone. 

9 Letter of Captain Hayes. '° James, vi., 5.30. 

" Letter of Decatur. 



148 



Naval War of 1812 



position by yawing, so , as not to close.' So 
things continued for half an hour, during which 
the President suffered more than during all the 
remainder of the combat/ At 6.00, the Presi- 
dent kept off, heading to the south, and the two 
adversaries ran abreast, the Americans using the 
starboard and the British the port batteries.^ 
Decatur tried to close with his antagonist, but 
whenever he hauled nearer to the latter she 
hauled off '^ and, being the swiftest ship, could of 
course evade him; so he was reduced to the 
necessity of trying to throw her out of the com- 
bat ^ by dismantling her. He was completely suc- 
cessful in this, and after two hours' fighting the 
Endyniion's sails were all cut from her yards ^ and 
she dropped astern, the last shot being fired from 
the President/ The Endymion was now com- 
pletely silent,^ and Commodore Decatur did not 
board her merely because her consorts were too 
close astern ^ ; accordingly, the President hauled up 
again to try her chances at running, having even 
her royal studding-sails set,'° and exposed her 
stern to the broadside of the Endymion,^^ hnt the 
latter did not fire a single gun.'^ Three hours 

' Letter of Decatur. ^ Cooper, 470. 

•5 Log of Ponione. ^ Report of Court-martial, 

s Letter of Commodore Decatur. 
6 Letter of Captain Hayes. 7 Log of Pomone. 
8 Ibid. 9 Report of Court-martial. '° James, vi., 538. 

" Letter of Commodore Decatur. " Log of Pomone. 



Naval War of 1812 149 

afterward, at 11,' the Pomone caught up with the 
President, and, luffing to port, gave her the star- 
board broadside ' ; the Tenedos being two cable 
lengths' distance astern, taking up a raking 
position.^ The Pomone poured in another broad- 
side, within musket-shot, 4 when the President sur- 
rendered and was taken possession of by Captain 
Parker, of the Tenedos.^ A considerable num- 
ber of the President's people were killed by these 
last two broadsides.^ The Endymion was at this 
time out of sight astern. 7 She did not come 
up, according to one account, for an hour and 
three quarters,^ and according to another, for 
three hours ^ ; and as she was a faster ship than 
the President, this means that she was at least 
two hours motionless, repairing damages. Com- 
modore Decatur delivered his sword to Captain 
Hayes, of the Majestic, who returned it, stating 
in his letter that both sides had fought with great 
gallantry.'" The President having been taken by 
an entire squadron," the prize-money was divided 

' Letter of Captain Hayes. ^ Log of Pomone. 
3 Decatur's letter. ■* Log of Pomone, 

s James, vi., 531. 

6 Letter of Commodore Decatur, March 6, 1815; deposi- 
tion of Chaplain Henry Robinson before Admiralty Court at 
St. George's, Bermuda, January, 1815. 

7 Letter of Decatur, January iSth. 8 Log of Pomone. 
9 Letter of Decatur, March 6th. 

'° Letter of Captain Hayes. 

" Admiral Hotham's letter, January 23d. 



I50 Naval War of 1812 

equally among the ships.' The President's crew, 
all told, consisted of 450 men,' none of whom were 
British.^ She had thus a hundred more men than 
her antagonist and threw about 100 pounds more 
shot at a broadside; but these advantages were 
more than counterbalanced by the injuries re- 
ceived on the bar, and by the fact that her powder 
was so bad that while some of the British shot 
went through both her sides, such a thing did not 
once happen to the Endymion,'^ when fairly hulled. 
The President lost 24 killed and 55 wounded 5; 
the Endymion, 11 killed and 14 wounded.^ Two 
days afterward, on their way to the Bermudas, a 
violent easterly gale came on, during which both 
ships were dismasted, and the Endymion in addi- 
tion had to throw over all her spar-deck guns.^ 

As can be seen, almost every sentence of this 
account is taken (very nearly word for word) from 
the various official reports, relying especially on 
the log of the British frigate Pomone. I have been 
thus careful to have every point of the narrative 
established by unimpeachable reference : first, be- 
cause there have been quite a number of British 

* Bermuda Royal Gazette, March 8, 1815. 

2 Depositions of Lieutenant Gallagher and the other officers. 

3 Deposition of Commodore Decatur. 

4 Bermuda Royal Gazette, January 6, 1818. 
s Decatur's letter. 

6 Letter of Captain Hope, January 15, 1815. 

7 James, vi., 534. 



Naval War of 1 812 151 

historians who have treated the conflict as if it 
were a victory and not a defeat for the Endymion; 
and in the second place, because I regret to say- 
that I do not think that the facts bear out the 
assertions, on the part of most American authors, 
that Commodore Decatur "covered himself with 
glory" and showed the "utmost heroism." As 
regards the first point, Captain Hope himself, in 
his singularly short official letter, does little be- 
yond detail his own loss, and makes no claim to 
having vanquished his opponent. Almost all the 
talk about its being a "victory" comes from 
James; and in recounting this, as well as all the 
other battles, nearly every subsequent British 
historian simply gives James's statements over 
again, occasionally amplifying, but more often 
altering or omitting, the vituperation. The point 
at issue is simply this: Could a frigate which, 
according to James himself, went out of action 
with every sail set, take another frigate which, for 
two hours, according to the log of the Ponione, 
lay motionless and unmanageable on the waters, 
without a sail? To prove that it could not, of 
course, needs some not overscrupulous manipu- 
lation of the facts. The intention with which 
James sets about his work can be gathered from 
the triumphant conclusion he comes to, that 
Decatur's name has been "sunk quite as low as 
that of Bainbridge or Porter," which, comparing 



152 Naval War of 1812 

small things to great, is somewhat like saying that 
Napoleon's defeat by Wellington and Blucher 
"sunk" him to the level of Hannibal. For the 
account of the American crew and loss, James 
relies on the statements made in the Bermuda 
papers, of whose subsequent forced retraction he 
takes no notice, and of course largely overesti- 
mates both. On the same authority, he states 
that the President'' s fire was "silenced," Commo- 
dore Decatur stating the exact reverse. The point 
is fortunately settled by the log of the Pomone, 
which distinctly says that the last shot was fired 
by the President. His last resort is to state that 
the loss of the President was fourfold (in reality 
threefold) that of the Endymion. Now we have 
seen that the President lost "a considerable num- 
ber" of men from the fire of the Pomone. Esti- 
mating these at only nineteen, we have a loss of 
sixty caused by the Endymion, and as most of 
this was caused during the first half hour, when 
the President was not firing, it follows that while 
the two vessels were both fighting, broadside and 
broadside, the loss inflicted was about equal; or, 
the President, aiming at her adversary's rigging, 
succeeded in completely disabling her, and inci- 
dentally killed twenty-five men, while the En- 
dymion did not hurt the President's rigging at 
all, and, aiming at her hull, where, of course, the 
slaughter ought to have been far greater than 



Naval War of 1 812 153 

when the fire was directed aloft, only killed about 
the same number of men. Had there been no 
other vessels in chase, Commodore Decatur, his 
adversary having been thus rendered perfectly 
helpless, could have simply taken any position he 
chose and compelled the latter to strike, without 
suffering any material additional loss himself. As 
in such a case he would neither have endured the 
unanswered fire of the Endymion on his quarter 
for the first half hour, nor the subsequent broad- 
sides of the Pomone, the President' s loss would 
probably have been no greater than that of the 
Constitution in taking the Java. It is difficult to 
see how any outsider with an ounce of common 
sense and fair-mindedness can help awarding the 
palm to Decatur, as regards the action with the 
Endymion. But I regret to say that I must 
agree with James that he acted rather tamely, 
certainly not heroically, in striking to the Pomone. 
There was, of course, not much chance of success 
in doing battle with two fresh frigates ; but then 
they only mounted eighteen-pounders, and, judg- 
ing from the slight results of the cannonading 
from the Endymion and the first two (usually the 
most fatal) broadsides of the Pomone, it would 
have been rather a long time before they would 
have caused much damage. Meanwhile, the Presi- 
dent was pretty nearly as well off as ever as far 
as fighting and sailing went. A lucky shot might 



154 Naval War of 1812 

have disabled one of her opponents, and then the 
other would, in all probability, have undergone 
the same fate as the Endymion. At least it was 
well worth trying, and though Decatur could not 
be said to be disgraced, yet it is excusable to wish 
that Porter or Perry had been in his place. It is 
not very pleasant to criticise the actions of an 
American whose name is better known than that 
of almost any .other single-ship captain of his time ; 
but if a man is as much to be praised for doing 
fairly, or even badly, as for doing excellently, 
then there is no use in bestowing praise at all. 

This is perhaps as good a place as any other to 
notice one or two of James's most common mis- 
statements ; they really would not need refutation 
were it not that they had been re-echoed, as usual, 
by almost every British historian of the war for 
the last sixty years. In the first place, James 
puts the number of the President's men at 475; 
she had 450. An exactly parallel reduction must 
often be made when he speaks of the force of an 
American ship. Then he says there were many 
British among them, which is denied under oath 
by the American officers; this holds good, also, 
for the other American frigates. He says there 
were but four boys ; there were nearly thirty ; and 
on p. 120 he says the youngest was fourteen, 
whereas we incidentally learn from the Life of De- 
catur that several were under twelve. A favorite 



Naval War of 1812 155 

accusation is that the American midshipmen were 
chiefly masters and mates of merchantmen; but 
this was hardly ever the case. Many of the mid- 
shipmen of the war afterward became celebrated 
commanders, and most of these (a notable in- 
stance being Farragut, the greatest admiral since 
Nelson) were entirely too young in 181 2 to have 
had vessels under them, and, moreover, came 
largely from the so-called "best families." 

Again, in the first two frigate actions of 181 2, 
the proportion of killed to wounded happened to 
be unusually large on board the American frigates ; 
accordingly, James states (p. 146) that the returns 
of the wounded had been garbled, underestimated, 
and made ' ' subservient to the views of the com- 
manders and their government." To support his 
position that Captain Hull, who reported seven 
killed and seven wounded, had not given the list 
of the latter in full, he says that " an equal num- 
ber of killed and wounded, as given in the Ameri- 
can account, hardly ever occurs, except in cases 
of explosion"; and yet, on p. 519, he gives the 
loss of the British Hermes as 25 killed and 24 
wounded, disregarding the incongruity involved. 
On p. 169, in noticing the loss of the United States, 
five killed and seven wounded, he says that " the 
slightly wounded as in all other American cases, 
are omitted." This is untrue, and the propor- 
tion on the United States, 5 to 7, is just about 



156 Naval War of 181 2 

the same as that given by James himself on the 
Endymion, 11 to 14, and Nautilus, 6 to 8. In 
supporting this theory, James brings up all the 
instances where the American wounded bore a 
larger proportion to their dead than on board 
the British ships, but passes over the actions with 
the Reindeer, Epervier, Penguin, Endymion, and 
Boxer, where the reverse was the case. One of 
James's most common methods of attempting to 
throw discredit on the much vilified " Yankees" is 
by quoting newspaper accounts of their wounded. 
Thus he says (p. 562) of the Hornet, that several 
of her men told some of the Penguin's sailors that 
she lost 10 men killed, 16 wounded, etc. Utterly 
false rumors of this kind were as often indulged 
in by the Americans as the British. After the 
capture of the President, articles occasionally ap- 
peared in the papers to the effect that some 
American sailor had counted "23 dead" on board 
the Endymion, that "more than 50" of her men 
were wounded, etc. Such statements were as 
commonly made and with as little foundation by 
one side as by the other, and it is absurd for a 
historian to take any notice of them. James does 
no worse than many of our own writers of the same 
date; but while their writings have passed into 
oblivion, his work is still often accepted as a 
standard. This must be my apology for devoting 
so much time to it. The severest criticism to 



Naval War of 1 812 157 

which it can possibly be subjected is to compare 
it with the truth. Whenever dealing with purely 
American affairs, James's history is as utterly un- 
trustworthy as its contemporary, Niles's Register, 
is in matters purely British, while both are in- 
valuable in dealing with things relating strictly 
to their own nation ; they supplement each other. 

On January 8th, General Packenham was de- 
feated and killed by General Jackson at New 
Orleans, the Louisiana and the seamen of the Caro- 
lina having their full share in the glory of the day, 
and Captain Henly being among the very few 
American wounded. On the same day. Sailing- 
master Johnson, with 28 men in two boats, cut 
out the British armed transport brig Cyprus, con- 
taining provisions and munitions of war, and 
manned by ten men.' On the i8th, the British 
abandoned the enterprise and retreated to their 
ships ; and Mr. Thomas Shields, a purser, formerly 
a sea-officer, set off to harass them while em- 
barking. At sunset, on the 20th, he left with 
five boats and a gig, manned in all with 53 men, 
and having under him Sailing-master Daily and 
Master's-mate Boyd.^ At 10 o'clock p.m., a large 
barge, containing 14 seamen and 40 officers and 

' Letter of Sailing-master Johnson, January 9, 18 15. 
^ Letter of Thomas Shields to Com. Patterson, January 
25. 1815. 



158 Naval War of 1 812 

men of the 14th Light Dragoons, was surprised 
and carried by boarding, after a sHght struggle. 
The prisoners outnumbering their captors, the 
latter returned to shore, left them in a place of 
safety, and again started at 2 a.m. on the morn- 
ing of the 2 2d. Numerous transports and barges 
of the enemy could be seen, observing very little 
order and apparently taking no precautions against 
attack, which they probably did not apprehend. 
One of the American boats captured a transport 
and five men; another, containing Mr. Shields 
himself and eight men, carried by boarding, after 
a short resistance, a schooner carrying ten men. 
The flotilla then reunited and captured, in suc- 
cession, with no resistance, five barges containing 
70 men. By this time the alarm had spread and 
they were attacked by six boats, but these were 
repelled with some loss. Seven of the prisoners 
(who were now half as many again as their cap- 
tors) succeeded in escaping in the smallest prize. 
Mr. Shields returned with the others, 78 in num- 
ber. During the entire expedition he had lost 
but three men, wounded; he had taken 132 pris- 
oners, and destroyed eight craft, whose aggregate 
tonnage about equalled that of the- five gunves- 
sels taken on Lake Borgne. 

On January 30, 181 5, information was received 
by Captain Dent, commanding at North Edisto, 
Ga., that a party of British officers and men, in 



Naval War of 1 812 159 

four boats belonging to H. M. S. Hebrus, Captain 
Palmer, were watering at one of the adjacent 
islands.' Lieutenant Lawrence Kearney, with 
three barges containing about 75 men, at once 
proceeded outside to cut them off, when the 
militia drove them away. The frigate was at 
anchor out of gunshot, but as soon as she per- 
ceived the barges began firing guns as signals. 
The British on shore left in such a hurry that they 
deserted their launch, which, containing a 12- 
pound boat carronade and six swivels, was taken 
by the Americans. The other boats — two cut- 
ters, and a large tender mounting one long 9 and 
carrying 30 men — made for the frigate; but 
Lieutenant Kearney laid the tender aboard and 
captured her after a sharp brush. The cutters 
were only saved by the fire of the Hebrus, which 
was very well directed — one of her shot taking off 
the head of a man close by Lieutenant Kearney. 
The frigate got under way and intercepted Kear- 
ney's return, but the Lieutenant then made for 
South Edisto, whither he carried his prize in 
triumph. This was one of the most daring ex- 
ploits of the war, and was achieved at very small 
cost. On February 14th, a similar feat was per- 
formed. Lieutenant Kearney had manned the 

' Letter of Lawrence Kearney of January 30, 18 15 (see in 
the Archives at Washington, Captains' Letters, vol. xlii., 
No. 100). 



i6o Naval War of 1 812 

captured launch with 25 men and the 12 -pound 
carronade. News was received of another harry- 
ing expedition undertaken by the British, and 
Captain Dent, with seven boats, put out to attack 
them, but was unable to cross the reef. Mean- 
while, Kearney's barge had gotten outside, and at- 
tacked the schooner Brant, sl tender to H. M. S 
Severyt, mounting an i8-pounder, and with a crew 
of two midshipmen and twenty-one marines and 
seamen. A running fight began, the Brant evi- 
dently fearing that the other boats might get 
across the reef and join in the attack; suddenly 
she ran aground on a sand-bank, which accident 
totally demoralized her crew. Eight of them 
escaped, in her boat, to the frigate ; the remaining 
fifteen, after firing a few shot, surrendered and 
were taken possession of.' 

I have had occasion from time to time to speak 
of cutting-out expeditions, successful and other- 
wise, undertaken by British boats against Amer- 
ican privateers ; and twice a small British national 
cutter was captured by an overwhelmingly su- 

' Letter of Captain Dent, February i6th (in Captains' 
Letters, vol. xlii., No. 130). Most American authors, headed 
by Cooper, give this exploit a more vivid coloring by increas- 
ing the crew of the Brant to forty men, omitting to mention 
that she was hard and fast aground, and making no allusion 
to the presence of the five other American boats, which un- 
doubtedly caused the Brant's flight in the first place. 



Naval War of 1812 161 

perior American opponent of this class. We now, 
for the only time, come across an engagement 
between a privateer and a regular cruiser of ap- 
proximately equal force. These privateers came 
from many different ports and varied greatly in 
size. Baltimore produced the largest number ; but 
New York, Philadelphia, Boston, and Salem were 
not far behind ; and Charleston, Bristol, and Ply- 
mouth supplied some that were very famous. 
Many were merely small pilot-boats with a crew 
of 20 to 40 men, intended only to harry the West 
Indian trade. Others were large, powerful craft, 
unequalled for speed by any vessels of their size, 
which penetrated to the remotest corners of the 
ocean, from Man to the Spice Islands. When a 
privateer started she was overloaded with men, 
to enable her to man her prizes; a successful 
cruise would reduce her crew to a fifth of its orig- 
inal size. The favorite rig was that of a schooner, 
but there were many brigs and brigantines. Each 
was generally armed with a long 24 or 32 on a 
pivot, and a number of light guns in broadside, 
either long 9's or short i8's or 12's. Some had no 
pivot gun, others had nothing else. The largest 
of them carried seventeen guns (a pivotal 32 and 
sixteen long 12's in broadside) with a crew of 150. 
Such a vessel ought to have been a match, at her 
own distance, for a British brig-sloop, but we 
never hear of any such engagements, and there 

VOL. II.— II 



i62 Naval War of 1812 

were several instances where privateers gave up, 
without firing a shot, to a force superior, it is true, 
but not enough so to justify the absolute tameness 
of the surrender/ One explanation of this was 
that they were cruising as private ventures, and 
their object was purely to capture merchantmen 
with as little risk as possible to themselves. An- 
other reason was that they formed a kind of sea- 
militia, and, like their compeers on land, some 
could fight as well as any regulars, while most 
would not fight at all, especially if there was need 
of concerted action between two or three. The 
American papers of the day are full of "glorious 
victories" gained by privateers over packets and 
Indiamen ; the British papers are almost as full of 
instances where the packets and Indiamen "hero- 
ically repulsed" the privateers. As neither side 
ever chronicles a defeat, and as the narration is 
apt to be decidedly figurative in character, there 
is very little hope of getting at the truth of such 
meetings; so I have confined myself to the men- 
tion of those cases where privateers, of either side, 
came into armed collision with regular cruisers. 
We are then sure to find some authentic ac- 
count. 

The privateer brig Chasseur, of Baltimore, Cap- 

' As when the Epervier, some little time before her own 
capture, took without resistance the Alfred, of Salem, mount- 
ing 16 long nines and having io8 men aboard. 



Naval War of 1 812 163 

tain Thomas Boyle, carried sixteen long 12's, and 
had, when she left port, 115 men aboard. She 
made eighteen prizes on her last voyage, and her 
crew was thus reduced to less than 80 men; she 
was then chased by the Barossa, frigate, and threw 
overboard ten of her long 12's. Afterward, eight 
9-pound carronades were taken from a prize, to 
partially supply the places of the lost guns; but 
as she had no shot of the calibre of these carro- 
nades, each of the latter was loaded with one 
4-pound and one 6-pound ball, giving her a broad- 
side of 76 lbs. On the 26th of February, two 
leagues from Havana, the Chasseur fell in with 
the British schooner St. Lawrence, Lieut. H. C. 
Gordon, mounting twelve 12-pound carronades, 
and one long 9; her broadside was thus 81 lbs., 
and she had between 60 and 80 men aboard.' The 
Chasseur mistook the St. Lawrence for a merchant- 
man and closed with her. The mistake was dis- 
covered too late to escape, even had such been 

^ Letter of Captain Thomas Boyle, of March 2, 18 15 (see 
Niles and Coggeshall) ; he says the schooner had two more 
carronades; I have taken the number given by James (p. 
539). Captain Boyle says the St. Lawrence had on board 
89 men and several more, including a number of soldiers and 
marines and gentlemen of the navy, as passengers; James 
says her crew amounted to 5 1 "exclusive of some passengers," 
which I suppose must mean at least nine men. So the 
forces were pretty equal; the Chasseur may have had 20 men 
more or less than her antagonist, and she threw from 5 to 21 
lbs. less weight of shot. 



1 64 Naval War of 1812 

Captain Boyle's intention, and a brief but bloody 
action ensued. At 1.26 p.m., the St. Lawrence 
fired the first broadside, within pistol-shot, to 
which the Chasseur replied with her great guns 
and musketry. The brig then tried to close, so 
as to board; but having too much way on, shot 
ahead under the lee of the schooner, which put 
her helm up to wear under the Chasseur's stem. 
Boyle, however, followed his antagonist's ma- 
noeuvre, and the two vessels ran along side by side, 
the St. Lawrence drawing ahead, while the firing 
was very heavy. Then Captain Boyle put his 
helm a-starboard and ran his foe aboard, when, in 
the act of boarding, her colors were struck at 1.41 
P.M., fifteen minutes after the first shot. Of the 
Chasseur's crew 5 were killed and 8 wounded, in- 
cluding Captain Boyle slightly. Of the St. Law- 
rence's crew 6 were killed and 17 (according to 
James, 18) wounded. This was a very creditable 
action. The St. Lawrence had herself been an 
American privateer, called the Atlas, and was of 
241 tons, or just 36 less than the Chasseur. The 
latter could thus fairly claim that her victory was 
gained over a regular cruiser of about her own force. 
Captain Southcomb of the Lottery, Captain Reid 
of the General Armstrong, Captain Ordronaux of 
the Neujchdtel, and Captain Boyle of the Chasseur 
deserve as much credit as any regularly com- 
missioned sea-officers. But it is a mistake to 



Naval War of 1 812 165 

consider these cases as representing the average; 
an ordinary privateer was, naturally enough, no 
match for a British regular cruiser of equal force. 
The privateers were of incalculable benefit to us, 
and inflicted enormous damage on the foe ; but in 
fighting they suffered under the same disadvan- 
tages as other irregular forces; they were utterly 
unreliable. A really brilliant victor^' would be 
followed by a most extraordinary defeat. 

After the Constitution had escaped from Boston, 
as I have described, she ran to the Bermudas, 
cruised in their vicinity a short while, thence to 
Madeira, to the Bay of Biscay, and finally off Por- 
tugal, cruising for some time in sight of the Rock 
of Lisbon. Captain Stewart then ran off south- 
west, and on February 20th, Madeira bearing 
W.S.W. 60 leagues,' the day being cloudy, with 
a light easterly breeze,^ at i p.m. a sail was made 
two points on the port bow; and at 2 p.m.. Captain 
Stewart, hauling up in chase, discovered another 
sail. The first of these was the frigate-built ship 
corvette Cyane, Captain Gordon Thomas Falcon, 
and the second was the ship-sloop Levant, Cap- 
tain the Honorable George Douglass.^ Both were 

' Letter of Captain Stewart to the Secretary of the Navy, 
May 20, 1815. 

^ Log of Constitution, February 20, 18 15. 
3 Naval Chronicle, xxxiii., 466. 



i66 Naval War of 1812 

standing close-hauled on the starboard tack, the 
sloop about ten miles to leeward of the corvette. 
At 4 P.M. the latter began making signals to her 
consort that the strange sail was an enemy, and 
then made all sail before the wind to join the 
sloop. The Constitution bore up in chase, set- 
ting her topmast, topgallant, and royal studding- 
sails. In half an hour she carried away her main 
royal mast, but immediately got another prepared, 
and at 5 o'clock began firing at the corvette with 
the two port-bow guns ; as the shot fell short the 
firing soon ceased. At 5.30, the Cyane got within 
hail of the Levant, and the latter's gallant com- 
mander expressed to Captain Falcon his inten- 
tion of engaging the American frigate. The two 
ships accordingly hauled up their courses and 
stood on the starboard tack; but immediately 
afterward their respective captains concluded to 
try to delay the action till dark, so as to get the 
advantage of manoeuvring.^ Accordingly they 
again set all sail and hauled close to the wind to 
endeavor to weather their opponent ; but, finding 
the latter coming down too fast for them to suc- 
ceed, they again stripped to fighting canvas and 
formed on the starboard tack in head and stem 
line, the Levant about a cable's length in front of 
her consort. The American now had them com- 
pletely under her guns and showed her ensign, to 

^ Naval Chronicle, xxxiii., 466. 



Naval War of 1812 167 

which challenge the British ships replied by setting 
their colors. At 6.10, the Constitution ranged up 
to windward of the Cyane and Levant, the former 
on her port quarter the latter on her port bow, 
both being distant about 250 yards from her ' — so 
close that the American marines were constantly 
engaged almost from the beginning of the action. 
The fight began at once, and continued with great 
spirit for a quarter of an hour, the vessels all firing 
broadsides. It was now moonlight, and an im- 
mense column of smoke formed under the lee of the 
Constitution, shrouding from sight her foes; and, 
as the fire of the latter had almost ceased. Captain 
Stewart also ordered his men to stop, so as to find 
out the positions of the ships. In about three 
minutes the smoke cleared, disclosing to the Amer- 
icans the Levant dead to leeward on the port beam, 
and the Cyane luffing up for their port quarter. 
Giving a broadside to the sloop, Stewart braced 
aback his main- and mizzen-topsails, with top- 
gallant sails set, shook all forward, and backed 
rapidly astern, under cover of the smoke, abreast 

^ Testimony sworn to by Lieut. W. B. Shubrick and 
Lieutenant-of-Marines Archibald Henderson before Thomas 
Welsh, Jr., Justice of the Peace, Suffolk Street, Boston, July 
20, 1815. The depositions were taken in consequence of a 
report started by some of the British journals that the action 
began at a distance of three quarters of a mile. All the 
American depositions were that all three ships began firing 
at once, when equidistant from each other about 250 yards, 
the marines being engaged almost the whole time. 



1 68 Naval War of 1 812 

the corvette, forcing the latter to fill again to 
avoid being raked. The firing was spirited for a 
few minutes, when the Cyane's almost died away. 
The Levant bore up to wear round and assist her 
consort, but the Constitution filled her topsails, 
and, shooting ahead, gave her two stern rakes, 
when she at once made all sail to get out of the 
combat. The Cyane was now discovered wearing, 
when the Constitution herself at once wore and 
gave her in turn a stern rake, the former luffing to 
and firing her port broadside into the starboard 
bow of the frigate. Then, as the latter ranged 
up on her port quarter, she struck, at 6.50, just 
forty minutes after the beginning of the action. 
She was at once taken possession of, and Lieuten- 
ant Hoffman, second of the Constitution, was put 
in command. Having manned the prize, Captain 
Stewart, at 8 o'clock, filled away after her consort. 
The latter, however, had only gone out of the 
combat to refit. Captain Douglass had no idea of 
retreat, and no sooner had he rove new braces 
than he hauled up to the wind, and came very 
gallantly back to find out his friend's condition. 
At 8.50, he met the Constitution, and, failing to 
weather her, the frigate and sloop passed each 
other on opposite tacks, exchanging broadsides. 
Finding her antagonist too heavy, the Levant then 
crowded all sail to escape, but was soon overtaken 
by the Constitution, and at about 9.30 the latter 



Naval War of 1 812 169 

opened with her starboard bow-chasers, and soon 
afterward the British captain hauled down his 
colors. Mr. Ballard, first of the Constitution, was 
afterward put in command of the prize. By one 
o'clock, the ships were all in order again. 

The Constitution had been hulled eleven times, 
more often than in either of her previous actions, 
but her loss was mainly due to the grape and 
musketry of the foe in the beginning of the fight. ^ 
The British certainly fired better than usual, es- 
pecially considering the fact that there was much 
manoeuvring, and that it was a night action. The 
Americans lost 3 men killed, 3 mortally and 9 
severely and slightly wounded. The corvette, out 
of her crew of 180, had 12 men killed and 26 
wounded, several mortally; the sloop, out of 140, 
had 7 killed and 16 wounded. The Constitution 
had started on her cruise very full-handed, with 
over 470 men, but several being absent on a prize, 
she went into battle with about 450.^ The prizes 
had suffered a good deal in their hulls and rigging, 
and had received some severe wounds in their 
masts and principal spars. The Cyane carried on 
her main-deck twenty-two 3 2 -pound carronades, 
and on her spar-deck two long 12's and ten 18- 

' Deposition of her officers, as before cited. 

^ Four hundred and ten officers and seamen, and 41 
marines, by her muster-roll of February 19th. (The muster- 
rolls are preserved in the Treasury Department at Washing- 
ton.) 



I/O Naval War of 1812 

pounder carronades. The Levant carried, all on 
one deck, eighteen 32-pound carronades and two 
long 9's, together with a shifting 12-pounder. 
Thus, their broadside weight of metal was 763 
pounds, with a total of 320 men, of whom 61 fell, 
against the Constitutioyis 704 pounds and 450 
men, of whom 15 were lost; or, nominally, the 
relative force was 100 to 91, and the relative loss 
100 to 24. But the British guns were almost ex- 
clusively carronades, which, as already pointed 
out in the case of the Essex, and in the battle off 
Plattsburg, are no match for long guns. Moreover, 
the scantling of the smaller ships was, of course, 
by no means as stout as that of the frigate, so that 
the disparity of force was much greater than the 
figures would indicate, although not enough to 
account for the difference in loss. Both the 
British ships were ably handled, their fire was well 
directed, and the Levant in especial was very gal- 
lantly fought. 

As regards the Constitution, "her manoeuvring 
was as brilliant as any recorded in naval annals," 
and it would have been simply impossible to sur- 
pass the consummate skill with which she was 
handled in the smoke, always keeping her antag- 
onists to leeward, and, while raking both of them, 
not being once raked herself. The firing was ex- 
cellent, considering the short time the ships were 
actually engaged, and the fact that it was at night. 



Naval War of 1 8 1 2 171 

Altogether, the fight reflected the greatest credit 
on her, and also on her adversaries.' 

The merits of this action can perhaps be better 
appreciated by comparing it with a similar one 
that took place a few years before between a 
British sloop and corvette on the one side, and a 
French frigate on the other, and which is given in 
full by both James and Troude. Although these 



t 



6.05 P.M .^ 



,6.20 
6.SS % \J^^S ^■'^(■--■-'-^•^•.^'Wl^ 




authors differ somewhat in the account of it, both 
agree that the Frenchman, the Nereide, of 44 guns 

' There is no British official account of the action. James 
states that the entire British force was only 302 men, of 
whom 12 were killed and 29 wounded. This is probably not 
based on any authority. Captain Stewart received on board 
301 prisoners, of whom 42 were wounded, several mortally. 
Curiously enough, James also underestimates the American 



172 Naval War of 1812 

on February 14, 18 10, fought a long and inde- 
cisive battle with the Rainbow of 26 and Avon 
of 18 guns, the British sloops being fought sepa- 
rately, in succession. The relative force was al- 
most exactly as in the Constitution s fight. Each 
side claimed that the other fled. But this much 
is sure : The Constitution, engaging the Cyane and 
Levant together, captured both ; while the Nereide, 
engaging the Rainbow and Avon separately, cap- 
tured neither. 

The three ships now proceeded to the Cape de 
Verdes, and on March loth anchored in the har- 
bor of Porto Praya, Island of San Jago. Here a 
merchant-brig was taken as a cartel, and a hun- 
dred of the prisoners were landed to help fit her 
for sea. The next day the weather was thick and 

loss, making it only 12. He also says that many attempts 
were made by the Americans to induce the captured British 
to desert, while the Constitution's officers deny this under 
oath, before Justice Welsh, as already quoted, and state that, 
on the contrary, many of the prisoners offered to enlist on 
the frigate, but were all refused permission — as "the loss of 
the Chesapeake had taught us the danger of having renegades 
aboard." This denial, by the way, holds good for all the 
similar statements made by James as regards the Guerriere, 
Macedonian, etc. He also states that a British court-mar- 
tial found various counts against the Americans for harsh 
treatment, but all of these were specifically denied by the 
American officers, under oath, as already quoted. 

I have reUed chiefly on Captain Stewart's narrative, but 
partly (as to time, etc.) on the British account in the Naval 
Chronicle. 



Naval War of 1 8 1 2 i 



/3 



foggy, with fresh breezes." The first and second 
lieutenants, with a good part of the people, were 
aboard the two prizes. At five minutes past 
twelve, while Mr. Shubrick, the senior remaining 
lieutenant, was on the quarter-deck, the canvas 
of a large vessel suddenly loomed up through 
the haze, her hull being completely hidden by 
the fog-bank. Her character could not be made 
out; but she was sailing close-hauled, and evi- 
dently making for the roads. Mr. Shubrick at 
once went down and reported the stranger to 
Captain Stewart, when that officer coolly re- 
marked that it was probably a British frigate or 
an Indiaman, and directed the lieutenant to re- 
turn on deck, call all hands, and get ready to go 
out and attack her.* At that moment the canvas 
of two other ships was discovered rising out of the 
fog astern of the vessel first seen. It was now 
evident that all three were heavy frigates.-' In 
fact they were the Newcastle, 50, Captain Lord 
George Stewart; Leander, 50, Captain Sir Ralph 
Collier, K. C. B. ; and Acasta, 40, Captain Robert 
Kerr, standing into Porto Praya, close-hauled on 
the starboard tack, the wind being light northeast 
by north. •» Captain Stewart at once saw that his 

' Log of Constitution, March ir, 1S15. 

^ Cooper, ii., 459. 

3 Letter of Lieutenant Hoffman, April 10, 1815. 

* Marshall's Naval Biography, ii., 535. 



174 Naval War of 1812 

opponents were far too heavy for a fair fight, and, 
knowing that the neutrality of the port would not 
be the slightest protection to him, he at once 
signalled to the prizes to follow, cut his cable, 
and, in less than ten minutes from the time the 
first frigate was seen, was standing out of the 
roads, followed by Hoffman and Ballard. Cer- 
tainly a more satisfactory proof of the excellent 
training of both officers and men could hardly be 
given than the rapidity, skill, and perfect order 
with which everything was done. Any indecision 
on the part of the officers or bungling on the part 
of the men would have lost everything. The 
prisoners on shore had manned a battery and 
delivered a furious but ill-directed fire at their 
retreating conquerors. The frigate, sloop, and 
corvette, stood out of the harbor in the order 
indicated, on the port tack, passing close under 
the east point, and a gunshot to windward of the 
British squadron, according to the American, or 
about a league, according to the British, accounts. 
The Americans made out the force of the strangers 
correctly, and their own force was equally clearly 
discerned by the Acasta; but both the Newcastle 
and Leander mistook the Cyane and Levant for 
frigates, a mistake similar to that once made 
by Commodore Rodgers. The Constitution now 
crossed her topgallant yards and set the fore- 
sail, mainsail, spanker, flying jib, and topgallant- 



Naval War of 1 8i 2 175 

sails ; and the British ships, tacking, made all sail 
in pursuit. The Newcastle was on the Constitu- 
tion's lee quarter and directly ahead of the 
Leander, while the Acasta was on the weather 
quarter of the Newcastle. All six ships were on the 
port tack. The Constitution cut adrift the boats 
towing astern, and her log notes that at 12.50 she 
found she was sailing about as fast as the ships on 
her lee quarter, but that the Acasta was luffing into 
her wake and dropping astern. The log of the 
Acasta says: "We had gained on the sloops, but 
the frigate had gained on us." At i.io the Cyane 
had fallen so far astern and to leeward that Cap- 
tain Stewart signalled to Lieutenant Hoffman to 
tack, lest he should be cut off if he did not. Ac- 
cordingly, the lieutenant put about and ran off 
toward the northwest, no notice being taken of 
him by the enemy beyond an ineffectual broadside 
from the stemmost frigate. At 2.35 he was out 
of sight of all the ships and shaped his course for 
America, which he reached on April loth.' At 
1.45, the Newcastle opened on the Constitution, 
firing by divisions, but the shot all fell short, ac- 
cording to the American statements, about 200 
yards, while the British accounts (as given in 
Marshall's Naval Biography) make the distance 
much greater ; at any rate, the vessels were so near 
that from the Constitution the officers of the New- 

' Letter of Lieutenant Hoffman, April lo, 1815. 



176 Naval War of 181 2 

castle could be seen standing on the hammock net- 
tings. But, very strangely, both the 50-gun ships 
apparently still mistook the Levant, though a low, 
flush-decked sloop like the Hornet, for the " Presi- 
dent, Congress, or Macedonian,'' Captain Collier 
believing that the Constitution had sailed with two 
other frigates in company. By three o'clock, the' 
Levant had lagged so as to be in the same position 
from which the Cyane had just been rescued ; ac- 
cordingly, Captain Stewart signalled to her to tack, 
which she did, and immediately afterward all 
three British ships tacked in pursuit. Before they 
did so, it must be remembered the Acasta had 
weathered on the Constitution, though left con- 
siderably astern, while the Newcastle and Leander 
had about kept their positions on her lee or star- 
board quarter; so that if any ship had been de- 
tached after the Levant it should have been the 
Leander, which had least chance of overtaking the 
American frigate. The latter was by no means as 
heavily armed as either of the two 50's, and but 
little heavier than the Acasta; moreover, she was 
shorthanded, having manned her two prizes. The 
Acasta, at any rate, had made out the force of the 
Levant, and, even had she been a frigate, it was 
certainly carrying prudence to an extreme to make 
more than one ship tack after her. Had the New- 
castle and Acasta kept on after the Constitution 

' Marshall, ii., 533. 



Naval War of 1 812 177 

there was a fair chance of overtaking her, for the 
Acasta had weathered on her, and the chase could 
not bear up for fear of being cut off by the New- 
castle. At any rate, the pursuit should not have 
been given up so early. Marshall says there was 
a mistake in the signalling. The British captains 
certainly bungled the affair ; even James says (p. 
558) ; " It is the most blundering piece of business 
recorded in these six volumes." As for Stewart 
and his men, they deserve the highest credit for the 
cool judgment and prompt, skilful seamanship 
they had displayed. The Constitution, having 
shaken off her pursuers, sailed to Maranham, 
where she landed her prisoners. At Porto Rico 
she learned of the peace, and forthwith made 
sail for New York, reaching it about the middle 
of May. 

As soon as he saw Captain Stewart's signal, 
Lieutenant Ballard had tacked, and at once made 
for the anchorage at Porto Praya, which he 
reached, though pursued by all his foes, and an- 
chored within 150 yards of a heavy battery.' The 
wisdom of Captain Stewart's course in not trust- 
ing to the neutrality of the port now became evi- 
dent. The Acasta opened upon the sloop as soon 
as the latter had anchored, at 4.30.^ The New- 
castle, as soon as she arrived, also opened, and so 

* Letter of Lieutenant Ballard, May 2, 1815. 

2 Newcastle's log, as given by Marshall and James. 

VOL. II. — 13 



1/8 Naval War of 1 812 

did the Leander, while the British prisoners on 
shore fired the guns of the battery. Having borne 
this combined cannonade for fifteen minutes,' the 
colors of the Levant were hauled down. The un- 
skilful firing of the British ships certainly did 
not redeem the blunders previously made by Sir 
George Collier, for the three heavy frigates dur- 
ing fifteen minutes' broadside practice in smooth 
water against a stationary and unresisting foe did 
her but little damage, and did not kill a man. The 
chief effect of the fire was to damage the houses of 
the Portuguese town.^ 

After the capture of the President, the Peacock, 
Captain Warrington, the Hornet, Captain Biddle, 
and Tom Bowline, brig, still remained in New 
York Harbor. On the 2 2d of January, a strong 
northwesterly gale began to blow, and the Ameri- 
can vessels, according to their custom, at onct 
prepared to take advantage of the heavy weather 
and run by the blockaders. They passed the bar 
by daylight, under storm canvas, the British 
frigates, lying to in the southeast, being plainly 
visible. They were ignorant of the fate of the 
President, a.nd proceeded toward Tristan d'Acunha, 
which was the appointed rendezvous. A few days 
out, the Hornet parted company from the two 
others ; these last reached Tristan d'Acunha about 

' Ballard's letter. "James, vi., 551. 



L 



Naval War of 1 8 1 2 179 

March i8th, but were driven off again by a gale. 
The Hornet reached the island on the 23d, and at 
half -past ten in the morning, the wind being fresh 
S.S.W., when about to anchor off the north point, 
a sail was made in the southeast, steering west.^ 
This was the British brig-sloop Penguin, Captain 
James Dickenson. She was a new vessel, having 
left port for the first time in September, 18 14. 
While at the Cape of Good Hope, she had received 
from Vice-Admiral Tyler 12 marines from the 
Medway, 74, increasing her complement to 132; 
and was then despatched on special service against 
a hea\'y American privateer, the Young Wasp, 
which had been causing great havoc among the 
homeward-bound Indiamen. 

When the strange sail was first seen, Captain 
Biddle was just letting go his topsail sheets ; he at 
once sheeted them home, and the stranger being 
almost instantly shut out by the land, he made 
all sail to the west, and again caught sight of her. 
Captain Dickenson now, for the first time, saw the 
American sloop, and at once bore up for her. The 
position of the two vessels was exactly the reverse 
of the Wasp and Frolic, the Englishman being to 
windward. The Hornet hove to, to let her antag- 
onist close; then she filled her main-topsail and 
continued to yaw, wearing occasionally to prevent 

' Letter from Captain Biddle to Commodore Decatur, 
March 25, 18 15. 



I So Naval War of 1812 

herself from being raked. At forty minutes past 
one, the Penguin, being within musket-shot, hauled 
to the wind on the starboard tack, hoisted a St. 
George's ensign and fired a gun. The Hornet 
luffed up on the same tack, hoisting American 
colors, and the action began with heavy broad- 
sides. The vessels ran along thus for fifteen 
minutes, gradually coming closer together, and 
Captain Dickenson put his helm a-weather, to run 
his adversary aboard. At this moment the brave 
young officer received a mortal wound, and the 
command devolved on the first lieutenant, Mr. 
McDonald, who endeavored very gallantly to 
carry out his commander's intention, and at 1.56 
the Penguin''s bowsprit came in between the 
Hornet's main- and mizzen-rigging on the star- 
board side. The American seamen had been 
called away, and were at their posts to repel 
boarders, but as the British made no attempt to 
come on, the cutlass men began to clamber into 
the rigging to go aboard the brig. Captain Biddle 
very coolly stopped them, " it being evident from 
the beginning that our fire was greatly superior 
both in quickness and effect." There was a heavy 
sea running, and as the Hornet forged ahead, 
the Penguin's bowsprit carried away her mizzen 
shrouds, stern davits, and spanker-boom ; and the 
brig then hung on her starboard quarter, where 
only small arms could be used on either side. An 



Naval War of 1812 181 

English officer now called out something which 
Biddle understood, whether correctly or not is 
disputed, to be the word of surrender ; accordingly, 
he directed his marines to cease firing, and jumped 
on the taffrail. At that minute two of the marines 
on the Penguin's forecastle, not thirty feet distant, 
fired at him, one of the balls inflicting a rather se- 
vere wound in his neck. A discharge of musketry 
from the Hornet at once killed both the marines, 

/PENCUIIf 
1.50 ...•-^^■" 



{ ^^^-^ -^■... 

''■"•••^&^ ^^^ HORNET 

and at that moment the ship drew ahead. As the 
vessels separated, the Penguin's foremast went 
overboard, the bowsprit breaking short off. The 
Hornet at once wore, to present a fresh broadside, 
while the Penguin's disabled condition prevented 
her following suit, and having lost a third of her 
men killed and wounded (14 of the former and 28 
of the latter), her hull being riddled through and 
through, her foremast gone, mainmast tottering, 
and most of the guns on the engaged side dis- 



1 82 Naval War of 1 812 

mounted, she struck her colors at two minutes 
past two, twenty-two minutes after the first gun 
was fired. Of the Hornet's 1 50 men, 8 were absent 
in a prize. By actual measurement she was two 
feet longer and slightly narrower than her antag- 
onist. Her loss was chiefly caused by musketry, 
amounting to i marine killed, i seaman mortally, 
Lieutenant Conner very severely, and Captain 
Biddle and 7 seamen slightly, wounded. Not a 
round shot struck the hull, nor was a mast or spar 
materially injured, but the rigging and sails were 
a good deal cut, especially about the fore- and 
main-topgallantmasts. The Hornefs crew had 
been suffering much from sickness, and 9 of the 
men were unable to be at quarters, thus reducing 
the vessels to an exact equality. Counting in these 
men, and excluding the 8 absent in a prize, we 
get as 

COMPARATIVE FORCE 

Weight 
Tonnage No. Guns Metal Crew Loss 

Hornet 480 10 279 142^ 11 

Penguin 477 10 274 132 42 

^ This number of men is probably too great; I have not 
personally examined the Horyiei's muster-roll for that period. 
Lieutenant Emmons, in his History, gives her 132 men; but 
perhaps he did not include the nine sick, which would make 
his statement about the same as mine. In response to my 
inquiries, I received a very kind letter from the Treasury 
Department (Fourth Auditor's office) , which stated that the 
muster-roll of the Hornet on this voyage showed " loi officers 
and crew (marines excepted)". Adding the 20 marines, 



Naval War of 1 812 183 

Or, the force being practically equal, the Hornet 
inflicted fourfold the loss and tenfold the damage 
she suffered. Hardly any action of the war re- 
flected greater credit on the United States marine 
than this — for the cool, skilful seamanship and ex- 
cellent gunnery that enabled the Americans to 
destroy an antagonist of equal force in such an 
exceedingly short time. The British displayed 
equal bravery, but were certainly very much be- 
hind their antagonists in the other qualities which 
go to make up a first-rate man-of-war's man. Even 
James says he "cannot offer the trifling disparity 
of force in this action as an excuse for the Pen- 
guifi's capture. The chief cause is . . . the 
immense disparity between the two vessels in . . . 
the effectiveness of their crews." ' 

would make but 121 in all. I think there must be some mis- 
take in this, and so have considered the Hornet's crew as 
consisting, originally, of 150 men, the same as on her cruises 
in 18 1 2. 

The Penguin was in reality slightly larger than the Hornet, 
judging from the comparisons made in Biddle's letter (for 
the original of which see in the Naval Archives, Captains' 
Letters, vol. xlii., No. 112). He saj^s that the Penguin 
though two feet shorter on deck than the Hornet, had a 
greater length of keel, a slightly greater breadth of beam, 
stouter sides, and higher bulwarks, with swivels on the cap- 
stan and tops, and that she fought both her "long 12's" on 
the same side. I have followed James, however, as regards 
this; he says her long guns were 6-pounders, and that but 
one was fought on a side. 

^ After the action but one official account, that of Captain 



184 Naval War of 181 2 

The Penguin was so cut up by shot that she had 
to be destroyed. After the stores, etc., had been 
taken out of her, she was thoroughly examined 
(Captain Biddle from curiosity taking her meas- 
urements in comparison with those of the Hornet) . 
Her destruction was hastened on account of a 
strange sail heaving in sight ; but the latter proved 
to be the Peacock, with the Tom Bowline in 

Biddle, was published; none of the letters of the defeated 
British commanders were published after 1813. As regards 
this action, every British writer has followed James, who 
begins his account thus: "Had the vessel in sight to wind- 
ward been rigged with three masts instead of two, and had 
she proved to be a British cruiser, Captain Biddle would have 
marked her down in his log as a ' frigate,' and have made off 
with all the canvas he could possibly spread. Had the ship 
overtaken the Hornet and been in reality a trifle superior in 
force. Captain Biddle, we have no doubt, would have ex- 
hausted his eloquence in lauding the blessings of peace before 
he tried a struggle for the honors of war." After this preface 
(which should be read in connection with the Hornet's un- 
accepted challenge to the Bonne Citoyenne, a ship "a trifle 
superior in force") it can be considered certain that James 
will both extenuate and also set down a good deal in malice. 
One instance of this has already been given in speaking of the 
President's capture. Again, he says, "the Hornet received 
several round shot in her hull," which she did — a month after 
this action, from the Cornwallis, 74; James knew perfectly 
well that not one of the Penguin's shot hit the Hornet's hull. 
The quotations I have given are quite enough to prove that 
nothing he says about the action is worth attending to. The 
funniest part of his account is where he makes Captain Biddle 
get drunk, lose his "native cunning," and corroborate his 
(James's) statements. He does not even hint at the authority 
for this. 



Naval War of 1 812 185 

company. The latter was now turned to account 
by being sent into Rio de Janeiro as a cartel with 
the prisoners. The Peacock and Hornet remained 
about the Island till April 13th, and then, giving 
up all hopes of seeing the President, and rightly 
supposing she had been captured, started out for 
the East Indies. On the 27th of the month, in 
lat. 38° 30' S. and long. 2>Z° E.,' the Peacock sig- 
nalled a stranger in the S.E., and both sloops 
crowded sail in chase. The next morning they 
came down with the wind aft from the northwest, 
the studding-sails set on both sides. The new 22- 
gun-sloops were not only better war vessels, but 
faster ones too, than any other ships of their rate ; 
and the Peacock by afternoon was two leagues 
ahead of the Hornet. At 2 p.m., the former was 
observed to manifest some hesitation about ap- 
proaching the stranger, which, instead of avoiding, 
had rather hauled up toward them. All on board 
the Hornet thought her an Indiaman, and "the 
men began to wonder what they would do with 
the silks," when, a few minutes before four, the 
Peacock signalled that it was a line-of-battle ship, 
which reversed the parts with a vengeance. War- 
rington's swift ship was soon out of danger, while 
Biddle hauled close to the wind on the port tack, 
with the Cornwallis, 74, bearing the flag of Ad- 

^ Letter of Captain Biddle, June loth, and extracts from 
her log. 



1 86 Naval War of 1 812 

miral Sir George Burleton, K.C.B./ in hot pur- 
suit, two leagues on his lee quarter. The 74 
gained rapidly on the Hornet, although she stopped 
to pick up a marine who had fallen overboard. 
Finding he had to deal with a most weatherly 
craft, as well as a swift sailer. Captain Biddle, at 
9 P.M., began to lighten the Hornet of the mass of 
stores taken from the Penguin. The Cornwallis 
gained still, however, and, at 2 a.m., on the 29th, 
was ahead of the Hornefs lee or starboard beam, 
when the sloop put about and ran off toward the 
west. Daylight showed the 74 still astern and to 
leeward, but having gained so much as to be within 
gunshot, and shortly afterward she opened fire, 
her shot passing over the Hornet. The latter had 
recourse anew to the lightening process. She had 
already hove overboard the sheet-anchor, several 
heavy spare spars, and a large quantity of shot 
and ballast; the remaining anchors and cables, 
more shot, six guns, and the launch now followed 
suit, and, thus relieved, the Hornet passed tem- 
porarily out of danger; but the breeze shifted 
gradually round to the east, and the liner came 
looming up till at noon she was within a mile, a 
shorter range than that at which the United States 
crippled and cut up the Macedonian; and had the 
Cornwallis' s fire been half as well aimed as that of 
the States, it would have been the last of the 

^ James vi., 564. 



Naval War of 1 812 187 

Hornet. But the 74's guns were very unskilfully 
served, and the shot passed for the most part away 
over the chase, but three getting home. Captain 
Biddle and his crew had no hope of ultimate es- 
cape, but no one thought of giving up. All the 
remaining spare spars and boats, all the guns but 
one, the shot, and in fact everything that could be 
got at, below or on deck, was thrown overboard. 
This increased the way of the Hornet, while the 
Cornwallis lost ground by hauling off to give broad- 
sides, which were as ineffectual as the fire from 
the chase-guns had been. The Hornet now had 
gained a little, and managed to hold her own, and 
shortly afterward the pluck and skill of her crew' 
were rewarded. The shift in the wind had been 
very much against them, but now it veered back 
again so as to bring them to windward ; and every 
minute, as it blew fresher and fresher, their 
chances increased. By dark, the Cornwallis was 
well astern, and during the night the wind kept 
freshening, blowing in squalls, which just suited 
the Hornet, and when day broke the liner was 
hull down astern. Then, on the morning of the 
30th, after nearly forty-eight hours' chase, she 

^ It is perhaps worth noting that the accounts incidentally 
mention the fact that almost the entire crew consisted of 
native Americans, of whom quite a number had served as im- 
pressed seamen on board British war-ships. James multiplies 
these threefold and sets them down as British. 



1 88 Naval War of 1812 

abandoned the pursuit. The Hornet was now, of 
course, no use as a cruiser, and made sail for New 
York, which she reached on June 9th. This chase 
requires almost the same comments as the last 
chase of the Constitution. In both cases the 
American captains and their crews deserve the 
very highest praise for plucky, skilful seamanship ; 
but exactly as Stewart's coolness and promptitude 
might not have saved the Constitution had it not 
been for the blunders made by his antagonists, so 
the Hornet would have assuredly been taken, in 
spite of Biddle's stubbornness and resource, if the 
Cornwallis had not shown such unskilful gunnery, 
which was all the more discreditable since she 
carried an admiral's flag. 

The Peacock was thus the only one left of the 
squadron originally prepared for the East Indies ; 
however, she kept on, went round the Cape of 
Good Hope, and cruised across the Indian Ocean, 
capturing four great Indiamen, very valuable 
prizes, manned by 291 men. Then she entered 
the Straits of Sunda, and on the 30th of June, off 
the fort of Anjier, fell in with the East India Com- 
pany's cruiser Nautilus, Lieutenant Boyce, a brig 
of 180 (American measurement, over 200) tons, 
with a crew of 80 men and 14 guns — four long 9's 
and ten 18-pound carronades.' Captain Warring- 

^ History of the Indian Navy, by Charles Rathbone Low 
(late lieutenant of the Indian Navy), London, 1877, p. 285. 



Naval War of 1 812 1S9 

ton did not know of the peace ; one of the boats of 
the Nautilus, however, with her purser, Mr. Bart- 
lett boarded him. Captain Warrington declares 
the latter made no mention of the peace, while Mr. 
Bartlett swears that he did before he was sent 
below. As the Peacock approached. Lieutenant 
Boyce hailed to ask if she knew peace had been 
declared. Captain Warrington, according to his 
letter, regarded this as a ruse to enable the brig to 
escape under the guns of the fort, and commanded 
the lieutenant to haul down his colors, which the 
latter refused to do, and very gallantly prepared 
for a struggle with a foe of more than twice his 
strength. According to Captain Warrington, one, 
or, by the deposition of Mr. Bartlett,' two broad- 
sides were then interchanged, and the brig sur- 
rendered, having lost seven men, including her first 
lieutenant, killed and mortally wounded, and eight 
severely or slightly wounded. Two of her guns 
and the sheet-anchor were disabled, the bends on 
the starboard side completely shivered from aft 
to the forechains, the bulwarks from the chess-tree 
aft much torn, and the rigging cut to pieces.^ The 
Peacock did not suffer the slightest loss or dam- 
age. Regarding the affair purely as a conflict be- 
tween vessels of nations at war with each other, 

* As quoted by Low. 

* Letter of Lieutenant Boyce to Company's Marine Board, 
as quoted by Low. 



190 Naval War of 181 2 

the criticism made by Lord Howard Douglass on 
the action between the President and Little Belt 
appHes here perfectly. "If a vessel meet an 
enemy of even greatly superior force, it is due to 
the honor of her flag to try the effect of a few 
rounds; but unless in this gallant attempt she 
leave marks of her skill upon the larger body, 
while she, the smaller body, is hit at every dis- 
charge, she does but salute her enemy's triumph 
and discredit her own gunnery." ' There could 
not have been a more satisfactory exhibition of 
skill than that given by Captain Warrington ; but 
I regret to say that it is difficult to believe he acted 
with proper humanity. It seems impossible that 
Mr. Bartlett did not mention that peace had been 
signed ; and when the opposing force was so much 
less than his own it would have been safe at least 
to defer the order "Haul down your flag" for a 
short time, while he could have kept the brig 
within half pistol-shot, until he could have inquired 
into the truth of the report. Throughout this 
work I have, wherever possible, avoided all refer- 
ences to the various accusations and recrimina- 
tions of some of the captains about "unfairness," 
■"cruelty," etc., as in most cases it is impossible to 
get at the truth, the accounts flatly contradicting 
one another. In this case, however, there cer- 
tainly seems some ground for the rather fervent 

* Naval Gunnery, p. 3. 



Naval War of 1812 191 

denunciations of Captain Warrington indulged in 
by Lieutenant Low. But it is well to remember 
that a very similar affair, with the parties reversed, 
had taken place but a few months before on the 
coast of America. This was on February 2 2d, 
after the boats of the Erebus, 20, and Primrose, 
18, under Captains Bartholomew and Phillot, had 
been beaten oft' with a loss of 30 men (including 
both captains wounded), in an expedition up St. 
Mary's River, Ga. The two captains and their 
vessels then joined Admiral Cockburn at Cumber- 
land Island, and on the 25th of February were in- 
formed officially of the existence of peace. Three 
weeks afterward the American gunboat, No. 168, 
Mr. Hurlburt, sailed from Tybee Bar, Ga., bear- 
ing despatches for the British admiral.' On the 
same day in the afternoon she fell in with the 
Erebus, Captain Bartholomew. Peace having been 
declared, and having been known to exist for 
over three weeks, no effort was made to avoid the 
British vessel ; but when the gunboat neared the 
latter she was suddenly hailed and told to heave to. 
Mr. Hurlburt answered that he had despatches for 
Admiral Cockburn, to which Captain Bartholomew 
responded, with many oaths, that he did not care ; 

' Letter from Com. Campbell to Secretary of Navy, March 
29, 18 1 5, including one from Sailing-master John H. Hurl- 
burt. of March 18, 18 15, preserved in the Naval Archives, 
in vol. xliii., No. 125, of Captains' Letters. See also Niles's 
Register, viii., 104, 118, etc. 



19^ Naval War of 1812 

he would sink her if she did not send a boat aboard. 
When Mr. Hurlburt attempted to answer some 
muskets were discharged at him, and he was told 
to strike. He refused, and the Erebus immediately- 
opened fire from her great guns ; the gunboat had 
gotten so far round that her pivot-gun would not 
bear properly, but it was discharged across the 
bows of the Erebus, and then Mr. Hurlburt struck 
his colors. Although he had lain right under the 
foe's broadside, he suffered no loss or damage ex- 
cept a few ropes cut, and some shot holes in the 
sails. Afterward, Captain Bartholomew apolo- 
gized, and let the gunboat proceed. 

This attack was quite as wanton and unpro- 
voked as Warrington's, and Bartholomew's foe 
was relatively to himself even less powerful ; more- 
over, while the Peacock's crew showed great skill 
in handling their guns, the crew of the Erebus 
most emphatically did not. The intent in both 
cases was equally bad, only the British captain 
lacked the ability to carry his out. 

SUMMARY 

The concluding operations of the war call for 
much the same comments as those of the preceding 
years. The balance of praise certainly inclines 
toward the Americans. Captain John Hayes's 
squadron showed great hardihood, perseverance, 
and judgment, which were rewarded by the cap- 



Naval War of 1812 193 

ture of the President; and Decatur's surrender 
seems decidedly tame. But as regards the action 
between the President and Endymioyi (taking into 
account the fact that the former fought almost 
under the guns of an overwhelming force, and was 
therefore obliged to expose herself far more than 
she otherwise would have), it showed nearly as 
great superiority on the side of the Americans as 
the frigate actions of 18 12 did — in fact, probably 
quite as much as in the case of the Java. Simi- 
larly, while the Cyane and Levant did well, the Con- 
stitution did better; and Sir George Collier's ships 
certainly did not distinguish themselves when in 
chase of Old Ironsides. So with the Hornet in her 
two encounters; no one can question the pluck 
with which the Penguin was fought, but her gun- 
nery was as bad as that of the Cornwallis sub- 
sequently proved. And, though the skirmish 
between the Peacock and Nautilus is not one to 
which an American cares to look back, yet, re- 
garding it purely from a fighting standpoint, there 
is no question which crew was the best trained 
and most skilful. 

LIST OF SHIPS BUILT IN 1815 

Name Rate Where Built Cost 

Washington 74 Portsmouth $235,861.00 

Independence 74 Boston 421,810.41 

Franklin 74 Philadelphia 438,149.40 

Guerriere 44 " 306,158.56 

Java 44 Baltimore 232,767.38 

Fulton 30 New York 320,000.00 

Torpedo — " 

VUL. II. — 13 



194 Naval War of 1812 

These ships first put to sea in this year. For 
the first time in her history, the United States pos- 
sessed line-of-battle ships; and for the first time 
in all history, the steam frigate appeared on the 
navy list of a nation. The Fulton, with her clumsy 
central wheel, concealed from shot by the double 
hull, with such thick scantling that none but heavy 
guns could harm her, and relying for offensive 
weapons not on a broadside of thirty guns of small 
calibre, but on two pivotal loo-pounder colum- 
biads, or, perhaps, if necessary, on blows from her 
hog snout, — the Fulton was the true prototype of 
the modem steam ironclad, with its few heavy 
guns and ram. Almost as significant is the pres- 
ence of the Torpedo. I have not chronicled the 
several efforts made by the Americans to destroy 
British vessels with torpedoes ; some very nearly 
succeeded, and although they failed it must not 
be supposed that they did no good. On the con- 
trary, they made the British in many cases very 
cautious about venturing into good anchorage 
(especially in Long Island Sound and the Chesa- 
peake), and by the mere terror of their name pre- 
vented more than one harrying expedition. The 
Fulton was not got into condition to be fought 
until just as the war ended ; had it continued a few 
months, it is more than probable that the deeds of 
the Merrimac and the havoc wrought by the Con- 
federate torpedoes would have been forestalled by 



Naval War of 1 812 195 

nearly half a century. As it was, neither of these 
engines of war attracted much attention. For 
ten or fifteen years the Fulton was the only war- 
vessel of her kind in existence, and then her name 
disappears from our lists. The torpedoes had 
been tried in the Revolutionary War, but their 
failure prevented much notice from being taken of 
them, and, besides, at that time there was a strong 
feeling that it was dishonorable to blow a ship up 
with a powder-can concealed under the water, 
though highly laudable to burn her by means of a 
fire-raft floating on the water — a nice distinction 
in naval ethics that has since disappeared.' 

AMERICAN VESSELS DESTROYED, ETC. 

By Ocean Cruisers 
Name Guns Tonnage Remarks 

President 52 1.576 Captured by squadron. 

52 guns, 1.576 tons. 

BRITISH VESSELS DESTROYED, ETC. 

a. — By Privateers 
Name Guns Tonnage Remarks 

Chasseur 12 240 'Qypriva.t'r St. Lawrence. 

b. — By Ocean Cruisers 

Cyane 34 659 By Constitution. 

Levant 20 500 Retaken. 

Penguin 19 477 By Hornet. 

85 guns, 1,876 tons. 

20 500 (Subtracting Lf?^'a;^/). 

65 guns, 1,376 tons. 

' James fairly foams at the mouth at the mere mention of 
torpedoes. 



196 Naval War of 181 2 

In summing up the results of the struggle on the 
ocean, it is to be noticed that very little was at- 
tempted, and nothing done, by the American 
navy, that could materially affect the result of the 
war. Commodore Rodgers's expedition after the 
Jamaica Plate fleet failed ; both the efforts to get 
a small squadron into the East Indian waters also 
miscarried ; and otherwise the whole history of the 
struggle on the ocean is, as regards the Americans, 
only the record of individual cruises and fights. 
The material results were not very great, at least 
in their effect on Great Britain, whose enormous 
navy did not feel in the slightest degree the loss of 
a few frigates and sloops. But, morally, the result 
was of inestimable benefit to the United States. 
The victories kept up the spirits of the people, cast 
down by the defeats on land ; practically decided 
in favor of the Americans the chief question in 
dispute, — Great Britain's right of search and im- 
pressment, — and gave the navy, and thereby the 
country, a world-wide reputation. I doubt if ever 
before a nation gained so much honor by a few 
single-ship duels. For there can be no question 
which side came out of the war with the greatest 
credit. The damage inflicted by each on the other 
was not very unequal in amount, but the balance 
was certainly in favor of the United States, as can 
be seen by the following tables, for the details of 
which reference can be made to the various years : 



Naval War of 1812 197 



AMERICAN LOSS BRITISH LOSS 

Caused Tonnage Guns Tonnage' Guns 

By Ocean Cruisers.. . 5,984 278 8,451 351 

On the Lakes 727 37 4.159 212 

By the Army 3,007 116 500 22 

By Privateers ... 402 20 

Total 9,718 431 13.512 6p5 

In addition, we lost 4 revenue-cutters, mounting 
24 guns, and, in the aggregate, of 387 tons, and 
also 25 gunboats, with 71 guns, and, in the aggre- 
gate, of nearly 2000 tons. This would swell our 
loss to 12,105 tons, and 526 guns '; but the loss of 

' The tonnage can only be given approximately, as that of 
the vessels on Lake Champlain is not exactly known, although 
we know about what the two fleets tonned relatively to one 
another. 

^ This differs greatly from the figures given by James in his 
Naval Occurrences (App. ccxv.). He makes the American 
loss 14,844 tons, and 660 guns. His list includes, for exam- 
ple, the '' Growler and Hamilton, upset in carrying sail to 
avoid Sir James's fleet"; it would be quite as reasonable to 
put down the loss of the Royal George to the credit of the 
French. Then he mentions the Julia and Growler, which 
were recaptured; the Asp, which was also recaptured; the 
"New York, 46, destroyed at Washington," which was 7iot 
destroyed or harmed in any way, and which, moreover, was 
a condemned hulk; the "Boston, 42 (in reahty 32), destroyed 
at Washington," which had been a condemned hulk for ten 
years, and had no guns or anything else in her, and was as 
much a loss to our navy as the fishing up and burning of an 
old wreck would have been ; and eight gunboats, whose de- 
struction was either mythical, or else which were not national 
vessels. By deducting all these, we reduce James's total by 
120 guns, and 2600 tons; and a few more alterations (such as 



1 98 Naval War of 1 8 1 2 

the revenue-cutters and gunboats can fairly be 
considered to be counterbalanced by the capture 
or destruction of the various British Royal Packets 
(all armed with from 2 to 10 guns), tenders, barges, 
etc., which would be in the aggregate of at least as 
great tonnage and gun force, and with more nu- 
merous crews. 

excluding the swivels in the President's tops, which he counts, 
etc.) , brings his number down to that given above — and also 
affords a good idea of the value to be attached to his figures 
and tables. The British loss he gives at but 530 guns and 
10,273 tons. He omits the 24-gun ship burnt by Chauncy at 
York, although including the frigate and corvette burnt by 
Ross at Washington; if the former is excluded the two latter 
should be, which would make the balance still more in favor 
of the Americans. He omits the guns of the Gloucester, be- 
cause they had been taken out of her and placed in battery on 
the shore, but he includes those of the Adams, which had been 
served in precisely the same way. He omits all reference to 
the British 14-gun schooner burnt on Ontario, and to all 3- 
and 4-gun sloops and schooners captured there, although in- 
cluding the corresponding American vessels. The reason 
that he so much underestimates the tonnage, especially on 
the lakes, I have elsewhere discussed. His tables of the rela- 
tive loss in men are even more erroneous, exaggerating that 
of the Americans, and greatly underestimating that of the 
British; but I have not tabulated this on account of the im- 
possibility of getting fair estimates of the killed and wounded 
in the cutting-out expeditions, and the difficulty of enumerat- 
ing the prisoners taken in descents, etc. Roughly, about 
2700 Americans and 3800 British were captured; the com- 
parative loss in killed and wounded stood much more in our 
favor. 

I have excluded from the British loss the brigs Detroit and 
Caledonia, and schooner Nancy (aggregating 10 guns and 



Naval War of 1 812 199 

But the comparative material loss gives no idea 
of the comparative honor gained. The British 
navy, numbering at the outset a thousand cruisers, 
had accomplished less than the American, which 
numbered but a dozen. Moreover, most of the 
loss suffered by the former was in single fight, 
while this had been but twice the case with the 
Americans, who had generally been overwhelmed 
by numbers. The President and Essex were both 
captured by more than double their force, simply 
because they were disabled before the fight began, 
otherwise they would certainly have escaped. 
With the exceptions of the Chesapeake and Argus 
(both of which were taken fairly, because their an- 
tagonists, though of only equal force, were better 
fighters) , the remaining loss of the Americans was 
due to the small cruisers stumbling from time to 
time across the path of some one of the innu- 
merable British heavy vessels. Had Congressional 
forethought been sufficiently great to have allowed 
a few line-of -battle ships to have been in readiness 
some time previous to the war, results of weight 

about 500 tons), destroyed on the upper lakes, because I 
hardly know whether they could be considered national ves- 
sels; the schooner Highflyer, of 8 guns, 40 men, and 209 tons, 
taken by Rodgers, because she seems to have been merely a 
tender; and the Dominica, 15, of 77 men and 270 tons, be- 
cause her captor, the privateer Decatur, though nominally an 
American, was really a French vessel. Of course, both tables 
are only approximately exact ; but at any rate the balance of 
damage and loss was over 4 to 3 in our favor. 



200 Naval War of 1812 

might have been accompHshed. But the only ac- 
tivity ever exhibited by Congress, in materially in- 
creasing the navy previous to the war, had been in 
partially carrying out President Jefferson's ideas 
of having an enormous force of very worthless 
gunboats — a scheme whose wisdom was about on 
a par with some of that statesman's political and 
military theories. 

Of the twelve ' single-ship actions, two (those 
of the Argus and Chesapeake) undoubtedly re- 
dounded most to the credit of the British, in two 
(that of the Wasp with the Reindeer, and that of 
the Enterprise with the Boxer), the honors were 
nearly even, and in the other eight the superiority 
of the Americans was very manifest. In three 
actions (those with the Penguin, Frolic, and 
Shannon) the combatants were about equal in 
strength, the Americans having slightly the ad- 
vantage; in all the others but two, the victors 
combined superiority of force with superiority of 
skill. In but two cases, those of the Argus and 
Epervier, could any lack of courage be imputed to 

* Not counting the last action of the Constitution, the 
President' s action, or the capture of the Essex, on account of 
the difficulty of fairly estimating the amount of credit due to 
each side. In both the first actions, however, the American 
ships seem to have been rather more ably fought than their 
antagonists, and, taking into account the overwhelming dis- 
advantages under which the Essex labored, her defence dis- 
played more desperate bravery than did that of any other 
ship during the war. 



Naval War of 1 812 '201 

the vanquished. The second year alone showed 
to the advantage of the British; the various en- 
counters otherwise were as creditable to the 
Americans at the end as at the beginning of the 
war. This is worth attending to, because many- 
authors speak as if the successes of the Americans 
were confined to the first year. It is true that no 
frigate was taken after the first year, but this was 
partly because the strictness of the blockade kept 
the American frigates more in port, while the 
sloops put out to sea at pleasure, and partly be- 
cause after that year the British i8-pounder 
frigates either cruised in couples, or, when single, 
invariably refused, by order of the Board of Admi- 
ralty, an encounter with a 24-pounder ; and though 
much of the American success was unquestionably 
to be attributed to more men and heavier guns, 
yet much of it was not. The war itself gives us 
two instances in which defeat was owing solely, it 
may be said, to inferiority of force — courage and 
skill being equal. The Wasp was far heavier than 
the Reindeer, and, there being nothing to choose 
between them in anything else, the damage done 
was about proportionate to this difference. It 
follows, as a matter of course, that the very much 
greater disproportion in loss in the cases of the 
Avon, Epervier, etc., where the disproportion in 
force was much less (they mounting 32's instead 
of 24's, and the victors being all of the same class), 



202' Naval War of 1 812 

is only to be explained by the inferiority in skill on 
the part of the vanquished. These remarks apply 
just as much to the Argus. The Reindeer, with 
her 24's, would have been almost exactly on a par 
with her, and yet would have taken her with even 
greater ease than the Peacock did with her 32's. 
In other words, the only effect of our superiority 
in metal, men, and tonnage was to increase some- 
what the disparity in loss. Had the Congress and 
Constellation, instead of the United States and Con- 
stitution, encountered the Macedonian and Java, 
the difference in execution would have been less 
than it was, but the result would have been un- 
changed, and would have been precisely such as 
ensued when the Wasp met the Frolic, or the Hor- 
net the Penguin. On the other hand, had the 
Shannon met the Constitution there would have 
been a repetition of the fight between the Wasp 
and Reindeer; for it is but fair to remember that 
great as is the honor that Broke deserves, it is no 
more than that due to Manners. 

The Republic of the United States owed a great 
deal to the excellent make and armament of its 
ships, but it owed still more to the men who were 
in them. The massive timbers and heavy guns of 
Old Ironsides would have availed but little had it 
not been for her able commanders and crews. Of 
all the excellent single-ship captains, British or 
American, produced by the war, the palm should 



Naval War of 1 8i 2 20^ 



J 



be awarded to Hull.' The deed of no other man 
(excepting j\Iacdonough) equalled his escape from 
Broke's five ships, or surpassed his half-hour's 
conflict with the Guerriere. After him, almost 
all the American captains deserve high praise — 
Decatur, Jones, Blakely, Biddle, Bainbridge, Law- 
rence, Burrows, Allen, Warrington, Stewart, Por- 
ter. It is no small glory to a country to have had 
such men upholding the honor of its flag. On a 
par with the best of them are Broke, Manners, and 
also Byron and Blythe. It must be but a poor- 
spirited American whose veins do not tingle with 
pride when he reads of the cruises and fights of the 
sea-captains, and their grim prowess, which kept 
the old Yankee flag floating over the waters of the 
Atlantic for three years, in the teeth of the might- 
iest naval power the world has ever seen ; but it is 
equally impossible not to admire Broke's chivalric 
challenge and successful fight, or the heroic death 
of the captain of the Reindeer. 

Nor can the war ever be fairly understood by 
any one who does not bear in mind that the com- 
batants were men of the same stock, who far more 
nearly resembled each other than either resembled 
any other nation. I honestly believe that the 
American sailor offered rather better material for 
a man-of-war's man than the British, because the 

' See Naval Tactics, by Commander J. H. Ward, and Life 
of Commodore Tatnall, by Charles C. Jones, Jr. 



204 Naval War of 1 8 1 2 

freer institutions of his country (as compared with 
the Britain of the drunken Prince Regent and his 
dotard father — a very different land from the 
present free England) and the peculiar exigencies 
of his life tended to make him more intelligent and 
self-reliant; but the difference, when there was 
any, was very small, and disappeared entirely 
when his opponents had been drilled for any 
length of time by men like Broke or Manners. The 
advantage consisted in the fact that our average 
commander was equal to the best, and higher than 
the average, of the opposing captains; and this 
held good throughout the various grades of the 
officers. The American officers knew they had re- 
doubtable foes to contend with, and made every 
preparation accordingly. Owing their rank to 
their own exertions, trained by practical experi- 
ence and with large liberty of action, they made 
every effort to have their crews in the most perfect 
state of skill and discipline. In Commodore Tat- 
nall's biography (p. 15) it is mentioned that the 
blockaded Constellation had her men well trained 
at the guns and at target practice, though still 
lying in the river, so as to be at once able to meet 
a foe when she put out to sea. The British captain, 
often owing his command to his social standing or 
to favoritism, hampered by red tape,' and accus- 
tomed, by twenty years' almost uninterrupted 

' For instance, James mentions that they were forbidden 



Naval War of 1 812 205 

success, to regard the British arms as invincible, 
was apt to laugh at all manoeuvring,' and scorned 
to prepare too carefully for a fight, trusting to the 
old British " pluck and luck" to carry him through. 
So, gradually, he forgot how to manoeuvre or to 
prepare. The Java had been at sea six weeks be- 
fore she was captured, yet during that time the 
entire exercise of her crew at the guns had been 
confined to the discharge of six broadsides of blank 
cartridges (James, vi., 184); the Constitution, like 
the Java, had shipped an entirely new and raw crew 
previous to her first cruise, and was at sea but five 
weeks before she met the Giterriere, and yet her 
men had been trained to perfection. This is a 
sufficient comment on the comparative merits of 
Captain Hull and Captain Lambert. The Amer- 
ican prepared himself in every possible way; the 
Briton tried to cope with courage alone against 
courage united to skill. His bad gunnery had 
not been felt in contending with European foes ^ 
as unskilful as himself. Says Lord Howard Doug- 
lass (p. 3) : " We entered with too much confidence 
into a war with a marine much more expert than 

to use more than so many shot in practice, and that Captain 
Broke utterly disregarded this command. 

' Lord Howard Douglass, Naval Gunnery, states this in 
various places : "Accustomed to contemn all manoeuvring." 

' Lord Howard Douglass; he seems to think that in 1812 
the British had fallen off absolutely, though not relatively to 
their European foes. 



2o6 Naval War of 1812 

any of our European enemies. . . . there was 
inferiority of gunnery as well as of force," etc. 
Admiral Codrington, commenting on the Eper- 
vier's loss, says, as before quoted, that, owing to 
his being chosen purely for merit, the American 
captain was an over-match for the British, unless 
" he encountered our best officers on equal 
terms." 

The best criticism on the war is that given by 
Capitaine Jurien de la Graviere.' After speaking 
of the heavier metal and greater number of men 
of the American ships, he continues: "And yet 
only an enormous superiority in the precision and 
rapidity of their fire can explain the difference in 
the losses sustained by the combatants. . . . Nor 
was the skill of their gunners the only cause to 
which the Americans owed their success. Their 
ships were faster; the crews, composed of chosen 
men, manoeuvred with uniformity and precision; 
their captains had that practical knowledge which 
is only to be acquired by long experience of the 
sea ; and it is not to be wondered at that the Con- 
stitution, when chased during three days by a 
squadron of five English frigates, succeeded in 
escaping, by surpassing them in manoeuvring, and 
by availing herself of every ingenious resource and 
skilful expedient that maritime science could sug- 
gest. ... To a marine exalted by success, 

' Cuerres Maritimes, ii., 269, 272, 274 (Paris, 1847). 



Naval War of 1 812 207 

but rendered negligent by the very habit of vic- 
tory, the Congress only opposed the best of vessels 
and most formidable of armaments. . . ." ' 

It is interesting to compare the results of this 
inter-Anglian warfare, waged between the Insular 
and the Continental English, with the results of the 
contest that the former were at the same time 
carrying on with their Gallo-Roman neighbors 
across the channel. For this purpose I shall rely 
on Troude's Batailles Navales, which would cer- 
tainly not give the English more than their due. 
His account of the comparative force in each case 
can be supplemented by the corresponding one 
given in James. Under drawn battles I include all 
such as were indecisive, in so far that neither com- 
batant was captured; in almost every case each 
captain claimed that the other ran away. 

During the years i8i2toi8i5, inclusive, there 
were eight actions between French and English 
ships of approximately equal force. In three of 
these, the English were victorious. 

In 181 2, the Victorious, 74, captured the Rivoli, 

74- 

' The praise should be given to the individual captains and 
not to Congress, however; and none of the American ships 
had picked crews. During the war the Shannon had the only- 
crew which could with any fairness be termed "picked," for 
her men had been together seven years, and all of her "boys" 
must have been well-grown young men, much older than the 
boys on her antagonist. 



2o8 Naval War of 1812 

COMPARATIVE FORCE 

Broadsides, Metal, lbs. 

Troude James 

Victorious 1,014 1,060 

Rivoli 1,010 1,085 

In 1814, the Tagus captured the Ceres and the 
Hehrus captured the Etoile. 

Broadsides, Metal, lbs. 

Troude James 

Tagus 444 467 

Ceres 428 463 

Hebriis 467 467 

Etoile 428 463 

The Ceres, when she surrendered, had but one 
man wounded, although she had suffered a good 
deal aloft. The fight between the 74's was mur- 
derous to an almost unexampled degree, 125 Eng- 
lish and 400 French falling. The Hehrus lost 40 
and the Etoile 120 men. 

Five actions were "drawn." 

In 1 81 2, the Swallow fought the Renard and 
Garland. The former threw 262, the latter 290 
pounds of shot at a broadside. 

In iSi$, the Pilot, throwing 262 pounds, fought 
a draw with the Egerie, throwing 260. 

In 1 81 4, two frigates of the force of the Tagus 
fought a draw with two frigates of the force of the 
Ceres; and the Eurotas, with 24-pounders, failed 



Naval War of 1812 209 

to capture the Chlorinde, which had only 18- 
pounders. 

In 181 5, the Amelia fought a draw with the A r^- 
thuse, the ships throwing, respectively, 549 and 463 
pounds, according to the English, or 572 and 410, 
pounds, according to the French, accounts. In 
spite of being superior in force, the English ship 
lost 141 men, and the French but 105. This was a 
bloodier fight than even that of the Chesapeake 
with the Shannon ; but the gunnery was, never- 
theless, much worse than that shown by the two 
combatants in the famous duel off Boston har- 
bor, one battle lasting four hours and the other 
fifteen minutes. 

There were a number of other engagements 
where the British were successful, but where it 
is difficult to compare the forces. Twice a 74 
captured or destroyed two frigates, and a razee 
performed a similar feat. An i8-gun brig, the 
Weasel, fought two i6-gun brigs till one of them 
blew up. 

The loss of the two navies at each other's hands 
during the four years was : 



English Ships 


French Ships 


I i6-gun brig 


3 line-of-battle ships 


I 1 2 -gun brig 


II frigates 


I lo-gun cutter 


2 26-gun flutes 




2 i6-gun brigs 




I lo-gun brig 


VOL. II.— 14 


Many gunboats, etc. 



2 10 Naval War of 1812 

Or one navy lost three vessels, mounting 38 
guns, and the other 19 vessels, mounting 830 guns. 

During the same time, the English lost to the 
Danes one 14-gun brig, and destroyed in return a 
frigate of 46 guns, a 6-gun schooner, a 4-gun cutter, 
two galliots and several gun-brigs. 

In the above lists it is to be noticed how many 
of the engagements were indecisive, owing chiefly 
to the poor gunnery of the combatants. The fact 
that both the Eurotas and the Amelia, though 
more powerfully armed and manned than the He- 
brus, yet failed to capture the sister ships of the 
frigate taken by the latter, shows that heavy 
metal and a numerous crew are not the only ele- 
ments necessary for success; indeed, the Eurotas 
and Amelia were as superior in force to their an- 
tagonists as the Constitution was to the Java. 

But the chief point to be noticed is the over- 
whelming difference in the damage the two navies 
caused each other. This difference was, roughly, 
as five to one against the Danes, and as fifty to one 
against the French ; while it was as four to three 
in favor of the American. These figures give some 
idea of the effectiveness of the various navies. At 
any rate, they show that we had found out what 
•the European nations had for many years in vain 
striven to discover — a way to do more damage 
than we received in a naval contest with England. 



CHAPTER IV 
1815 

THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS 

The war on land generally disastrous — British send expedi- 
tion against New Orleans — Jackson prepares for the defence 
of the city — Night attack on the British advance guard — 
Artillery duels — Great battle of January 8, 1815— Slaughter- 
ing repulse of the main attack — Rout of the Americans on the 
right bank of the river — Final retreat of the British — Obser- 
vations on the character of the troops and commanders en- 
gaged. 

WHILE our navy had been successful, the 
war on land had been for us full of 
humiliation. The United States then 
formed but a loosely knit confederacy, the sparse 
population scattered over a great expanse of land. 
Ever since the Federalist party had gone out of 
power in 1800, the nation's ability to maintain 
order at home and enforce respect abroad had 
steadily dwindled ; and the twelve years' nerveless 
reign of the Doctrinaire Democracy had left us im- 
potent for attack and almost as feeble for defence. 
Jefferson, though a man whose views and theories 
had a profound influence upon our national life, 
was perhaps the most incapable Executive that 

ever filled the presidential chair; being almost 

211 



212 Naval War of 1812 

purely a visionary, he was utterly unable to grap- 
ple with the slightest actual danger, and, not 
even excepting his successor, Madison, it would be 
difficult to imagine a man less fit to guide the State 
with honor and safety through the stormy times 
that marked the opening of the present century. 
Without the prudence to avoid war or the fore- 
thought to prepare for it, the Administration 
drifted helplessly into a conflict in which only the 
navy prepared by the Federalists twelve years be- 
fore, and weakened rather than strengthened dur- 
ing the intervening time, saved us from complete 
and shameful defeat. True to its theories, the 
House of Virginia made no preparations, and 
thought the war could be fought by "the nation in 
arms" ; the exponents of this particular idea, the 
militiamen, a partially armed mob, ran like sheep 
whenever brought into the field. The regulars 
were not much better. After two years of war- 
fare, Scott records in his autobiography that there 
were but two books of tactics (one written in 
French) in the entire army on the Niagara fron- 
tier; and officers and men were on such a dead 
level of ignorance that he had to spend a month 
driUing all of the former, divided into squads, in 
the school of the soldier and school of the com- 
pany.' It is small wonder that such troops were 

' Memoirs of Lieutenant-General Scott, written by himself 
(2 vols., New York, 1864), i., p. 115. 



Naval War of 1 812 213 

utterly unable to meet the English. Until near 
the end, the generals were as bad as the armies 
they commanded, and the administration of the 
War Department continued to be a triumph of 
imbecility to the very last.' With the exception 
of the brilliant and successful charge of the Ken- 
tucky Mounted Infantry at the battle of the 
Thames, the only bright spot in the war in the 
North was the campaign on the Niagara frontier 
during the summer of 1814; and even here, the 
chief battle, that of Lundy's Lane, though re- 
flecting as much honor on the Americans as on the 
British, was for the former a defeat, and not a vic- 
tory, as most of our writers seem to suppose. 

But the war had a dual aspect. It was partly a 
contest between the two branches of the English 
race, and partly a last attempt on the part of the 
Indian tribes to check the advance of the most 
rapidly growing one of these same two branches ; 
and this last portion of the struggle, though at- 
tracting comparatively little attention, was really 
much the most far-reaching in its effect upon his- 

' Monroe's biographer (see James Monroe, by Daniel C. 
Oilman, Boston, 1883, p. 123) thinks he made a good Secre- 
tary of War; I think he was as much a failure as his prede- 
cessors, and a harsher criticism could not be passed on him. 
Like the other statesmen of his school, he was mighty in word 
and weak in action; bold to plan but weak to perform. As 
an instance, contrast his fiery letters to Jackson with the fact 
that he never gave him a particle of practical help. 



2 14 Naval War of 1812 

tory. The triumph of the British would have dis- 
tinctly meant the giving a new lease of life to the 
Indian nationalities, the hemming in, for a time, 
of the United States, and the stoppage, perhaps 
for many years, of the march of English civiliza- 
tion across the continent. The English of Britain 
were doing all they could to put off the day when 
their race would reach to a world-wide supremacy. 
There was much fighting along our Western 
frontier with various Indian tribes ; and it was es- 
pecially fierce in the campaign that a backwoods 
general of Tennessee, named Andrew Jackson, 
carried on against the powerful confederacy of the 
Creeks, a nation that was thrust in like a wedge 
between the United States proper and their de- 
pendency, the newly acquired French Province of 
Louisiana. After several slaughtering fights, the 
most noted being the battle of the Horse-Shoe 
Bend, the power of the Creeks was broken forever ; 
and afterward, as there was much question over 
the proper boundaries of what was then the Latin 
land of Florida, Jackson marched south, attacked 
the Spaniards, and drove them from Pensacola. 
Meanwhile, the British, having made a successful 
and ravaging summer campaign through Virginia 
and Maryland, situated in the heart of the country, 
organized the most formidable expedition of the 
war for a winter campaign against the outlying 
land of Louisiana, whose defender Jackson, of 



Naval War of 1 812 215 

necessity, became. Thus, in the course of events, 
it came about that Louisiana was the theatre on 
which the final and most dramatic act of the war 
was played. 

Amid the gloomy, semi-tropical swamps that 
cover the quaking delta thrust out into the blue 
waters of the Mexican Gulf by the strong torrent 
of the mighty Mississippi, stood the fair, French 
city of New Orleans. Its lot had been strange and 
varied. Won and lost once and again, in conflict 
with the subjects of the Catholic king, there was a 
strong Spanish tinge in the French blood that 
coursed so freely through the veins of its citizens ; 
joined by purchase to the great Federal Republic, 
it yet shared no feeling with the latter, save that 
of hatred to the common foe. And now an hour 
of sore need had come upon the city ; for against it 
came the red English, lords of fight by sea and 
land. A great fleet of war vessels — ships of the 
line, frigates, and sloops — under Admiral Cochrane, 
was on the way to New Orleans, convoying a still 
larger fleet of troop ships, with aboard them some 
ten thousand fighting men, chiefly the fierce and 
hardy veterans of the Peninsular War,' who had 

' "The British infantry embarked at Bordeaux, some for 
America, some for England." {History of ilie War in the 
Peninsula, by Major-General Sir W. F. P. Napier, K.C.B. 
New edition. New York, 1882. Vol. v., p. 200.) For discus- 
sion of numbers, see farther on. 



2i6 Naval War of 1812 

been trained for seven years in the stern school of 
the Iron Duke, and who were now led by one of the 
bravest and ablest of all Wellington's brave and 
able lieutenants, Sir Edward Packenham. 

On the 8th of December, 181 4, the foremost ves- 
sels, with among their number the great two-decker 
Tonnant, carrying the admiral's flag, anchored 
off the Chandeleur Islands ' ; and as the current of 
the Mississippi was too strong to be easily breasted, 
the English leaders determined to bring their men 
by boats through the bayous, and disembark 
them on the bank of the river ten miles below the 
wealthy city at whose capture they were aiming. 
There was but one thing to prevent the success of 
this plan, and that was the presence in the bayous 
of five American gunboats, manned by a hundred 
and eighty men, and commanded by Lieuten- 
ant-commanding Catesby Jones, a very shrewd 
fighter. So against him was sent Captain Nicholas 
Lockyer with forty-five barges, and nearly a thou- 
sand sailors and marines, men who had grown 
gray during a quarter of a century of unbroken 
ocean warfare. The gunboats were moored in a 
head-and-stern line, near the Rigolets, with their 
boarding-nettings triced up, and everything ready 
to do desperate battle ; but the British rowed up 
with strong, swift strokes, through a murderous 
fire of great guns and musketry ; the vessels were 

^ See ante, p. 151. 



Naval War of 1 8 1 2 217 

grappled amid fierce resistance; the boarding- 
nettings were slashed through and cut away ; with 
furious fighting the decks were gained ; and one by 
one, at push of pike and cutlass stroke, the gun- 
boats were carried in spite of their stubborn de- 
fenders ; but not till more than one barge had been 
sunk, while the assailants had lost a hundred men, 
and the assailed about half as many. 

There was now nothing to hinder the landing 
of the troops ; and as the scattered transports ar- 
rived the soldiers were disembarked, and ferried 
through the sluggish water of the bayous on small 
flat-bottomed craft; and, finally, December 23d, 
the advance guard, two thousand strong, under 
General Keane, emerged at the mouth of the canal 
Villere, and camped on the bank of the river,' but 
nine miles below New Orleans, which now seemed 
a certain prize, almost within their grasp. 

Yet, although a mighty and cruel foe was at 
their very gates, nothing save fierce defiance 
reigned in the fiery Creole hearts of the Crescent 
City. For a master-spirit was in their midst. An- 
drew Jackson, having utterly broken and destroyed 
the most powerful Indian confederacy that had 
ever menaced the Southwest, and having driven 
the haughty Spaniards from Pensacola, was now 
bending all the energies of his rugged intellect and 

' Letter of Major-General John Keane, December 26, 
1814. 



21 8 Naval War of 1812 

indomitable will to the one object of defending 
New Orleans. No man could have been better 
fitted for the task. He had hereditary wrongs to 
avenge on the British, and he hated them with 
an implacable fury that was absolutely devoid of 
fear. Born and brought up among the lawless 
characters of the frontier, and knowing well how 
to deal with them, he was able to establish and 
preserve the strictest martial law in the city with- 
out in the least quelling the spirit of the citizens. 
To a restless and untiring energy he united 
sleepless vigilance and genuine military genius. 
Prompt to attack whenever the chance offered 
itself, seizing with ready grasp the slightest van- 
tage-ground, and never giving up a foot of earth 
that he could keep, he yet had the patience to 
play a defensive game when it so suited him, and 
with consummate skill he always followed out the 
scheme of warfare that was best adapted to his 
wild soldiery. In after years he did to his country 
some good and more evil; but no true American 
can think of his deeds at New Orleans without 
profound and unmixed thankfulness. 

He had not reached the city till December 2d, 
and had therefore but three weeks in which to 
prepare the defence. The Federal Government, 
throughout the campaign, did absolutely nothing 
for the defence of Louisiana; neither provisions 
nor munitions of war of any sort were sent to it, 



Naval War of 1 812 219 

nor were any measures taken for its aid." The 
inhabitants had been in a state of extreme de- 
spondency up to the time that Jackson arrived, 
for they had no one to direct them, and they were 
weakened by factional divisions ^ ; but after his 
coming there was nothing but the utmost enthu- 
siasm displayed, so great was the confidence he 
inspired, and so firm his hand in keeping down all 
opposition. Under his direction earthworks were 
thrown up to defend all the important positions, 
the whole population working night and day at 
them; all the available artillery was mounted, 
and every ounce of war material that the city con- 
tained was seized; martial law was proclaimed; 
and all general business was suspended, every- 
thing being rendered subordinate to the one grand 
object of defence. 

Jackson's forces were small. There were two 
war vessels in the river. One was the little 
schooner Carolina, manned by regular seamen, 
largely New Englanders. The other was the 
newly built ship Louisiana, a powerful corvette; 
she had, of course, no regular crew, and her officers 
were straining every nerve to get one from the 
varied ranks of the maritime population of New 

' Historical Memoir of the War in West Florida and Louisi- 
ana (by Major A. Lacarriex Latour, translated from the 
French by H. P. Nugent, Philadelphia, 1816), p. 66. 

2 Latour, 53. 



2 20 Naval War of 1812 

Orleans; long-limbed and hard-visaged Yankees, 
Portuguese, and Norwegian seamen from foreign 
merchantmen, dark-skinned Spaniards from the 
West Indies, swarthy Frenchmen who had served 
under the bold privateersman Lafitte, — all alike 
were taken, and all alike by unflagging exertions 
were got into shape for battle.' There were two 
regiments of regulars, numbering together about 
eight hundred men, raw and not very well dis- 
ciplined, but who were now drilled with great 
care and regularity. In addition to this, Jack- 
son raised somewhat over a thousand militiamen 
among the citizens. There were some Americans 
among them, but they were mostly French Creoles,^ 
and one band had in its formation something that 
was curiously pathetic. It was composed of free 
men of color,^ who had gathered to defend the 
land which kept the men of their race in slavery ; 
who were to shed their blood for the Flag that 
symbolized to their kind not freedom but bond- 
age ; who were to die bravely as freemen, only that 
their brethren might live on ignobly as slaves. 
Surely, there was never a stranger instance than 
this of the irony of fate. 

But if Jackson had been forced to rely only on 
these troops. New Orleans could not have been 

1 Letter of Commodore Daniel G. Patterson, December 20, 

1814. 

2 Latour, no. ^ Latour, ni. 



Naval War of 1 812 221 

saved. His chief hope lay in the volunteers of 
Tennessee, who, under their Generals, Cofifee and 
Carroll, were pushing their toilsome and weary way 
toward the city. Every effort was made to hurr>' 
their march through the almost impassable roads, 
and at last, in the very nick of time, on the 23d of 
December, the day on which the British troops 
reached the river bank, the vanguard of the Ten- 
nesseeans marched into New Orleans. Gaunt of 
form and grim of face, with their powder-horns 
slung over their buckskin shirts, carrying their 
long rifles on their shoulders and their hea\'y hunt- 
ing-knives stuck in their belts, with their coon- 
skin caps and fringed leggings, — thus came the 
grizzly warriors of the backwoods, the heroes of 
the Horse-Shoe Bend, the victors over Spaniard 
and Indian, eager to pit themselves against the 
trained regulars of Britain, and to throw down the 
gage of battle to the world-renowned infantry of 
the island Enghsh. Accustomed to the most law- 
less freedom, and to giving free rein to the full 
violence of their passions, defiant of discipHne and 
impatient of the slightest restraint, caring little 
for God and nothing for man, they were soldiers 
who, under an ordinary commander, would have 
been fully as dangerous to themselves and their 
leaders as to their foes. But Andrew Jackson was 
of all men the one best fitted to manage such 
troops. Even their fierce natures quailed before 



222 Naval War of 1812 

the ungovernable fury of a spirit greater than 
their own; and their sullen, stubborn wills were 
bent at last before his unyielding temper and iron 
hand. Moreover, he was one of themselves; he 
typified their passions and prejudices, their faults 
and their virtues ; he shared their hardships as if 
he had been a common private, and, in turn, he 
always made them partakers of his triumphs. 
They admired his personal prowess with pistol and 
rifle, his unswerving loyalty to his friends, and the 
relentless and unceasing war that he waged alike 
on the foes of himself and his country. As a 
result, they loved and feared him as few generals 
have ever been loved or feared ; they obeyed him 
unhesitatingly; they followed his lead without 
flinching or murmuring, and they ever made good 
on the field of battle the promise their courage 
held out to his judgment. 

It was noon of December 23d when General 
Keane, with nineteen hundred men, halted and 
pitched his camp on the east bank of the Missis- 
sippi ; and in the evening enough additional troops 
arrived to swell his force to over twenty -three hun- 
dred soldiers.' Keane's encampment was in a 
long plain, rather thinly covered with fields and 

^ James (Military Occurrences of the Late War, by Wm. 
James, London, 1818), vol. ii., p. 362, says 2050 rank and file; 
the English returns, as already explained, unlike the French 
and American, never included officers, sergeants, drummers, 
artillerymen, or engineers, bv;t only "sabres and baYonets" 



Naval War of 1 812 223 

farmhouses, about a mile in breadth, and bounded 
on one side by the river, on the other by gloomy 
and impenetrable cypress swamps ; and there was 
no obstacle interposed between the British camp 
and the city it menaced. 

At two in the afternoon word was brought to 
Jackson that the foe had reached the river bank, 
and, without a moment's delay, the old backwoods 
fighter prepared to strike a rough first blow. At 
once, and as if by magic, the city started from her 
state of rest into one of fierce excitement and 
eager preparation. The alarm-guns were fired; 
in every quarter the war-drums were beaten; 
while, amid the din and clamor, all the regulars 
and marines, the best of the creole militia, and 
the vanguard of the Tennesseeans, under Coffee, — 
forming a total of a little more than two thousand 
men,' — were assembled in great haste; and the 

(Napier, iv., 252). At the end of Napier's fourth volume is 
given the "morning state" of Wellington's forces on April 10, 
1814. This shows 56,030 rank and file and 7431 officers, ser- 
geants, and trumpeters or drummers; or, in other words, to 
get at the real British force in an action, even supposing there 
are no artillerymen or engineers present, 13 per cent, must be 
added to the given number, which includes only rank and file. 
Making this addition, Keane had 2310 men. The Americans 
greatly overestimated his force, Latour making it 4980. 

' General Jackson, in his official letter, says only 1500; but 
Latour, in a detailed statement, makes it 2024; exclusive of 
107 Mississippi dragoons who marched with the column, but 
being on horseback had to stay behind, and took no part in the 
action. Keane thought he had been attacked by 5000 men. 



224 Naval War of 1812 

gray of the winter twilight saw them, with Old 
Hickory at their head, marching steadily along 
the river bank toward the camp of their foes. 
Patterson, meanwhile, in the schooner Carolina, 
dropped down with the current to try the effect 
of a flank attack. 

Meanwhile, the British had spent the afternoon 
in leisurely arranging their camp, in posting the 
pickets, and in foraging among the farmhouses. 
There was no fear of attack, and as the day ended 
huge camp-fires were lit, at which the hungry sol- 
diers cooked their suppers undisturbed. One di- 
vision of the troops had bivouacked on the high 
levee that kept the waters from flooding the land 
near by ; and about half-past seven in the evening 
their attention was drawn to a large schooner 
which had dropped noiselessly down, in the gather- 
ing dusk, and had come to anchor a short distance 
off shore, the force of the stream swinging her 
broadside to the camp.' The soldiers crowded 
down to the water's edge, and, as the schooner 
returned no answer to their hails, a couple of mus- 
ket-shots were fired at her. As if in answer to 
this challenge, the men on shore heard plainly the 

I I have taken my account of the night action chiefly from 
the work of an EngUsh soldier who took part in it: Ensign 
(afterward Chaplain-General) H. R. Gleig's Narrative of the 
Campaigns of the British Army at Washington, Baltimore, and 
New Orleans. (New edition, Philadelphia, 182 1, pp. 286- 
300.) 



Naval War of 1812 225 

harsh voice of her commander, as he sang out: 
" Now then, give it to them for the honor of Amer- 
ica"; and at once a storm of grape hurtled into 
their ranks. Wild confusion followed. The only 
field-pieces with Keane were two light 3 -pounders, 
not able to cope with the Carolina s artillery ; the 
rocket-guns were brought up, but were speedily 
silenced; musketry proved quite as ineffectual; 
and in a very few minutes the troops were driven 
helter-skelter off the levee, and were forced to 
shelter themselves behind it, not without having 
suffered severe loss.' The night was now as black 
as pitch; the embers of the deserted camp-fires, 
beaten about and scattered by the schooner's 
shot, burned with a dull red glow ; and at short in- 
tervals the darkness was momentarily lit up by 
the flashes of the Carolina s guns. Crouched be- 
hind the levee, the British soldiers lay motionless, 
listening in painful silence to the pattering of the 
grape among the huts, and to the moans and 
shrieks of the wounded who lay beside them. 
Things continued thus till toward nine o'clock, 
when a straggling fire from the pickets gave warn- 
ing of the approach of a more formidable foe. The 
American land-forces had reached the outer lines 
of the British camp, and the increasing din of the 

I General Keane, in his letter, writes that the British suf- 
fered but a single casualty; Gleig, who was present, says 
(p. 288) : "The deadly shower of grape swept down numberB 

in the camp." 
VOL. 11. — 15 



2 26 Naval War of 1812 

musketry, with ringing through it the whip-Hke 
crack of the Tennesseean rifles, called out the 
whole British army to the shock of a desperate 
and uncertain strife. The young moon had by 
this time struggled through the clouds, and cast 
on the battle-field a dim, unearthly light that but 
partly relieved the intense darkness. All order 
was speedily lost. Each officer, American or Brit- 
ish, as fast as he could gather a few soldiers round 
him, attacked the nearest group of foes; the 
smoke and gloom would soon end the struggle, 
when, if unhurt, he would rally what men he could 
and plunge once more into the fight. The battle 
soon assumed the character of a multitude of in- 
dividual combats, dying out almost as soon as they 
began, because of the difficulty of telling friend 
from foe, and beginning with ever-increasing fury 
as soon as they had ended. The clatter of the 
firearms, the clashing of steel, the rallying cries 
and loud commands of the officers, the defiant 
shouts of the men, joined to the yells and groans of 
those who fell, all combined to produce so terrible 
a noise and tumult that it maddened the coolest 
brains. From one side or the other bands of men 
would penetrate into the heart of the enemy's 
lines, and would there be captured, or would cut 
their way out with the prisoners they had taken. 
There was never a fairer field for the fiercest per- 
sonal prowess, for in the darkness the firearms were 



Naval War of 1 812 227 

of little service, and the fighting was hand to hand. 
Many a sword, till then but a glittering toy, was 
that night crusted with blood. The British sol- 
diers and the American regulars made fierce play 
with their bayonets, and the Tennesseeans, with 
their long hunting-knives. Man to man, in grim- 
mest hate, they fought and died, some by bullet 
and some by bayonet-thrust or stroke of sword. 
More than one in his death agony slew the foe at 
whose hand he himself had received the mortal 
wound; and their bodies stiffened as they lay, 
locked in the death grip. Again the clouds came 
over the moon; a thick fog crept up from the 
river, wrapping from sight the ghastly havoc of 
the battle-field; and long before midnight the 
fighting stopped perforce, for the fog and the 
smoke and the gloom were such that no one could 
see a yard away. By degrees each side drew off." 
In sullen silence, Jackson marched his men up the 
river, while the wearied British returned to their 
camp. The former had lost over two hundred,^ 

^ Keane writes: "The enemy thought it prudent to retire, 
and did not again dare to advance. It was now 12 o'clock, 
and the firing ceased on both sides"; and Jackson: "We 
should have succeeded ... in capturing the enemy, had 
not a thick fog, which arose about (?) o'clock, occasioned 
some confusion. ... I contented myself with lying on 
the field that night." Jackson certainly failed to capture the 
British; but equally certainly damaged them so as to arrest 
their march till he was in condition to meet and check them. 

' 24 killed, 115 wounded, 74 missing. 



2 28 Naval War of 1812 

the latter nearly three hundred ' men ; for the 
darkness and confusion that added to the horror 
lessened the slaughter of the battle. 

Jackson drew back about three miles, where he 
halted and threw up a long line of breastworks, 
reaching from the river to the morass; he left a 
body of mounted riflemen to watch the British. 
All the English troops reached the field on the day 
after the fight; but the rough handling that the 
foremost had received made them cautious about 
advancing. Moreover, the left division was kept 
behind the levee all day by the Carolina, which 
opened upon them whenever they tried to get 
away ; nor was it till dark that they made their es- 
cape out of range of her cannon. Christmas day 
opened drearily enough for the invaders. Al- 
though they were well inland, the schooner, by 
greatly elevating her guns, could sometimes reach 
them, and she annoyed them all through the day ^ ; 
and as the Americans had cut the levee in their 
front, it at one time seemed likely that they would 
be drowned out. However, matters now took a 
turn for the better. The river was so low that the 

^46 killed, 167 wounded, 64 missing. I take the ofificial 
return for each side as authority for the respective force and 
loss. 

^ "While sitting at table, a loud shriek was heard . . A 
shot had taken effect on the body of an unfortunate sol- 
dier . . . who was fairly cut in two at the lower portion 
of the belly!" (Gleig, p. 306.) 



Naval War of 1 812 ^29 

cutting of the levee instead of flooding the plain ' 
merely filled the shrunken bayous, and rendered it 
easy for the British to bring up their heavy guns ; 
and on the same day their trusted leader, Sir Ed- 
ward Packenham, arrived to take command in 
person, and his presence gave new life to the 
whole army. A battery was thrown up during 
the two succeeding nights on the brink of the 
river opposite to where the Carolina lay ; and at 
dawn a heavy cannonade of red-hot shot and shell 
was opened upon her from eleven guns and a 
mortar.' She responded briskly, but very soon 
caught fire and blew up, to the vengeful joy of the 
troops whose bane she had been for the past few 
days. Her destruction removed the last obstacle 
to the immediate advance of the army ; but that 
night her place was partly taken by the mounted 
riflemen, who rode down to the British Hnes, shot 
the sentries, engaged the outposts, and kept the 
whole camp in a constant state of alarm. ^ 

In the morning Sir Edward Packenham put his 
army in motion, and marched on New Orleans. 
When he had gone nearly three miles he suddenly, 
and to his great surprise, stumbled on the Amer- 
ican army. Jackson's men had worked like beav- 

' Latour, 113. 

' Gleig, 307. The Americans thought the battery con- 
sisted of five 18- and 12-pounders; Gleig says nine field-pieces 
(9- and 6-pounders) , two howitzers, and a mortar. 

3 Gleig, 310. 



230 Naval War of 181 2 

ers, and his breastworks were already defended by 
over three thousand fighting men/ and by half a 
dozen guns, and moreover were flanked by the 
corvette Louisiana, anchored in the stream. No 
sooner had the heads of the British columns ap- 
peared than they were driven back by the fire of 
the American batteries ; the field-pieces, mortars, 
and rocket-guns were then brought up, and a sharp 
artillery duel took place. The motley crew of the 
Louisiana handled their long ship guns with par- 
ticular effect; the British rockets proved of but 
little service " ; and, after a stiff fight, in which 
they had two field-pieces and a Hght mortar 
dismounted,^ the British artillerymen fell back 
on the infantry. Then Packenhami drew off his 
whole army out of cannon shot, and pitched his 
camp facing the intrenched lines of the Americans. 
For the next three days the British battalions lay 
quietly in front of their foe, like wolves who have 
brought to bay a gray boar, and crouch just out 
of reach of his tusks, waiting a chance to close in. 

' 3282 men in all, according to the Adjutant-General's re- 
turn for December 28, 1814. ^ Latour, 121. 

3 Gleig, 314. The official returns show a loss of 18 Amer- 
icans and 58 British, the latter suffering much less than Jack- 
son supposed. Lossing, in his Field-Book of the War of 1812, 
not only greatly overestimates the British loss, but speaks as 
if this was a serious attack, which it was not. Packenham's 
army, while marching, unexpectedly came upon the American 
intrenchment, and recoiled at once, after seeing that his field- 
pieces were unable to contend with the American artillery. 



Naval War of 1 812 231 

Packenham, having once tried the strength of 
Jackson's position, made up his mind to breach 
his works and silence his guns with a regular 
battering train. Heavy cannon were brought up 
from the ships, and a battery was established on 
the bank to keep in check the Louisiana. Then, 
on the night of the last day of the year, strong 
parties of workmen were sent forward, who, 
shielded by the darkness, speedily threw up stout 
earthworks, and mounted therein fourteen heavy 
guns,' to face the thirteen ' mounted in Jackson's 
lines, which were but three hundred yards distant. 

New Year's day dawned very misty. As soon 
as the haze cleared off, the British artillerymen 
opened with a perfect hail of balls, accompanied 
by a cloud of rockets and mortar-shells. The 
Americans were taken by surprise, but promptly 
returned the fire, with equal fury and greater skill. 

' Ten long i8's and four 24-pound carronades (James, ii., 
368) . Gleig says (p. 318) , " 6 batteries mounting 30 pieces of 
heavy cannon." This must include the "brigade of field- 
pieces" of which James speaks. Nine of these, 9- and 6- 
pounders, and two howitzers, had been used in the attack on 
the Carolina; and there were also two field-mortars and two 
3-pounders present; and there must have been one other 
field-piece with the army, to make up the thirty of which 
Gleig speaks. 

2 Viz.: one long 32, three long 24's, i long iS, three long 
12's, three long 6's, a 6-inch howitzer, and a small carronade 
(Latour, p. 147) ; and on the same day Patterson had in his 
water-battery one long 24 and two long 12's (see his letter of 
January 2d), making a total of 16 American guns. 



2.^2 Naval War of 1812 



Their guns were admirably handled ; some by the 
cool New England seamen lately forming the crew 
of the Carolina, others by the fierce creole pri- 
vateersmen of Lafitte, and still others by the 
trained artillerymen of the regular army. They 
were all old hands, who in their time had done their 
fair share of fighting, and were not to be flurried 
by any attack, however unexpected. The British 
cannoneers plied their guns like fiends, and fast 
and thick fell their shot ; more slowly, but with 
surer aim, their opponents answered them.' The 
cotton bales used in the American embrasures 
caught fire, and blew up two powder caissons; 
while the sugar-hogsheads of which the British 
batteries were partly composed were speedily 
shattered and splintered in all directions. Though 
the British champions fought with unflagging 

I The British historian, Alison, says {History of Europe, by 
Sir Archibald AUson, 9th edition, Edinburgh and London, 
1852, vol. xii., p. 141) : " It was soon found that the enemy's 
guns were so superior in weight and number, that nothing was 
to be expected from that species of attack. ' ' As shown above ; 
at this time Jackson had on both sides of the river 16 guns, 
the British, according to both James and Gleig, between 20 
and 30. Jackson's long guns were one 32, four 24's, one 18, 
five 12's, and three 6's, throwing in all 224 pounds; Packen- 
ham had ten long i8's, two long 3's, and from six to ten long 
9's and 6's, thus throwing between 228 and 258 pounds of 
shot; while Jackson had but one howitzer and one carronade 
to oppose four carronades, two howitzers, two mortars, and a 
dozen rocket-guns; so, in both number and weight of guns, 
the British were greatly superior. 



Naval War of 1 812 233 

courage and untiring energy, and though they had 
long been versed in war, yet they seemed to lack 
the judgment to see and correct their faults, and 
most of their shot went too high.' On the other 
hand, the old sea-dogs and trained regulars who 
held the field against them, not only fought their 
guns well and skilfully from the beginning, but all 
through the action kept coolly correcting their 
faults and making more sure their aim. Still, the 
fight was stiff and well contested. Two of the 
American guns were disabled and 34 of their men 
were killed or wounded. But one by one the 
British cannon were silenced or dismounted, and 
by noon their gunners had all been driven away, 
with the loss of 78 of their number. 

The Louisiana herself took no part in this ac- 
tion. Patterson had previously landed some of 
her guns on the opposite bank of the river, placing 
them in a small redoubt. To match these the 
British also threw up some works and placed in 

I In strong contrast to Alison, Admiral Codrington, an eye- 
witness, states the true reason of the British failure {Memoir 
of Admiral Sir Edward Codrington, by Lady Bourchier, Lon- 
don, 1873, vol. i., p. 334"): "On the ist we had our batteries 
ready, by severe labor, in a situation from which the artillery 
people were, as a matter of course, to destroy and silence the 
opposing batteries, and give opportunity for a well-arranged 
storm. But instead, not a gun of the enemy appeared to 
suffer, and our own firing too high was not discovered till " too 
late. " Such a failure in this boasted arm was not to be ex- 
pected, and I think it a blot on the artillery escutcheon." 



234 Naval War of 1812 

them heavy guns, and all through New Year's day 
a brisk cannonade was kept up across the river 
between the two water-batteries, but with very- 
little damage to either side. 

For a week after this failure the army of the in- 
vaders lay motionless, facing the Americans. In 
the morning and evening the defiant, rolling 
challenge of the English drums came throbbing 
up through the gloomy cypress swamps, to where 
the grim riflemen of Tennessee were lying behind 
their log breastworks, and both day and night the 
stillness was at short intervals broken by the sullen 
boom of the great guns which, under Jackson's 
orders, kept up a never-ending fire on the leaguer- 
ing camp of his foes.' Nor could the wearied 
British even sleep undisturbed; all through the 
hours of darkness the outposts were engaged in a 
most harassing bush warfare by the backwoods- 
men, who shot the sentries, drove in the pickets, 
and allowed none of those who were on guard a 
moment's safety or freedom from alarm. ^ 

But Packenham was all the while steadily pre- 
paring for his last and greatest stroke. He had 
determined to make an assault in force as soon as 
the expected reinforcements came up ; nor, in the 
light of his past experience in conflict with foes of 
far greater military repute than those now before 

' Gleig, 322. ' Gleig, 323. 



Naval War of 1812 



-00 



him, was this a rash resolve. He had seen the 
greatest of Napoleon's marshals, each in turn, de- 
feated once and again, and driven in headlong 
flight over the Pyrenees by the Duke of WelHng- 
ton; now he had under him the flower of the 
troops who had won those victories ; was it to be 
supposed for a moment that such soldiers ' who, 
in a dozen battles, had conquered the armies and 
captured the forts of the mighty French emperor, 
would shrink at last from a mud wall guarded by 
rough backwoodsmen? That there would be loss 
of life in such an assault was certain ; but was loss 
of life to daunt men who had seen the horrible 
slaughter through which the stormers moved on 
to victory at Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajos, and San 
Sebastian? At the battle of Toulouse an English 
army, of which Packenham's troops then formed 
part, had driven Soult from a stronger position 
than was now to be assailed, though he held it with 
a veteran infantry. Of a surety, the dashing gen- 
eral who had delivered the decisive blow on the 

' Speaking of Soult 's overthrow a few months previous to 
this battle, Napier says (v., 209) : " He was opposed to one of 
the greatest generals of the world, at the head of unconquer- 
able troops. For what Alexander's Macedonians were at 
Arbela, Hannibal's Africans at Cannae, Caesar's Romans at 
Pharsalia, Napoleon's Guards at Austerlitz — such were Wel- 
lington's British soldiers at this period. . . . Six years of 
uninterrupted success had engrafted on their natural strength 
and fierceness a confidence that made them invincible." 



236 Naval War of 181 2 

stricken field of Salamanca/ who had taken part 
in the rout of the ablest generals and steadiest 
soldiers of Continental Europe, was not the man 
to flinch from a motley array of volunteers, militia, 
and raw regulars, led by a grizzled old bush- 
fighter, whose name had never been heard of out- 
side of his own swamps, and there only as the 
savage destroyer of some scarcely more savage 
Indian tribes. 

Moreover, Packenham was planning a flank at- 
tack. Under his orders a canal was being dug 
from the head of the bayou up which the British 
had come, across the plain to the Mississippi. This 
was to permit the passage of a number of ships' 
boats, on which one division was to be ferried to 

* " It was about 5 o'clock when Packenham fell upon Thom- 
ieres. . . From the chief to the lowest soldier, all [of 

the French] felt that they were lost, and in an instant Packen- 
ham, the most frank and gallant of men, commenced the bat- 
tle. The British columns formed lines as they marched, and 
the French gunners, standing up manfully for the honor of 
their country, sent showers of grape into the advancing masses 
while a crowd of light troops poured in a fire of musketry, 
under cover of which the main body endeavored to display a 
front. But, bearing onwards through the skirmishes with 
the might of a giant, Packenham broke the half-formed lines 
into fragments, and sent the whole in confusion upon the ad- 
vancing supports. . . . Packenham, bearing onwards 
with conquering violence, . . . formed one formidable line 
two miles in advance of where Packenham had first attacked ; 
and that impetuous officer, with unmitigated strength, still 
pressed forward, spreading terror and disorder on the enemy's 
left." (Napier, iv., 57, 58, 59.) 



Naval War of 1 812 237 

the opposite bank of the river, where it was to 
move up, and, by capturing the breastworks and 
water-battery on the west side, flank Jackson's 
main position on the east side.' When this canal 
was nearly finished the expected reinforcements, 
two thousand strong, under General Lambert, 
arrived, and by the evening of the 7th all was ready 
for the attack, which was to be made at daybreak 
on the following morning. Packenham had under 
him nearly 10,000 ^ fighting men; 1500 of these, 

' "A particular feature in the assault was our cutting a 
canal into the Mississippi. ... to convey a force to the 
right bank, which . . . might surprise the enemy's 
batteries on that side. I do not know how far this measure 
was relied on by the general, but, as he ordered and made his 
assault at daylight, I imagine he did not place much depend- 
ence upon it." (Codrington, i., 335) 

* James (ii., 373) says the British "rank and file " amounted 
to 8153 men, including 1200 seamen and marines. The only 
other place where he speaks of the latter is in recounting the 
attack on the right bank, when he says "about 200" were 
with Thornton, while both the admirals, Cochrane and Cod- 
rington, make the number 300; so he probably underesti- 
mates their number throughout, and at least 300 can be 
added, making 1500 sailors and marines, and a total of 8453. 
This number is corroborated by Major McDougal, the ofiQcer 
who received Sir Edward's body in his arms when he was 
killed; he says (as quoted in the Memoirs of British Generals 
Distinguished During the Peninsular War, by John William 
Cole, London, 1856, vol. ii., p. 364) that after the battle and 
the loss of 2036 men, "we had still an effective force of 6400," 
making a total before the attack of 8436 rank and file. Call- 
ing it 8450, and adding 13.3 per cent, for the officers, ser- 
geants, and trumpeters, we get about 9600 men. 



238 Naval War of 181 2 ' 

under Colonel Thornton, were to cross the river 
and make the attack on the west bank. Packen- 
ham himself was to superintend the main assault, 
on the east bank, which was to be made by the 
British right under General Gibbs, while the left 
moved forward under General Keane, and General 
Lambert commanded the reserve.^ Jackson's ^ 

^ Letter of Major-General John Lambert to Earl Bathurst, 
January lo, 1815. 

2 4698 on the east bank, according to the ofificial report of 
Adjutant-General Robert Butler, for the morning of January 
8th. The details are as follows; 

At batteries i54 

Command of Colonel Ross (671 regulars and 

742 Louisiana militia) 1413 

Command of General Carroll (Tennesseeans, 

and somewhat under 500 Kentuckians) . . 1562 
General Coffee's command (Tennesseeans, 

and about 250 Louisiana militia) 813 

Major Hind's dragoons 230 

Colonel Slaughter's command 5^*^ 

Total 4698 

These figures tally almost exactly with those given by 
Major Latour, except that he omits all reference to Colonel 
Slaughter's command, thus reducing the number to about 
4100. Nor can I anywhere find any allusion to Slaughter's 
command as taking part in the battle; and it is possible that 
these troops were the 500 Kentuckians ordered across the 
river by Jackson; in which case his whole force but sUghtly 
exceeded 5000 men. 

On the west bank there were 546 Louisiana militia — 260 of 
the First Regiment, 176 of the Second, and no of the Sixth. 
Jackson had ordered 500 Kentucky troops to be sent to re- 
inforce them; only 400 started, of whom but 180 had arms. 
Seventy more received arms from the Naval Arsenal; and 
thus a total of 250 armed men were added to the 546 already 
on the west bank. 



Naval War of 1 812 239 

position was held by a total of 5500 men.' Hav- 
ing kept a constant watch on the British, Jackson 
had rightly concluded that they would make the 
main attack on the east bank, and had, accord- 
ingly, kept the bulk of his force on that side. His 
works consisted simply of a mud breastwork, with 
a ditch in front of it, which stretched in a straight 
line from the river on his right across the plain, 
and some distance into the morass that sheltered 
his left. There was a small, unfinished redoubt in 
front of the breastworks on the river bank. Thir- 
teen pieces of artillery were mounted on the works. ^ 
On the right was posted the Seventh regular in- 
fantry, 430 strong; then came 740 Louisiana 
militia (both French Creoles and men of color, and 
comprising 30 New Orleans riflemen, who were 
Americans), and 240 regulars of the Forty-fourth 

' Two thousand Kentucky militia had arrived, but in 
wretched plight ; only 500 had arms, though pieces were found 
for about 250 more; and thus Jackson's army received an 
addition of 750 xery badly disciplined soldiers. 

"Hardly one third of the Kentucky troops, so long ex- 
pected, are armed, and the anns they have are not fit for 
use." (Letter of General Jackson to the Secretary of War, 
January 3d.) 

^ Almost all British writers underestimate their own force 
and enormously magnify that of the Americans. AUson, for 
example, quadruples Jackson's relative strength, writing: 
"About 6000 combatants were on the British side; a slender 
force to attack double their number, intrenched to the teeth in 
works bristUng with bayonets and loaded with heavy artillery." 
Instead of double, he should have said half; the bayonets 



240 Naval War of 1812 

regiment ; while the rest of the hne was formed by 
nearly 500 Kentuckians and over 1600 Tennes- 
seeans, under Carroll and Coffee, with 250 Creole 
militia in the morass on the extreme left, to guard 
the head of a bayou. In the rear were 230 
dragoons, chiefly from Mississippi, and some other 
troops in reserve; making in all 4700 men on the 
east bank. The works on the west bank were 
farther down stream, and were very much weaker. 
Commodore Patterson had thrown up a water- 
battery of nine guns, three long 24's and six long 
12's, pointing across the river, and intended to 
take in flank any foe attacking Jackson. This 
battery was protected by some strong earthworks, 
mounting three field-pieces, which were thrown up 
just below it, and stretched from the river about 
two hundred yards into the plain. The line of 
defence was extended by a ditch for about a 

only "bristled" metaphorically, as less than a quarter of the 
Americans were armed with them; and the British breaching 
batteries had a heavier " load " of artillery than did the Amer- 
ican lines. Gleig says that, "to come nearer the truth," he 
"will choose a middle course, and suppose their whole force to 
be about 25,000 men" (p. 325). Gleig, by the way, in speak- 
ing of the battle itself, mentions one most startling evolution 
of the Americans, namely, that "without so much as lifting 
their faces above the ramparts, they swung their firelocks by 
one arm over the wall and discharged them" at the British. 
If any one will try to perform this feat, with a long, heavy 
rifle held in one hand, and with his head hid behind a wall, so 
as not to see the object aimed at, he will get a good idea of the 
likelihood of any man in his senses attempting it. 



Naval War of 1812 241 

quarter of a mile farther, when it ended, and from 
there to the morass, half a mile distant, there were 
no defensive works at all. General Morgan, a very 
poor militia officer,' was in command, with a force 
of 550 Louisiana militia, some of them poorly 
armed; and on the night before the engagement 
he was reinforced by 250 Kentuckians, poorly 
armed, undisciplined, and worn out with fatigue/ 
All through the night of the 7th a strange mur- 
murous clangor arose from the British camp, and 
was borne on the moist air to the lines of their 
slumbering foes. The blows of pickaxe and spade, 
as the ground was thrown up into batteries by 
gangs of workmen, the rumble of the artillery as it 
was placed in position, the measured tread of the 
battalions as they shifted their places or marched 
off under Thornton, — all these and the thousand 

^ He committed every possible fault, except showing lack 
of courage. He placed his works at a very broad instead of 
at a narrow part of the plain, against the advice of Latour, 
who had Jackson's approval (Latour, 167). He continued 
his earthworks but a very short distance inland, making them 
exceedingly strong in front, and absolutely defenceless on ac- 
count of their flanks being unprotected. He did not mount 
the lighter guns of the water-battery on his lines as he ought 
to have done. Having a force of 800 men, too weak anyhow, 
he promptly divided it; and, finally, in the fight itself, he 
stationed a small number of absolutely raw troops in a thin 
line on the open, with their flank in air; while a much larger 
number of older troops were kept to defend a much shorter 
line, behind a strong breastwork, with their flanks covered, 

* Latour, 170. 

vol., II.- JO 



242 Naval War of 1812 

other sounds of warlike preparation were softened 
and blended by the distance into one continuous 
humming murmur, which struck on the ears of 
the American sentries with ominous foreboding 
for the morrow. By midnight Jackson had risen 
and was getting everything in readiness to hurl 
back the blow that he rightly judged was soon to 
fall on his front. Before the dawn broke his sol- 
diery was all on the alert. The bronzed and 
brawny seamen were grouped in clusters around 
the great guns. The Creole soldiers came of a race 
whose habit it has ever been to take all phases of 
life joyously; but that morning their gayety was 
tempered by a dark undercurrent of fierce anxiety. 
They had more at stake than any other men on 
the field. They were fighting for their homes; 
they were fighting for their wives and their 
daughters. They well knew that the men they 
were to face were very brave in battle and very 
cruel in victory ' ; they well knew the fell destruc- 
tion and nameless woe that awaited their city 
should the English take it at the sword's point. 

^ To prove this, it is only needful to quote from the words 
of the Duke of Wellington himself; referring, it must be re- 
membered, to their conduct in a friendly, not a hostile, 
country. "It is impossible to describe to you the irregu- 
larities and outrages committed by the troops. They are 
never out of sight of their ofificers, I might almost say, out of 
sight of the commanding ofBcers of the regiments, that out- 
rages are not committed. . . . There is not an outrage 
of any description which has not been committed on a people 



Naval War of 1 812 243 

They feared not for themselves ; but in the hearts 
of the bravest and most careless there lurked a 
dull terror of what that day might bring upon 
those they loved.' The Tennesseeans were 
troubled by no such misgivings. In saturnine, 

who have uniformly received them as friends." "I really 
believe that more plunder and outrages have been committed 
by this army than by any other that ever was in the field." 
" A detachment seldom marches . . . that a murder, or 
a highway robbery, or some act of outrage is not committed 
by the British soldiers composing it. They have killed eight 
people since the army returned to Portugal." "They really 
forget everything when plunder or wine is within reach." 

' That these fears were just can be seen by the following 
quotations, from the works of a British officer, General Na- 
pier, who was an eye-witness of what he describes. It must 
be remembered that Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajos, and San Se- 
bastian were friendly towns, only the garrisons being hostile. 
" Now commenced that wild and desperate wickedness which 
tarnished the lustre of the soldiers' heroism. All, indeed, 
were not alike, for hundreds risked and many lost their lives 
in striving to stop the violence; but the madness generally 
prevailed, and as the worst men were leaders here, all the 
dreadful passions of human nature were displayed. Shame- 
less rapacity, brutal intemperance, savage lust, cruelty and 
murder, shrieks and piteous lamentations, groans, shouts, 
imprecations, the hissing of fires bursting from the houses, 
the crashing of doors and windows, the reports of muskets 
used in violence, resounded for two days and nights in the 
streets of Badajos. On the third, when the city was sacked, 
when the soldiers were exhausted by their own excesses, the 
tumult rather subsided than was quelled." (Vol. iii., 377.) 
And again: "This storm seemed to be a signal from hell for 
the perpetration of villainy which would have shamed the 
most ferocious barbarians of antiquity. At Rodrigo intoxica- 
tion and plunder had been the principal object; at Badaios 



244 Naval War of 1812 

confident silence they lolled behind their mud 
walls, or, leaning on their long rifles, peered out 
into the gray fog with savage, reckless eyes. So, 
hour after hour, the two armies stood facing each 
other in the darkness, waiting for the light of day. 

lust and murder were joined to rapine and drunkenness; but 
at San Sebastian the direst, the most revolting cruelty was 
added to the catalogue of crimes — ^one atrocity, of which a 
girl of seventeen was the victim, staggers the mind by its 
enormous, incredible, indescribable barbarity ... a Por- 
tuguese adjutant, who endeavored to prevent some wicked- 
ness, was put to death in the market-place, not with sudden 
violence from a single ruffian, but deliberately, by a number 
of English soldiers . . . and the disorder continued 
until the flames, following the steps of the plunderer, put an 
end to his ferocity by destroying the whole town." Packen- 
ham himself would have certainly done all in his power to 
prevent excesses, and has been foully slandered by many 
early American writers. Alluding to these, Napier remarks, 
somewhat caustically: "Pre-eminently distinguished for de- 
testation of inhumanity and outrage, he has been, with as- 
tounding falsehood, represented as instigating his troops to 
the most infamous excesses; but from a people holding inil- 
lions of their fellow-beings in the most horrible slavery, while 
they prate and vaunt of liberty until all men turn in loathing 
from the sickening folly, what can be expected? (Vol. v., p. 
31.) Napier possessed to a very eminent degree the virtue of 
being plain-spoken. Elsewhere (iii., p. 450), after giving a 
most admirably fair and just account of the origin of the 
Anglo-American War, he alludes, with a good deal of justice, 
to the Ainericans of 181 2, as "a people who (notwithstanding 
the curse of black slavery which clings to them, adding the 
most horrible ferocity to the peculiar baseness of their mer- 
cantile spirit, and rendering their republican vanity ridiculous) 
do, in their general government, uphold civil institutions 
which have startled the crazy despotisms of Europe." 



Naval War of 1 812 245 

At last the sun rose, and as its beams struggled 
through the morning mist they glinted on the 
sharp steel bayonets of the English, where their 
scarlet ranks were drawn up in battle array, but 
four hundred yards from the American breast- 
works. There stood the matchless infantry of the 
island king, in the pride of their strength and the 
splendor of their martial glory ; and, as the haze 
cleared away, they moved forward, in stern silence, 
broken only by the angry, snarling notes of the 
brazen bugles. At once the American artillery 
leaped into furious life ; and, ready and quick, the 
more numerous cannon of the invaders responded 
from their hot, feverish lips. Unshaken amid the 
tumult of that iron storm, the heavy red column 
moved steadily on toward the left of the American 
line, where the Tennesseeans were standing in mo- 
tionless, grim expectancy. Three fourths of the 
open space was crossed, and the eager soldiers 
broke into a run. Then a fire of hell smote the 
British column. From the breastwork in front of 
them the white smoke curled thick into the air, as 
rank after rank the wild marksmen of the back- 
woods rose and fired, aiming low and sure. As 
stubble is withered by flame, so withered the Brit- 
ish column under that deadly fire ; and, aghast at 
the slaughter, the reeling files staggered and gave 
back. Packenham, fit captain for his valorous 
host, rode to the front, and the troops, rallying 



246 Naval War of 181 2 

round him, sprang forward with ringing cheers. 
But once again the peahng rifle-blast beat in their 
faces ; and the Hf e of their dauntless leader went 
out before its scorching and fiery breath. With 
him fell the other general who was with the column 
and all of the men who were leading it on ; and, as 
a last resource, Keane brought up his stalwart 
Highlanders; but in vain the stubborn moun- 
taineers rushed on, only to die as their comrades 
had died before them, with unconquerable cour- 
age, facing the foe to the last. Keane himself was 
struck down; and the shattered wrecks of the 
British column, quailing before certain destruction, 
turned and sought refuge beyond reach of the 
leaden death that had overwhelmed their com- 
rades. Nor did it fare better with the weaker 
force that was to assail the right of the American 
line. This was led by the dashing Colonel Rennie 
who, when the confusion caused by the main at- 
tack was at its height, rushed forward with im- 
petuous bravery along the river bank. With such 
headlong fury did he make the assault, that the 
rush of his troops took the outlying redoubt, 
whose defenders, regulars and artillerymen, fought 
to the last with their bayonets and clubbed mus- 
kets, and were butchered to a man. Without 
delay, Rennie flung his men at the breastworks be- 
hind, and, gallantly leading them, sword in hand, 
he and all around him fell, riddled through and 



Naval War of 1 812 247 

through by the balls of the riflemen. Brave 
though they were, the British soldiers could not 
stand against the singing, leaden hail, for if they 
stood it was but to die. So in rout and wild dis- 
may they fled back along the river bank to the 
main army. For some time afterward the British 
artillery kept up its fire, but was gradually silenced, 
and the repulse was entire and complete along the 
whole line ; nor did the cheering news of success 
brought from the west bank give any hope to the 
British commanders, stunned by their crushing 
overthrow.* 

Meanwhile, Colonel Thornton's attack on the op- 
posite side had been successful, but had been de- 

^ According to their official returns, the British loss was 
2036 ; the American accovints, of course, make it much greater. 
Latour is the only trustworthy American contemporary his- 
torian of this war, and even he at times absurdly exaggerates 
the British force and loss. Most of the other American "his- 
tories" of that period were the most preposterously bom- 
bastic works that ever saw print. But as regards this battle, 
none of them are as bad as even such British historians as 
Alison; the exact reverse being the case in many other bat- 
tles, notably Lake Erie. The devices each author adopts to 
lessen the seeming force of his side are generally of much the 
same character. For instance, Latour says that Soo of Jack- 
son's men were employed on works at the rear, on guard 
duty, etc., and deducts them; James, for precisely similar 
reasons, deducts 853 men: by such means, one reduces Jack- 
son's total force to 4000, and the other gives Packenham but 
7300. Only 2000 Americans were actually engaged on the 
east banks. 



248 Naval War of 181 2 

layed beyond the originally intended hour. The 
sides of the canal by which the boats were to be 
brought through to the Mississippi caved in and 
choked the passage, ' so that only enough got 
through to take over a half of Thornton's force. 
With these, seven hundred in number,^ he crossed, 
but as he did not allow for the current, it carried 
him down about two miles below the proper landing 
place. Meanwhile, General Morgan, having under 
him eight hundred militia,^ whom it was of the ut- 
most importance to have kept together, promptly 
divided them and sent three hundred of the rawest 
and most poorly armed down to meet the enemy in 
the open. The inevitable result was their imme- 
diate rout and dispersion ; about one hundred got 
back to Morgan's lines. He then had six hundred 
men, all militia, to oppose to seven hundred regu- 
lars. So he stationed the four hundred best, dis- 
ciplined men to defend the two hundred yards of 
strong breastworks, mounting three guns, which 
covered his left, while the two hundred worst dis- 
ciplined were placed to guard six hundred yards 
of open ground on his right, with their flank resting 

'Codrington, i., 386. 

^ James says 298 soldiers and about 200 sailors; but Ad- 
miral Cochrane in his letter (January iSth) says 600 men, 
half sailors; and Admiral Codrington also (p. 335) gives this 
number, 300 being sailors. Adding 13I per cent, for the 
officers, sergeants, and trumpeters, we get 680 men. 

3 796. (Latour, 164-172.) 



Naval War of 1 812 249 

in air, and entirely unprotected/ This truly phe- 
nomenal arrangement ensured beforehand the cer- 
tain defeat of his troops, no matter how well they 
fought ; but, as it turned out, they hardly fought 
at all. Thornton, pushing up the river, first at- 
tacked the breastwork in front, but was checked 
by a hot fire; deploying his men, he then sent a 
strong force to march round and take Morgan on 
his exposed right flank.'' There, the already de- 
moralized Kentucky militia, extended in thin order 
across an open space, outnumbered, and taken in 
flank by regular troops, were stampeded at once, 
and after firing a single volley they took to their 
heels. ^ This exposed the flank of the better dis- 
ciplined Creoles, who were also put to flight, but 
they kept some order and were soon rallied.'* In 
bitter rage Patterson spiked the guns of his water- 
battery and marched off with his sailors, un- 

' Report of Court of Inquiry, Major-General William Carroll 
presiding. 

2 Letter of Col. W. Thornton, January 8, 1815. 

3 Letter of Commodore Patterson, January 13, 181 5. 

4 Alison outdoes himself in recounting this feat. Having 
reduced the British force to 340 men, he says they captured 
the redoubt, "though defended by 22 guns and 1700 men." 
Of course, it was physically impossible for the water-battery 
to take part in the defence; so there were but three guns, and 
by halving the force on one side and trebling it on the other, 
he makes the relative strength of the Americans just sixfold 
what it was, — and is faithfully followed by other British 
writers 



250 Naval War of 181 2 

molested. The American loss had been slight, 
and that of their opponents not heavy, though 
among their dangerously wounded was Colonel 
Thornton. 

This success, though a brilliant one, and a dis- 
grace to the American arms, had no effect on the 
battle. Jackson at once sent over reinforcements 
under the famous French general, Humbert, and 
preparations were forthwith made to retake the 
lost position. But it was already abandoned, and 
the force that had captured it had been recalled 
by Lambert, when he found that the place 
could not be held without additional troops.^ 
The total British loss on both sides of the river 
amounted to over two thousand men, the vast 
majority of whom had fallen in the attack on the 
Tennesseeans, and most of the remainder in the 
attack made by Colonel Rennie. The Amer- 
icans had lost but seventy men, of whom but 
thirteen fell in the main attack. On the east 
bank, neither the creole militia nor the Forty- 
fourth regiment had taken any part in the 
combat. 

The English had thrown for high stakes and 
had lost everything, and they knew it. There 

I The British Colonel Dickson, who had been sent over to 
inspect, reported that 2000 men would be needed to hold the 
battery; so Lambert ordered the British to retire. (Lam- 
bert's letter, January loth.) 



Naval War of 1 812 251 

was nothing to hope for left. Nearly a fourth 
of their fighting men had fallen ; and among the 
officers the proportion was far larger. Of their 
four generals, Packenham was dead, Gibbs dying, 
Keane disabled, and only Lambert left. Their 
leader, their ablest officers, and all the flower 
of their bravest men were lying, stark and dead, 
on the bloody plain before them; and their 
bodies were doomed to crumble into mouldering 
dust on the green fields where they had fought 
and had fallen. It was useless to make another 
trial. They had learned, to their bitter cost, 
that no troops, however steady, could advance 
over open ground against such a fire as came 
from Jackson's lines. Their artillerymen had 
three times tried conclusions with the Ameri- 
can gunners, and each time they had been 
forced to acknowledge themselves worsted. They 
would never have another chance to repeat 
their flank attack, for Jackson had greatly 
strengthened and enlarged the works on the 
west bank, and had seen that they were fully 
manned and ably commanded. Moreover, no 
sooner had the assault failed than the Americans 
again began their old harassing warfare. The 
heaviest cannon, both from the breastwork and 
the water-battery, played on the British camp, 
both night and day, giving the army no rest, and 
the mounted riflemen kept up a trifling but in- 



252 Naval War of 1812 

cessant and annoying skirmishing with their 
pickets and outposts. 

The British could not advance, and it was worse 
than useless for them to stay where they were, 
for though they, from time to time, were rein- 
forced, yet Jackson's forces augmented faster 
than theirs, and every day lessened the numerical 
inequality between the two armies. There was 
but one thing left to do, and that was to retreat. 
They had no fear of being attacked in turn. 
The British soldiers were made of too good stuff 
to be in the least cowed or cast down even by 
such a slaughtering defeat as that they had just 
suffered, and nothing would have given them 
keener pleasure than to have had a fair chance at 
their adversaries in the open ; but this chance was 
just what Jackson had no idea of giving them. 
His own army, though in part as good as an army 
could be, consisted also in part of untrained 
militia, while not a quarter of his men had 
bayonets ; and the wary old chief, for all his har- 
dihood, had far too much wit to hazard such a 
force in fight with a superior number of seasoned 
veterans, thoroughly equipped, unless on his own 
ground and in his own manner. So he contented 
himself with keeping a sharp watch on Lambert ; 
and, on the night of January i8th, the latter 
deserted his position, and made a very skilful 
and rapid retreat, leaving eighty wounded men 



Naval War of 1 812 253 

and fourteen pieces of cannon behind him.' A 
few stragglers were captured on land, and, while 
the troops were embarking, a number of barges, 
with over a hundred prisoners, were cut out by 
some American seamen in row-boats; but the 
bulk of the army reached the transports unmo- 
lested. At the same time, a squadron of vessels, 
which had been unsuccessfully bombarding Fort 
Saint Philip for a week or two, and had been 
finally driven off when the fort got a mortar 
large enough to reach them with, also returned; 
and the whole fleet set sail for Mobile. The 
object was to capture Fort Boyer, which con- 
tained less than four hundred men, and, though 
formidable on its sea-front,^ was incapable of de- 

' Letter of General Jackson, January 19th, and of General 
Lambert, January 28th. 

^ "Towards the sea its fortifications are respectable 
enough; but on the land side it is little better than a block- 
house. The ramparts being composed of sand not inore than 
three feet in thickness, and faced with plank, are barely 
cannon-proof; while a sand hill, rising within pistol-shot of 
the ditch, completely commands it. Within, again, it is as 
much wanting in accommodation as it is in strength. There 
are no bomb-proof barracks, nor any hole or arch under 
which men might find protection from shells; indeed, so de- 
ficient is it in common lodging-rooms, that great part of the 
garrison sleep in tents. . . . With the reduction of this 
trifling work all hostilities ended." (Gleig, 357.) 

General Jackson impliedly censures the garrison for sur- 
rendering so quickly; but in such a fort it was absolutely im- 
possible to act otherwise, and not the slightest stain rests 
upon the fort's defenders. 



254 Naval War of 1812 

fence when regularly attacked on its land side. 
The British landed, February 8th, some 1500 
men, broke ground, and made approaches; for 
four days the work went on amid a continual 
fire, which killed or wounded 1 1 Americans and 
3 1 British ; by that time the battering-guns were 
in position and the fort capitulated, February 
12th, the garrison marching out with the honors 
of war. Immediately afterward, the news of 
peace arrived, and all hostilities terminated. 

In spite of the last trifling success, the cam- 
paign had been to the British both bloody and 
disastrous. It did not affect the results of the 
war, and the decisive battle itself was a per- 
fectly useless shedding of blood, for peace had 
been declared before it was fought. Nevertheless, 
it was not only glorious but profitable to the 
United States. Louisiana was saved from being 
severely ravaged, and New Orleans from possible 
destruction; and after our humiliating defeats 
in trying to repel the invasion of Virginia and 
Maryland, the signal victory of New Orleans was 
really almost a necessity for the preservation of 
the national honor. This campaign was the great 
event of the war, and in it was fought the most 
important battle as regards numbers that took 
place during the entire struggle ; and the fact that 
we were victorious not only saved our self-respect 
at home, but also gave us a prestige abroad which 



Naval War of 1 812 255 

we should otherwise have totally lacked. It could 
not be said to entirely balance the numerous de- 
feats that we had elsewhere suffered on land, — 
defeats which had so far only been offset by 
Harrison's victory in 18 13 and the campaign in 
Lower Canada in 181 4,— but it at any rate went 
a long way toward making the score even. 

Jackson is certainly by all odds the most 
prominent figure that appeared during this war, 
and stands head and shoulders above any other 
commander, American or British, that it pro- 
duced. 

It win be difficult, in all history, to show a 
parallel to the feat that he performed. In three 
weeks' fighting, with a force largely composed 
of mihtia, he utterly defeated and drove away 
an army twice the size of his own, composed of 
veteran troops, and led by one of the ablest of 
European generals. During the whole campaign 
he only erred once, and that was in putting 
General Morgan, a very incompetent officer, in 
command of the forces on the west bank. He 
suited his movements admirably to the various 
exigencies that arose. The promptness and skill 
with which he attacked, as soon as he knew 
of the near approach of the British, undoubt- 
edly saved the city; for their vanguard was so 
roughly handled that, instead of being able to 
advance at once, they were forced to delay three 



256 Naval War of 181 2 

days, during which time Jackson intrenched him- 
self in a position from which he was never driven. 
But after this first attack, the offensive would 
have been not only hazardous, but useless, and 
accordingly Jackson, adopting that mode of war- 
fare which best suited the ground he was on and 
the troops he had under him, forced the enemy 
always to fight him where he was strongest, and 
confined himself strictly to the pure defensive — 
a system condemned by most European authori- 
ties,' but which has at times succeeded to ad- 
miration in America, as witness Fredericksburg, 
Gettysburg, Kenesaw Mountain, and Franklin. 
Moreover, it must be remembered that Jackson's 
success was in nowise owing either to chance or 
to the errors of his adversary.'' As far as for- 
tune favored either side, it was that of the 

' Thus Napier says (vol. v., p. 25): "Soult fared as most 
generals will who seek by extensive lines to supply the want 
of numbers or of hardiness in the troops. Against rude com- 
manders and undisciplined soldiers, lines may avail; seldom 
against accomplished commanders, never when the assailants 
are the better soldiers." And again (p. 150): "Offensive 
operations must be the basis of a good defensive system." 

^ The reverse has been stated again and again, with very 
great injustice, not only by British, but even by American 
writers (as, e. g., Prof. W. G. Sumner, in his A>idrew Jackson 
as a Public Man, Boston, 1882). The climax of absurdity is 
reached by Major McDougal, who says (as quoted by Cole in 
his Memoirs of British Generals, ii., p. 364): "Sir Edward 
Packenham fell, not after an utter and disastrous defeat, but 
at the very moment when the arms of victory were extended 



Naval War of 1812 257 

British ' ; and Packenham left nothing undone to 
accomplish his aim, and made no movements that 
his experience in European war did not justify 
his making. There is not the slightest reason for 
supposing that any other British general would 
have accomplished more or have fared better than 
he did."" Of course, Jackson owed much to the 
nature of the ground on which he fought ; but the 
opportunities it afforded would have been useless 

towards him"; and by James, who says (ii., 388) : "The pre- 
mature fall of a British general saved an American city." 
These assertions are just on a par with those made by Amer- 
ican writers, that only the fall of Lawrence prevented the 
Chesapeake from capturing the Shannon. 

British writers have always attributed the defeat largely 
to the fact that the 44th regiment, which was to have led the 
attack with fascines and ladders, did not act well. I doubt if 
this had any effect on the result. Some few of the men with 
ladders did reach the ditch, but were shot down at once, and 
their fate would have been shared by any others who had 
been with them; the bulk of the column was never able to 
advance through the fire up to the breastwork, and all the 
ladders and fascines in Christendom would not have helped 
it. There will always be innumerable excuses offered for any 
defeat; but on this occasion the truth is simply that the Brit- 
ish regulars found they could not advance in the open against 
a fire more deadly than they had ever before encountered. 

' E. g.: The unexpected frost made the swamps firm for 
them to advance through; the river being so low when the 
levee was cut, the bayous were filled, instead, of the British 
being drowned out ; the Carolina was only blown up because 
the wind happened to fail her; bad weather delayed the ad- 
vance of arms and reinforcements, etc. 

^^ " He was the next man to look to after Lord Wellington ". 
(Codrington, i., 339). 

VOL. II. — 17 



258 Naval War of 181 2 

in the hands of any general less ready, hardy, and 
skilful than Old Hickory. 

A word as to the troops themselves. The Brit- 
ish infantry was at that time the best in Europe, 
the French coming next. Packenham's soldiers 
had formed part of Wellington's magnificent 
Peninsular army, and they lost nothing of their 
honor at New Orleans. Their conduct through- 
out was admirable. Their steadiness in the night 
battle, their patience through the various hard- 
ships they had to undergo, their stubborn courage 
in action, and the undaunted front they showed 
in time of disaster (for at the very end they were 
to the full as ready and eager to fight as at 
the beginning), all showed that their soldierly 
qualities were of the highest order. As much 
cannot be said of the British artillery, which, 
though very bravely fought was clearly by no 
means as skilfully handled as was the case with 
the American guns. The Courage of the British 
officers of all arms is mournfully attested by the 
sadly large proportion they bore to the total on 
the hsts of the killed and wounded. 

An even greater meed of praise is due to the 
American soldiers, for it must not be forgotten 
that they were raw troops opposed to veterans; 
and, indeed, nothing but Jackson's tireless care 
in drilling them could have brought them into 
shape at all. The regulars were just as good 



Naval War of 1 812 259 

as the British, and no better. The Kentucky 
mihtia, who had only been 48 hours with the 
army and were badly armed and totally undis- 
ciplined, proved as useless as their brethren of 
New York and Virginia, at Queenstown Heights 
and Bladensburg, had previously shown them- 
selves to be. They would not stand in the open 
at all, and even behind a breastwork had to be 
mixed with better men. The Louisiana militia, 
fighting in defence of their homes, and well 
trained, behaved excellently, and behind breast- 
works were as formidable as the regulars. The 
Tennesseeans, good men to start with, and already 
well trained in actual warfare under Jackson, 
were in their own way unsurpassable as soldiers. 
In the open field the British regulars, owing to 
their greater skill in manoeuvring, and to their 
having bayonets, with which the Tennesseeans 
were unprovided, could in all likelihood have 
beaten them ; but in rough or broken ground the 
skill of the Tennesseeans, both as marksmen and 
woodsmen, would probably haVe given them the 
advantage ; while the extreme deadliness of their 
fire made it far more dangerous to attempt to 
storm a breastwork guarded by these forest 
riflemen than it would have been to attack the 
same work guarded by an equal number of the 
best regular troops of Europe. The American 
soldiers deserve great credit for doing so well ; but 



26o Naval War of 1812 

greater credit still belongs to Andrew Jackson, 
who, with his cool head and quick eye, his stout 
heart and strong hand, stands out in history as 
the ablest general the United States produced, 
from the outbreak of the Revolution down to 
the beginning of the Great Rebellion. 



APPENDIX A 

TONNAGE OF THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN MEN- 
OF-WAR IN 1812-15 

ACCORDING to Act of Congress (quoted in 
Niles's Register, iv., 64), the way of meas- 
uring double-decked or war vessels was as 
follows : 

" Measure from fore-part of main stem to after- 
part of stem-port, above the upper deck; take 
the breadth thereof at broadest part above the 
main wales, one half of which breadth shall be ac- 
counted the depth. Deduct from the length three 
fifths of such breadth, multiply the remainder by 
the breadth and the product by tha depth ; divide 
by 95; the quotient is tonnage." 

{i. e., If length = x, and breadth = y; 
Tonnage = ( x-|y) XyX^y ^ 

95 

Niles states that the British mode, as taken from 
Steele's Shipmaster's Assistant, was this: Drop 
plumb-line over stem of ship and measure dis- 
tance between such line and the after part of the 
stem-port at the load water-mark ; then measure 
from top of said plumb-line in parallel direction 

261 



262 Naval War of 181 2 

with the water to perpendicular point immediately 
over the load water-mark of the fore-part of main 
stem; subtract from such admeasurement the 
above distance; the remainder is ship's extreme 
length, from which deduct 3 inches for every foot 
of the load-draught of water for the rake abaft, 
and also three fifths of the ship's breadth for the 
rake forward; remainder is length of keel for 
tonnage. Breadth shall be taken from outside to 
outside of the plank in broadest part of the ship 
either above or below the main wales, exclusive of 
all manner of sheathin"" or doubling. Depth is to 
be considered as one half the length. Tonnage 
will then be the length into the depth into breadth, 
divided by 94. 

Tonnage was thus estimated in a purely arbi- 
trary manner, with no regard to actual capacity or 
displacement ; and, moreover, what is of more im- 
portance, British method differed from the Amer- 
ican so much that a ship measured in the latter 
way would be nominally about 15 per cent, larger 
than if measured by British rules. This is the ex- 
act reverse of the statement made by the British 
naval historian, James. His mistake is pardon- 
able, for great confusion existed on the subject at 
that time, even the officers not knowing the ton- 
nage of their own ships. When the President 
was captured, her officers stated that she meas- 
ured about 1400 tons; in reality, she measured 



Naval War of 1 812 263 

1576, American measure. Still more singular 
was the testimony of the officers of the Argus, 
who thought her to be of about 350 tons, while she 
was of 298, by American, or 244, by British meas- 
urement. These errors were the more excusable 
as they occurred also in higher quarters. The 
earliest notice we have about the three 44-gun 
frigates of the Constitution's class, is in the letter 
of Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Stoddart, 
on December 24, 1798,' where they are expressly 
said to be of 1576 tons; and this tonnage is given 
them in every navy list that mentions it for 40 
years afterwards ; yet Secretary Paul Hamilton, in 
one of his letters, incidentally alludes to them as 
of 1444 tons. Later, I think about the year 1838, 
the method of measuring was changed, and their 
tonnage was put down as 1607, James takes the 
American tonnage from Secretary Hamilton's 
letter as 1444, and states (vol. vi., p. 5) that this is 
equivalent to 1533 tons English, But, in reality, 
by American measurement, the tonnage was 
1576; so that, even according to James's own 
figures, the British way of measurement made 
the frigate 43 tons smaller than the American way 
did; actually the difference was nearer 290 tons. 
James's statements as to the size of our various 
ships would seem to have been largely mere guess- 
work, as he sometimes makes them smaller and 

' American State Papers, xiv., 57. 



264 Naval War of 181 2 

sometimes larger than they were according to the 
official navy lists. Thus, the Constitution, Presi- 
dent, and United States, each of 1576, he puts 
down as of 1533; the Wasp, of 450, as of 434; 
the Hornet, of 480, as of 460; and the Chesa- 
peake, of 1244, as of 1 135 tons. On the other 
hand, the Enterprise, of 165 tons, he states to be 
of 245 ; the Argus, of 298, he considers to be of 
316, and the Peacock, Frolic, etc., of 509 each, as 
of 539. He thus certainly adopts different stand- 
ards of measurement, not only for the American 
as distinguished from the British vessels, but 
even among the various American vessels them- 
selves. And there are other difficulties to be en- 
countered: not only were there different ways of 
casting tonnage from given measurements, but 
also there were different ways of getting what 
purported to be the same measurement. A ship 
that, according to the British method of meas- 
urement was of a certain length, would, according 
to the American method, be about 5 per cent, 
longer; and so, if two vessels were the same size, 
the American would have the greatest nominal 
tonnage. For example, James, in his Naval 
Occurrences (p. 467), gives the length of the 
Cyane's main-deck as 118 feet 2 inches. This 
same Cyane was carefully surveyed and measured, 
under orders from the United States navy de- 
partment, by Lieut. B. F. Hoffman, and in his 



Naval War of 1 812 265 

published report ' he gives, among the other dimen- 
sions: "Length of spar-deck, 124 feet 9 inches," 
and "length of gun-deck, 123 feet 3 inches." 
With such a difference in the way of taking 
measurements, as well as of computing ton- 
nage from the measurements when taken, it 
is not surprising that, according to the Amer- 
ican method, the Cyane should have ranked as 
of about 659 tons, instead of 539. As James 
takes no account of any of these differences I 
hardly know how to treat his statements of 
comparative tonnage. Thus, he makes the Hor- 
net 460 tons, and the Peacock and Penguin, 
which she at different times captured, about 388 
each. As it happens, both Captain Lawrence 
and Captain Biddle, who commanded the Hornet 
in her two successful actions, had their prizes 
measured. The Peacock sank so rapidly that 
Lawrence could not get very accurate measure- 
ments of her; he states her to be four feet 
shorter and a half foot broader than the Hornet. 
The British naval historian, Brenton (vol. v., 
p. Ill), also states that they were of about the 
same tonnage. But we have more satisfactory 
evidence from Captain Biddle. He stayed by his 
prize nearly two days, and had her thoroughly 
examined in every way; and his testimony is, 
of course, final. He reports that the Penguin 

' American State Papers, xiv., p. 417. 



266 Naval War of 1812 

was by actual measurement two feet shorter 
and somewhat broader than the Hornet, and with 
thicker scanthng. She tonned 477, compared 
to the Hornefs 480 — a difference of about one 
half of one per cent. This testimony is cor- 
roborated by that of the naval inspectors who 
examined the Epervier after she was captured 
by the Peacock. Those two vessels were, respec- 
tively, of 477 and 509 tons, and as such they 
ranked on the navy lists. The American Peacock 
and her sister ships were very much longer than 
the brig-sloops of the Epervier' s class, but were 
no broader, the latter being very tubby. All the 
English sloops were broader in proportion than 
the American ones were; thus, the Levant, which 
was to have mounted the same number of guns 
as the Peacock, had much more beam, and was of 
greater tonnage, although of rather less length. 
The Macedonian, when captured, ranked on our 
lists as of 1325 tons,' the United States as of 
1576; and they thus continued until, as I have 
said before, the method of measurement was 
changed, when the former ranked as of 1341, and 
the latter as of 1607 tons. James, however, 
makes them, respectively, 1081 and 1533. Now, 
to get the comparative force, he ought to have 
adopted the first set of measurements given, 

' See the work of Lieutenant Emmons, who had access to 
all the official records. 



Naval War of 1812 267 

or else have made them 1081 and 1286. Out of 
the twelve single-ship actions of the war, four 
were fought with 3 8 -gun frigates like the Mace- 
donian, and seven with i8-gun brig-sloops of the 
Epervier's class; and, as the Macedonian and 
Epervier were both regularly rated in our navy, 
we get a very exact idea of our antagonists in 
those eleven cases. The twelfth was the fight 
between the Enterprise and the Boxer, in which 
the latter was captured ; the Enterprise was appa- 
rently a little smaller than her foe, but had two 
more guns, which she carried in her bridle-ports. 

As my purpose in giving the tonnage is to get 
it comparatively, and not absolutely, I have given 
it throughout for both sides as estimated by the 
American method of that day. The tonnage of 
the vessels on the lakes has been already noticed. 



APPENDIX B 

PREVIOUS HISTORY OF UNITED STATES NAVY 

Very few students of naval history will deny 
that in 181 2 the average American ship was 
superior to the average British ship of the same 
strength; and that the latter was, in turn, su- 
perior to the average French ship. The expla- 
nation given by the victor is in each case the 
same: the American writer ascribes the success 



268 Naval War of 1 812 

of his nation to ' ' the aptitude of the American 
character for the sea, " and the Briton similarly 
writes that the "English are inherently better 
suited for the sea than the French. " Race 
characteristics may have had some little effect 
between the last pair of combatants (although 
only a little), and it is possible that they some- 
what affected the outcome of the Anglo-American 
struggle, but they did not form the main cause. 
This can best be proved by examining the com- 
bats of two preceding periods in which the 
English, French, and Americans were at war 
with one another. 

During the years 1 798-1800, the United States 
carried on a desultory conflict with France, then 
at war with England. Our navy was just built, 
and was rated in the most extraordinary man- 
ner: the Chesapeake, carrying i8-pounders, was 
called a 44; and the Constellation, which carried 
24's, a 36; while the Washington, rating 24, was 
really much heavier than the Boston, rating 28. 
On February 9, 1799, after an hour's conflict, the 
Constellation captured the French frigate L'ln- 
surgente; the Americans lost 3, the French 70 
men, killed and wounded. The Constellation car- 
ried but 38 guns; twenty-eight long 24's, on the 
main-deck, and ten long 12's on the quarter- 
deck, with a crew of 309 men. According to 
Troude (iii., 169), L'Insurgenie carried twenty-six 



Naval War of 1812 269 

long 12's, ten long 6's, and four 3 6 -pound car- 
ronades; the Americans report her number of 
men as nearly four hundred. Thus, in actual' 
(not nominal) weight of shot the Constellation 
was superior by about 80 pounds, and was in- 
ferior in crew by from 50 to 100 men. This 
would make the vessels apparently nearly equal 
in force; but, of course, the long 24's of the Con- 
stellation made it impossible that Ulnsurgente, 
armed only with long 12's, should contend with 
her. As already said, a superiority in number of 
men makes very little difference, provided each 
vessel has ample to handle the guns, repair 
damages, work the sails, etc. Troude goes 
more into details than any other French his- 
torian; but I think his details are generally 
wrong. In this case he gives the Constellation 
12's instead of the 24's she really carried; and 
also supplies her with ten 3 2 -pound carronades 
— of which species of ordnance there was then 
not one piece in our navy. The first carronades 

' French shot was really very much heavier than the nomi- 
nally corresponding English shot, as the following table taken 
from Capt. T. L. Simmons's work on Heavy Ordnance (London, 
1837, p. 62) will show: 

Nominal French Weight Actual Weight of Same Shot in 
of Shot English Pounds 

■i6 lbs. 43 lbs. 4 oz. 

24 " 28 " 8f " 

18 " 21 " 4h " 

12 " 14 " 7 " 



2 -JO Naval War of 1 8 1 2 

we ever had were those carried by the same 
frigate on her next voyage. She had completely 
changed her armament, having twenty-eight long 
i8's on the main-deck, ten 24-pound carronades on 
the quarter-deck ; and, I believe, six long 1 2's on the 
forecastle, with a crew of 310 men. Thus armed, 
she encountered and fought a drawn battle with 
La Vengeance. Troude (vol. iii., pp. 201 and 216) 
describes the armament of the latter as twenty-six 
long i8's, ten long 8's, and four 3 6 -pound carron- 
ades. On board of her was an American prisoner, 
James Howe, who swore she had 52 guns and 400 
men (see Cooper, i. , 306) . The French and Amer- 
ican accounts thus radically disagree. The point 
is settled definitely by the report of the British 
captain, Milne, who, in the 5^w^, frigate, captured 
La Vengeance in the same year, and then reported 
her armament as being twenty-eight long iS's, 
sixteen long 12's, and eight 36-pound carronades, 
with 326 men. As the American and British ac- 
counts, written entirely independent of one an- 
other, tally almost exactly, it is evident that 
Troude was very greatly mistaken. He blunders 
very much over the Constellation'' s armament. 

Thus, in this action, the iVmerican frigate fought 
a draw with an antagonist nearly as much su- 
perior to herself as an American 44 was to a Brit- 
ish 38. In November, 1800, the " 28-gun frigate, " 
Boston, of 530 tons, 200 men, carrying twenty-four 



Naval War of i8i2 271 

long 9's on the main-deck, and on the spar- 
deck eight long 6's (or possibly 12 -pound car- 
ronades) captured, after two hours' action, the 
French corvette Berceau, of 24 guns, long 8's; the 
Boston was about the same size as her foe, with 
the same number of men, and superior in metal 
about as 10 to 9. She lost 15, and the Berceau 
40, men. Troude (iii., p. 219) gives the Berceau 
30 guns, twenty- two long 8's, and eight 12 -pound 
carronades. If this is true, she was in reality of 
equal force with the Boston. But I question if 
Troude really knew anything about the combat- 
ants; he gives the Boston (of the same size and 
build as the Cyane) 48 guns— a number impossible 
for her to carry. He continually makes the gross- 
est errors; in this same (the third) volume, for 
example, he arms a British 50-gun ship with 72 
cannon, giving her a broadside fifty per cent, 
heavier than it should be (p. 141) ; and, still worse, 
states the ordinary complement of a British 3 2 -gun 
frigate to be 384 men, instead of about 220 (p. 
417). He is by no means as trustworthy as James, 
though less rancorous. 

The United States schooner Experiment, of 
12 guns, long 6's, and 70 men, captured the 
French man-of-war three-masted schooner La 
Diane, of 14 guns (either 4- or 6-pounders), with 
a crew of 60 men, and 30 passengers; and the 
Enterprise, the sister vessel of the Experiment, 



2;:! Naval War of 1812 

captured numerous strong privateers. One of 
them, a much heavier vessel than her captor, 
made a most obstinate fight. She was the Flam- 
beau, brig, of fourteen 8-pounders and 100 men, of 
whom half were killed or wounded. The Enter- 
prise had 3 killed and 7 wounded. 

Comparing these different actions, it is evident 
that the Americans were superior to the French 
in fighting capacity during the years 1799 and 
1800. During the same two years there had been 
numerous single contests between vessels of Brit- 
ain and France, ending almost invariably in favor 
of the former, which I mention first in each couple. 
The 1 2 -pounder frigate Dccdalus captured the 
i2-pounder frigate Priidente, of equal force. The 
i8-pounder frigate Syhille captured the frigate 
Forte, armed with 52 guns, thirty of them long 24's 
on the main-deck; she was formidably armed 
and as heavy as the Constitution. The Syhille lost 
22, and the Forte 145, men killed and wounded. 
The i8-pounder frigate Clyde, with the loss of 5 
men, captured the 12 -pounder frigate Ve stale, 
which lost 32. The cutter Courser, of twelve 
4-pounders and 40 men, captured the privateer 
Guerriere, of fourteen 4-pounders and 44 men. 
The cutter Viper, of fourteen 4-pounders and 
48 men, captured the privateer Siiret, of four- 
teen 4-pounders and 57 men. The i6-gun ship- 
sloop Peterel, with 89 men, engaged the Cerf, 14, 



Naval War of 1 812 273 

Lejoille, 6, and Ligurienne, 16, with, in all, 240 
men, and captured the Ligurienne. The 30-gun 
corvette Dart captured by surprise the 38-gun 
frigate Desirce. The Gypsy, of ten 4-pounders 
and 82 men, captured the Quidproquo, of eight 
guns, 4- and 8-pounders, and 98 men. The 
schooner Alilbrook, of sixteen 18-pound carron- 
ades and 47 men, fought a draw with the priva- 
teer Bellone, of 24 long 8's and six 36-pound 
carronades. Finally, six months after La Ven- 
geance had escaped from the Constellation (or 
beaten her off, as the French say), she was cap- 
tured by the British frigate Seine, which threw a 
broadside about 30 pounds more than the Ameri- 
can did in her action, and had some 29 men less 
aboard. So that her commander. Captain Milne, 
with the same force as Commodore Truxton, of 
the Constellation, accomplished what the latter 
failed to do. 

Reviewing all these actions, it seems pretty 
clear that, while the Americans were then un- 
doubtedly much superior to the French, they 
were still, at least slightly, inferior to the British. 

From 1777 to 1782, the state of things was 
very different. The single combats were too 
numerous for me to mention them here; and, 
besides, it would be impossible to get at the 
truth without going to a great deal of trouble 
—the accounts given by Cooper, Schomberg, and 

VOL. 11. — 18 



2 74 Naval War of 1 8 1 2 

Troude differing so widely that they can often 
hardly be recognized as treating of the same 
events. But it is certain that the British were 
very much superior to the Americans. Some of 
the American ships behaved most disgracefully, 
deserting their consorts and fleeing from much 
smaller foes. Generally, the American ship was 
captured when opposed by an equal force — 
although there were some brilliant exceptions to 
this. With the French, things were more equal; 
their frigates were sunk or captured time and 
again, but nearly as often they sunk or cap- 
tured their antagonists. Some of the most gal- 
lant fights on record are recounted of French 
frigates of this period; in 1781, the Minerve, 32, 
resisted the Courageous, 74, till she had lost 73 
men and had actually inflicted a loss of 17 men 
on her gigantic antagonist, and the previous 
year the Bellepoule, 32, had performed a similar 
feat with the Nonsuch, 64, while the Capricieuse, 
32, had fought for five hours before surrendering 
to the Prudente and Licorne, each of force equal to 
herself. She lost 100 men, inflicting a loss of 55 
upon her two antagonists. Such instances make 
us feel rather ashamed when we compare them 
with the fight in which the British ship Glasgow, 
20, beat off an American squadron of 5 ships, in- 
cluding two of equal force to herself, or with the 
time when the Ariadne, 20, and Ceres, 14, at- 



Naval War of 1 812 275 

tacked and captured without resistance the 
Alfred, 20, the latter ship being deserted in the 
most outrageously cowardly manner by her con- 
sort, the Raleigh, 32. At that period, the average 
American ship was certainly by no means equal to 
the average French ship of the same force, and the 
latter, in turn, was a little, but only a little, in- 
ferior to the average British ship of equal strength. 

Thus, in 1782, the British stood first in nautical 
prowess, separated but by a very narrow interval 
from the French, while the Americans made a 
bad third. In 1789, the British still stood first, 
while the Americans had made a great stride 
forward, coming close on their heels, and the 
French had fallen far behind into the third place. 
In 181 2, the relative positions of the British and 
French were unchanged, but the Americans had 
taken another very decided step in advance, and 
stood nearly as far ahead of the British as the 
latter were ahead of the French. 

The explanation of these changes is not diffi- 
cult. In 1782, the American war vessels were in 
reality privateers; the crews were unpractised, 
the officers untrained, and they had none of the 
traditions and discipline of a regular service. 
At the same time the French marine was at 
its highest point; it was commanded by officers 
of ability and experience, promoted largely for 
merit, and with crews thoroughly trained especially. 



276 Naval War of 181 2 

in gunnery, by a long course of service on the 
sea. In courage, and in skill in the manage- 
ment of guns, musketry, etc., they were the full 
equals of their English antagonists; their slight 
average inferiority in seamanship may, it is pos- 
sible, be fairly put down to the difference in 
race. (It seems certain that, when serving in 
a neutral vessel, for example, the Englishmen 
aboard are apt to make better sailors than the 
Frenchmen.) In 1799, the revolution had de- 
prived the French of all their best officers, had 
let the character of the marine run down and 
the discipline of the service become utterly 
disorganized; this exposed them to frightful re- 
verses, and these, in turn, prevented the charac- 
ter of the service from recovering its former tone. 
Meanwhile, the Americans had established for the 
first time a regular navy, and, as there was ex- 
cellent material to work with, it at once came up 
close to the English; constant and arduous ser- 
vice, fine discipline, promotion for merit, and the 
most unflagging attention to practical seaman- 
ship and gunnery, had, in 181 2, raised it far 
above even the high English standard. During all 
these three periods the English marine, it must be 
remembered, did not fall off, but at least kept its 
position ; the French, on the contrary, did fall off, 
while the American navy advanced, by great 
strides, to the first place. 



Naval War of 1 812 277 

APPENDIX C 

After my work was in press I, for the first 
time, came across Prof. J. Russell Soley's Naval 
Campaign of 1812, in the " Proceedings of the 
United States Naval Institute," for October 20, 
1 88 1. It is, apparently, the precursor of a more 
extended history. Had I known that such a 
writer as Professor Soley was engaged on a work 
of this kind, I certainly should not have at- 
tempted it myself. 

In several points our accounts differ. In the 
action with the Guerribre his diagram differs from 
mine, chiefly in his making the Constitution 
steer in a more direct line, while I have repre- 
sented her as shifting her course several times in 
order to avoid being raked, bringing the wind first 
on her port and then on her starboard quarter. 
My account of the number of the crew of the 
Gnerriere is taken from the Constitution's muster 
book (in the Treasury Department at Washington) , 
which contains the names of all the British pris- 
oners received aboard the Constitutioyt after the 
fight. The various writers used "larboard" and 
"starboard" with such perfect indifference, in 
speaking of the closing and the loss of the Guer- 
riere's mizzenmast, that I hardly knew which ac- 
count to adopt ; it finally seemed to me that the 
only way to reconcile the conflicting statements 



278 Naval War of 181 2 

was by making the mast act as a rudder, first to 
keep the ship off the wind until it was dead aft and 
then to bring her up into it. If this was the case, 
it deadened her speed, and prevented Dacres from 
keeping his ship yard-arm and yard-arm with the 
foe, though he tried to steady his course with the 
helm; but, in this view, it rather delayed Hull's 
raking than helped him. If Professor Soley's ac- 
count is right, I hardly know what to make of the 
statement in one of the American accounts that 
the Constitution "luffed across the enemy's bow," 
and of Cooper's statement (in Putnam's Magazine) 
that the Guerriere's bowsprit pressed against the 
Constitution's "lee or port quarter." 

In the action of the Wasp with the Frolic, I 
have adopted James's statement of the latter's 
force; Professor Soley follows Captain Jones's 
letter, which gives the brig three additional guns 
and 18 pounds more metal in broadside. My 
reason for following James was that his account 
of the Frolic's force agrees with the regular 
armament of her class. Captain Jones gives her 
two carronades on the topgallant forecastle, which 
must certainly be a mistake ; he makes her chase- 
guns long 12's, but all the other British brigs 
carried 6's; he also gives her another gun in 
broadside, which he calls a 12 -pounder, and 
Lieutenant Biddle (in a letter to his father) a 
32-pound carronade. His last gun should perhaps 



Naval War of 1 812 279 

be counted in ; I excluded it because the two 
American officials differed in their account of it, 
because I did not know through what port it could 
be fought, and because James asserted that it was 
dismounted and lashed to the forecastle. The 
Wasp left port with 138 men ; subtracting the pilot 
and two men who were drowned, makes 135 the 
number on board during the action. As the bat- 
tle was fought, I doubt if the loss of the brig's 
main-yard had much effect on the result ; had it 
been her object to keep on the wind, or had the 
loss of her after-sails enabled her antagonist to 
cross her stem (as in the case of the Argus and 
Pelican) , the accident could fairly be said to have 
had a decided effect upon the contest. But, as a 
short time after the fight began the vessels were 
running nearly free, and as the Wasp herself 
was greatly injured aloft at the time, and made 
no effort to cross her foe's stem, it is difficult to 
see that it made much difference. The brig's head- 
sails were all right, and, as she was not close- 
hauled, the cause of her not being kept more 
under command was probably purely due to the 
slaughter on her decks. 

Professor Soley represents the combat of the 
States and Macedonian as a plain yard-ann and 
yard-arm action after the first forty minutes. I 
have followed the English authorities and make it 
a running fight throughout. If Professor Soley is 



28o Naval War of 1812 

right, the enormous disparity in loss was due 
mainly to the infinitely greater accuracy of the 
American fire ; according to my diagram, the chief 
cause was the incompetency of the Macedonian's 
commander. In one event, the difference was 
mainly in the gunnery of the crews, in the other, 
it was mainly in the tactical skill of the captains. 
The question is merely as to how soon Garden, 
in his headlong, foolishly rash approach, was en- 
abled to close with Decatur. I have represented 
the closing as taking place later than Professor 
Soley has done ; very possibly, I am wrong. Could 
my work now be rewritten, I think I should adopt 
his diagram of the action of the Macedonian. 

But in the action with the Java, it seems to me 
that he is mistaken. He has here followed the 
British accounts; but they are contradicted by 
the American authorities, and, besides, have a very 
improbable look. When the Constitution came 
round for the second time, on the port tack, James 
declares the Java passed directly across her 
stem, almost touching, but that the British crew, 
overcome by astonishment or awe, did not fire a 
shot; and that shortly afterward the manoeuvre 
was repeated. When this incident is said to have 
occurred the Java's crew had been hard at work 
fighting the guns for half an hour, and they con- 
tinued for an hour and a half afterward ; it is im- 
possible to believe that they would have forborne 



Naval War of 1 812 281 

to fire more than one gun when in such a superb 
position for inflicting damage. Even had the 
men been struck with temporary lunacy, the offi- 
cers alone would have fired some of the guns. 
Moreover, if the courses of the vessels were such 
as indicated on Professor Soley's diagram, the 
Java would herself have been previously ex- 
posed to a terrible raking fire, which was not the 
case. So the alleged manoeuvres have, per se, 
a decidedly apochryphal look; and, besides, they 
are flatly contradicted by the American accounts 
which state distinctly that the Java remained to 
windward in every portion of the fight. On this 
same tack Professor Soley represents the Java as 
forereaching on the Constitution; I have reversed 
this. At this time, the Java had been much cut 
up in her rigging and aloft generally, while the 
Constitution had set much additional sail, and in 
consequence the latter forged ahead and wore 
in the smoke unperceived. When the ships 
came foul. Professor Soley has drawn the Consti- 
tution in a position in which she would receive a 
most destructive stern rake from her antagonist's 
whole broadside. The positions could not have 
been as there represented. The Java's bowsprit 
came foul in the Constitution's mizzen-rigging and 
as the latter forged ahead she pulled the former 
gradually round till, when they separated, the 
ships were in a head and stern line. Commodore 



282 Naval War of 1 812 

Bainbridge, as he particularly says, at once "kept 
away to avoid being raked," while the loss of 
the headsails aboard the Java would cause the 
latter to come up in the wind, and the two 
ships would again be running parallel, with the 
American to leeward. I have already discussed 
fully the reasons for rejecting in this instance, the 
British report of their own force and loss. This 
was the last defeat that the British officially 
reported; the admiralty were smarting with the 
sting of successive disasters and anxious at all costs 
to put the best possible face on affairs (as wit- 
ness Mr. Croker's response to Lord Dundonald's 
speech in the House). There is every reason for 
believing that in this case the reports were gar- 
bled; exactly as, at a later date, the official corre- 
spondence preceding the terrible disaster at Cabul 
was tampered with before being put before the 
public (see McCarthy's History of our Own Times). 
It is difficult to draw a diagram of the action 
between the Hornet and Peacock, although it was 
so short, the accounts contradicting one another as 
to which ship was to windward and which on the 
" larboard tack " ; and I do not know if I have cor- 
rectly represented the position of the combatants 
at the close of the engagement. Lieutenant Conner 
reported the number of men aboard the Hornet fit 
for duty as 1 3 5 ; Lawrence says she had eight absent 
in a prize and seven too sick to be at quarters. This 



Naval War of 1 812 28 



o 



would make an original complement of 150, and 
tallies exactly with the number of men left on the 
Hornet after the action was over, as mentioned by- 
Lawrence in his account of the total number of 
souls aboard. The log-book of the Hornet just be- 
fore starting on her cruise states her entire com- 
plement as 158; but four of these were sick and left 
behind. There is still a discrepancy of four men, 
but during the course of the cruise nothing would 
be more likely than that four men should be 
gotten rid of, either by sickness, desertion, or dis- 
missal. At any rate, the discrepancy is very trivial. 
In her last cruise, as I have elsewhere said, I have 
probably overestimated the number of the Hor- 
net's crew; this seems especially likely when it is 
remembered that toward the close of the war 
our vessels left port with fewer supernumeraries 
aboard than earlier in the contest. If such is the 
case, the Hornet and the Penguin were of almost 
exactly equal force 

My own comments upon the causes of our success, 
upon the various historians of the war, etc., are 
so similar to those of Professor Soley, that I almost 
feel as if I had been guilty of plagiarism ; yet I 
never saw his writings till half an hour ago. But, 
in commenting on the actions of 181 2, I think 
the Professor has laid too much stress on the 
difference in "dash" between the combatants. 
The Wasp bore down with perfect confidence to 



284 Naval War of 181 2 

engage an equal foe ; and the Hornet could not tell 
till the Peacock opened fire that the latter was 
inferior in force, and moreover fought in sight of 
another hostile vessel. In the action with the 
Guerriere it was Hull and not Dacres who acted 
boldly, the Englishman delaying the combat and 
trying to keep it at long range for some time. In 
this fight it must be remembered that neither foe 
knew the exact force of the other until the close 
work began ; then, it is true, Dacres fought most 
bravely. So with the Macedonian; James par- 
ticularly says that she did not know the force of 
her foe, and was confident of victory. The Java, 
however, must have known that she was to en- 
gage a superior force. In neither of the first 
two frigate actions did the Americans have a 
chance to display any courage in the actual 
fighting, the victory was won with such ease. 
But in each case they entered as bravely, al- 
though by no means as rashly or foolishly, into 
the fight as their antagonists did. It must always 
be remembered that, until this time, it was by no 
means proved that 24-pounders were better guns 
than i8's to put on frigates; exactly as, at a 
little later date, it was vigorously contended that 
4 2 -pounders were no more effective guns for two- 
deckers than 3 2 -pounders were. Till 181 2, there 
had been no experience to justify the theory that 
the 24-pounder was the better gun. So that, in 



Naval War of 1 812 285 

the first five actions, it cannot be said that the 
British showed any especial courage in beginning 
the fight ; it was more properly to be called igno- 
rance. After the fight was once begun, they cer- 
tainly acted very bravely, and, in particular, the 
desperate nature of the Frolic's defence has never 
been surpassed. 

But, admitting this is a very different thing from 
admitting that the British fought more bravely 
than their foes; the combatants were about on 
a par in this respect. The Americans, it seems 
to me, were always to the full as ready to engage 
as their antagonists were ; on each side there were 
few over-cautious men, such as Commodore Rod- 
gers and Sir George Collier, the opposing captains 
on Lake Ontario, the commander of the Bonne 
Citoyenne, and, perhaps. Commodore Decatur; 
but, as a rule, either side jumped at the chance of a 
fight. The difference in tactics was one of skill and 
common sense, not one of timidity. The United 
States did not " avoid close action" from over-cau- 
tion, but simply to take advantage of her oppo- 
nent's rashness. Hull's approach was as bold as 
it was skilful ; had the opponent to leeward been 
the Endymion instead of the Guerriere, her 24- 
pounders would not have saved her from the fate 
that overtook the latter. Throughout the war I 
think that the Americans were as bold in begin- 
ning action, and as stubborn in continuing it, as 



286 Naval War of 1812 

were their foes— although no more so. Neither 
side can claim any superiority on the average, 
though each can, in individual cases, as regards 
courage. Foolhardiness does not imply bravery. 
A prize-fighter who refused to use his guard would 
be looked upon as exceptionally brainless, not as 
exceptionally brave ; yet such a case is almost ex- 
actly parallel to that of the captain of the Mace- 
donian. 



APPENDIX D 

In the Historical Register of the United States 
(edited by T. H. Palmer, Philadelphia, 1814), 
vol. i., p. 105 (State Papers), is a letter from 
Lieut. L. H. Babbitt to Master-commandant 
Wm. U. Crane, both of the Nautilus, dated Sep- 
tember 13, 181 2, in which he says that, of the 
six men imprisoned by the British on suspicion 
of being of English birth, four were native-born 
Americans, and two naturalized citizens. He 
also gives a list of six men who deserted, and en- 
tered on the Shannon, of whom two were Ameri- 
can born — the birthplaces of the four others not 
being given. Adding these last, we still have but 
six men as the number of British aboard the 
Nautilus. It is thus seen that the crack frigate 
Shannon had American deserters aboard her — 



Naval War of 1 812 287 

although these probably formed a merely trifling 
fraction of her crew, as did the British deserters 
aboard the crack frigate Constitution. 

On p. 108, is a letter of December 17, 181 2, 
from Geo. S. Wise, purser of the Wasp, stating 
that twelve of that ship's crew had been detained 
"under the pretence of their being British sub- 
jects"; so that nine per cent, of her crew may 
have been British — or the proportion may have 
been very much smaller. 

On p. 117, is a letter of January 14, 181 3, from 
Commodore J. Rodgers, in which he states that 
he encloses the muster-rolls of H. B. M. ships 
Moselle and Sappho, taken out of the captured 
packet Swallow ; and that these muster-rolls 
show that in August, 181 2, one eighth of the 
crews of the Moselle and Sappho was composed of 
Americans. 

These various letters thus support strongly 
the conclusions reached on a former page as to 
the proportion of British deserters on American 
vessels. 

In A Biographical Memoir of the late Commo- 
dore Joshua Barney, from Autographical Notes and 
Journals (edited by Mary Barney, Boston, 1832), 
on pages 263 and 315, are descriptions of the 
flotilla destroyed in the Patuxent. It consisted of 
one gunboat, carrying a long 24; one cutter, car- 
rying a long 18, a columbiad 18, and four 9-pound 



288 Naval War of 1 812 

carronades ; and thirteen row-barges, each carry- 
ing a long 18 or 12 in the bow, with a 3 2 -pound or 
1 8 -pound carronade in the stern. On page 256, 
Barney's force in St. Leonard's creek, is described 
as consisting of one sloop, two gunboats, and 
thirteen barges, with, in all, somewhat over 500 
men; and it is claimed that the flotilla drove 
away the blockading frigates entirely unaided, the 
infantry force on shore rendering no assistance. 
The work is of some value, as showing that James 
had more than doubled the size, and almost 
doubled the strength, of Barney's various gun- 
boats. 

It may be mentioned, that on page 108, Commo- 
dore Barney describes the Dutch-American frigate 
South Carolina, which carried a crew of 550 men, 
and was armed with twenty-eight long 42's on the 
main deck, and twelve long 12's on the-spar deck. 
She was far heavier than any of our 44-gun frig- 
ates of 1 81 2, and an overmatch for anything un- 
der the rank of a 74. This gives further emphasis 
to what I have already stated — that the dis- 
tinguishing feature of the War of 1 8 1 2 is not the 
introduction of the heavy frigate, for heavy frig- 
ates had been in use among various nations for 
thirty years previously, but the fact that for the 
first time the heavy frigate was used to the best 
possible advantage. 



Naval War of i8i^ 289 

APPENDIX E 

In the last edition of James's Naval History of 
Great Britain, published in London, in 1886, by 
Richard Bentley & Son, there is an appendix by 
Mr. H. T. Powell, devoted to the War of 181 2, 
mainly to my account thereof. 

Mr. Powell begins by stating with nai've solem- 
nity that "most British readers will be surprised 
to learn that, notwithstanding the infinite pains 
taken by William James to render his history a 
monument of accuracy, and notwithstanding the 
exposure he brought upon contemporary misstate- 
ments, yet to this day the Americans still dis- 
pute his facts. " It is difficult to discuss seriously 
any question with a man capable of writing down 
in good faith such a sentence as the above. James 
(unlike Brenton and Cooper) knew perfectly well 
how to be accurate; but if Mr. Powell will read 
the comments on his accounts which I have ap- 
pended to the description of almost every battle, 
he will see that James stands convicted beyond 
possibility of doubt, not merely of occasional in- 
accuracies or errors, but of the systematic, malici- 
ous, and continuous practice of every known form 
of wilful misstatement, from the suppression of 
the truth and the suggestion of the false to the lie 
direct. To a man of his character, the tempta- 
tion was irresistible; for when he came to our 

VOL. II. — 19 



290 Naval War of 1812 

naval war, he had to appear as the champion of 
the beaten side and to explain away defeat in- 
stead of chronicling victory. The contemporary 
American writers were quite as boastful and un- 
truthful. No honorable American should at this 
day endorse their statements; and, similarly, no 
reputable Englishman should permit his name to 
be associated in any way with James's book 
without explicitly disclaiming all share in, or sym- 
pathy with, its scurrilous mendacity. 

Mr. Powell's efforts to controvert my state- 
ments can be disposed of in short order. He first 
endeavors to prove that James was right about 
the tonnage of the ships ; but all that he does is to 
show that his author gave for the English frigates 
and sloops the correct tonnage by English and 
French rules. This I never for a moment disputed. 
What I said was that the comparative tonnage 
of the various pairs of combatants, as given by 
James, was all wrong; and this Mr. Powell does 
not even discuss. James applied one system cor- 
rectly to the English vessels ; but he applied quite 
another to the American (especially on the lakes) . 
Mr. Powell actually quotes Admiral Chads as a 
witness, because he says that his father con- 
sidered James's account of the Javas fight ac- 
curate; if he wishes such testimony, I can 
produce many relatives of the Perrys, Porters, 
and Rodgerses of 181 2, who insist that I have 



Naval War of 1 812 291 

done much less than justice to the American side. 
He says I passed over silently James's schedule 
of dimensions of the frigates and sloops. This is 
a mistake ; I showed by the testimony of Captains 
Biddle and Warrington and Lieutenant Hoffman 
that his comparative measurements (the absolute 
measurements being of no consequence) for the 
American and British sloops are all wrong; and 
the same holds true of the frigates. 

Mr. Powell deals with the weight of shot exactly 
as he does with the tonnage — that is, he seeks to 
show what the absolute weight of the British shot 
was; but he does not touch upon the point at 
issue, the comparative weight of the British and 
American shot. 

When he comes to the lake actions, Mr. Powell 
is driven to conclude that what I aver must be 
accurate, because he thinks the Confiance was the 
size of the General Pike (instead of half as large 
again; she mounted 30 guns in battery on her 
main-deck, as against the Pikes 26, and stood 
to the latter as the Constellation did to the 
Essex), and because an American writer (very 
properly) expresses dissatisfaction wnth Commo- 
dore Chauncy ! What Mr. Powell thinks this last 
statement tends to prove would be difficult to say. 
In the body of my work I go into the minute 
details of the strength of the combatants in the 
lake action ; I clearly show that James was guilty 



292 Naval War of 1 812 

of gross and wilful falsification of the truth ; and 
no material statement I make can be successfully 
controverted. 

So much for Mr. Powell. But a much higher 
authority, Mr. Frank Chiswell, has recently pub- 
lished some articles which tend to show that my 
conclusions as to the tonnage of the sea vessels 
(not as to the lake vessels, which are taken from 
different sources) are open to question. In the 
appendix to my first edition I myself showed 
that it was quite impossible to reconcile all the 
different statements; that the most that could be 
done was to take one method and apply it all 
through, admitting that even in this way it 
would be impossible to make all the cases square 
with one another. 

Mr. Chiswell states that "the American ton- 
nage measurements, properly taken, never could 
give results for frigates varying largely from the 
English tonnage." But a statement like this is 
idle; for the answer to the "never could" is that 
they did. If Mr. Chiswell will turn to James's 
Naval Occurrences, he will find the Chesapeake set 
down as of 1135 tons, and the Macedonian as of 
1081 ; but in the American navy lists, which are 
those I followed, the Chesapeake is put down as 
of 1244 tons. A simple application of the rule 
of three shows that even if I accepted James's 
figures, I would be obliged to consider the Mace- 



Naval War of 1 812 ^9o 

donian as of about 1185 tons, to make her cor- 
respond with the system I had adopted for the 
American ships. 

But this is not all. James gives the length of 
the Macedonian as 154 feet 6 inches. In the 
Navy Department at Washington are two plans 
of the Macedonian. One is dated 181 7, and gives 
her length as 157 ft. 3 in. This difference in 
measurement would make a difference of 20 odd 
tons; so that by the American mode she must 
certainly have been over 1200 tons, instead of 
under iioo, as by the British rules. The second 
plan in the Navy Department, much more elab- 
orate than the first, is dated 1829, and gives the 
length as 164 ft.; it is probably this that Em- 
mons and the United States Navy lists have fol- 
lowed^as I did myself in calling the tonnage of 
the Macedonian 1325. Since finding the plan 
of 181 7, however, I think it possible that the 
other refers to the second vessel of the name, 
which was built in 1832. If this is true, then 
the Macedonian (as well as the Guerriere and 
Java) should be put down as about 120 tons 
less than the measurements given by Emmons 
and adopted by me; but even if this is so, she 
must be considered as tonning over 1200, using 
the method I have applied to the Chesapeake. 
Therefore, adopting the same system that I ap- 
phed to the American 38-gun frigates, the British 



294 Naval War of 1812 

38-gun frigates were of over 1200 not under iioo 
tons. 

As for the Cyane, James makes her but 118 ft. 
and 2 in. long, while the American Peacock he 
puts at 119 ft. 5 in. But Lieutenant Hoffman's 
official report makes the former 123 ft. 3 in., and 
the plans in the State Department at Washing- 
ton make the latter 117 ft. 11 in. in length. I 
care nothing for the different methods of meas- 
uring different vessels; what I wish to get at is 
the comparative measurement, and this stands as 
above. The comparative tonnage is thus the very- 
reverse of that indicated by James's figures. 

Finally, as to the brigs, James makes them 
some ten feet shorter than the American ship- 
sloops. In the Washington archives I can find 
no plan on record of the measurements of the 
captured Epervier; but in the Navy Department, 
volume X of the Letters of M asters-Command- 
ant, 18 14, under date of May 12th, is the state- 
ment of the Surveyor of the Port of Charleston 
that she measured 467 tons (in another place it 
is given as 477). James makes her 388; but as 
he makes the American Wasp 434, whereas she 
stands on our list as of 450, the application of the 
same rule as with the frigates gives us, even taking 
his own figures, 400 as her tonnage, when meas- 
ured as our ships were. But the measurements of 
the Surveyor of the Port who examined the Eper- 



Naval War of 1 812 295 

vier are corroborated by the statements of Capt. 
Biddle, who captured her sister brig, the Pen- 
guin. Biddle reported that the latter was two 
feet shorter and a httle broader than his own 
ship, the Hornet, which was of 480 tons. This 
would correspond almost exactly with the Sur- 
veyor's estimate. 

It still seems impossible to reconcile all these 
conflicting statements ; but I am inclined to think 
that, on the whole, in the sea (not the lake) vessels 
I have put the British tonnage too high. On the 
scale I have adopted for the American 44-gun 
and 38-gun frigates, and i8-gun sloops like the 
Hornet and Wasp, the British 38-gun frigates 
ought to be put down as of a little over 1200, 
and the British 18 -gun sloops as of between 
400 and 450 tons. In other words, of the twelve 
single-ship actions of the war, five — those of the 
Chesapeake and Shannon, Enterprise and Boxer, 
Wasp and Frolic, Hornet and Peacock, Hornet 
and Penguin — were between vessels of nearly 
equal size ; in six, the American was the superior 
about in the proportion of five to four (rather 
more in the case of the frigates, rather less in the 
case of the brigs) ; and in one, that of the Argus 
and Pelican, the British sloop was the bigger, 
in a somewhat similar ratio. 

This correction would be in favor of the British. 
But in a more important particular, I think I have 



296 Naval War of 181 2 

done injustice to the Americans. I should have 
allowed for the short weight of American metal 
on the lakes, taking off seven per cent, from the 
nominal broadsides of Perry and Macdonough ; for 
the American ordnance was of exactly the same 
quality as that on the ocean vessels, while the 
British was brought over from England, and 
must have shown the same superiority that ob- 
tained on the sea-going ships. 

Moreover, I am now inclined to believe that 
both the Guerriere and the Java, which were 
originally French ships, still carried French i8's 
on their main-deck, and that, therefore, about 20 
pounds should be added to the broadside weight 
of metal of each. The American accounts stated 
this to be the case in both instances ; but I paid 
no heed to them until my attention was called to 
the fact that the English had captured enormous 
quantities of French cannon and shot and cer- 
tainly used the captured ordnance on some of 
their ships. 

In writing my history, I have had to deal with 
a mass of confused and contradictory testimony, 
which it has sometimes been quite impossible to 
reconcile, the difficulty being greatly enhanced 
by the calculated mendacity of James and some 
others of the earlier writers, both American and 
British. Often I have had to simply balance 
probabilities, and choose between two sets of fig- 



Naval War of 1 812 297 

ures, aware that, whichever I chose, much could 
be said against the choice. It has, therefore, been 
quite impossible to avoid errors ; but I am con- 
fident they have been as much in favor of the 
British as the Americans; and in all important 
points my statements are substantially accurate. 
I do not believe that my final conclusions on the 
different fights can be disputed. James asserts 
that the American ships were officered by cun- 
ning cowards, and manned, to the extent of half 
their force in point of effectiveness, by renegade 
British. I show that the percentage of non- 
American seamen aboard the American ships was 
probably but little greater than the percentage of 
non-British seamen aboard the British ships ; and 
as for the charges of cowardice, there were but two 
instances in which it could be fairly urged against 
a beaten crew— that of the British Epervier and 
that of the American Argus (for the cases of Sir 
George ColHer, Commodore Rodgers, Chauncy, 
Yeo, the commander of the Bonne Citoyenne, 
etc., cannot be considered as coming under this 
head). James states that there was usually a 
great superiority of force on the side of the Amer- 
icans this is true; but I show that it was not 
nearly as great as he makes it, and that in deal- 
ing with the lake flotillas his figures are absolutely 
false, to the extent of even reversing the relative 
strength of the combatants on Lake Champlain, 



298 Naval War of 181 2 

where the Americans won, although with an in- 
ferior force. In the one noteworthy British vic- 
tory, that of the Shannon, all British authors fail 
to make any allowance for the vital fact that the 
Shannon's crew had been drilled for seven years, 
whereas the Chesapeake had an absolutely new 
crew, and had been out of port just eight hours; 
yet such a difference in length of drill is more im- 
portant than disparity in weight of metal. 

As a whole, it must be said that both sides 
showed equal courage and resolution; that the 
Americans usually possessed the advantage in 
material force; and that they also showed a de- 
cided superiority in fighting skill, notably in 
markmanship. 



INDEX 



Abeille, i., 258 

Aboukir, i., 29, 67 

Acasta, i., 54, 69, 90, loi, ii., 

173-177, . ^ ^ , 
Accurate finng of the Amen- 

cans, i., 206 

d'Ache, ii., loi 

Achille, i., 51 

Adams, i., 66, 78, 88, 89; ii., 
23. 35. 63. 198; cruise, ii., 
63; chased by Tigress, li., 
64, 65; curious saiUng 
quaUties resulting from be- 
ing built by contract, ii., 
65; grounds on Isle of 
Haute, ii., 66; attacked by 
British in Penobscot, ii., 
66; burned by Captain 
Morris, ii., 67 

Adams, Chaplain, ii., 34 

Adams, Lieutenant, i., 278 

Adirondack region, i., 170 

Adonis, ii., 60 

jEoliis, i., 90, 103, 107, 108 

Mtna, i., 121, 123 

Africa, i., 54, 90, loi, 103, 
107, 108 

Alacrity, i., 258 

Albion, ii., 42 

Alert, {., 99, 100, 168; cap- 
tured by Essex, i., 100 

Alexandria, i., 214, 215 

Alexandria surrenders to 
British, ii., 44. 45 

Alfred, ii., 162 

Alison, Sir A., ii., 121 

Allen, ii., 115 



Allen, Lieut. U. H., i., 251 

Allen, Lieut. W. H., on 
United States,!., ij^o; com- 
mander of Argus, i., 250, 
253.255; ii-.203; mortally 
wounded, i., 250 

Alligator, i., 267; ii., 8, 9, 75; 
futile attempt to cut her 
out, ii. , 9 ; sunk in a squall, 
ii., 9 

Almy, Sailing-master T. C, 
i., 318 

Alwyn, Master J. C, i., 113, 

114. 152 

Ambuscade, i., 237 

Amelia Island, ii., 40 

Americans accused of treach- 
ery, i., 228 

American gunboats employed 
in protecting coasting 
trade, i., 241, 242; futile 
attack on British vessels, 
i., 243; lesson taught by 
their failure, i., 266 

American loss in all, ii., 197- 
199 

American navy, confidence m 
itself, i., 35; esprit de corps 
of its officers, i., 35; life- 
long training of sailors, i., 
36; great effectiveness and 
reasons for it, i., 37; no im- 
pressment, i., 44; vessels 
not "largely manned by 
British sailors," i., 46-55; 
proportion of officers fur- 
nished by different States 



299 



300 



Index 



American navy — Continued 
and sections, i., 55; ton- 
nage, i., 56; navy yards, 
i., 57; statistics of officers 
and seamen, i., 57; list of 
vessels, tonnage, and de- 
scription, i., 59-63; com- 
pared with British navy, 
i., 64; charges of under- 
rating, i., 65-70; unques- 
tionable superiority in 
force, i., 74; effectiveness 
due to small size, i., 75; 
crew of a '44, i., 84; of an 
i8-gun ship, i., 84; tabu- 
lated comparison of three 
British and three American 
vessels, i., 86; superior dis- 
cipline of Americans, i., 
164; officers better paid 
and of a better class, i., 
164; American navy gave 
more damage than it re- 
ceived, ii., 196 

American naval officers, rea- 
sons for their superiority, 
ii., 204-205; ignorance of 
army officers and men, ii., 
212—213 

American privateers cut out 
by British squadron, i., 
2 1 0—2 1 2 

American Revolution, fleet 
actions of British with 
Europeans mostly inde- 
cisive during war of, ii., 105 

American sailors, compared 
with British, i,, 43; of 
better material for man-of- 
war's crew than British, ii., 
204; on Guerriere, i., 119 

American sharpshooters, i., 
164 

American State Papers, i., 
25. 59. 312; ii., 38, 80, 
116 

American vessels built and 



captured or destroyed in 
1S12, i., 168; prizes made, 
i., 169; in 1813, i., 256- 
267; in 1814, ii., 143; in 
1815, ii., 193-195, sum- 
mary, ii., 192-196; make- 
shifts in use of merchant 
schooners, i., 176 

American whalers, i., 43 

American writings miscalled 
histories, i., 301 

Amherst Bay, i., 295 

Amherstburg, i., 309, 310 

Anglo-French naval war, ii., 
207; comparative force 
and loss, ii., 208-210 

Angus, Lieut. S., i., 248, ii., 
108; leads disastrous ex- 
pedition against Red 
House barracks, i., 193- 
194 

Anjier, ii., 188 

Appling, Major, ii., 96-97 

Arab, i., 211-212 

Arbuthnot, Admiral, victory 
over B arras off Chesa- 
peake, ii., 105 

Arbuthnot, Capt. J., ii., 56 

Argo, i., 132 

Argus, i., 5, 48, 79, 86, 90, 
119, 131, 195, 203, 249- 
258, 265-267; ii., 39, 40 
45,82,199,200; makes six 
prizes, i., 131 ; engagement 
with Pelican, i., 250; is 
captured by her, i., 252; 
comparative force and loss, 
i., 252-254; not an action 
creditable to Americans, 
i., 254; diagram of ac- 
tion, i., 254; charges 
against her crew, i., 255; 
powder alleged to be bad, 
i., 255; comparison with 
previous combats, i., 256; 
inferiority of beaten crew 
unaccountable, i., 257 



Index 



301 



Ariel, L, 309, 311, 315, 318- 
321, 325, 327, 328; 11., 109 

Armada, ii., 55 

Armide, ii., 74 

Armstrong, Lieutenant, ii., 
187 

Arundel, Sailing-master, 1., 
188; wounded and 
drowned, i., 189 

Asp, i., 187, 247, 267, 271, 
278, 281, 289, 296-299, 
302, 311; ii., 197; cut out 
by boats from Mohawk and 
Contest, i., 247 

Aspinwall, Lieutenant, i., 283 

Astrea, i., 144 

Atalanta, ii., 60 

Atlas, ii., 164 

Austrians, i., 74 

Autobiography of a Seaman, 

i-. 4, 157 
Avon, 1., 82, 254, 256, 257; 

ii., 56-59,62, 83, 172, 201; 

chased by Wasp, ii., 56; 

captured after short and 

furious engagement, ii., 58; 

sinks, ii., 59 
Aylwin, ii., 115 
Ayscough, Sir G., i., 66 
Azores, i., 213 



Badajos, ii., 235; instance of 
cruelty of British troops at, 

ii-, 243 
Bainbridge, Commodore, 1., 
45, 62, 146, 148, 150, 152, 

154, 155. 157, 159. 162, 
165, 221, 223, 239; n., 108, 

151. 203 
Bainbridge, Master J., ii., 34 
Baker, Captain, ii., 45 
Ballahou, ii., 41, 82 
Ballard, ii., 115 
Ballard, Lieutenant, ii., 169, 

174, 177 
Baltic, battle of, i., 28, 336 



Baltimore, i., 210; ii., 41, 73, 
161, 162; unsuccessfully 
attacked by British, i., 11; 
ii., 46 

Barbadoes, i., 265; ii., 35, 41 

Barclay, Capt. R. H., i., 79, 
85. 273, 306, 317, 331, 332, 
2ii(>' 339; "•, 1.14; com- 
mander of British forces 
on Lake Erie, i., 309-311; 
description of his squadron 
and crews, i., 311— 315; 
engagement with Perry, 
i-> 3i7~32o; severely 
wounded, i., 321 

Bamegat, i., 102 

Barney, Commodore J., i., 
50; ii., 42, 44; errone- 
ously called an Irishman, 
ii., 41; attacks Albion and 
Dragon with flotilla, ii., 42, 

43 
Barnwell, Sailing-master, ii., 

20 
Barossa, i., 244; ii., 163 
Barras, Admiral, ii., 105 
Barrie, Sir R., relieved by 

Rear-Admiral Cochrane, 

ii-, 3 
Barry, Captain, ii., 67 
Bartholomew, Captain, ii., 

191, 192; wanton attack 

on American gunboat, ii., 

192 
Bartlett, Purser, ii., 189, 190 
Bassett, Sailing-master, ii., 8; 

promoted to lieutenancy, 

ii.. 9 
Bastard, Capt. J., i., loi 
Batailles Navales de la 

France, see Graviere, i. , 121 
Bathurst, Earl, ii., 238 
Baynes, Adj. -Gen. E.,i., 284, 

3'^i< 314 . 
Bayonnaise, 1., 237 
Beale, G., Jr., ii., 116 
Bell, Lieutenant, ii., 134 



302 



Index 



Belvidera, i., 8i, 90-95, loi, 
103, 106-108, 210; engage- 
ment with. President ,\. , 91- 

95 
Bentham, Capt. G., ii., 68 

Beresjord, i., 272, 285, 306; 

ii., 88 
Beresford, Capt. J. P., i-. 130 
Bermuda Royal Gazette, ii., 

Bermudas, 1., 132, 199; n., 

Biddle, Captam, 1., 126, 130, 
216; ii., 108, 145, 178, 179, 
182, 184, 187, 203 
Bignall, Lieut. G., i., 318, 

325 
Big Salmon River, ii., 95 
Big Sandy Creek, ii., 95, 96 
Bingham, Captain, i., 8 
Black Rock, i., 192 
Black Snake, ii., 97, 143 
Bladensburg, i., 11, 212; 

ii-- 43 
Blaeny, Lieutenant, 11., 93 
Blake's victory' over Dutch, 

i., 336, 340 
Blakely, Capt. J., i., 50, 82; 

ii., 34, 47. 49-51. 53-60, 

85, 203 
Bland, Quartermaster F., ii., 

20 
Blockade of American coast, 

strictness of, ii., i 
Blucher, ii., 152 
Blyth, Capt. S., i., 260; ii., 

203; killed, i., 261; great 

personal courage and hu- 
manity, i., 263 
Boarding nettings boiled in 

pitch, i., 198 
Boasting on both sides, ii., 4 
Bombay, i., 210 
Bonne Citoyenne, i., 145, 159, 

202, 221 ; ii., 184, 
Borgne, Lake, ii., 74, 158 
Boston, i., 59; ii., 197 



Boston, i., 109, 159, 165, 199; 
ii., 8, 145. 161, 165 

Boston Gazette, i., 156 

Boston Harbor, ii., 209 

Boston Lighthouse, i., 222 

Bowyer, Fort, ii., 68 

Boyer, Fort, ii., 253 

Boxer, i., 260, 262-264, 
267; ii., 81, 115, 140, 156, 
200, 296; engagement with 
Enterprise, i., 260-262; is 
captured, i., 262 

Brailesford, Midshipman, i., 

^94 
Braimer, Captain, ii., 58 
Brant, ii., 160 
Breckenbridge, Lieutenant, 

i., 245 
Brenton's Naval History, i., 

16, 17, 46, 47, 50, 51, 77. 

91, 113, 142, 145, 157, 300; 

ii. , 1 2 8 ; its inaccuracy, i. , 1 7 
Brest, i., 265 
Brine, Captain, ii., 54 
Bristol, ii., 161 
British accused of brutality, 

i., 228; ii., 242-243 
British Admiralty report, i., 

53 

British Infantry, 11., 245, 258 

British loss, summary, ii., 
197, 207-210, 250, 251; 
balance of loss against the 
British, ii., 199 

British navy, its great pres- 
tige at opening of war, i., 
122; numbered a thousand 
vessels, ii., 199 

British officers hampered by 
red tape, ii., 204 

British vessels captured or 
destroyed in 181 2, i., 168; 
in 1813, i., 267; in 1814, 
ii., 82, 83; in 1815, ii., 195; 
total loss, ii., 197. i?^; 
vessels on great lakes, in- 
experience of crews, i., 172 



Index 



30: 



British whalers in Pacific, i., 
200 

Broke, Capt. P. V., afterward 
Admiral, i., 43, 76, 102, 
109, 116, 219-228, 233- 
236; ii., 3. 84, 203-204; 
memoir of, i., 76; his 
chivalric challenge of Law- 
rence, i., 221; gallant con- 
duct in engagement against 
Chesapeake, i., 221-230 

Brooks, Lieutenant, mortally 
wounded, i., 322, 325 

Broom, Lieut. J., killed, i., 
226 

Brown, Capt. T., ii., 4 

Brown, Gen. J., i., 283; ii., 
92, 99, loi, 102 

Brown, Lieutenant, i., 188, 
278; ii., 96 

Brutality of British troops, i., 

197 
Buchan, Lieut. E., 1., 318: 

dangerously wounded, i., 

321, 3?5 
Budd, Lieut. C, ii., 192 
Budd, Lieut. G., i., 221, 226, 

227 
Bulger, Lieutenant, ii., no, 

III 
Bunker Hill, i., 41 
Bureau of Navigation, i., 52 
Burleton, Admiral Sir G., ii., 

186 
Burlington Heights, ii., 99 
"Burlington Races," i., 306 
Burrows, ii., 115 
Burrows, Lieut. W., Com. of 

the Enterprise, i., 260; ii., 

203; mortally wounded, i., 

262; his gallant conduct 

and great popularity, i., 

262, 263 
Bush, Lieutenant, i., 113 
Byng, Capt. H. D., i., 247 
Byron, Capt. R., i., 91-95, 

loi, 109, 210; ii., 203 



Calder, Sir R., i., 294 

Caledonia, i., 173, 190, 192, 
193, 282, 308, 311, 315, 
317-325. 327. 328; n., 109, 
in, 198; and four schoon- 
ers brought into Lake Erie, 
i., 282 

Caledonia, British privateer, 
captured by Norwich, {., 
212 

Call, William, ii., 17 

Callao, i., 200 

Campaign on the lakes, a fair 
account difficult, i., 175 

Campbell, Commodore H. G., 
i., 240; ii., 68, 71, 191 

Campbell, Master's Mate J., 

i-. 317 

Camperdown, victory of Lord 
Duncan, i., 28, 337 

"Canada must be con- 
quered, " i., 9 

Canadian colonies feebly de- 
fended, i., 9 

Canadians, alleged cowardice 
of, i., 181 

Canary Islands, i., 198; ii.,63 

Captains' Letters, i., 102, 
218, 223, 240; ii., 159, 160, 
183, 191 

Carden, Capt. J. S., i., 134- 

136, 139-143; ii-. 23; a 
poor commander, i., 139 
Carnation, i., 258; ii., 68, 69 
Caroband Bank, i., 202 
Carolina, i., 53, 168; ii., 74, 
79. 157. 219, 224, 225, 228, 
232 
Carolinas, i., 196; ii., 144 
Carroll, Major-General, ii., 

221, 240, 249. 
Carron, ii., 68 

Cassin, Lieutenant - Com- 
mander, i., 245; ii., 115, 

134. 142. 
Castilian, ii., 59 
Castlereagh, Lord, i., 53 



304 



Index 



Castine, ii., 66 

Cathcart, Captain, i., 214 

Centipede, i., 246; ii., 115, 

140 
Chads, Lieut. H. C, i., 147, 

149. 151. .154-156, 158 

Chameleon, i., 157 

Champlain, Lake, i., 171, 
174, 176, 180, 1S6; Battle 
of, i., 180, 333, 334, 33S, 
341; ii., 113, 121, 197 

Champlin, Sailing-master, i., 
318, 324; ii., no, III 

Chandeleur Islands, ii., 74, 
216 

Charlestown, i., 223, 264 

Charwell, ii., -88, 90, 91, 112 

Chasseur, ii., 162-164, 195; 
American privateer, chased 
by Barossa, ii., 163; mis- 
takes St. Lawrence for 
merchantman and engages 
her, ii., 163 

Chauncy, Commodore L, i., 
82, 177, 186, 191, 235, 
279, 282, 285, 287-289, 
291-293; ii., 86-91, 198; 
commander of forces 
on Ontario, i., 186; at 
Sackett's Harbor, i., 188; 
attacks Royal George, i., 
188; takes York, i., 279, 
and Fort George, i., 280; 
in action with Yeo does not 
compare favorably, i., 291, 
292; advantage from long 
guns, i., 296; his account 
of action near Genesee 
River, i., 296; engagement 
in York Bay, i., 297-303; 
partial victory off Burling- 
ton, i., 299; criticised as a 
commander, i., 307, 308; 
blockades Kingston, ii., 98; 
refuses to co-operate with 
Gen. Brown, ii., 100, 104; 
does not make best use of 



his materials, ii., 104; not 
deserving of praise given 
him, ii., 107 

Chauncy, Lieut. W., i., 278, 
286 

Chauncy's squadron on On- 
tario compared with Yeo's 
i., 271-273 

Cherub, ii., 10-16, 18, 21, 27, 
29-31 

Chesapeake, 1., 4, 51, 52, 83, 
85, 89, 130, 139, 182, 198, 
216, 220—226, 228—231, 
233-237. 254, 266, 267; ii., 
172, 199, 200; refitted out 
at Boston, inexperienced 
crew and new officers, i., 
216; armament, i., 220; 
engagement with Shannon, 
i., 221-230; captured by 
her, i., 228; diagram of 
action, i., 229 

Chesapeake Bay, i., 196, 210; 

Chesapeake River, i., 102; ii., 

3, 105, 145, 194 
CJievreiie, i., 158 
Childers, ii., 68 
Chili, ii., 105 
Chippeway, i., 173, 180, 314, 

316, 317, 319, 321, 324, 

327., 328, 343; "•- 81 
Chlorinde, i., 122 
Chubb, i., 182, 343; ii., 118, 

119, 131, 132, 136, 141, 143 
Ciudad Rodrigo, ii., 235, 243 
Claxton, Lieutenant, i., 128 
Claxton, Midshipman, i., 325 
Clement, Sailing-master G., 

ii-, 55 
Cleopatra, i., 144 

Clyde, i., 73 

Cockburn, Admiral, i., 196; 
ii., 191; attack on Wash- 
ington, ii., 43 

Cochrane, Admiral, i., 4; ii., 
3.45. 74. 215,237 



Index 



305 



Codrington, Admiral, 71/^- 
moirs, i., 75, 174, 206; ii., 
35, 39, 206, 233; comments 
on uselessness of mere 
martinets, i., 206 

Coffee, Gen., ii., 221, 238 

Coggeshall, G., History of 
American Privateers, i., 
247; ii.,72,163; gross mis- 
statements and sneers, i., 
247 

Cole, Memoirs of British Gen- 
erals, ii., 237, 256 

Collier, Captain, Sir G. R.,i., 
146, 214; ii., 47. 173. 176, 
178, 193; his blunders, ii., 

Columbia, n., 45, 82 
Couius, i., 144 
Co>iflance, i., 80, 180, 
304, 335; ii., 114- 118 



K 



\^ 



131. 132, 



i8r, 
119, 
135- 



94. 
215. 



128 

141. 143 

Congress, i., 70, 90, 91 
131, 132, 169, 212, 
267 ; ii., 118, 176, 202 

Congress, measure proposed 
against France and Eng- 
land, i., 7 

Congressional forethought, 
lack of, ii., 199 

Conklin, Lieut, A., i., 318 

Conkling, Lieut., ii., 112, 

113 ^ . 

Conner, Lieut. D., 1., 204, 

205, 209, 259 

Conquest, i., 185, 18S, 271, 
278, 280, 289, 296 

Constellation, i., ^^, 39, 70, 
89, 144. 197. 211, 245, 246; 
ii., 118, 202, 204; unsuc- 
cessful attempt to capture 
her, i., 197, 198 

Constitution, i., 5, 41, 45, 47, 
51-54, 67-72, 80-83, 86- 
89, 102-114, 116-122, 130, 
140, 142, 144-152, 156- 



163, 169, 217. 334; u., 5- 
8, 63, 85, 142, 145. 153. 
165-177, 188, 193, 202, 
205, 206; skirmish with 
and escape from British 
squadron, i., 102-109; cap- 
tures and bums two brigs, 
i., 109; recaptures Ameri- 
can brig, i., 109; engage- 
ment with and capture of 
Guerriere, i., 110-114; 
comparative force and loss, 
i., 114; diagram of action, 
i. , 115; her gtmnery excel- 
lent, faultlessly handled, 
i., 117; crew new men, i., 
118; engagement with 
Java, i., 147-15 1 ; cap- 
tures Java, i., 152; slight 
damage received, list of 
killed and wounded, i., 
152; comparative force 
and loss, i., 155; diagram 
of action, i., 153; cruising, 
ii., 5; captures Pictou, ii., 
5 ; misstatements in regard 
tocrew, ii., 6, 7 ; chased by 
two British frigates, ii., 
7; engagement with Cyane 
and Levant, ii., 167-172; 
captures both, ii., 168, 169; 
comparative force and loss. 



169, 



170; 



brilliant 



manoeuvring of C, dia- 
gram of action and com- 
ments on it, ii., 171; 
chased by British squad- 
ron, ii., 174-176; success- 
ful escape, ii., 177, 178 

Contest, i., 247 

Cooper, J. F., Naval History 
of the United States, i., 52, 
82, 92, 102, 105, 112, 118, 
124, 134, 178, 180, 181, 
183, 198, 200, 203, 230, 
231, 255, 269, 292, 310, 
318, 33°' 333' ii-> 5°. 53. 



3o6 



Index 



Cooper — Continued 

60, 80, 87, 107, 116, 118, 
147, 148, 160, 173; disposi- 
tion to praise everything 
American, i., 22; his in- 
judicious praise, i., 330 

Cooper's Allies Wallingford, 
Home as Found, Pilot, 
Two Admirals, i., 26 

Cooper, Midshipman, i., 205 

Copenhagen, i., 29 

Coshnahan, Midshipman, i., 
226 

Cornick, Lieut. H. D., i., 157 

Cornwall, i., 249 

Cornwallis, i., 69, 157, ii., 
184, 185, 193 

Courage alone does not make 
a great commander, i., 329 

Courier National, i., 144 

Cowell, Lieut. J. G., heroism 
when wounded, ii., 17 

Cox, Lieut. W. S., ii., 96; his 
cowardice, i., 225 

Crab Island, ii., 122, 133, 141 

Crane, Lieutenant, i., loi 

Craney Island, i., 197, 245 

Crawford, U. S. Minister to 
France, i., 249 

Creeks, power of, broken at 
battle of Horseshoe Bend, 
ii., 214 

Creerie, Lieut. J., i., 239, 240 

Creighton, Captain, i., 46 

Creole Militia, ii., 220, 239- 

Croghan, Colonel, ii., 109 
Crowninshield, Sec. B. W., i., 

Crow's Shoal, i., 248 
Cumberland Head, ii., 129- 

Cumberland Island, 11., 191 
Cummings, Midshipman J. 

C, i., 192, 325 
Curlew, i., 212 
Curry, Lieut. R. C, i., 247 



Cutting-out expedition 
against privateers, ii., 160; 
daring and successful one 
by British, ii., no, in 

Cyane, i., 65, 76, 80, 81, 214, 
334; ii., 2, 33, 165-169, 
171, 172, 174-176, 193, 195; 
engagement with Constitu- 
tion, ii., 167-172; surren- 
ders, ii., 168 

Cyprus, ii., 157 



Dabney, Consul J. B., ii., 68 
Dacres, Capt. J. R., i., loi, 
109, no, 116, 117, 119, 
139, 141, 142; wounded in 
engagement with Constitu- 
tion, i., 113 
Dail3\ Sailing-master, ii., 157 
Danes defeated in battle of 

Baltic, i., 336 
Danish gunboat, i., 242 
Dart captured by Newport 

flotilla, i., 264 
Davies, Lieut. D., i., 154 
Dearborn, General, i., 278, 

280, 281 
Decatur, ii., 199 
Decatur, Commodore, i., 31, 
39-41, 49, 52, 71, 90, 133- 

135' 138' ^4'' '^2' 216, 
221, 255, 257; ii., 23, 41, 
154, 179, 203; chased in 
the President by British 
fleet, ii., 145-148; sur- 
renders, ii., 149; did not 
" cover himself with glor}^" 
ii., 151; but acted rather 
tamely, ii., 153, i54, i93 
Delaware, i., 145 
Delaware Bay, i., 196, 248 
Demerara River, i., 202 
Dent, Capt. J. H., ii., 9, 158, 

160 
De Ruyter, i., 66, 183, 336, 

340 



Index 



307 



De Suffrein's five combats 
with Sir Edward Hughes, 
ii., 105 

Detroit, i., 190-193, 314, 316, 
317. 319-321, 326-329, 
330, 343; ii.. Ill, 198 

Detroit, capture of, i., 190 

Devastation, ii., 44, 46 

De Winter, i., 28 

Diadem, i., 245 

Dickenson, Capt. J., ii., 179, 
180 

Dickson, Colonel, ii., 250 

Dictator, i., 68 

Didon, i., 121 

Discipline displayed on 
American privateer Lot- 
tery, i., 210; neglect of 
essentials for mere inci- 
dents, in British navy, i., 
206 

Dixon, Corporal, i., 226 

Dobbs, Captain, ii., 112, 113 

Doctrinaire Democracy, ii., 
211 

Dolphin, {., 211, 212 

Dominica, ii., 199 

Douglass, Capt. G., ii., 165, 
168 

Douglass, Lord H., Naval 
Gunnery, i., 93, 94,_ 117, 
140, 141, 234, 238; ii., 22, 
190, 205; comments on 
action between Essex and 
Phcrbe, ii., 22 

Dover, i., 314 

Downes, Lieutenant, i., 201; 
ii., 18 

Downie, Capt. G., i., 81, 182, 
273; ii., 120, 123, 124, 127, 
128, 131; his force on 
Champlain, ii., 118-121; 
action with Macdonough, 
ii., 131, 132; killed, ii., 139 

Dragon, ii., 42, 67 

Dragoons from Mississippi, 
ii., 240 



Drake singeing the beard of 

the Catholic king, ii., 24 
Drummond, i., 304, 343 
Drummond, Gen. G., ii., 92, 

93 , . . 

Drunkenness on the Argus, 1., 

255. 257 
Dudley, Midshipman, i., 194 
Duncan, Lord, i., 28; victory 

at Camperdown, i., 337 
Dundonald, Lord, Autohi- 

ography of a Seaman, i., 4, 

77. 157 , . , 

Durham, Admiral, memoir of, 

by Captain Murray, ii., 7 

Dutch, i., 44 

Eagle, i., 335, 341-344; ii., 
81, 114, 115, 117, 130-132, 
137-141; captured, i., 342 

Earl of Moira, i., 172, 185, 
272, 283, 306; ii., 88 

Earle, Commodore, i., 172; 
feeble attack on Sackett's 
Harbor, i., 184; shows 
gross incompetence, i., 185 

East Indies, ii., 105, 145, 188 

Eckford, Henry, i., 180, 269, 
311: ii., 86, 87 

Egvptienne, i., 62 

Elliott, Capt. J. D., i., 188, 
191-193, 277, 297, 318, 
323,330; u., in; captures 
Detroit and Caledonia, i., 
192 

Ellis, Captain, i., 214 

Emmons, Lieut. G. 'E., Statis- 
tical History of U. S. Navy, 
{., 20, 59, 65, 198, 271, 311- 
312; ii., 80, 182; best 
American work on the sub- 
ject, i., 25 

Endymion, i., 15, 64, 69-71, 
79, 86, 229; ii., 72, 73, 145- 
156, 193; attack on Prince 
de Neufchdtel repulsed after 
desperate struggle, ii., 72 



3o8 



Index 



/ 



English Channel, ii., 48 
English vessels twice the size 

of Dutch, i., 336 
English victories over Dutch 

due to superiority in force, 

i-- 336 

Enterprise, i., 39; engage- 
ment with Boxer, i., 259- 
264; captures her, i., 262; 
severity of action, i., 263; 
superior force of Ameri- 
cans, i., 263; unfit to 
cruise and made a guard- 
ship, i., 264 

Epervier, i., 54, 65, 66, 82, 86, 
256, 257; ii., 36-40, 81, 83, 
155, 162, 200, 201, 206; 
captured by Peacock, com- 
parative force and loss, ii., 
38, 39: gunnery of British, 
poor, ii., 39; Epervier -puT- 
chased for U. S. Navy, ii., 

4° 
Epworth, Captain, i., 131 

Erebus, ii., 44, 46, 191, 192 

Erie, ii., 81 

Erie, Fort, i., 191; ii., 112 

Erie, Lake, i., 170, 173-177, 
180, 193. 194, 297, 308; ii., 
no; no American force 
there in 181 2, i., 190 

Erie, Lake, battle of (18 13), 
i., 326; teaches advantage 
of having the odds, i., m', 
victory honorably won, i., 
337: fought mainly by 
Canadians, i., 33S 

Espiegle, i., 202, 206, 221 

Essex, {., 43, 49, 54, 64, 72, 
78, 80, 89, 96-99, 139, 145, 
165, 169, 200-202, 267, 

335; ii-. 10-17. 19-21, 23- 
26, 28-34, 61, 82, 83, 170, 
199, 200; cuts out trans- 
port from Minerva, i., 97; 
crtiising, i., 97-101; en- 
gagement with Alert, i.j 



99 ; captures N acton, i. , 1 65 ; 
captures English merchant 
vessel, i., 166; struck by 
squall and disabled, ii., 13; 
attacked by Phcebe and 
Cherub, {{., 13-15; terrible 
loss and damage, ii., 20; 
surrenders, ii., 21; com- 
ments and criticism on the 
action, ii., 22-32 ; repaired 
at Valparaiso and sent to 
England, ii., 33 
Essex Junior, ii., 10, 12, 13, 

18, 33.. 34 
Eurotas, i., 122 
Euryalus, ii., 44, 45 
Eurydice, i., 51 
Evans, Captain, i., 62, 198 
Evans, Surgeon A. A., i., 

152, 156 
Everard, Capt. T., i., 342 



Fair American, i., 187, 271, 
278, 289, 296 

Fairy, ii., 45 

Falcon, Capt. G. T., ii., 165, 
166 

Falkiner, Lieutenant, i., 226 

False Duck Islands, i., 188, 
296, 304 

Farragut, D. G. (Admiral), i., 
98, 200; ii., II, 17, 20, 21, 
in his memoirs comments 
on Phcebe-Essex fight, ii., 
27, 28, 31, 32; greatest 
admiral since Nelson, ii., 

155 
Fayal, ii., 68 

Fernando de Noronha, island, 

i., 165 
Ferris, Sailing-master, ii., 76 
Finch, {., 181, 182, 343; ii., 

118-122, 131-133, 141, 

.^43 
Finch, Lieut. B., i., 165, 297, 
302 



Index 



309 



Finnis, Capt. R., i., 318; 

killed, i., 320 
Firefly, ii., 81 
Fischer, Lieut. -Col. V., ii., 92, 

93 

Flambeau, ii., 81 
Florida, ii., 22 
Florida, ii., 64, 214 
Floyd, Capt. R., ii., 68 
Forrest, Midshipman, i., 325 
Forte, i., 71, 120 
Fortune of War, ii., 68 
Forty Mile Creek, i., 285 
Franklin, ii., 193 
Franklin, ii., 256 
Fredericksburg, ii., 256 
Fredrickscoarn, i., 144 
" Free Trade and Sailors' 

Rights, i., 7 
French-English naval war, 

ii., 207 
French histories of English 
compared with English 
histories of Americans, i., 
238 
French infantry, ii., 258 
Frenchman's Creek, ii., 112 
Frigate, definition and de- 
scription of, i., 67 
Frio Cape, i., 166 
Frolic, i., 14, 43. 48, 63, 85, 
124—130, 160, 168, 220, 
334; ii., 26, 35, 53, 80, 82, 
85, 179, 200, 202; engage- 
ment with Wasp, captured 
by her after great slaugh- 
ter, i., 126; comparative 
force and loss, i., 127; dia- 
gram of action, i., 128 
Fulton, ii., 193, 194 
Fundy, Bay, i., 109 
Funk, Lieut. J. M., i., 135 



Galatea, i., 132 

Gallagher, Lieutenant, i., 49; 
ii., 150 



Gallapagos, i., 200 

Gamble, Lieut. P., ii., 135 I 

Gaiuo, i., 144 

Garden, Capt. S. J., i., 325 

Garland, Lieutenant, mor- 
tally wounded, i., 321 

Geisinger, Midshipman, ii., 
60 

General Armstrong, ii., 68, 70, 
164; attacked by British 
boats, ii., 68; attacked by 
Carnation, scuttled and 
burned by her own crew, 
ii., 69, 70 

General Pike, i., 80, 8r; ii., 
2-4, 8, 10, 17-22, 24, 29- 
ZZ^ 35. 39. 166, 168, 177, 
192, 205 

Genesee River, i., 286, 305, 
308; ii., 102, 104; engage- 
ment near mouth, i., 295 

George, Fort,i., 305-308; ii., 
99, 10 1 ; attacked and cap- 
tured by Chauncy's squad- 
ron, i., 280-282, 284 

Georgia, i., 196; ii., 144 

Georgiana, i., 201 

Gibbs, General, ii., 238, 251 

Gibraltar, ii., 55 

Gladiator, i., 149 

Gloire, i., 144 

Gloucester, i., 172, 185, 27S, 
279, 284, 343, ii., 198 

Good Hope, Cape, ii., 179, 
187 

Gordon, Capt. J. A., skilful 
attack on Fort Washing- 
ton, ii., 44, 45 

Governor Tompkins, i., 185, 
188, 271, 277, 280, 289, 
296—299, 302 

Graham, Midshipman, i., 194 

Graig, Lieutenant, i., 244 

Grasse, Comte de, victory 
over Sir T. Graves, ii., 

105 
Graves, Sir T., ii., 105 



310 



Index 



Graviere, Admiral J. de la, 
Guerres Alaritimes, i., 129, 
233; ii.,206; commentson 
first three engagements, 
i., 159-162; the best criti- 
cism on the naval war, ii., 
206 
Great Britain, views held in 
regard to neutral rights, i., 
I, 6, 7; find now no advo- 
cates, i., 7; offers apology 
for attack on Chesapeake, 
issues Orders in Council, i., 
8; engaged in European 
conflict during early part 
of this war, i., 9; assem- 
bles army of 14,000 men, i., 
1 1 ; greatness of naval 
power, i., 27, 28; upward 
of a thousand vessels at 
opening of war, ii., 199 
Great Sodas, i., 286 
Greene, Capt. P. B., i., 145 
Greenwich, i., 202 
Gregory, Lieut. F. H., ii., 97 
"Gridiron Flag," i., 35 
Griffith, Admiral, ii., 66 
Groivler, i., 179, 185, 188, 278, 
280, 287, 289,-291, 304, 

341-344; ii-. 92, 93. 118, 
143, 197; captured by 
gunboats, i., 342 

Guerin, Histoire Maritime de 
France, i., 237 

Guerriere, i., 13, 15, 48, 51, 
54, 72, 79. 83, 85, 90, 101- 
103, ip5, 110-114, 117- 
119, 122, 133, 139, 142, 
158, 160, 161, 168, 230, 
_235; ii., 6, 45, 172, 193, 
205 ; engagement with and 
capture by Constitution, 
i., 110-114; blown up by 
Americans, i., 116; falsely 
alleged to have been rotten 
i., 116; handling of her 
compared with that of Con- 



stitution, i., 117; outma- 
noeuvred by Constitution, 
i., 117 
Gunnery, skill of British fal- 
len off, i., 206; ii., 205; 
accuracy and superiority 
of Americans, ii., 232, 251, 
259 

Halifax, i., loi, 228 
Hambleton, Purser, i., 325 
Hamilton, i., 185, 188, 271, 

277, 281, 288, 304, 311; ii., 

197 
Hamilton, Secretary P., i., 

45. 58 
Hampden, ii., 66 
Hampton Roads, i., 197, 243 
Hampton sacked by British 

with revolting brutality, i., 

196 
Hanchett, Captain, i., 245 
Hardy, Captain, i., 70 
Hardy, Sir T. , ii., j 
Harris, Sergeant, i., 226 
Harrison, General, i., 318 
Hatfield, Midshipman, i., 279 
Haute, Isle of, ii., 66 
Havana, ii., 163 
Havannah, ii., 46 
Hawkins, Capt. R., i., 97 
Hawkins, Lieut. A., ii., 72 
Hayes, Capt. J., ii., 146-149, 

192 
Head, Capt. J., i., 212 
Hebrus, ii., 46, 159 
Hector, i., 201 
Hell Gate, i., 216 
Henderson, Captain, ii., 64 
Henderson, Lieutenant, ii., 

167 
Henly, Capt. R., i., 54; ii., 

115 ^. 
Henly, Lieut. J. D., 1., 210 
Hermes, ii., 68, 83, 155 
Hicks, Lieutenant, ii., 122 
Highflyer, i., 215, 267; ii., 199 



Index 



311 



Highlanders led by General 
Keane, ii., 246 

Hilyar, Capt. J., ii., 10-12, 
14—16, 19, 21—32; conduct 
in action with £55^:^, ii., 16, 
18; letter concerning de- 
fence of Essex, ii., 24, 26; 
breach of faith, ii., 28; 
courteous treatment of 
prisoners, ii., 29 

Hinn, Lieutenant, i., 278 

Hislop, Lieut. G., i., 157, 158 

Historical Register of the 
United States, ii., 287 

Hoffman,. Lieutenant, i., 112; 
ii., 168, 174, 175 

Hogue, ii., 3 

Holdup, Lieut. T., i., 194, 

Hollaway, Capt., n., 93 
Holmes' Hole, i., 208 
Hood, Sir S., i., 28 
Hope, Capt. H., ii., 72, 145, 

Hope, Lieut. D., 1., 133; n., 

35 

Horn, Cape, i., 200 

Hornet, i., 50, 64, 76, 82, 85, 
90, 96, 131, 145, 146, 159, 
163, 169, 199, 202—209, 
216, 220, 252, 255, 256, 
265, 267, 334; ii., 35, 85, 

142, 145. 156, 176, 178- 
188, 193, 202; captures a 
privateer, i., 96; chased by 
Montagu, i., 202; captures 
Resolution,!., 202; engage- 
ment with Peacock, cap- 
tures her, i., 203, 204; 
comparative loss, i., 205; 
diagram of action, i., 207; 
comparative force, i., 208, 
209; generous treatment 
to officers and crew of Pea- 
cock, i., 208; captures Pen- 
guin, ii., 181; diagram of 
action, ii., 181; compara- 



tive force and loss, ii., 182; 
a creditable action for 
Americans, ii., 183; chased 
by Cornwallis, but escapes, 
ii., 187 

Horseshoe Bend, battle of, ii., 
214, 221 

Hotham, Admiral, ii., 145, 

149 
House of Virginia and its 

theories, ii., 212 
Hughes, Sir E., ii., 105 
Hull, Capt. J., i., 31, 102-109, 
114, 116, 140, 162, 234, 
260, 326; ii., 55, 108, 155; 
his letter, i., 52; foremost 
ship-captain of the war, i., 
108-110, 114; exultation 
caused by victory over 
Guerriere, i., 122; his fa- 
mous cruise, ii., 65; de- 
serves palm as best single- 
ship captain, ii., 202-203 
Humbert, General, ii., 250 
Humble, James, i., 150, 154 
Hunter, i., 173, 180, 209, 311, 
314, 316, 31S-321, 324, 

327. 343 
Hunter's Point, i., 216 

Hurlburt, Sailing-master, ii., 

191, 192 
Huron, Lake, i., 170, 176; n., 

109 
Hutchinson, Lieut. W., i.,215 

Icarus, {., 157 

Impressment of American 

seamen, i., 1-4, 41; cases 

on record, i., 53 
Indefatigable, i., 69 
Independence, ii., 193 
Indian Ocean, ii., 188 
Inglis, Lieut. G., i., 322 
Ingraham, E. D., Capture of 

Washington, {., 11 
Ingram, Lieut. W., ii., 21 
Ireland, i., 215; ii., 64 



312 



Index 



Irish Channel, i., 215 
Irvine, Lieutenant, i., 190, 

194, 320 
Isle aux Noix, i., 341 ; ii., 1 15 
Italians, i., 44 
Izard, General, ii., 102 

Jackson, General Andrew, ii., 
79,157; at New Orleans, i., 
212; a backwoods general, 
ii., 214; his campaign 
against the Creeks, ii., 214; 
attacks the Spaniards and 
drives them from Pensaco- 
la, ii., 214; becomes defen- 
der of Lotiisiana,ii.,2i4; his 
vigilance, military' genius, 
and patience, ii., 218; 
fortifies New Orleans, ii., 
219; raises 1000 militia- 
men, chiefly Creoles, ii., 
220: his principal reliance, 
the Tennessee volunteers, 
ii., 221; his management 
of and popularity with 
thein, ii., 222; learns of 
arrival of Keane's force 
and prepares to attack 
him, ii., 223; desperate 
hand to hand night en- 
gagement, ii., 226-227; 
" grizzled old bush-fighter," 
ii., 236; disposition of his 
forces in waiting for com- 
bined British attack, ii., 
239-241; fierceness of 
the ensuing engagement, 
ii., 245-247; defeats the 
British at nearly all points, 
ii., 245-247; sends rein- 
forcements under Humbert 
to retake position lost by 
Morgan, ii., 250; his forces 
increasing daily, ii., 252; 
his unjust censure of garri- 
son of Fort Boyer for sur- 
rendering (quickly, ii., 253; 



the most prominent figure 
in the war, ii., 255; the 
feat performed by him al- 
most unparalleled, ii., 255; 
his success due not to 
chance or errors of his ad- 
versaries, ii., 256; tireless 
care in drilling raw troops, 
ii., 258; the ablest Ameri- 
can general up to the time 
of the great Rebellion, ii., 
260 
Jamaica, i., 90 
Jamaica fleet, ii., 64, 196 
James, W., Naval History of 
Great Britain and Naval 
Occurrences, i., 2, 5, 6, 44- 
52, 69, 76, 79, 83, 92, 93, 
99, 105, 119, 122, 123, 134, 

140, 145. 157. 174, 178- 

185, 195, 197, 203, 206, 

2og, 210, 213, 214, 224, 

229, 232, 237-239, 246, 

252, 253, 258, 260, 269- 

273, 279, 280, 284, 288, 

294-297, 312, 313, 318, 

m^ 337. 2,?>^'' "•' 4. 6, 8, 
19, 21, 25, 31, 35-38, 41, 
48, 55. 56, 59. 66-69, 72- 
75. 89, 93, 96, 115, 118- 
124, 139, 141, 146-153. 
r55. 163, 171, 177, 178, 
183-187, 195, 204, 207; 
most valuable authority 
on British affairs, hatred 
toward Americans, i., 18; 
misstatements, i., 19, 20; 
basis for all other English 
histories of the war, i., 21; 
unreliability, i., 178, 246; 
grossly inaccurate, inexcu- 
sable garbling of reports, ii . , 
32, 33; wilful perversion of 
truth, ii., 32, 33; endeavor 
to prove American seamen 
cowards, ii., 61; wherein 
his chief value for reference 



Index 



313 



James — Continued 

lies, ii., 62; misstatements 
echoed by all British his- 
torians, ii., 154; utterly vm- 
trustworthy, except for 
things purely British, ii., 

jfasseur, ii., 42 

Java, i., 51, 72, 76, 77, 82-85, 
122, 13Q, 146-163, 168, 230, 

233. 334; ii-. 6, 45. 193. 
202, 205, 210; engagement 
with Constitution, i., 147- 
151; captured by her, i., 
151; after receiving severe 
injuries, i., 152; list of 
killed and wounded, i., 

152-155 
Jefjerson, ii., 86, 89, 91, 98 
Jefferson, Pres. T., project of 
having navy composed of 
small gunboats, i., 243; 
ii., 200; weakness of, as 
Executive, ii., 211, 212 
John Adams, i., 59, 88; cu- 
rious tradition about her 
sailing qualities, ii., 65 
John, Lieutenant-Colonel, ii., 

67 
Johnson, Lieut. R., n., 70 
Johnston, Sailing-master, ii., 

75- 157 
Jones, n., 86, 89, 91, 98 
Jones, Capt. J., i., 123-127, 

130, 216; ii., 203 
Jones, Lieut. T. C, ii., 74-76, 

79. 216 
Jones, Surgeon J. C, i., i^i, 

156 
Julia, 1., 179, 185, 188, 280, 

287, 289, 291, 304, 344; 

ii., 197 
Junon, i., 210, 244, 248; n., 7 

Keane, Major-General John, 
advances on New Orleans, 
December 23d, ii., 17; 



camps on east bank of 
Mississippi, ii., 222; esti- 
mate of his force by differ- 
ent authorities, ii., 222; 
leisurely arrangement of 
his camps, ii., 224; sur- 
prised by attack of Patter- 
son in the Carolina, ii., 
225; is disabled, ii., 246 
Kearney, Lieut. L., ii., 159 
Klaeson, Captain, blowing 

up his ship, ii., 24 
Kenesaw Mountain, ii., 256 
Kentvicky Militia poorly 
armed, ii., 238, 239; of 
little use, ii., 259 
Kentucky Mounted Infantry, 
brilliant charge of, ii., 213 
Kerr, Capt. R. ii., 173 
King, Captain, i., 193 
King, Lieutenant, i., 193, 

194; ii., 41 
Kingston, i., 175, 188, 190, 

270, 277, 283, 285, 287, 
304; ii., 88, 91, 94, 98, 102 
blockaded by Chauncy, i., 
190; ii., 98 

Knox, Pilot, i., 224 

Lady Gore, i., 304, 343 
Lady of the Lake, i., 269, 

271, 278, 280, 286; cap- 
tures Lady Murray, i., 286 

Lady Prevost, i., 173, 180, 
314, 316, 318, 319, 321, 
324, 328, 343 

Lady Murray, i., 286 

Lafitte, French privateers- 
man, ii., 220 

Lamb, Midshipman, killed, i., 

325 ^ . . 

Lambert, Captain, 1., 146, 

150; ii., 205; mortally 

wounded in action with 

Constitution, i., 152 

Lambert, General, arrives 

with reinforcement for 



314 



Index 



Lambert — Continued 

Packenham, ii., 238; re- 
treats, ii., 252; reaches 
transports safely, ii., 253; 
sails for Mobile and cap- 
tures Fort Boyer, ii., 253 

Landrail, ii., 82 ; captured by 
Syren, privateer, ii., 55 

Lang, Jack, i., 47, 126 

Laugharne, Capt. T. L. O., i., 

LauresiDius, i., 243 
Law, Lieutenant, i., 225 
Lawrence, i., 309-313, 315- 

323, 326-328, 330; ii., 26; 
reduced to a wreck on Lake 
Erie, i., 325; heroic cour- 
age shown in the defence, 
i., 326 

Lawrence, Captain, i., 90, 
145, 199, 202, 205, 208, 
209, 216, 221, 222, 232, 
263, 266; ii., 2, 203; fa- 
tally wounded, i., 225, 228; 
a "Bayard of the Seas," 
i., 234, 236 

Leander,\\.,i^'], 173, 174, 178; 
captures Rattlesnake, ii., 47 

Lee, Midshipman, ii., 138, 
141 

Leopard, i., 52; attack on 
Chesapeake, i., 8 

Les Petites Coquilles, ii., 75 

Levant, i., 66, 80, 81, 214, 
334; ii-. 35, 166-168, 170- 
172, 174, 176, 178, 193, 
195 ; engagement with Con- 
stitution, n., 167-172; sur- 
renders, ii., 169 

Levees cut by Americans, ii., 
228 

Linnet i., 181; ii., 115, 118, 

.119. 131. .132. 137-143 
Little Belt, i., 173, 180, 215, 

314, 316, 318, 319, 321, 

324, 327. 33(>, 343; .11-. 190 
Livermore, Chaplain, i., 226 



Lockyer, Captain, ii., 74, 77, 
79, 216, 217 

Loire, ii., 4, 42, 43 

London Naval Chronicle, i., 
25: ii., 119, 123, 141, 165, 
166, 172 

Long Island, ii., 146 

Long Island Sound, i., 196; 
ii., 194 

Losack, Capt. W., i., 132 

Losses in this war compared 
with Anglo-French naval 
struggle, ii., 207-210, and 
Anglo-Danish, ii., 210; bal- 
ance of loss against Great 
Britain, ii., 210 

Lossing, Field-Book of War of 
1812,1., 14, 183, 191, 208, 
279, 280, 311, 342; ii., 116, 
119 

Lottery, American privateer, 
i., 210, 212; ii., 164; cap- 
tured, after stubborn re- 
sistance, by British squad- 
ron, i., 210 

Louis XV., ii., 107 

Louisiana, i., 168; ii., 74, 80, 
157, 219, 230, 231 

Louisiana, ii., 214, 215; Fed- 
eral Government does 
nothing for defence of, ii., 
218; militia of, ii., 220, 239- 
241, 250, 259 

Low, C. R., History of Indian 
Navy, i., 252; ii., 188, 189, 
191 

Lower Canada, campaign in, 
ii-, 255 

Ludlow, ii., 115 

Ludlow, Lieut. A., i., 217, 
225, 227, 228; mortally 
wounded, ii., 214, 215 

Lumley, Captain, i., 210; ii., 

145 , 
Lundy's Lane, i., 212; ii., 213 

Lyman, Master's Mate, ii., 60 

Lyman, Midshipman, ii., 34 



Index 



315 



Lynhaven Bay, i., 210 
Lynx, i., 211, 212; ii., 81 

Macdonough, Capt. T., i., 11, 
81,273,341, ii., 108; force 
on Lake Champlain, ii., 
114-117, 1 21-124; victor 
against decided odds, i., 
332, 335. 341; assumes 
command of Champlain, i., 
341 ; builds three new ves- 
sels, i., 345, 346; prepara- 
tion for engagement, ii., 
128; prays before the bat- 
tle, ii., 131; description of 
the action, ii., 132-143; 
Macdonough's gallant and 
energetic conduct, ii., 135- 
137; courtesy and hu- 
manity to prisoners and 
wounded, ii., 141; his vic- 
tory, ii., 142; his character 
— one of the greatest of our 
sea-captains, ii., 143 

Macomb, General, at Platts- 
burg, ii., 114 

Macedonian, i., 13, 40, 54, 68, 
71, 72, 82, 83, 85, 130, 133, 

136, 138, 139. 142. 144, 
158, 160, 161, 168, 216, 
230, 235; ii., 23, 118, 172, 
176, 186, 202; engage- 
ment with and capture by 
United States, i., 133-135; 
severely damaged and with 
great loss of crew, i., 136; 
Americans in her crew, i., 

Machilimacinac, ii., 109 
Madeira, i., 198; ii., 165 
Madison, i., 187, 270, 271, 

274, 280, 289, 291, 296, 

297, 299, joi-303, 306; ii., 

87, 89, 91, 100, 115 
Madison, incapacity of as 

President, ii., 212 
Magnet, ii., 88, 90, 98, 143 



Maidstone, i., 210 

Maitland, Captain, ii., 5, 6 

Majestic, ii., 146, 149 

Makanilla, ii., 64 • 

Malheureux Islands, ii., 75 

Man, Isle of, ii., 161 

Manly, i., 144 

Manners, Capt. W., i., 43, 90; 
ii., 53, 84, 85; heroic con- 
duct in action with Wasp, 
ii., 50; mortally wounded 
leading the attack, ii., 51; 
praise due him, ii., 202 

Maples, Capt. J. F., i., 250- 

253 
Maranham, u., 177 

Marquesas, i., 200 
Marryat's novels, i., 26 
Mars, {., 264 
Marshall, Captain, i., 154 
Marshall's Royal Naval Bi- 
ography, {., 16, 41, 52, 102, 
105. '^i^< 136; ii., 173. 176, 

177 
Martha's Vineyard, 1., 208 

Martin, i., 248 
Mary, i., 304, 343 
Maryland, ii., 214, 254 
Masters - Commandant Let- 
ters, {., 199, 249; ii., 115 
Matterface, Lieut. W., ii., 69, 

McCall, Lieut. E. R., 1., 260, 

261 
McClintock, Midshipman, i., 

247 
McCreery, Lieut. D., i., 261 
McDonald, Lieutenant, ii., 

180 
McGowan, Midshipman, ii., 

103 
McHenry, Fort, attacked im- 

successfully by bomb-ves- 
sels, ii., 46 
McKeever, Lieut. J. D., ii., 76 
McKnight, Lieutenant, ii., 
20, 34, 60 



3i6 



Index 



McPherson, Lieutenant, i., 
i88, 277 

Meduse, i., 265 

Medway, ii., 54, 179 

Alelville, i., 272, 274, 288, 
295, 306; ii., 88 

Menelaus, ii., 44 

Merrimac, ii., 194 

Meteor, ii., 44, 46 

Milan, 1., 144 

Militia of U.S., as a rule, use- 
less in this war, but gain 
splendid victory at New 
Orleans, i., 12; not able to 
withstand much smaller 
well-trained force, i., 187; 
free colored, of New Or- 
leans, ii., 220; of Ken- 
tucky, ii., 238, 239, 259 

Miller, Captain, ii., 43, 44 

Miller, Lieutenant, i., 48 

Mills, Colonel, i., 283 

Minerva, i., 90, 97-99 

Mindham, W., i., 223, 227 

Mississippi, ii., 79, 215, 216; 
canal cvit in, ii., 236, 248 

Mitchell, Colonel, ii., 92, 94 

Mix, Sailing-master, i., 188, 
278 

Mobile, ii., 253 

Mobile Point', ii., 68 

Mohawk, {., 247; ii., 87, 88, 
91, 100 

Mohawk River, i., 172 

Mona Passage, ii., 5 

Monk, Sailing-master J., i., 
212 

Montagu, i., 146, 202 

Montgomery, i., 343 

Montreal, ii., 88, 89, 91, 100 

Montresor, Captain, ii., 74 

Morgan, General, ii., 248, 255 

Morris, Captain Charles (Com- 
modore) , Autobiography, 
i.. Ill, 164; ii., 63-67 

Morris, Lieut. C, i., 104, 113, 
142 



Mount, Cape, ii., 63 

Mulcaster, Capt. W. H., i., 
298-302, 306; ii., 92, 93; 
best British officer on On- 
tario, i., 299 

Murray, Capt. J., i., 342, 343; 
11., 7 

Nancy, ii., no, 198 

Nantucket,!., loi, 215; ii., 
72 

Napoleon's defeat by Wel- 
lington, ii., 152 

Narcissus, i., 210, 239; ii., 
42, 43; captures Viper, i., 
210 

Nattagawassa Creek, ii., 109 

Nautilus, i., 48, 54, 90, loi, 
168, 253; ii., 29, 156, 188, 
189, 193; captured by 
British squadron, i., loi 

Naval archives, ii., 115 

Naval Chronicle, i., 51, 152, 
156, 157, 181, 261 

Naval monument, ii., 4 

Naval war of 181 2, causes 
of, i., i; impossibility of 
avoiding it, i., 7; decla- 
ration of war June 18,1812, 
i., 9; slight preparations 
made, i., 9; opens badly 
for United States, i., 10; 
battles mere skirmishes, i., 
10; battle at Bladensburg, 
burning of public buildings 
at Washington, attack on 
Baltiinore, i., 11; battle of 
New Orleans, i., 12; au- 
thorities referred to, i., 13; 
overwhelming naval su- 
premacy of Great Britain, 
i., 27; practical lessons 
conveyed by the war, i., 
3 1 ; race identity of coin- 
batants, i., 32; practically 
a civil war, i., 2,i'< Ameri- 
can navy at beginning of 



Index 



317 



Naval War of 181 2 — Cont'd 
war, i., 34; officers well 
trained, i., 34; efficiency of 
seamen and its causes, 
i., 36; similarity between 
British and American sea- 
men, i., 33, 43; American 
vessels manned chiefly by 
native Americans, many of 
whom had fonnerly been 
impressed into British 
navy, i., 40-54; quotas of 
seamen contributed by the 
different States, i., 55; 
navy yards, i., 57; lists of 
officers and men, i., 58; 
tonnage and ratings, 
American ships properly 
rated, i., 60-75; arma- 
ments, three styles of guns 
used, i., 77; difference de- 
scribed, i., 78-81; short 
weight of American shot, 
i.,82; comparison of British 
and American frigates, i., 
83-88; Belvidcra pursued 
by Commodore Rodgers, i., 
9 1 ; engagement between 
Belvidera and President, i., 
92-93; Hornet captures a 
privateer, i., 96; cruise of 
Essex, i., 96-101; Consti- 
tution captures Guerricre, 
i.,114; marked superiority 
shown by Americans, i., 
119; Wasp captures Frolic 
after hot action, i., 123; 
disproportionate loss on 
British side, i., 130; both 
vessels captured by Poic- 
tiers, i., 130; United States 
captures Macedonian, i., 
135; slight American and 
great British loss, i., 135; 
comments by Lord Doug- 
lass on the action, i., 140, 
141; Constitution cSi^tMres 



Java, i., 152; slight in- 
juries received by Consti- 
tution, i., 152; severe loss 
on Java, i., 152; diagram 
of action, i., 153; compara- 
tive force and loss, i., 155; 
comments by various au- 
thorities, i., 156-158; com- 
ments by Admiral de la 
Graviere on first three bat- 
tles of war, i., 159-162; 
comments by the author, 
i., 162-163; Vixen cap- 
tured by Southampton, and 
both wrecked, i., 165; 
Essex captures Nocton, 
afterward recaptured, i., 
165; suminary of the 
year's fighting, i., 166-169; 
vessels captured or de- 
stroyed, and vessels built, 
i., 168; prizes made, i., 
169; war on the lakes, i., 
170; combatants on nearly 
equal footing, i. , 171; diffi- 
culty of comparing the 
rival squadrons, i., 176; 
unreliability of authorities, 
especially Jaines, i., 178; 
Earle's feeble attack on 
Sackett's Harbor, i., 1S4; 
pursuit and . attack on 
Royal George by Chauncy, 
i., 188-189; Elliott cap- 
tures Detroit and Caledo- 
nia, {., 192; attack on Red 
House barracks by Lieu- 
tenant Angus, i., 193; 
disastrous result, i., 194; 
brutal sacking of Hamp- 
ton, i., 196; blockade of 
Ainerican coast, i., 196; 
Commodore Porter's cam- 
paign with Essex in South 
Pacific, i., 200; Hornet 
blockades Bonne Citoyenne, 
i., 159, 202; Hornet cap- 



3i8 



Index 



Naval War of 1812 — Cont'd 
tures Resolution, i., 202; 
Hornet captures Peacock, i. , 
204; diagram of action, i., 
207 ; comparative force 
and loss, i., 209; generous 
treatment shown by vic- 
tors, i., 208; Narcissus 
captures Viper, i., 210; 
Lottery, Dolphin, Racer, 
Arab, and Lynx, American 
privateers, cut out by 
British boats, i., 210—212; 
Norwich captures British 
privateer Caledonia, i. ,2 1 2 ; 
third cruise of Commo- 
dore Rodgers, i., 212-215; 
United States, Macedonian, 
and Wasp blockaded in 
New London, i., 216; 
Broke 's challenge to Law- 
rence, i., 221; engagement 
between Shannon and 
Chesapeake, i., 222-230; 
Chesapeake captured after 
desperate fight, i., 228; 
comments and criticism by 
Cooper, i., 230-232; by de 
la Graviere, i., 233; by au- 
thor, i., 231-232; by Brit- 
ish historians, i., 236; Sur- 
veyor captured by Narcis- 
sus, {., 239-240; futile gun- 
boat actions, i. , 243; Brit- 
ish attack on Craney Is- 
land, i., 245; repulsed with 
loss, i., 246; Asp cut out 
by boats from Mohawk and 
Contest, {., 247; American 
gunboat cut out by boats 
from Junon and Martin, i., 
248 ; engagement between 
Argus and Pelican, i., 250- 
251; capture of Argus, i., 
252 ; comparative force and 
loss, and diagram of action, 
i., 253-254; not a credit- 



able action for Americans, 
i.,254; comments and com- 
parison with similar fights, 
i., 254-259; Enterprise 
captures Boxer after very 
severe engagement, i., 262; 
British privateer Dart cap- 
tured by Newport flotilla, 
i., 264; ocean warfare of 
1813 in favor of British, i., 
265; summary of year, i., 
265-267; vessels sunk, 
taken, built, and pur- 
chased, prizes made, i., 
266-267; 01^ the lakes, 
1813, Chauncy's squadron 
compared with Yeo's, i., 
271-276; Yeo's superior, 
i., 273; Chauncy takes 
York, i., 278; takes Fort 
George, inflicting heavy 
loss, i., 280-282; British 
evacuate Niagara frontier, 
i., 282; British attack on 
Sackett's Harbor is re- 
pulsed with great loss, i., 
283-284; Lady of Lake 
captures Lady Murray, i., 
286; Hamilton and. Scourge 
founder in a squall, i., 288; 
evolution of the two squad- 
rons, i., 289; diagram 
showing position of vessels, 
i., 290; British gain ad- 
vantage in action ensuing, 
i., 291; but the result not 
decisive, i., 293; nor the 
victory brilliant, i., 294; 
Americans reinforced by 
Sylph, i., 295; engage- 
ment near Genesee River, 
i., 295; in York Bay, i., 
297-300; diagram of ac- 
tion, i., 298; comments 
and criticism by Brenton, 
James, and the author, i., 
300-303; American force 



Index 



319 



Naval War of 1812 — Cont'd 
superior, i., 301; reported 
heavy loss on the Wolfe 
and Royal George, i., 304; 
Yeo blockaded in Kings- 
ton, i., 304; summary of 
the season on Ontario, i., 
305-308; success in favor 
of Americans, i., 305, 308; 
Yeo and Chauncy com- 
pared, i., 305, 306; reason 
for American success, i., 
308; campaign on Lake 
Erie,!., 308; description of 
the squadrons, i., 311-317; 
engagement with heavy 
loss on both sides, i., 319- 
325; American victory and 
its importance, i., 326; 
"glory" of it overesti- 
mated, i., 326; diagram of 
action, i., 327, 32S; great 
valor displayed on both 
sides, i., 326; injudicious 
praise in Cooper's Naval 
History, i., 330; comments 
and criticism, i., 331-340; 
victory due to heavy metal, 
i.,332; and superior equip- 
ment in general, i., 337; 
for which credit is due to 
Perry, i., 337; men form- 
ing the crews, i., 338; cam- 
paign on Champlain, i., 
341; Growler and Eagle 
captured by gunboat at- 
tack, i., 342; total loss on 
lakes during 181 3, i., 343, 
344; on the ocean, 18 14, 
ii., I ; destruction of coast- 
ers and fishing-boats at 
Pettipauge, ii., 3; cruise of 
Rodgers, ii., 3; Constitu- 
tion, chased into Marble- 
head, ii., 8; attempt at 
cutting out the Alligator 
defeated, ii., 8; British 



manoeuvres to capture Es- 
sex, ii., 18; fight between 
Phiebe and Cherub and Es- 
sex, ii., 18-21; Essex cap- 
tured after great loss, ii., 
2 1 ; comments and criti- 
cisms on the action, ii., 
22—23; discrepancies in 
official accounts of loss on 
Essex, ii., 26; comparative 
force on the three vessels, 
ii., 30; action between Pea- 
cock and Epervier, ii., 36- 
38; Epervier captured, ii., 
37; diagram of action, ii., 
37: comparative force and 
loss, ii., 38, 39; comments, 
ii., 39; Cominodore Bar- 
ney's flotilla attacks Dra- 
gon axid Albion, u., ^^2; at- 
tack of British on Wash- 
ington by land and sea, 
ii., 43; capture of Wash- 
ington by General Ross, 
and burning of public 
buildings, ii., 46; Balti- 
more threatened, ii., 46; 
unsuccessful attack on 
Fort McHenry and retire- 
ment of British fleet and 
army, ii., 46; Wasp cap- 
tures Reindeer after severe 
engagement, ii., 48-52; 
diagram of action, ii., 52; 
comments, ii., 53; the 
odds against Reindeer, ii., 
53; gallantry of both cap- 
tains, ii., 53, 54; Eag/(? 
tender captured, ii., 54; 
Syren taken by Medway, 
Landrail taken by priva- 
teer Syren, ii., 54, 55; 
Wasp chases Avon, ii., 56; 
captures her after brief and 
furious engagement, ii., 58; 
Avon sinks, ii., 59; dia- 
gram of action, ii., 58; 



320 



Index 



Naval War of 1812 — Cont'd 
comparative force and loss, 
comments, ii., 59; cruise of 
the Adams, ii., 63; chased 
by Tigress and escapes, ii., 
64, 65; curious sailing 
qualities resulting from be- 
ing built by contract, ii., 
65; attacked on Penobscot, 
ii., 66; burned by Captain 
Morris, ii., 67; privateer 
General Armstrong at- 
tacked in Fayal roads, ii., 
68; crew compelled to 
scuttle and burn her, ii., 
70; boats from Endymion 
attack privateer Prince de 
Neufchdtel, ii., 71, 72; re- 
pulsed after desperate 
struggle, ii., 73; American 
gunboats on Lake Borgne 
taken, ii., 74; serious loss 
of British, ii., 79; sum- 
mary of year's fighting, 
vessels built, lost, and cap- 
tured, ii., 80-83; general 
comments, ii., 83; prizes 
made, ii., 85; on the lakes, 
18 14 — Ontario: American 
schooners converted into 
transports, ii., 86; new 
vessels launched by Ameri- 
cans, ii., 86; by British, ii., 
88; statistics of the two 
squadrons, ii., 89, 90; se- 
rious sickness among the 
Americans, ii., 87; Yeo 
takes Oswego, ii., 91; and 
blockades Sackett's Har- 
bor, ii., 94; raises blockade, 
ii., 97; Chauncy blockades 
Kingston, ii., 98; refuses 
to co-operate with General 
Brown, ii., 100-103; cau- 
tiousness of commanders of 
both squadrons, ii., 100- 
108; Captain Sinclair, 



commander of American 
forces on upper lakes, 
bums St. Joseph, ii., 109; 
makes unsuccessful expe- 
dition against Mackinaw, 
leaves for Lake Erie, ii., 
no; daring cutting-out 
expedition of British on 
Huron and Erie, ii., iio- 
112; capture of Ohio and 
Soniers, ii., 112; Cham- 
plain, description of Mac- 
donough's and Downie's 
squadrons, ii., 11 5-1 20; 
James's erroneous state- 
ments in regard to them, 
ii., 121— 127; description of 
action, ii., 130-141; gal- 
lant and energetic conduct 
of Macdonough, ii., 135; 
inexperience of the crews, 
loading cannon without 
powder, ii., 136; Macdon- 
ough's victory, ii., 142; 
extraordinary damage to 
vessels on both sides, ii., 
140; Macdonough one of 
the greatest of American 
sea captains, ii., 142; his 
character, ii., 143; on the 
ocean, 181 5, ii., 144; Presi- 
dent chased by Captain 
Hayes's squadron, ii., 146; 
dismantles Endymion, ii., 
148, but is raked by Tene- 
dos and Pomone, and sur- 
renders, ii., 149; account 
of this action taken mainly 
from official reports, ii., 
150; discussion of various 
misstatements in regard to 
it, ii., 1 51-156; brilliant 
cutting-out expeditions by 
Americans, ii., 157-160; 
American privateer Chas- 
seur engages and captures 
St. Laivrence, ii., 162-164; 



Index 



321 



Naval War of 181 2 — Cont'd 
ability of several privateer 
captains, ii., 164; cruise of 
ConstitiiHon, ii., 165; en- 
gagement with Cyane and 
Levant, ii., 167-172; cap- 
tures both, ii., 168, 169; 
comparative force and loss, 
ii., 169, 170; brilliant 
manosuvring of Constitu- 
tion, diagram of action, 
comments, ii., 171; Con- 
stitution chased by three 
frigates, ii., 174; success- 
ful escape, ii., I'j-j; Hornet 
captures Penguin, ii., 180- 
183; diagram of action , ii. , 
181; comparative force, ii., 
181; Hornet escapes from 
pursuit of Cormvallis, ii., 
187; Peacock captures East 
Indiaman, Nautilus, ii., 
189; Captain Warrington 
acts without proper pre- 
cautions, ii., 190; wanton 
attack on American gun- 
boat by Captain Bartholo- 
mew, after declaration of 
peace, ii., 191; summary 
of events in 1815, ii., 192; 
Americans deserve balance 
of praise, ii., 192; list of 
ships built and destroyed, 
ii., 193-195; feeling about 
use of torpedoes, ii., 195; 
material result of naval 
part of war slight, moral 
benefit to the Americans 
great, ii., 196; total loss on 
both sides compared, ii., 
197; comments and criti- 
cisms on various actions of 
the war in general, ii., 199- 
206; best criticism that of 
de la Graviere in Guerres 
Maritimes, ii., 206; com- 
pared with resultsof Anglo- 



French struggle, ii., 207- 
210; tonnage of vessels in 
181 2, how estimated, ii., 
262-267; twelve single- 
ship actions in war, ii,, 268; 
catises of American suc- 
cess, ii., 269; previovis his- 
tory of American navy, ii., 
268-277; Soley's Naval 
Campaign of 1S12, ii., 278 
Navigation bureau, i., 203 
Navy list of 18 16, i., 47 
Navy of Great Britain corn- 
pared with that of U. S., i., 

64 
Navy of U. S., reputation 
gained in the war, i., 8; in- 
creased fourfold in num- 
bers during war, i., g; pre- 
vious history, ii., 269, 273; 
Troude'<s blunders, ii., 271 ; 
superior to French in 1800, 
ii., 274, but slightly infe- 
rior to British, ii., 275 ; but 
in 1777-82 much inferior, 
ii., 276; reasons, ii., 276 
Nayaden, i., 68, 71 
Neale, Lieutenant, i., 245 
Nelson, Lord, i., 41, 183; 
"presumptuous," i., 239; 
success against heavy odds, 

Nereide, i., 73; ii., 171 

Nereyda, i., 200 

Netly, ii., 88, 90, 91, 112 

Nettle, ii., 115 

Neufchdtel, i., 15, 86; ii., 164 

Neutral rights, views held by 

United States and Great 

Britain, i., i, 6, 7 
Newcastle, ii., 173-177 
New England furnished 44 % 

of tonnage U. S. Navy, i., 

56; loyalty doubted, i., 

196 
New England seamen on 

Carolina, ii., 219, 232 



322 



Ind 



ex 



Newfoundland, i., 96, 109, 
213, 215; ii., 64 

New Jersey, i., 196 

New London, i., 143, 216; 
ii., 145; blockaded by- 
Hardy, ii., 3 

New Orleans, i., 212; ii., 71, 
73- 145. 157. 215. 217-221; 
battle of, i., 12; n., 211- 
260; a useless shedding of 
blood, i., 12 

New York, i., 59, 170, 216; ii., 
41, 145, 161, 177, 178, 198 

Niagara, i., 310-313, 315- 

320, 323-325. 327. 328, 
330; ii., 88-92, 100, 109, 

Niagara Bay, 1., 293 

Niagara Falls, i., 174 

Niagara, Fort, i., 287, 291; 
ii., 99 

Niagara frontier evacuated 
by British, i., 282; cam- 
paign of 1814 on, ii., 213 

Niagara River, ii., 98 

Nicholson, Joseph, letter, i., 
264 

Nicholson, Lieut. N. J., ii., 

40, 54 

Nile, battle of, i., 237 

Niles's Weekly Register, i., 25, 
124, 156, 183, 208, 211, 
212, 229; ii., 38, 58, 99, 
163, 191; misstatements 
and buncombe, i., 20; ut- 
terly untrustworthy, ex- 
cepting for matters purely 
American; supplements 
James, ii., 157 

Nocton, i., 165 

Nonsuch, {., 168 

Norse, i., 44 

North Bergen, i., 214 

North Cape, i., 214 

North Edisto, ii., 9, 158 

Norwich captures privateer 
Caledonia, i., 212 



Nova Scotia, i., 109 

Nova Scotia privateers, i., 

260 
Nymphe, i., 131, 265; ii., 5 

O'Connor, Captain, ii., 92 
Odenheimer, Lieutenant, 

knocked overboard, ii., 20 
Ogdensburg, i., 185 
Ohio, i., 308, 310; ii., 112, 

143 
Old adage, "L'audace," etc., 

i-, 303 ., 

"Old Ironsides" (Constitu- 
tion), i., 107; ii., 15, 193, 
202 

Oliver, Capt. R. D., i., 216 

Oneida, i., 184, 185, 187-190, 
271, 274, 275, 277, 280, 
289, 296, 298, 301, 303, 
306; ii., 86, 88, 91, 98 

Oneida Indians, ii., 96 

Oneida Lake, i., 172 

Ontario, i., 187, 271, 278, 280, 
289, 296; ii., 80 

Ontario, Lake, i., 170-176, 
183, 184, 293, 310, 311; 
ii., 105, 198 

Onyx, i., 144 

Oporto, i., 250 

Orders in Council of Great 
Britain, i., 8 

Ordronaux, Captain, ii., 71, 
72, 164 

L'Orient, i., 249; ii., 54, 55 

Orpheus, i., 63; ii., 34 

Ortegal, Cape, ii., 41 . 

Osgood, Lieutenant, i., 277 

Oswego, ii., 91, 95, 98, 104; 
taken by Yeo, ii., 92, 93 

Packenham, Gen. Sir E., ii., 
74, 216, 235-237; takes 
command at New Orleans, 
ii., 229; destroys the Caro- 
lina, ii., 229; surprised at 
meeting American force, 



Index 



323 



Packenham — Continued 
ii., 229; is repulsed by 
batteries and the Louis- 
iana, ii., 232-233; har- 
assed by . Americans, ii., 
234; waits for reinforce- 
ments, ii., 234; digs canal 
to the river, ii., 236; re- 
inforced by Lambert, ii., 
237; fierce battle ensues, 
ii., 245-247; defeat not 
due to error on his part, ii., 
257; his soldiers veterans 
of Wellington, ii., 258; 
death of, ii., 157, 246 
Packet, Lieut. J. H., i., 318 
Paige, Lieutenant, i., 218 
Paine, Sailing-master T., 
. great gallantry shown, ii., 

Palinure, 1., 258 

Palmas, Cape, ii., 63 

Palmer, Captain, ii., 159 

Pamphlets in reply to Coop- 
er's account of battle of 
Lake Erie, i., 333 

Park, Lieut. T., ii., 70 

Parker, Capt. G., i., 51, 152, 
158; ii., 7, 8, 54, 145, 149 

Parker, Midshipman G. , ii. ,78 

Parker, Sir P., ii., 44 

" Parthian " mode of warfare, 
i., 238 

Pasley, i., 144 

Patterson, Captain, i., 46; 
ii., 79, 224, 233, 240, 249 

Patuxent River, ii,, 42, 43 

Paulding, Admiral, ii., 119, 
120 

Paulding, Midshipman, ii., 
133 

Peacock, i., 14, 50, 54, 63, 65, 
160, 199, 203-209, 253, 
254, 256, 257, 265, 267; ii., 
35-40, 48, 63, 80, 85, 145, 
178, 184, 185, 189, 193, 
202; engagement with 



Hornet, i., 203; surrenders 
to her and sinks, i., 204; 
generous treatinent of crew 
by officers of Hornet, i., 
208; captures Epervier, ii., 
37; diagram of action, ii., 
37; comparative force and 
loss, ii., 38, 39; comments 
on the action, ii., 39; skil- 
ful seamanship and excel- 
lent gunnery shown by the 
Americans, ii., 39; cap- 
tures East Indiaman Nau- 
tilus without loss or dam- 
age, ii., 189 
Peake, Capt. W., i., 203; 
neglect of essentials for 
mere incidents of disci- 
pline, i., 206 
Pearce, Captain, ii., 65 
Pechell, Captain, i., 245 
Pelican, i., 15, 250-257; ii., 
39; engagement with Ar- 
gus, {., 250; captures her, 
i., 252; comparative loss 
and force, i., 253-254; 
diagram of action, i., 254 
Pendleton, Lieut. T. M., ii., 

68 
Penguin, i., 76, 82, 85, 145, 
220, 254, 334; ii., 156, 

177-184, 193, 195, 200, 

202; captured by Hornet, 
ii., 182 ; diagram of action, 
ii., 182; destroyed, ii., 184 

Penguin Point, i., 260 

Penobscot River, ii., 66 

Pensacola, ii., 214 

Percival, Sailing-master, cap- 
tures Eagle, tender, ii., 54 

Perry, ii., 41 

Perry, Com. O. H., i., 79, 85, 
194, 269, 281, 282, 287, 
297, 308, 309; ii., 108, 154; 
commanding American 
forces on Lake Erie, i., 194, 
308; description of squad- 



324 



Index 



Perry — Continued 

ron, i., 311; and crews, i., 
312-317; engagement with 
Barclay, i., 317-318; his 
indomitable spirit, i., 323- 
324; his humanity to the 
wounded enemy, i., 325; 
great reputation gained by 
his victory, i., 326, 329; 
praised by Cooper, i., 330, 
333; deserves great credit 
for effectiveness of his 
squadron, i., 337-339; his 
methods similar to Blake, 

i-« 340 
Pert, i., 185, 188, 271, 278, 

289, 296, 311 
Pettigrew, Lieutenant, i., 278 
Pettipauge, destruction of 

fishing-boats, ii., 3 
Philadelphia, i., 39 
Philadelphia, ii., 161 
Phillot, Captain, ii., 191 
Phoebe, i., 68, 73, 80, 335; ii., 
10-16, 18, 21, 22, 27, 29-32 
Phcenix, i., 121 
Pictoii, ii., 5, 85 
Piedynontaise, i., 121 
Pierce, Lieutenant, i., 218 
Pigot, Captain, i., 64; ii., 34 
Pike, General, i., 278, 284; 
killed by explosion, i., 279 
Pique, ii., 5, 6 
Plautagoict. ii., 4, 68, 69 
Plattsburg,i.,343; ii., 1 14, 170 
Plattsburg Bay, ii., 128, 

129, 141 
Plymouth, ii., 161 
Pocock, ii., 106 
Poicticrs, i., 130 
Polkinghome, Lieut. J., cuts 
out four American priva- 
teers, i. , 211; a brilliant ex- 
pedition, i., 212 
Ponione, ii., 145-153 
Popham, Captain, ii., 93, 95, 

97 



Porcupine, i., 309, 311, 315, 
318, 321, 327, 328; ii., 112, 

113 
Port Christian, ii., 75 

Porter, Admiral, i., 18, 19, 
42, 61, 72, 96, 145, 165, 
200, 239; ii., 10-18, 20, 22, 
29. 31. 32, 108, 151, 154, 
203; thorough training of 
his crew on the Essex, i., 
90 ; cruise in South Pacific, 
breaking up whaling fleet, 
i., 42, 200 — 202, 265; 
knocked down by shot, ii., 
20 

Portland, i., 260; ii., 68 

Porto Praya, ii., 173, 177 

Porto Rico, ii., 177 

Portsmouth, i., 149, 213; ii., 
124 

Portugal, ii., 165; her small 
navy, i., 76 

Portuguese customs under 
British influence, i., 44, 200 

Potomac River, ii., 44, 63 

Pratt, Lieutenant, ii., 77 

Preble, i., 343; ii., 115, 117, 

130. 132, ^33' 141 
Preble, G. H. i., 57, 65 
President, i., 9, 67, 70, 90, 91, 

131, 132, 169, 212, 215, 
265, 267, 343; ii., 3, 4. 85, 
145-154, 156, 176, 178, 
185, 190, 193, 195, 198- 
200; attack on Little Belt, 
i., 8 ; engagement with Bel- 
videra,i., gi-gy, chased by 
British fleet, ii., 145; at- 
tacked by Endymion but 
dismantles her, ii., 148; at- 
tacked by Tenedos and 
Pomona and surrenders, ii., 
149 

Presque Isle, i., 286, 308; 

ii., 98 
Prevost, Sir G., i., 11, 181, 

269, 283, 284; ii., 113, 119, 



Index 



325 



Prevost — Continued 

120, 123; attacks Sackett's 
Harbor with Yeo and is re- 
pulsed, i., 283, 284; re- 
turns in confusion to Can- 
ada, ii., 142 

Primrose, ii., 191 

Prince de Neufchdiel, ii., 71; 
attacked by boats of Endy- 
mion, ii., 72; repulses 
them after desperate strug- 
gle, ii., 73 

Prince Regent, 1., 172, 283; 
ii., 88, 89, 91, 100 

Prince Regent, ii., 204 

Princess Charlotte, ii., 88, 89, 
91, 100 

Pring, Captain, ii., 122, 123, 
130, 139, 142 

Privateer, American, descrip- 
tion of, ii., 161-163 

Prize-money ($25,000) voted 
by Congress to crew of 
Wasp, i., i^o; prizes made 
by American vessels in 
181 2, i., i6p 

Prometheus, ii., 81 

Prosperous, i., 340 

Prussians, i., 74 

Psyche, i., 73 

Put-in Bay, i., 310 



Queen Charlotte, i., 173, 180, 
314, 316, 319, 321, 324, 

325. 327. 328, 343 
Queenstown, ii., 112 

Queenstown Heights, ii., 
259 



Race, Cape, i., 109 

Racer, i., 211 

Radcliflfe, Lieutenant, ii.,i 12, 

"3 
Rainbow, ii., 172 
RamilUes, ii., 3 



Rattlesnake, i., 48, 267; ii., 
35, 47, 82; captured by 
Leander, ii., 47 
Ravvle, Lieut. R., ii., 70 
Read, Lieut. G. U. i., 165 
Reade, Colonel, ii., 44 
Red House barracks attacked 
by Lieutenant Angus, i., 

193 
Reid, Capt. S. C, u., 68-71, 

164 

Reindeer, i., 43, 65, 90, 254; 
ii., 19, 26, 48-52, 83, 84, 
142, 156, 200-203; en- 
gagement with Wasp, ii., 
48-52; severity of action, 
ii., 50; diagram and com- 
parative force and loss, ii., 
52; the odds against the 
Reindeer, ii., 53 
Rennie, Colonel, ii., 246, 250 
Renshaw, Lieutenant-Com- 
mander, i., 264; ii., 47 
Resolution, i., 202 
Rifleman, ii., 65 
Rigolets, the, ii., 216 
Rio de Janeiro, ii., 185 
Riviere, Lieut. H., La Marine 

Frangaise, ii., 106, 107 
Roach, Lieut. L, i., 191, 192 
Roach, William, ii., 17 
Roberts, Captain, ii., 74, 75 
Robinson, Batty, i., 154 
Robinson, Chaplain H., ii., 

Rock of Lisbon, u,, 165 
Rodgers, Commodore, i., 8, 
48, 90, 96, 103, 146; ii., 3, 
45, 108, 196, 199; chase of 
Belvidera, fires first gun, 
i., 91, 92; leaves Boston, 
i., 131; chases Nymphe, 
i., 131; captures Jamaica 
packet Swallow, pursues in 
vain Galatea, i., 131, 132 
Ross, General, attack on 
Washington, ii., 43; cap- 



326 



Index 



Ross — Continued 

tiires the city and burns 
the public buildings, ii., 45 ; 
unsviccessful attack on 
Baltimore, is killed, ii., 46 

Rota, ii., 68-70 

Roulette, Lieutenant, i., 190, 

321.325 
Rouvier, Lieutenant, His- 
toire des Marins Frangais, 

i-. 237 
RoyalGeorge, i., 172, 184, 188, 

189, 272, 274, 283, 298- 

302, 304, 306, 307; ii., 88; 

attacked by Chauncy's 

squadron, i., 188 

"Rtifif,"ii., 20 

Sackett's Harbor, i., 88, 175, 
184, 188, 189, 277,279,283, 

293. 305- 306; li., 97. 98, 
102, 104; inadequate de- 
fences, i., 283; attack by 
Prevost, repulsed with 
great loss to him, i., 284, 
285 ; slight fortifications, ii., 
86, 91; blockaded by Yeo, 
ii. ,94 ; blockade raised, ii. , 97 
St. Augustine, ii., 3 
St. Catharines, i., 199 
St. David's Head, i., 250 
St. George's Channel, i., 249 
St. George's, Bermuda, Ad- 
miralty Court, ii., 149 
St. Joseph's Fort and bar- 
racks burned, ii., 109 
St. Lawrence, ii., 42, 103, 115, 

163, 164 
St. Lawrence, Gulf, i., 109 
St. Lawrence River, i., 170 
St. Leonard Creek, ii., 42 
St. Louis Bay, ii., 75 
St. Mary's, ii., 40, 71 
St. Mary's River, ii., 191 
St. Mary's Strait, ii., no 
St. Philip, Fort, ii., 253 - 
Salamanca, ii., 236 



Salem, ii., 161 

Samwell, Midshipman, i., 226 

Sanders, Captain, i., 243, 248 

San Domingo, i., 134, 245 

Sandy Hook, i., 196; ii., 4, 146 

San Florcnzo, i., 73, 121 

San Gallan, i., 200 

San Jago, i., 145, 165; ii., 

172 
San Salvador, i., 145, 147, 

158, 159. 
San Sebastian, ii., 235, 343 
Sapelo Bar, ii., 68 
Saranac, ii., 81 
Saranac River, i., 343; ii., 

130 
Saratoga, 1., 180, 335; u., 

115, 117, 129-132, 134-141 
Saunders, Lieut. J., i., 154, 

245 
Savannah, ii., 40, 64, 71 

Sawyer, Admiral, i., loi 

Scorpion, i., 247, 309, 311, 

312, 315, 318-321, 324, 

325- 327. 328; n., 42, 109, 

III, 143 
Scott, at Lundy's Lane, i. , 2 1 2 
Scott, Colonel, i., 280,284,286 
Scourge, i., 187, 271, 277, 281, 

288 
Sea Horse, i., 144; ii., 44, 75, 

77 , . 

Seamen on the lakes, their 

characteristics, i., 338 
Seneca, i., 172, 283 
Senhouse, Captain, i., 248 
Seringapatam, i., 202 
Serrat, Sailing-master G., i., 

318 .. 

Severn, n., 46, 160 
Seybert's Statistical Annals, 

i-, 58 
Shannon, i., 54, 68, 83, 85, 90, 
98, loi, 103-108, 117, 217- 
226, 228-231, 234, 238; ii., 
142, 200, 202, 206, 209; 
careful training of her 



Index 



327 



Shannon — Continued 

crew described by James, 
i., 218, 219; her armament, 
i., 220; engagement with 
Chesapeake, i., 222-229; 
captures her, i., 22S; dia- 
gram of action, i., 229 

Shannon River, ii., 64 

Shaw, Captain, i., 46 

Shead, SaiHng-master, i., 248 

Sheafe, General, i., 278 

Sliclbiirne. ii., 35 

Sheppard, Sailing-master, ii., 

75 
Sherbrooke, General, n., 66 

Shields, Purser T., ii., 157 

Shubrick, Lieut. J. T., i., 204, 

245 
Shubrick, Lieut. W. B., n., 

167- 173 
Sigoumey, Lieutenant, 1., 247 

Siiiico, i., 172, 283 

Simmons, Captain, Heavy 
Ordnance, i., 83, 142 

Sinclair,Captain Arthur, i. ,90 , 
131; commander of Ameri- 
can forces on upper lakes, 
ii., 109; bums St. Joseph, 
ii., 109; unsuccessful at- 
tack on Mackinaw, leaves 
for Lake Erie, ii., 109, no 

Single-ship actions in the 
war, twelve in all, ii., 268, 
296 

Slaughter, Colonel, ii., 238 

Smith, Captain, i., 212 

Smith, Lieut. S., in command 
of American forces on 
Champlain, i., 278, 341; 
makes plucky fight when 
attacked, i., 342 

Smith, Midshipman, i., 226 

Smith, Robert, i., 62 

Soley, Prof. J. R., Naval 
Campaign of 181 2, ii., 278; 
compared with other au- 
thorities, ii., 279-283 



Sotners, i., 308, 311, 318, 319, 
321, 325, 327, 328; ii., 112, 

^•*3 . 
Somerville, Capt. P., u., 68 
Sophie, ii., 68 
Sorel River, i., 341, 343 
South Africa, ii., 54 
Southampton, i., 90, 98, 165; 

captures Vixen, i., 165 
Southcomb, Capt. J., i.,210; 

ii., 164 
Spain, " Floating Castles," 

"■' 24 
Spaniards driven from Pensa- 

cola by Jackson, -ii., 214 
Spanish countries under the 

British influence, i., 200 
Spark, ii., 81 

Spedders, Lieut. R., ii., 76, 78 
Speedy, i., 77, 144 
Speedy, Christopher, i., 149 
Spice Islands, ii., 161 
Spilsbury, Captain, ii., 95 
Spitfire, i., 214 
Spithead, i., 146 
Squaw Island, i., 193 
Stackpole, i., 138 
Statira, i., 71, 138, 210 
Stevens, Sailing-master, i., 

278 
Stewart, Capt. C, i., 45, 76, 198, 

211; ii., 5-7, 165, 167, 168, 

171, 173, 176, 177 
Stoddart, Sec. Benj., i., 59 
Stokes, Lieut. T., killed, i., 

314, 320, 325 
Stone River, ii., 8 
Stony Creek, ii., 95 
Stuart, Lord, i., 214 
Sunda, Straits of, ii., 188 
Superb, ii., 3 

Superior, ii.,86,88,gi, 95, 100 
Surprise, i., 261; ii., 115 
Surveyor, i., 239, 240 
Swallow, i., 131 
Swartout, Midshipman, i., 

325 



328 



Index 



Sybil, i., 1 20 

Sydney Smith, i., 272, 274, 

285, 306; ii., 88 
Sylph, 1., 286, 295, 296, 298, 

299, 302; ii., 86, 88, 91, 98 
S-iren, i., 48; ii., 54, 82; 

captured by the Medway, 

ii-. 54 

Parbell, Captain, i., 243 

Tartarus, ii., 58 

Tatnall, Lieutenant, life by 

C. C. Jones, Jr., i., 197, 246, 

ii., 77, 203, 204_ 
Taylor, Capt. J., i., 203 
Taylor, General, i., 151, 152 
Taylor, Master, i., 325 
Tenedos, i., 98; ii., 8, 55, 145- 

^ 147. 149 
Tennessee Volunteers, ii., 

221—223, 259 
Terror, ii., 46 
Thalia, i., 95 

Thames, battle of, ii., 213 
Thompson, Midshipman, i., 

279 
Thorn, i., 144 
Thornborough, Admiral, i., 

250 
Thornton, Colonel, ii., 247, 

249, 250 
Ticonderoga, ii., 114, 117, 118, 

122, 130, 132-134, 140, 

142 
Tigress, i., 308, 31 1, 315, 318, 

321, 327, 328; n., 64, 109, 

no, 143 
Tom Bowline, ii., 81, 145, 

178, 184 
Tom Cringle's Log, i., 26 
Tonnage of vessels in 181 2, 

how estimated, ii., 262- 

268; general imcertainty 

and difference between 

British and American 

methods, ii., 263-267 
Tonnant, ii., 77, 216 



Torch, ii., 81 
Torpedo, ii., 193 
Toulouse, battle of, ii., 235 
Townsend, Captain Lord 

James, i., loi 
Towsen, Capt. N., i., 191, 192 
Trafalgar, i., 28, 29, 41 
Trant, Sailing-master, i., 188, 

278 
Travis, W. S., i., 239 
Treaty of peace signed Dec- 

cember 24, 18 14, ratified 

February 15, 1815, ii., 144 
Trippe, i., 308, 311,312,315, 

318, 321,323-325, 327, 328 
Tristan d'Acunha, ii., 178 
Tromp, i., 336, 340 
Troude, O., Bafailles Na- 

vales, i., 120, 121, 144, 237, 

23S, 294; ii., 171, 207 
Truxton, i., 34 
Tucker, Capt. T. T., ii., 10, 21 
Tumbez, i., 200 
Turner, Lieut. D., i., 318, 

323; ii., no 
Twin, Sergeant, i., 226 
Tybee Bar, ii., 191 
Tyler, Admiral, ii., 54, 179 

Ulrick, Sailing-master, ii., 76, 

United States, i., 40, 52, 67, 
68, 70, 82, 87, 88, 90, 117, 
121, 131, 134, 135, 136, 
138, 141, 160, 161, 169, 
215, 221, 249, 255, 257; 
li., 142, 155, 186, 202; en- 
gagement with Macedo- 
nian, i., 133, 134; the latter 
strikes in i^ hours, i., 135; 
American loss slight, i., 
135; comparative force 
and loss, i., 138; struck by 
lightning, i., 216 

United States, high commer- 
cial importance, i., 5; 
greatest injury received 



Index 



329 



United States — Continued 
from Great Britain, i., 6; 
principle contended for 
now universally accepted, 
i., 7; passes embargo act 
in retaliation for the Orders 
in Council, i., 8; declares 
war June, 181 2, i., 8; badly 
worsted at first, i., 10; 
weakness of American 
navy, i., 29; policy of gov- 
ernment supported, i., 197; 
in 1815, ii., 211 

Upton, Captain, ii., 7 

Valparaiso, i., 200; ii., 10, 13, 

28, 33 
Vashon, Cap tarn, 1., 90 
Vaughan, Sailing-master, ii., 

97 

Vengeance, 1., 34 

Verde, Cape de,i., 1 98; ii.,63 

Vermont, i., 170 

Vessels mentioned (see also 
in proper alphabetical 
place): Abeille, Acasta, 
Achille, Adams, Adonis, 
Molus, ^ina, Africa, 
Alacrity, Albion, Alert, 
Alexandria, Alfred, Allen, 
Alligator, Arab, Argo, Ar- 
gus, Ariel, Armada, Ar- 
mide. Asp, Astrea, Ata- 
lanta, Atlas, Avon, Ayl- 
win, B all alio H, Ballard, Ba- 
rossa, Belvidera, Beresford, 
Black Snake, Boston, Boxer, 
Bonne Citoyenne, Brant, 
Burrows, Caledonia, Car- 
nation, Carolina, Carroti, 
Castilian, Centipede, Cha- 
meleon, Charwell, Chasseur, 
Cherub, Chesapeake, Chip- 
peway, Childers, Chubb, 
Cleopatra, Clyde, Columbia, 
Comus, Confiance , Congress , 
Conquest, Constellation, 



Constitution, Contest, Corn- 
■wallis. Curlew, Cyane, Cy- 
prus, Dart, Decatur, De- 
troit, Devastation, Diadem, 
Dictator, Dolphin, Domin- 
ica, Dover, Dragon, Druni- 
mond. Eagle, Earl of Moira, 
Egyptienne, Endymion, Ep- 
ervier, Erebus, Erie, Espie- 
gle, Essex, Essex Junior, 
Eurotas, Euryalus, Eury- 
dicc. Fair American, Fairy, 
Finch, Firefly, Flambeau, 
Florida, Fortune of War, 
Franklin, Frolic, Fulton, 
Galatea, General Arm- 
strong, General Pike, 
Gladiator, Gloucester, Gov- 
ernor Tompkins, Growler, 
Guerrihe, Hamilton, Ha- 
va'tnah, Hebrus, Hermes, 
Highflyer, Hague, Harriet, 
Hunter, Icarus, Indefatiga- 
ble, Independence, Jasseur, 
Java, Jefferson, John 
'Adams, Jones, Julia, 
Junon, Lady Gore, Lady 
'Murray, Lady of the Lake, 
Lady Prevost, Landrail, 
Laurestinus, Lawrence, Le- 
ander. Leopard, Levant, 
Linnet, Little Belt, Loire, 
Lottery, Louisiana, Ludlow, 
Lynx, Macedonian, Mad- 
ison, Magnet. Maidstone, 
Majestic, Mars, Martin, 
Mary, Mediuay, Meduse, 
Melville, Menelaus, Merri- 
mac. Meteor, Minerva, Mo- 
hawk, Moira, Montagu, 
Montgomery, Montreal, 
Nancy, Narcissus, Nauti- 
lus, Nereide, Netly, Nettle, 
Neufchdtel, New Castle, 
New York, Niagara, Noc- 
ton. Nonsuch, Norwich, 
Nymphe, Ohio, Oneida, On- 



330 



Index 



Vessels — Cmttinued 

tario, Onyx, Orpheus, Pa- 
lintire, Pasley, Peacock, Pel- 
ican, Penguin, Perry, Pert, 
Philadelphia, Phcebe, Phce- 
nix, PictoH, Pique, Plan- 
tagenet, Poictiers, Pomone, 
Porcupine, Preble, Presi- 
dent, Primrose, Princess 
Charlotte, Prince de Neuf- 
chdtel. Prince Regent, Pro- 
metheus, Prosperous, Psy- 
che, Queen Charlotte, Racer, 
Rainbow, Ramillies, Rattle- 
snake, Reindeer, Resolu- 
tion, Rifleman, Rota, Royal 
George, St. Lawrence, San 
Domingo, San Florenzo, 
Saranac , Saratoga , Scorpion , 
Scourge, Sea-horse, Seneca, 
Seringapatam , Severn, 
Shannon, Shelburne, Simco, 
Sotners, Sophie, Sotithamp- 
ton, Spark, Speedy, Spit- 
fire, Star, Statira, Superb, 
Superior, Siir prise. Sur- 
veyor, Swallow, Sybil, Syd- 
ney Smith, Sylph, Syren, 
Tartarus, Tenedos, Terror, 
Thalia, Thorn, Ticonde- 
roga, Tigress, Tom Bowline, 
Tonnant, Torpedo, Torch, 
Trippe, United States, 
Viper, Vixen, Volcano, 
Washington, Wasp, Wil- 
liams, Wilmer, Wolfe, 
Woodbridge, Young Wasp 

Vestale, i., 73 

Victory, i., 40 

Villeneuve, M., i., 294 

Vincent, General, i., 280, 281 

Viper, i., 48, 210, 267; ii., 
115; captured by Narcis- 
sus, i., 210 

Virgin, i., 144 

Virginia, success of British 
campaign in, ii., 214, 254 



Vixen, i., 48, 165, 168; cap- 
tured by Southampton, i., 

V olcano, ii., 46 

Wadsworth, Colonel, ii., 43 
Wadsworth, Lieutenant, ii., 

64 
Wales, Captain, ii., 36, 37 
War department, imbecility 

of its administration, ii., 

213 

War of 1 81 2: on land, disas- 
trous for U. S., ii., 211 ; its 
dual aspect, ii., 213; what 
British triumph would 
have meant, ii., 214 

Ward's Manual of Naval 
Tactics, i., 183, 318; ii., 
1 19, 203 

Wareham, ii., 3 

Warren, Adm. Sir. J., i., 196, 

295. 

Warrington, Capt. L., ii., 35, 
38, 40, 108, 145, 178, 189, 
190, 203; his attack on 
the Nautilus needless 
cruelty, ii., 28, 29; acted 
without proper humanity, 
ii., 190 

Washington, ii., 193 

Washington, burning of pub- 
lic buildings, i., 1 1 ; ii., 45; 
British advance on.ii., 43- 

45 

Washington, Fort, n., 44; at- 
tacked by Gordon, and 
abandoned, ii., 45 

Wasp, i., 17, 43, 47, 49, 50, 
54, 66, 82, 84, 89, 123-130, 
168, 169, 203, 216, 220, 

255. 256, 334; ii-. 34, 47- 
52, 55-62, 80, 85, 142, 179, 
200-202; engagement with 
Frolic, i., 124; captures 
her after fight of 43 min- 
utes, i., 126; comparative 



Index 



33^ 



Wasp — Continued 

force and loss, i., 127; dia- 
gram of action, i., 128; 
enormous disparity in 
damage suffered by each 
vessel, i., 130; fine crew 
and daring commander, 
ii., 47; bums and scuttles 
many ships in English 
Channel, ii., 48; engage- 
ment with and capture of 
Reindeer, ii., 48-52; de- 
structive cannonade, ii., 
49; diagram of action and 
comparative force and loss, 
ii., 52 ; chases and captures 
Avon, after furious engage- 
ment, ii., 57, 58; Avon 
sinks, ii., 59; captures .4/a- 
lanta, ii., 60; shortly after 
never heard of again, ii., 
61; comments on vessel, 
crew, and their actions, ii., 
61, 62 

Waters, Midshipman K., i., 
263 

Watson, Lieutenant, i., 250, 

251 
Watt, Lieutenant, i., 226 

Watts, Sailing - master, i., 

192 
Webb's Peninsula; McClel- 

lan's Campaign of 1862, i., 

231 
Wellington, "the Iron Duke," 

ii., 152, 216; his defeat of 

Napoleon's marshals, ii., 

235 
Wells, Lieut. H., i., 185 
Welsh, T., Jr., ii., 167 
Western frontier fighting, ii.. 

West Indies, i., 199; ii., 3 
Westphal, Lieut. P., i., 248 
Whaling trade of British in 

South Pacific broken up by 

Porter, i., 42, 200 



Whinyates, Capt. T., i., 123, 

125-127, 130 
Wilkinson, General, expedi- 
tion of, to Canada, i., 285 
William, i., 146 
Williams, Lieut. A. O., ii., 70 
Wilmer, ii., 115 
Wilmer, Lieutenant, knocked 

overboard and drowned, 

ii., 20 
Wintle, Lieutenant, i., 126 
Wolfe, {., 272, 274, 283, 288, 

298-301, 304, 306, 307; ii., 

88 
Wood, Lieut. P. V., i., 157 
Woodhridge, ii., 63 
Woolsey, Lieutenant, i., 172, 

184, 188, 277; ii., 95, 96 
Worsley, Lieutenant, ii., no 
Worth, Lieutenant F. A., ii., 70 
Wragg, Midshipman, i., 194 
Wright, Lieut. F. W., i., 205, 

209 



Yamall, Lieutenant, i., 312; 
badly wounded, i., 322, 325 

Yeo, Commod. Sir J. L., com- 
mander of British squad- 
ron on Lake Ontario, i., 98, 
165, 177, 284-290; ii., 98 
100; attacks Sackett's 
Harbor with Prevost , and is 
repulsed, i., 270, 274, 283- 
285, 287-289; superiority 
of his vessels, i., 275; action 
withChauncy, i., 291; cap- 
tures two schooners, i., 
291-292; his victory nei- 
ther decisive nor brilliant, 
i., 293, 294; gets the worst 
of action near Genesee 
River, i., 295; his force not 
used to best advantage, i., 
297-303; blockaded in 
Kingston, i., 304. 305; crit- 
icised and compared with 



1 



C 



t ' 



2>Z2 



Index 



Yeo — Continued 

Chauncy.i., 306; his squad- 
ron in 1814, ii., 89, 90; 
takes Oswego, ii., 92-93, 
and blockades Sackett's 
Harbor, ii., 94; raises 
blockade, ii., 97; declines 
to fight against odds, ii., 
98; cautiousness amount- 
ing to timidity, ii., 102; as 



good as his opponent, ii., 

108, 127 
Yeocomico Creek, i., 247 
Yonge, C. D., History of the 

British Navy, not good, i., 

293; ii., 121 
York (now Toronto) , i., 270, 

277, 278, 280, 284, 297, 

305, 307; ii., 198 
Young Wasp, ii., 179 



IMAR 2 7 1950 



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